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Think Neither Good Nor Evil: Metaethics and Cross-Cultural Philosophy 
§I.1 Metaethics: ‘Not Doing Evil’ 
As academic philosophy took a linguistic turn in the twentieth century, particularly in the English 
speaking world, the subject matter of metaethics was realized; mainly, the study of the nature, scope and 
meaning of moral judgments.  By extending the epistemic commitment that all philosophical inquiries 
might be nothing other than a matter of logic and language, metaethical theories focus upon the nature of 
moral language in order to query the meaning and justification of value judgments, rather than evaluate 
what one ought and ought not do. 
 That being said, metaethical inquiry has been part of the general practice of doing moral 
philosophy since Plato.  For example, when Socrates asks in the Meno whether virtue can be taught, he is 
posing a metaethical question; or, when he proclaims in the Apology that the unexamined life is not worth 
living, he is proffering a metaethical value judgment about meaningful lives.  When one reads Plato’s 
dialogues, one is presented with a range of metaethical inquiries, including semantics and the meaning of 
the words “piety” or “justice.”  Therein, we are able to see the makings of a metaethical standpoint that 
can be aptly characterized as cognitivist, in that moral knowledge exists, and that rational beings have the 
capacity to realize such.  Notwithstanding this characterization, other philosophers, such as Sextus 
Empiricus, examined similar metaethical matters and questions.  Consider the following passage from 
Chapter twenty-three, “Is Anything by Nature Good, Bad, or Indifferent?” from his Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism:  
If then, things which move by nature move all men alike, while we are not all moved alike by the 
so-called goods, there is nothing good by nature.  In fact it is impossible to believe either all of 
the views now set forth, because of their conflicting character, or any one of them.  For he who 
asserts that one must believe this view, but not that, becomes a party to the controversy, since he 
has opposed to him the arguments of those who take the rival view, and therefore he himself, 




there does not exist any agreed criterion of proof owing to the unsettled controversy about these 
matters, he will be reduced to suspending judgment, and consequently he will be unable to affirm 
positively what the good by nature is. (Sextus Empiricus 1990, 250-251) 
By extending his skepticism, vis-à-vis the problem of criterion, to ethical issues, in this case the nature of 
the word ‘good,’ Sextus’ writings on ethics invite twentieth century metaethical interpretations such as 
moral skepticism and anti-realism.   
Modern thinkers from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, including David Hume (1711-
1786) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) have also engaged in metaethical inquiry in ways that invite 
similar metaethical interpretations.  In regards to Hume, section III of Book II: “Of the Passions,” from 
his A Treatise of Human Nature (1738-1740) reveals an important metaethical point about the history of 
moral philosophy, mainly the biased assumption that one’s moral motivation to act in a particular way is 
grounded in reason. 
Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of 
passion and reason, to give preference to reason, and to assert that men are only so far virtuous as 
they conform themselves to its dictates.  Every rational creature, `tis said, is oblig’d to regulate 
his actions by reason; and if any other motive or principle challenge the direction of his conduct, 
he ought to oppose it, `till it be entirely subdu’d, or at least brought to a conformity with that 
superior principle.  On this method of thinking the greatest part of moral philosophy, ancient and 
modern, seems to be founded; nor is there an ampler field, as well for metaphysical arguments, as 
popular declamations, than this suppos’d  pre-eminence of reason above passion.  The eternity, 
invariableness, and divine origin of the former have been display’d to the best advantage: The 
blindness, unconstancy, and deceitfulness of the latter have been as strongly insisted on.  In order 
to shew the fallacy of all this philosophy, I shall endeavour to prove first, that reason alone can 
never be a motive to any action of the will; and secondly, that it can never oppose passion in the 
direction of the will. (Hume 1978, 413)  
According to Hume, morals are not reducible to reason; instead, they are derived from our sentiments and 
passions which are neither true or false; “Tis impossible therefore, they can be pronounced either true or 
false, and be either contrary or conformable to reason” (Hume 1978, 459).  Based upon this metaethical 
point, when it comes to the nature of moral propositions, which are signified by words such as ‘ought’ or 
‘should,’ Hume argues that such statements are not grounded in descriptive facts about the world that can 
be expressed through statements signified by the word ‘is;’ according to Hume, one can never derive an 




For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, `tis necessary that it 
shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what 
seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are 
entirely different from it.  But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to 
recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention wou’d subvert all the 
vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded 
merely on the relations of objects, nor perceived by reason. (Hume 1978, 469-470) 
This metaethical point about moral language, vis-à-vis ‘is’ and ‘ought,’ along with his normative claim 
that, “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office 
than to serve and obey them” (Hume 1978, 415), provided philosophical scaffolding for twentieth century 
non-cognitivists, such as A.J Ayer and C.L. Stevenson, who maintained that moral propositions are not 
descriptions of facts, nor statements that are truth apt, but rather expressions of feeling, emotion and 
attitudes.  
Similar to Hume, though not as influential upon twentieth century Anglo-American non-
cognitivists, Nietzsche also challenges the metaethical assumptions of philosophers, both ancient and 
modern, vis-à-vis the rational foundations for morality.  For example, consider the following from 
Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil (1886): 
 Just because our moral philosophers knew the facts of morality only very approximately in  
 arbitrary extracts or in accidental epitomes - for example, as the morality of their environment,  
 their class, their church, the spirit of their time, their climate and part of the world - just because  
 they were poorly informed and not even very curious about different peoples, times, and past ages 
 - they never laid eyes on the real problems of morality; for these emerge only when we compare  
 many moralities.  In all “science of morals” so far one thing was lacking, strange as it may sound: 
 the problem of morality itself; what was lacking was any suspicion that there was something  
 problematic here.  What the philosophers called “a rational foundation for morality” and tried to  
 supply was, seen in the right light, merely a scholarly variation of the common faith in the  
 prevalent morality; a new means of expression for this faith; and just another fact within a  
 particular morality; indeed in the last analysis a kind of denial that this morality might ever be  
 considered problematic - certainly the opposite of an examination, analysis, questioning, and  
 vivisection of this very faith. (Nietzsche 1966, 97-98) 
And, just as Hume believed that morality is derived from our sentiments and feelings, Nietzsche argues 
that, “moralities are also merely a sign language of the affects” (Nietzsche 1966, 100).  Thus, while it is 
the case that the academic field of metaethics is born out of a twentieth century philosophical movement 




 Now, unless one is blinded by an ethnocentric cognitive bias, when we explore the philosophical 
perspectives and traditions outside of Western civilization, one will discover a number of metaethical 
questions raised and theories proffered.  For example, in Nishida Kitarō’s (1870-1945) famous 
publication, An Inquiry Into the Good (1911), he not only critically evaluates competing normative 
theories, he expounds a metaethical perspective that echoes Hume and the fact/value problem that 
emerges within Western analytic circles; “The fact that a thing is a certain way does not enable us to 
know that it ought to be a certain way […] judgments of suitability and unsuitability are not really 
judgments by the pure intellect but rather value judgements” (Nishida 1990, 113).  Based upon this 
is/ought dualism, An Inquiry Into The Good attempts to articulate, through a comparative/cross-cultural 
method, an ethical outlook that reflects Nishida’s Zen experience, which he characterizes as “pure-
experience.”  According to Nishida:  
The good is the actualization of personality.  Viewed internally, this actualization is the 
satisfaction of a solemn demand – that is, the unification of consciousness – and its ultimate form 
is achieved in the mutual forgetting of self and other and the merging of subject and object […] 
As emphasized in Buddhist thought, the self and the universe share the same foundation; or 
rather, they are the same thing.  For this reason we can feel in our minds the infinite significance 
of reality as an infinite truth in knowledge, as infinite beauty in feeling, and as infinite good in 
volition. (Nishida 1990, 142-143) 
In this passage, while Nishida does not reference the thirteenth century Japanese Zen philosopher, Dōgen, 
for anyone familiar with Dōgen’s writings, one will no doubt hear echoes from his Genjō Kōan: “To 
study the Buddha’s Way is to study the self.  To study the self is to forget the self.  To forget the self is to 
be verified by the myriad things.  To be verified by the myriad things is to let drop off the body-mind self 
and the body-mind of others (Dōgen 2009, 256-257).  It is to Dōgen’s philosophical works, particularly 
his ethical writings, that we will turn our attention throughout this dissertation; and, in doing so, we shall 
explore, via cross-cultural philosophy, how his metaethics can be brought into dialogue with Nietzsche’s.   
  Zen Master Dōgen (1200-1253) is recognized as the founder of the Sōtō Zen school in Japan, 
and, is widely respected not only for being a religious reformer, but also for being a profound Buddhist 




Shōbōgenzō, “Treasury of the True Dharma-Eye,” is a collection of essays on Buddhist philosophical 
ideas and ritual practices that define the monastic life of Zen adepts.  From the metaphysics of existence 
as “One Bright Jewel,” Ikka Myōju, to his epistemology of “The Presencing of Truth,” Genjō Kōan, to his 
philosophy of mind and phenomenology of meditation as presented in his essay “A Needle for Zazen,” 
Zazengi, the philosophical breadth of the Shōbōgenzō reveals how literature can be used as a practice for 
cultivating the mind.   
In regards to ethics, particularly metaethics, the fascicle “Not Doing Evil,” Shoaku-Makusa, 
invites us to consider ethics as an embodied practice, vis-à-vis zazen, that is not preoccupied with 
thinking about good and evil as if they are cognitively true or false.  To understand this normative 
perspective, one must first make sense of what Dōgen means when he characterizes good, bad and 
indifference as unborn (Jpn. mushō), which is a central query that this dissertation explores.   And, just as 
we can benefit from using metaethical concepts from the twentieth century in order to make sense of the 
ethical writings of Plato or Sextus Empiricus, our inquiry seeks to understand how the Western 
metaethical lens of anti-realism, particularly Nietzsche’s version of such, might help clarify Dōgen’s 
ethical teachings and practices, which is succinctly captured by the following capping phrase (Jpn. 
jakugo) from Victor Sōgen Hori’s in Zen Sand (2003), (henceforth abbreviated as ZS): “Do not think at 
all about good and bad” (Jpn. Issai no zen’aku subete shiryō suru nakare) (ZS 8.27).   Although Dōgen 
does not explicitly discuss metaethics in his work as Western academics do in university seminars and 
peer-reviewed publications, I want to argue that his metaethical view: (1) can be interpreted as anti-realist 
in regards to the metaphysical nature of values and anti-cognitivist in regards to the meaning of moral 
judgments; (2) constitutes an “active” moral nihilism with regard to moral ontology and value creation; 
and (3) constitutes moral skepticism with regard to moral epistemology. 
§I.2 Research Question 
The main research question of this dissertation is: “How can Dōgen’s writings, interpreted as an 




contemporary Western metaethical debates, especially regarding non-anthropocentric value creation?”  
This main research question will be answered through answering four sub questions: 
1. What are the main philosophical and metaethical commitments of anti-realism – error theory and 
non-cognitivism – in Western philosophy, specifically in light of Nietzsche’s writings? (Chapter one) 
2. In what ways have Buddhist ethical perspectives been interpreted through Western ethical 
theories so far, and, in what ways can Buddhist metaethics in general provide new and fruitful 
perspectives within this arena of scholarship? (Chapter two) 
3. How can Dōgen’s metaethical views be interpreted in an anti-realist and anti-cognitivist way? 
(Chapters three, four, five and six) 
4. How can Dōgen’s metaethical views be brought into dialogue with Nietzsche’s metaethical 
views, especially regarding non-anthropocentric value creation? (Chapter seven) 
§I.3 Western vs. Buddhist Metaethics 
Philosophical studies in ethics can be divided into three, though not entirely separate, 
philosophical areas: (1) normative ethics; (2) applied ethics; and (3) metaethics.   “What makes an action 
right or wrong?”, for instance, or more specifically, “do the consequences of our actions justify the 
actions themselves?”, are the kinds of questions that normative ethicists address.  Based upon these and 
many other questions, those working in the field of applied ethics are able to help identify and explain 
complex moral issues and situations that impact our everyday lives.  For example, in the context of 
medicine, applied ethicists are able to lay bare reasons and arguments that support a range of moral 
positions on beginning of life issues, end of life issues, health care, etc.  Or, in the context of the 
environment, students of applied ethics can come to understand why the ‘more-than-human-world’ 




Metaethics, however, is more abstract.  The questions that concern philosophers working in this 
field include questions of semantics, such as, “are moral statements meaningful propositions?”; questions 
of ontology, such as, “what is the nature of good and evil?”; and, epistemological questions, including, 
“do we know what the virtues are and can they be taught?”  While these questions seem to take us way 
from the everyday lives most humans are engaged in, they are indeed important as they shape normative 
theories and their application.  In other words, while metaethics is a unique field of moral philosophy, we 
ought not to think of it as an academic silo; rather, it seems more appropriate to view such in relation with 
both normative and applied ethics as an overlapping Venn diagram.  In the context of environmental 
ethics, we can see how metaethical inquiry shapes our moral outlook towards the value of “nature” and 
the non-humanized world; for example, consider the following from J.S. Mill’s essay, “Nature:” 
Nature, Natural, and the group of words derived from them, or allied to them in etymology, have  
 at all times filled a great place in the thoughts and taken a strong hold on the feelings of mankind.  
 That they should have done so is not surprising when we consider what the words, in their  
 primitive and most obvious signification, represent; but it is unfortunate that a set of terms which  
 play so great a part in moral and metaphysical speculation should have acquired many meanings  
 different from the primary one, yet sufficiently allied to it to admit of confusion.  The words have 
 thus become entangled in so many foreign associations, mostly of a very powerful and tenacious 
 character, that they have come to excite, and to be the symbols of, feelings which their original  
 meaning will by no means justify; and which have made them one of the most copious sources of  
 false taste, false philosophy, false morality, and even bad law. (Mill 2012, 123) 
According to Mill, when we think critically about the ambiguity of the word ‘nature,’ as well as the 
metaethical distinction between what ‘is’ the case and what we think ‘ought’ to be the case, he believes 
that we will discover that there is nothing that humanity can learn about the moral life from the ‘natural 
world.’ “Nature cannot be a proper model for us to imitate,” for in light of what ‘is’ the case, vis-à-vis 
predator-prey relationships and natural disasters, “Either it is right that we should kill because nature kills; 
torture because nature tortures; ruin and devastate because nature does the like; or we ought not to 
consider at all what nature does, but what is good to do” (Mill 2012, 128-129). 
In general, the field of metaethics can be divided into two camps, mainly ethical objectivism and 
moral skepticism.  What distinguishes the two is that the former position, objectivism, maintains that 




Landau 2015, 291-292).  Objective moral standards are universal; they are standards that apply to 
everyone regardless of whether people believe that they do; and, moral propositions “are objectively true 
whenever they accurately tell us what these objective moral standards are or what they require of us” 
(Schafer-Landau 2015, 291).  Contrary to this standpoint, moral skepticism denies that any objective 
moral standards exist.  Herein, based upon this epistemological difference, there are a variety of 
metaethical standpoints and theories that help explain the nature of moral values and the status of moral 
propositions.  To survey them all will take us outside of the scope of this dissertation; however, we shall 
review a few perspectives of moral skepticism as they are important for the purposes of this project.   
Moral skepticism, can be divided into the standpoints of ethical relativism and anti-
realism/nihilism.  In regards to ethical relativism, there are no objective moral standards; rather, moral 
standards exist in relation to a culture (i.e. cultural relativism) or individuals (i.e. subjectivism). When we 
consider the semantic dimension of this metaethical platform, the status of moral statements and 
utterances depend upon the attitudes of individuals or convictions that cultures and social groups 
maintain.   
On the other side of the aisle of moral skepticism, anti-realism/nihilism, which includes error 
theory and non-cognitivism, argues that: (1) there are no moral features or facts that exist in the world 
(i.e. there are no mind-independent values); (2) no moral judgments are true; and (3) there is no moral 
knowledge.  However, these two anti-realist philosophies differ in regards to the nature of moral 
propositions and ethical discourse.  For error theory, moral judgments and propositions “always fail to 
describe the moral features of things.  Thus we always lapse into error when thinking in moral terms” 
(Schafer-Landau 2015, 309).  Contrary to this commitment, non-cognitivism in general, expressivism in 
particular, maintains that when we formulate moral judgments and engage in moral discourse, “We are 
not trying to report moral features possessed by various actions, motives or policies.  Instead, we are 
venting our emotions, commanding others to act in certain ways, or revealing a plan of action,” which is 




We will say more about some of the aforementioned theories and perspectives in Chapter one, 
particularly error theory and non-cognitivism.  For right now, it is important to note that the 
nihilistic/anti-realist lens through which we will examine some of Dōgen’s writings on ethics in this 
dissertation is, prima facie, in keeping with Zen philosophy in general.  After all, Zen is characterized as 
“a special transmission outside the scriptures, no dependence upon words or letters” (Kalupahana 1992, 
230).  According to Zen, there are no mind-independent truths that words and letters can describe and 
refer to, nor are there any teachings that can convey how to discover such.  Everything is empty (Skt. 
śūnya) of an independent self-essence, including our expressions about things or beliefs. Thus, if Zen 
ethics is predicated upon realizing emptiness, then perhaps an anti-realist interpretation of Dōgen’s ethics 
is warranted.  One reason supporting this hermeneutical contention is that Dōgen, in keeping with the 
Mahāyāna philosophy of emptiness, maintains that all things lack a permanent self-essence.  Thus, if we 
were to interpret Dōgen’s ethics through an essentialist, realist or cognitivist lens, then that interpretation 
would run counter to his overall philosophical outlook of non-essentialism.  Accordingly, when we 
consider Dōgen’s ethics in the context of his practice of seated meditation, zazen, it seems as though that 
if one were to think about moral beliefs and value judgments as if they were essentially real, then such 
thinking would directly obstruct one’s ability to realize emptiness; this is perhaps why, in his 
Fukanzazengi, “Principles of Seated meditation,” Dōgen instructs his adepts to, “Cast aside all 
involvements and discontinue all affairs.  Good is not thought of; evil is not thought of” (Dōgen 
1988,177).  Herein it is through his teachings on meditation, and the realization that all things are empty, 
that we are able to begin to discern key differences between “truth-seeking” metaethics within academia, 
and Dōgen’s “way-seeking” metaethical perspective.   
In their book Thinking through Confucius (1987) David Hall and Roger Ames introduced the 
difference between truth-seeking and way-seeking approaches to philosophy. While truth-seeking 
approaches emphasize justification, vis-à-vis necessary and sufficient conditions for theoretical truth, 




This way-seeking approach is also identified by Kyoto School philosopher Masao Abe (1915-2006) as 
Lebens-Philosophie, “philosophy of life.”  In his introduction to Nishida’s An Inquiry Into The Good, Abe 
states that the thinkers who have taken this way-seeking approach to philosophy, including Nietzsche and 
Kierkegaard, were primarily concerned with “the inner dimension of human existence, the creative 
development of subjectivity, and the irrational power of life” (Abe 1990, xiii). Thus, while the practice of 
philosophy in Western universities and colleges is mostly motivated by truth-seeking values and goals, 
Dōgen’s writings on the moral life, in similar ways to Nietzsche, are motivated by way-seeking values.  
For Dōgen, ethics is a practice, which, as we shall see, is inextricably tied to zazen, sitting meditation.  
Through his prose and poetry, Dōgen does not attempt to prove a particular theory/ism true; rather, 
Dōgen’s perspectivism recognizes that all theories are tied to a particular point of view and/or web-of-
beliefs, and so, all theories are forever open to nuanced interpretations and counter positions.  In this 
dissertation I will argue that as a practice, Dōgen’s ethics of non-thinking (Jpn. hishiryō) is centered on 
the non-anthropocentric realization that all beings, including stones and streams, are Buddha-nature.  
Accordingly, unlike J.S Mill’s truth-seeking perspective, Dōgen believes that there is much we can learn, 
vis-à-vis way-seeking values, from ‘nature’ and the more-than-human-world.    
Since the realization of Buddha-nature is embodied within the practice of zazen, ethics as a way-
seeking practice allows Dōgen to reformulate how we think about a whole range of moral perspectives, 
including karma and the teachings of ‘original enlightenment’ (Jpn. hongaku).  Specifically, in regards to 
the latter, what is central to this predominately Tendai Buddhist philosophy is the belief that all human 
beings are inherently enlightened, “in that it was not a temporal occurrence that had a beginning and end 
in time” (Kim 2004, 22).  What vexed Dōgen at a very young age as a Tendai monk was that if humans 
are originally enlightened, “and consequently liberated here and now within this body-mind existence, 
then why do we have to exert ourselves at all?  What is the significance of intellectual, moral, cultic, and 




Dōgen’s initial question may be restated as follows: If, as Tendai Buddhism expounds, all 
sentient beings are originally endowed with the Buddha-nature and are inherently awakened to 
their true nature, why is it necessary for so many Buddhist practitioners in the past, present, and 
future to set upon a religious quest and practice various forms of Buddhist discipline to attain 
enlightenment?  Are not that resolve and practice unnecessary? (Abe 1992, 20) 
 As we explore a selection of fascicles within Dōgen’s Shōbōgenzō, we shall see how Dōgen’s way-
seeking perspective on the moral life advances a moral imagination that includes all sentient and 
insentient beings within the class of beings that are “originally enlightened.”   
 As noted above, within the academic field of metaethics, philosophies such as error theory and 
non-cognitivism have been characterized as nihilistic since they both argue that the values and standards 
for moral behavior are not mind-independent facts (i.e. naturalism), nor are they mind-independent non-
natural properties (i.e. intuitionism).  Contrary to the popular opinion, this does not mean that anti-
realism/nihilism is a threat to cultural values vis-à-vis pessimism and apathy (i.e. what Nietzsche calls 
passive nihilism).  No doubt, anti-realism challenges a range of cultural perspectives that adhere to some 
version of foundationalism; however, the negation of metaethical realism/objectivism does not entail that 
individuals who lean towards anti-realism are categorically apathetic, and thus, either don’t care about 
anything, or are unable to participate in conventional moral discourse within the field of applied ethics.  
Thus, it is along this anti-realist horizon of metaethics that we find ourselves journeying into this 
dissertation.  While some Dōgen scholars, such as Hee-Jin Kim, are reluctant to characterize this 
thirteenth century Zen master in this way, my characterization of Dōgen as an anti-realist is consistent 
with Kōshō Itagaki’s Sōtō Zen perspective that:  
Nothing in all of being is superior or inferior.  For the sake of convenience, people make 
distinctions and value judgments, but these can only apply in context of individual situations.  
They do not pertain to reality itself, where there is neither good nor bad, neither greater nor lesser, 
neither superior nor inferior.  All existence is complete just as it is.  In Mahāyāna Buddhism, this 
teaching is expressed as: “Equality is Distinction.  Distinction is equality.”  Distinction means 
difference, and is not merely the label of a doctrine.  Everything is for that time, and existence at 
that time is everything; relative distinctions are not absolute. (Itagaki 2016, 26-27) 
To maintain that value judgments do not correspond to mind-independent facts or truths, and that neither 




defend anti-realism in its bare bones form.  According to Itagaki, Dōgen’s ethics is non-dualistically 
framed in light of the Mahāyāna philosophy of emptiness (Skt. śūnyatā) whereby all phenomenal beings 
and ideas are understood to be dependently-conditioned (Skt. pratītyasamutpāda) and without an inherent 
self-nature (Skt. svabhāva).  As I understand Itagaki’s interpretation of Dōgen, this philosophy of non-
foundationalism entails that metaethical realism/objectivism/cognitivism is flawed since such positions 
defend the existence of mind-independent moral values and/or truths.  From a Mahāyāna perspective, all 
beliefs and value judgments are mind-dependent; and, all mind-dependent beliefs and judgments are 
dependent upon various antecedent conditions that are situational and relative.  Thus, they are empty.  Or, 
as Dōgen states in the fascicle Shoaku-Makusa, all value judgments - good, bad and indifference – are 
‘uncreated’ (Jpn. mushō). 
 Dōgen’s metaethical standpoint of anti-realism - all values and moral beliefs are mushō - is the 
central pillar of this study as it provides support for our analysis of: (1) Dōgen’s philosophy of language 
in the context of ethics; (2) Dōgen’s interpretation of the Buddhist philosophy of karma; (3) the interface 
between ethics, meditation, and non-thinking (Jpn. hishiryō); and (4) the comparative horizons between 
the metaethical perspectivism of Dōgen and Nietzsche, particularly in regards to non-anthropocentric 
value creation.  Accordingly, I will show that “anti-cognitivism,” rather than error theory or non-
cognitivism, is the metaethical perspective that best characterizes Dōgen’s standpoint regarding the status 
of moral propositions in general, his normative instructions concerning meditation, zazen, in particular.  
Since this is a term that is not conventionally used by scholars of metaethics, it is worth noting how I 
stipulate its meaning.  
What do I mean by anti-cognitivist?  In short, anti-cognitivism is the metaethical standpoint that 
moral propositions are not about properties facts or truths; rather, moral propositions reveal perspectives. 
As we noted above, error theory maintains that moral propositions refer to mind-independent truths; 
however, unlike realism and objectivism, error theory contends that this belief is an erroneous judgment 




theory, false.  Thus, as an anti-realist philosophy, anti-cognitivism does not share the error theoretical 
standpoint that moral propositions are truth apt.  However, this epistemic commitment does not entail the 
non-cognitive standpoint that moral statements/propositions are reducible to our attitudinal dispositions 
that unfold from our embodied affects feelings and emotions.  The term anti-cognitivism is a nuanced 
metaethical outlook that is quite similar to atheism whereby the denial of the existence of ‘God’ is not 
necessarily accompanied by an alternative metaphysical theory.  While non-cognitivism denies that there 
are mind-independent moral facts or properties, they do proffer a positive thesis, mainly that moral 
statements are expressions of emotion.  As we will soon see, both Nietzsche and Dōgen agree with the 
non-cognitive commitment that our embodied passions are salient to our values, moral 
statements/expressions and beliefs; however, unlike non-cognitivism, there is no indication in the writings 
of Nietzsche and Dōgen that they believed that moral statements are reducible to feelings, as if feelings in 
themselves are essentially/inherently distinct from reason, as Hume maintained.  In regards to Nietzsche’s 
writings, our values ascend from pre-reflective forces, vis-à-vis will to power; and, in regards to Dōgen’s 
practice of Zen, values and normative judgments are, in keeping with the Mahāyāna tradition, realized 
through one’s insight into the emptiness of all phenomenal things and ideas (i.e. wisdom (Skt.prajñā)), 
which in turn conditions, yet is also mutually conditioned by, great compassion (Skt. mahā-karuna)  
According to Dōgen, the mutual-co-arising of wisdom and compassion (i.e. Buddha-nature) is contingent 
upon the practice of zazen and the phenomenology of non-thinking.  In this dissertation, my 
characterization of both Nietzsche and Dōgen as anti-realist and anti-cognitivist will contribute to André 
van der Braak’s characterization of these thinkers as non-anthropocentric, non-essentialist and non-
teleological.   
§I.4 Methodology 
Often characterized as “cross cultural philosophy,” the field of comparative philosophy focuses 
upon issues, problems and theories by creating dialogues between different literary sources, thinkers and 




eighteenth century, it is not until the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that comparative 
philosophy began to gain traction within academic institutions.  As the world becomes more 
interconnected, and cultures continue to overlap, exploring philosophical questions and ideas cross-
culturally in dialogue together could not be more important, particularly when we consider the existential 
threats that loom over all humanity which we must, as a global community, act cooperatively to mitigate 
and solve.   
My inquiry into Dōgen’s metaethics falls within this general field of comparative philosophy.  
However, my goal is not to simply to enumerate affinities and differences between Dōgen and Western 
metaethics in general, Nietzsche’s metaethics in particular.  As noted above, this dissertation offers a 
metaethical interpretation of Dōgen’s writings that is: (1) anti-realist in regards to the nature of moral 
values, and anti-cognitivist in regards to the meaning of moral judgments; (2) nihilistic – active nihilism – 
with regard to moral ontology; and (3) skeptical in regards to moral epistemology.  Herein, I recognize 
that there are inherent challenges and obstacles that this philosophical pursuit faces, including the 
chauvinistic tendency to recreate other traditions in the image of one’s own, or the incommensurability 
and inability to translate concepts from one tradition and meaningfully apply such to another tradition.  
However, I believe it would be a mistake to abort our comparative inquiry and ignore what might be a 
meaningful cross-cultural dialogue simply because our inquiry might turn out erroneous.  By being 
mindful of these challenges, and by employing the tools of critical thinking, my examination will avoid 
pigeonholing Dōgen within specific metaethical camps that do not share the nuances his perspective 
embodies.   
§I.5 Overview of Chapters 
 My inquiry in this dissertation is divided into seven chapters and a conclusion.  In Chapter one, 
“Anti-realism in Contemporary Metaethics and Nietzsche,” we begin by exploring the emergence of anti-
realism in general, error theory and non-cognitivism in particular.  After examining some of the twentieth 




prescriptivism and expressivism, our examination of metaethics will focus primarily upon Nietzsche’s 
metaethical perspective.  Herein our inquiry will consider two general areas of Nietzsche’s metaethics: (1) 
perspectivism vis-à-vis the ‘death of God’ and nihilism as a cultural phenomenon; (2) anti-realist 
commitments vis-à-vis the nature of language and the nature of the affects.  From this examination we 
shall discover that while the anti-realist designation is useful for characterizing Nietzsche’s metaethics, 
both error theory and non-cognitivism fall short in being able to capture the nuances of his perspectivism, 
vis-à-vis the will to power.  Thus, this chapter will show that Nietzsche is anti-realist in regards to the 
existence of moral facts, properties or mind-independent truths; and, in regards to moral propositions and 
statements, I will characterize Nietzsche as anti-cognitivist according to the stipulated definition noted 
above. Ultimately this chapter will equip us with the philosophical tools and concepts for interpreting 
Dōgen’s metaethics.      
       In Chapter two, “Buddhism and Western Moral Philosophy,” I examine how Buddhist ethics has 
been interpreted through Western ethical theories and perspectives.  I will showcase various perspectives 
concerning the hermeneutical debate regarding the merits of examining Buddhist ethics through Western 
ethical ideas, conceptual categories and normative thought experiments, such as the trolley problem; 
therein my focus will be centered upon Damien Keown’s virtue-theoretical interpretation of early 
Buddhist ethics, vis-à-vis Aristotle, and Charles Goodman’s consequentialist/utilitarian interpretation of 
Indo-Tibetan Mahāyāna ethics.   From there, I proceed to highlight some of the philosophical 
developments of Buddhist ethical thinking in Theravāda traditions, as well Indo-Tibetan and East-Asian 
Mahāyāna schools.  The goal of this examination is to help situate Dōgen within the historical 
development of Buddhist normative and metaethical thinking, and the multivalent ideas and perspectives, 
as well as scholarly interpretations of such.  To do this, I conclude the chapter with a systematic review of 
Mahāyāna Buddhist metaethics by considering the problem of justification, vis-à-vis conventional 
normative beliefs, albeit recognizing that all values are empty (Skt. śūnya) (i.e. anti-realism).  




that have been considered by some scholars, including Bronwyn Finnigan, Mark Siderits, Mario D’Amato 
and Laura Guerrero, Russell Guilbault and Bret Davis.  By reviewing the prospects and problems tied to 
the metaethical strategies non-cognitivism, fictionalism, conventionalism and contextualism, I conclude 
this chapter by introducing the concept anti-cognitivism so as to clarify how a Mahāyāna anti-realist, such 
as Dōgen, can coherently justify conventional value judgments; in short, conventional normative 
judgments do not refer to mind-independent normative facts or truths, nor are they reducible to mere 
feelings and emotions, but instead they reveal and conceal perspectives.   
 Chapter three, “Beginning on the Path of Revealing and Concealing: Situating Dōgen’s 
Metaethics,” provides the philosophical backstory of Dōgen’s life as a Buddhist thinker and reformer 
during the Kamakura period, as well as founder of the Sōtō (Ch. Caodong) tradition of Zen in Japan.  
More specifically, by examining Dōgen’s critical reflections regarding the Mahāyāna philosophy of 
original enlightenment (Jpn. hongaku) and Buddha-nature (Jpn. busshō), this chapter will reveal how 
Dōgen’s ‘way-seeking’ metaethic, vis-à-vis his philosophy of zazen and the nonduality of practice and 
realization invites both anti-realist and anti-cognitivist interpretations.  In the course of achieving this 
goal, I show how Dōgen’s Zen perspective differs from the ‘silent illumination’ teachings and practice of 
continental Caodong teachers and masters.  And, in regards to the bodhisattva ideal and the doctrine of 
skillful means (Skt. upāya), which are salient to Mahāyāna ethics, I will show how Dōgen’s reevaluation 
of the doctrine of original enlightenment, vis-à-vis nonduality of practice and realization, provides a 
reevaluation of the doctrine of skillful means; thus, instead of interpreting skillful means a 
consequentialist philosophy, I contend that Dōgen interprets such in light of the East Asian philosophy of 
non-action (Ch. wu-wei).   
 Chapter four, “Dōgen’s Uncreated Metaethic,” brings us to one of the main pillars of this 
dissertation.  As we explore a selection of Dōgen’s writings on ethics, particularly his metaethical 
reflections on the nature of moral values, I argue in this chapter that Dōgen’s characterization of the 




are uncreated, meaning they are empty, and so, not essentially real.  This anti-realist characterization is in 
many ways an extension of Van der Braak’s characterization of Dōgen as non-essentialist and non-
teleological in his Nietzsche and Zen: Self-Overcoming Without a Self (2011).  From there, I consider 
some standard objections and concerns that are frequently raised against anti-realism, including whether 
an anti-realist can provide justification for normative beliefs.  Finally, this chapter will also begin setting 
the stage for characterizing Dōgen, in light of the Buddhist philosophy of the two truths, as an anti-
cognitivist in regards to moral propositions and normative instructions, particularly those tied to the 
practice of zazen, which will be explored in Chapter five. 
 In Chapter five, “Anti-Cognitivism: Dōgen’s Language of Morals,” I begin making the case for 
characterizing Dōgen’s metaethics as anti-cognitivist.  My main argument for advancing this metaethical 
interpretation is based upon the following if/then conditional premise: if it is the case that Zen believes 
that words and letters cannot ultimately describe any mind independent truth or fact, then it is not the case 
that Zen believes that moral propositions can describe or express moral facts or truths.  By building off of 
the research of Dale S. Wright, Victor Sōgen Hori, Steven Heine and Rupert Read, vis-à-vis the nature of 
language from the perspective of Zen, I will show that the antecedent, Zen believes that words and letters 
cannot ultimately describe or express mind-independent truths or facts, is accurate; and, because it is 
accurate, it thereby follows that it is not the case that Zen believes that moral propositions can describe or 
express moral facts or truths.  As we shall see, this philosophy of language captures, in broad strokes, 
Dōgen’s metaethical commitments.  However, we shall also see that that Dōgen’s philosophy of language 
is quite nuanced, particularly in regards to the Buddhist philosophy of the two truths. 
Accordingly, by appealing to J.L. Austin’s distinction between descriptive and performative 
speech acts, I will show that Dōgen’s writings on ethical issues, depending upon the context, can be 
interpreted from a conventional standpoint or an ultimate standpoint.  From a conventional/ ‘crooked’ 
standpoint (Jpn. hen-i), normative judgments, such as ‘it is wrong to kill,’ seem to describe the world, 




However, from an ultimate/ ‘straight’ standpoint (Jpn. shōi), normative statements do not describe mind-
independent facts nor express mind-independent truths or properties; ultimately, everything is empty, 
including the language we use for understanding that all things are empty.  Following from this 
distinction between conventional and ultimate modes of discourse, we shall discover that Dōgen does not 
think that we are limited to a conventional standpoint when speaking about normative matters.  One can, 
as the Zen kōan curriculum reveals, and as Dōgen’s writings show, speak from an ultimate perspective 
whereby language is not intended to describe the world, but rather is a performative act.  Thus we shall 
pay close attention to the normative topic of karma so as to see how Dōgen participates in a normative 
discourse without reifying values, judgments or conceptions of right-action. 
 My focus in Chapter six, “Mountain Still State: Ethical Non-Thinking and the Metaethics of 
Meditation,” is centered upon the interface between the Mahāyāna philosophy of emptiness, ethics and 
meditation within Dōgen’s writings.  According to Dōgen, the practice of meditation, zazen, or just sitting 
(Jpn. shikantaza), is the central practice in which Buddha-nature is realized.  Since the ongoing realization 
of Buddha-nature is the focus of Dōgen’s ethics, it follows that meditation is the focus of his ethics; thus, 
in this chapter we shall see that zazen ‘is’ how Dōgen attempts to show, rather than tell, how conventional 
normative judgments ‘ought’ to be justified.  The phenomenology of this “ethical practice” consists of 
neither thinking nor not thinking, but rather a middle way mode of awareness of non-thinking.  By 
examining the distinctions between discriminative thinking, absent mindedness, vis-à-vis not thinking, 
and mindful non-thinking, we shall see how Dōgen’s phenomenology of zazen invites an anti-cognitivist 
characterization of this normative practice.   
 Finally, in Chapter seven, “Non-Anthropocentric Value Creation: Dōgen and Nietzsche’s      
Faithfulness to the ‘Great Earth’,” we are able to see how nihilistic philosophies – applied in the practice 
of what Nietzsche calls “active nihilism” –  such as anti-realism in general, and anti-cognitivism in 
particular, provide an optimistic, idealistic and passionate moral vision for creating values in order to 




Dōgen and Nietzsche in dialogue together, we are not only able to rethink our assumptions regarding 
“Western” and Eastern” philosophies, we are also able to see how their perspectives can condition and 
inspire a moral imagination that is not fettered to the cognitive biases that define anthropocentrism.  By 
building off the comparative scholarship of Parkes and Van der Braak, I will make the case that not only 
are there ‘affinities’ between Dōgen and Nietzsche, but that their perspectives, when brought in dialogue 
together, provide an earth-centered conception of meaning whereby perspectivism, passion and play 
become the existential focus for overcoming our anthropocentric comportment and habits of thinking. 
 Finally, in the Conclusion, “Not-Committing Value Judgments Is Not-doing Metaethics,” my 
comparative treatment of Dōgen and Nietzsche will conclude with some subsequent reflections in regards 
to where this research goes from here.  By understanding Dōgen’s anti-realism in general, and the practice 
of anti-cognitivism via zazen in particular, we discover opportunities for exploring how Dōgen might be 
able to help us think through philosophical issues within the following areas: (1) environmental ethics; (2) 
business ethics and the value of work; (3) medical ethics; (4) contemporary philosophical discussions on 
the meaning of life.  Zen Buddhism in general, Dōgen’s Zen in particular, has been left out of most 
scholarly discussions within the field of applied ethics.  Perhaps this is due in part to the fact that many 
scholars and intellectuals assume that if a philosophical perspective does not champion some standard of 
moral objectivity, then there is little that that perspective can offer in regards to normative issues that 
affect our everyday lives for both current and future generations.  I hope that this work will show that this 
assumption is misguided.  Indeed, anti-realist perspectives such as Dōgen’s can expand our moral 
imagination and deepen our moral sensitivity in ways that not only allow us to think critically about social 
and environmental issues, but also attune us to nature in a non-anthropocentric way whereby, “The great 
earth has no outside” (Jpn. Daihō soto nashi) (ZS 4.368). 






Chapter One    
Anti-realism In Contemporary Metaethics and Nietzsche 
 
§1.1 Chapter Overview  
This opening chapter will attempt to achieve three goals.  First, it aims to provide a general 
blueprint for the metaethical philosophy of anti-realism.  In doing so, I plan to identify and explain the 
main philosophical divisions within contemporary metaethics with special attention given to the 
differences between the anti-realist perspectives of error theory and non-cognitivism; herein, our 
examination will be centered around the works of Louis Pojman (2006), Russ Shafer-Landau (2015) and 
Aaron Zimmerman (2010). The second goal is to explore a selection of Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
philosophical works in order to determine which metaethical theories best characterize his perspective.  
Herein our inquiry will focus upon two general areas of Nietzsche’s metaethics: (1) perspectivism vis-à-
vis the ‘death of God’ and nihilism as a cultural phenomenon; and (2) anti-realist commitments vis-à-vis 
the nature of language and the role of the affects.  As we explore these philosophical horizons through 
Nietzsche’s works, we shall assess some contemporary metaethical interpretations of Nietzsche, including 
error theory, fictionalism, non-cognitivism and constructivism.  Accordingly, we shall discover that while 
the anti-realist characterization is useful for characterizing Nietzsche’s metaethics, none of the 
aforementioned interpretations are able to fully capture the nuances of his perspectivism.  Thus, this 
chapter will show that Nietzsche is anti-realist in regards to the existence of moral facts, properties or 
mind-independent truths; and, when it comes to moral propositions and statements, I will characterize 
Nietzsche as anti-cognitivist – moral language does not describe nor express moral truths, rather, they 
reveal and conceal normative perspectives.  By fleshing out salient philosophical commitments embedded 
within anti-realism in general, Nietzsche’s metaethics in particular, we will be prepared to make sense of 
Dōgen’s metaethics in Chapters three, four, five, and six as well as open a comparative dialogue between 





§1.2 Metaethical Horizons: Objectivism, Subjectivism and Nihilism 
 Metaethics is an area of philosophical inquiry that is primarily interested in the metaphysical and 
epistemological status of moral values and beliefs.  Unlike normative ethics, which is concerned with a 
range of specific questions and issues, such as whether or not killing is always worse than letting die, 
philosophers who do metaethics focus upon questions that are far more general in scope.  For example, 
are moral values derived from reason or feelings/sentiments/affects?  Are morals objective or subjective?  
Is moral knowledge possible?  Rather than providing moral arguments and reasons for specific moral 
beliefs vis-à-vis what makes actions right, or, how to evaluate human character traits, vis-à-vis virtues and 
vices, metaethics is interested in philosophizing about “the very terms and structure of ethical theory” 
(Pojman 2006, 209).  Can we derive prescriptive ‘ought’ statements from descriptive ‘is’ statements?  
What are moral intuitions?  Is the concept “good” a natural property of the world?  While seemingly 
abstract and distant from our everyday experience of the moral life, doing metaethics is pivotal for 
reflecting upon how we can improve our moral beliefs and thereby formulate considered moral 
judgments1 on matters ranging from health care policy to climate justice.   
 Within this field of philosophy, there are, according to Russ Shafer-Landau, basically three 
metaethical positions one can generally take: (1) moral objectivism; (2) moral subjectivism or relativism; 
and (3) nihilism/anti-realism.  Beginning with (1), moral objectivism/realism generally maintains that the 
status of values and moral norms is independent of our views, attitudes and opinions of such (i.e. moral 
values are mind-independent); objective values, standards and norms “are those that apply to everyone, 
even if people don’t believe that they do, even if people are indifferent to them, and even if obeying them 
fails to satisfy anyone’s desires” (Shafer-Landau 2015, 291).  As a metaethical counterpart to moral 
                                                 
1 Considered moral judgments are judgments about the rightness or wrongness of an action or event.  The conditions 
proper for considered moral judgments include: (1) the judgment is not in the heat of the moment, and so not 
distorted by intense emotional forces or cognitive biases; (2) the judgment is made free from mental distractions; (3) 




objectivism/realism, cognitivism maintains that our moral propositions about actions and events have 
truth value that is not dependent upon our feelings, attitudes or dispositions.       
 Contrary to moral objectivism, both the subjectivist and the nihilist are skeptical of the moral 
objectivist’s confidence that there are any mind-independent values or normative truths.  From the 
perspective of subjectivism/relativism, our moral values and conceptions of right and wrong are either 
relative to one’s culture (cultural relativism) or relative to the individual (ethical subjectivism); according 
to moral subjectivism, all values and normative beliefs are mind-dependent.  For example, in his essay 
“Moral Relativism Defended” (1975), Gilbert Harman argues that this metaethical standpoint is 
predicated upon a strict logical form:  
Just as a judgment that something is large makes sense only in relation to one or another 
comparison class, so to, I will argue, the judgment that it is wrong of someone to do something 
makes sense only in relation to an agreement or understanding.  A dog may be large in relation to 
chihuahuas but not large in relation to dogs in general.  Similarly, I will argue an action may be 
wrong in relation to one agreement but not in relation to another.  Just as it makes no sense to ask 
whether a dog is large, period, apart from any relation to a comparison class, so too […] it makes 
no sense to ask whether an action is wrong, period, apart from any relation to an agreement. 
(Harman 2007, 41)   
 The third position, nihilism, like subjectivism, also maintains that there are no mind-independent 
values or normative truths.  However, unlike subjectivism, nihilism argues that, “there are no moral truths 
at all” (Shafer-Landau; 2015, 292). 
 Moral nihilists join with relativists in opposing ethical objectivism.  Morality is wholly a human 
 creation – in this, nihilists and relativists are united.  But nihilists are no fans of ethical relativism.  
 Relativists believe in moral goodness, moral duty, and moral virtue.  Nihilists don’t.  Nihilists 
 deny that there are any moral qualities.  There are no moral requirements.  Nothing is morally 
 good. (Shafer-Landau 2015, 308).    
Herein, metaethical nihilism is different from, “the purely epistemic skeptic,” who argues, “that whether 
or not there are moral truths, any evidence, reasons, or grounds we have for our moral beliefs must prove 
insufficient to provide us with moral knowledge or even justified moral belief” (Zimmerman 2010, 43); 




43).  Accordingly, when it comes to the moral propositions we use in the everyday world, they do not 
report or describe any moral facts or properties.   
Of the three positions, nihilism seems most controversial.  Since it advances a mode of skepticism 
that leads to the denial of objective values and normative truths, one might wonder if such a perspective 
would have disastrous results for society and humanity as a whole.2  After all, if one maintains, as 
nihilists do, that there are no values or normative truths of any kind, then how could one ever judge an 
action as being unfair/unjust?  How could one advocate for policies concerning climate change or 
economic justice if there are no foundational values or normative truths to serve as a metaethical 
touchstone?  These concerns will be addressed throughout this dissertation.  For right now, it is important 
to note that nihilism, and the denial of objective moral facts and truths does not entail that one cannot 
express one’s moral dispositions and attitudes.  As Steven Luper-Foy explains in Invulnerability: On 
Securing Happiness, “It is one thing to make a metaphysical claim that values lack objectivity, and quite 
another to claim that one does not attribute any value whatever to anything.  We can deny that anything 
has objective value and still attribute subjective importance to many things” (Luper 1996, 91).  Herein, 
Luper’s nuanced interpretation of nihilism makes clear that nihilism is not a monolith.  Rather, as a 
metaethical standpoint, according to Pojman and Schafer-Landau, it fractures into two philosophical 
camps: (1) error theory; and (2) expressivism/non-cognitivism.  
§1.3 What is Error Theory?    
 Error theory defends the metaethical claim that all moral beliefs, and the values that support such, 
are erroneous.  Similar to atheists who claim that ‘God’ does not exist, according to error theorists, while 
many may believe that there are objective values and mind-independent normative truths, they are 
erroneous.  As J.L. Mackie writes in Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, “The denial of objective values 
                                                 
2 The argument from disastrous results is as follows: 
 P1. If widespread acceptance of a view would lead to disastrous results, then that view is false. 
 P2. Widespread acceptance of nihilism would lead to disastrous results. 




will have to be put forward […] as an ‘error theory’, a theory that although most people in making moral 
judgments implicitly claim, among other things, to be pointing to something objectively prescriptive, 
these claims are all false” (Mackie 1977, 35).  According to Mackie, “our moral obligations have become 
so integral to moral thought that there can be no moral obligations unless they have this quality” (i.e., the 
quality of being objectively prescriptive) (Zimmerman 2010,48).  However, because nothing is 
objectively/intrinsically prescriptive, it follows that there are no moral obligations or normative truths.   
 In general, error theory maintains four metaethical commitments: (1) there are no moral features 
or properties that exist in the world; (2) no moral judgment is ever true; (3) our sincere moral judgments 
always fail to describe the moral features of things; (4) there is no moral knowledge (Shafer-Landau 
2015, 309).  These commitments are supported by two arguments: the ‘argument from relativity’ and the 
‘queerness argument.’   Beginning with the former, Mackie’s relativity argument is not an endorsement of 
the epistemic commitments of cultural relativism whereby, “an act is morally acceptable just because it is 
allowed by the guiding ideals of the society in which it is performed” (Schafer-Landau 2015, 293).  No 
doubt, “people assert moral codes based on their familiarity with moral codes they learn in their 
societies,” (Muhlnickel 2011,233); however, that does not entail that there are moral facts or truths that 
actually exist.   Instead, the argument from relativity is more modest in that it emphasizes “the 
unimpeachable fact of moral relativity: moral judgments observed in behavior, described in records of 
deliberation, and stated in authoritative moral codes of different societies and historical eras are different 
and often incompatible with one another” (Muhlnickel 2011, 233).   Embedded within this argument is 
the dependency thesis, which states that the validity of any normative belief is derived from cultural 
acceptance.   In light of this thesis, it is the incompatibility of normative beliefs that makes the tenability 
of moral objectivism/realism vulnerable to doubt.   
 That being said, such vulnerability does not completely refute the objectivist standpoint.  After 
all, one may argue that just because there is some incompatibility between different normative beliefs that 




share, such as murder is wrong.  Accordingly, the objectivist will also be quick to highlight the epistemic 
point that the incompatibility of different moral beliefs does not entail that there are no normative truths; 
they might point to one of a good many instances, such as the effectiveness of social distancing and the 
use of facial coverings during a global pandemic, to illustrate the metaethical point that just because there 
is a disagreement about normative beliefs does not mean that no perspective is right, as error theory 
contends.   From the vantage point of objectivism, “factual differences in the circumstances of various 
societies result in different applications of objective moral principles” (Muhlnickel 2011, 233).   
It is in response to this objectivist line of reasoning that Mackie’s queerness argument is best 
understood.  The queerness argument states that if moral facts existed, they would be so strange –  queer – 
that they would require an equally strange faculty to perceive and understand such.  Since there is no 
evidence that suggests that such a faculty exists, we are forced to conclude that there are, indeed, no 
moral facts; right and wrong simply do not exist. 
 Even more important, however, and certainly more generally applicable, is the argument from 
 queerness.  This has two parts, one metaphysical, the other epistemological.  If there were 
 objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly 
 different from anything else in the universe.  Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it 
 would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from 
 our ordinary ways of knowing everything else. (Mackie 2007, 31) 
To help flesh out the analytical import of this argument, Robert Muhlnickel states that: 
The argument from queerness claims there are two necessary conditions of the existence of 
objective moral facts.  The first condition is a claim about the ontology of moral facts.  Putative 
moral facts would consist of a different kind of entity or relation than those known by scientific 
observation and hypothesizing, ordinary perception, quasi-scientific methods.  The second 
condition claims that the mental ability humans would have to possess in order to have 
knowledge of moral facts would be specifically moral.  Such ability would be different in kind 
from other human mental abilities. (Muhlnickel 2011, 233) 
Thus, the queerness argument, according to Pojman, reveals that, as a metaethical philosophy, error 
theory is a version of extreme nihilism.  In light of the aforementioned commitments, “there is nothing 




(Pojman 2006, 242).  For the error theorist, when we reflect upon our lives, at the end of the day, nothing 
ultimately matters.  According to error theory, all moral propositions are erroneous.   
Herein it is important to note a metaethical counterpart of error theory: fictionalism.  As Simon 
Blackburn notes in On Truth, both error theory and fictionalism “are reactions to Moore’s non-natural 
distribution of moral properties or moral facts ‘out there’ (Blackburn 2018, 107); however, while error 
theory maintains, “that moral discussion is a chasing a will-‘o-the-wisp. […] others, ‘fictionalists’ 
suppose that at best it is a useful fiction to say that this is true, although in reality it is not” (Blackburn 
2018, 91).  Herein fictionalism is the anti-realist standpoint that all moral beliefs and propositions are 
artifacts of make believe.  However, when it comes to the status of moral values, both error theory and 
fictionalism maintain that, “it is not strictly true that it is wrong to stamp on babies for fun” (Blackburn 
2018, 91-92).   
§1.4 What is Non-cognitivism?  
 While sharing the same skeptical perspective as error theory, vis-à-vis moral objectivism/realism, 
non-cognitivism does not go as far in overturning the foundations of metaethics.   Rather, as Pojman sees 
it, non-cognitivism is a moderate form of nihilism.  “Moderate nihilism holds that, although no moral 
truths exist, moral discourse is expressive.  Morality is merely a functionally useful way of projecting our 
feelings onto the world” (Pojman 2006, 242).  In other words, while non-cognitivism shares the following 
aforementioned commitments with error theory, (1) there are no moral features or properties that exist in 
the world, (2) no moral judgment is true, and (4) there is no moral knowledge, non-cognitivists disagree 
with error theorists about (3), our sincere moral judgments always fail to describe the moral features of 
things.  From the anti-realist perspective of non-cognitivism, moral statements, judgments and beliefs are 
not intended to describe the way the world is.  Rather, as Shafer-Landau explains, moral discourse is 
either engaged in “venting our emotions, commanding others to act in certain ways, or revealing a plan of 
action” (Shafer-Landau 2015, 314).  Moral discourse and ethical disagreements are nothing other than 




“When we condemn torture, for instance, we are expressing our opposition to it, indicating our disgust at 
it, publicizing our reluctance to perform it, and strongly encouraging others not to go in for it.  We can do 
all of these things without trying to say anything is true” (Shafer-Landau 2015, 314).  In short, according 
to Arron Zimmerman, the general standpoint of non-cognitivism can be characterized as: “either (a) there 
are no beliefs or judgments with moral content, or (b) if there are, they are so unlike our non-evaluative 
beliefs that they cannot be coherently assessed in epistemic terms” (Zimmerman 2010, 181).  Unlike a 
priori claims – parallel lines don’t intersect – or a posteriori claims – willows are green – moral 
commitments and beliefs are not cognizable.  Though we may assert that “stealing is bad,” or, “greed is 
not a virtue,” such expressions do not cognitively ‘light-up’ in the same way as “all bachelors are 
unmarried” or “the sky is blue.”   
 The metaethical standpoint of non-cognitivism is, by and large, a twentieth century philosophical 
perspective that was born out of the linguistic turn in Anglo-American academic circles.  Since non-
cognitivism’s emergence on the stage of Western moral philosophy, it has evolved into three specific 
standpoints: (1) emotivism; (2) prescriptivism; and (3) expressivism.  Let us briefly explore each of these 
to see how they differ.  
The emergence of non-cognitivism as a metaethical theory in the twentieth century was 
conditioned by the intellectual climate surrounding the Vienna Circle of logical positivists.  As an 
intellectual movement of the 1920’s, logical positivism attempted to advance our understanding of 
philosophical matters (though in deflationary ways) through the pioneering achievements of science and 
mathematics.3  One idea that defined the analytic perspective of the logical positivists is the verifiability 
criterion of meaning.  According to this criterion, genuine ideas, such as ‘the grass is green,’ are traceable 
to empirical elements of experience.  Accordingly, “if thoughts about the empirical world are ‘made up’ 
out of ideas, it would seem to follow that all genuine thoughts about the world must have as constituent 
                                                 
3 The founders of this movement included scientists, such as Moritz Schlick, and philosophers, such as Herbert 




thoughts that denote items of experience” (Fumerton 1999, 514).  In other words, according to logical 
positivism, any “genuine contingent assertion about the world must be verifiable through experience or 
observation” (Fumerton 1999, 514).   
Of his many philosophical works, A.J. Ayer’s publication Language, Truth and Logic (1936), 
helped introduce the general ideas and commitments of the logical positivists to the Anglophone world.  
In Chapter one, “The Elimination of Metaphysics,” Ayer begins by laying bare the positivist’s criterion of 
verifiability, or verificationism, which maintains that the only meaningful statements are those that are 
verifiable; “We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows 
how to verify the proposition which it purports to express – that is, if he knows what observations would 
lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false” 
(Ayer 1936, 48).  By applying this principle to the subject matter of ethics, we have the birth of non-
cognitivism in Western moral philosophy as the emotive theory of ethics.  What are the metaethical nuts 
and bolts of emotivism?  Beginning with the criterion of verificationism, according to Ayer, moral 
statements and judgments are not verifiable, and for that reason, they are not meaningful and/or truth apt. 
Ayer has us consider the example of stealing to make this very point. 
The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content.  Thus, if I 
say to someone, “You acted wrongly in stealing that money,” I am not stating anything more than 
if I had simply said, “You stole that money.”  In adding that this action is wrong I am not making 
any further statement about it.  I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it.  It is as if I had 
said, “You stole that money,” in a particular tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some 
special exclamation marks.  The tone, or the exclamation marks, adds nothing to the literal 
meaning of the sentence.  It merely serves to show that the expression of it is attended by certain 
feelings in the speaker. (Ayer 1936, 142) 
Since words like good or bad add nothing meaningful to moral propositions such as, “you acted badly in 
stealing the money,” Ayer concludes that the very subject matter of ethics is non-cognitive.4    
                                                 
4 In The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (1977), Gilbert Harman provides a charitable treatment of the 
emotive theory of morals by characterizing it, like Pojman, as moderately nihilistic.  As noted at the beginning of the 
chapter, nihilism is the view “that there are no moral facts, no moral truths and no moral knowledge.  Moderate 





 Ayer’s version of emotivism has been challenged from a variety of angles.  The most forceful 
objection to his theory struck at the core of the logical positivist’s verification criterion of knowledge. The 
problem for Ayer, and the Vienna Circle’s criterion of knowledge, is that the principle of verification is 
not a verifiable proposition, and so it too is meaningless.  Why is this the most forceful challenge?  Well, 
as Stephen Schwartz states, the principle of verification, “was close to the heart of logical positivism and 
its most famous doctrine.  Without the verifiability criterion of meaningfulness logical positivism loses 
much of its sting and its aura of clearing the air of unscientific mists” (Schwartz 2012, 78).  Since Ayer’s 
dismissal of cognitivism was grounded in the verification criterion of knowledge, we must therefore 
regard emotivism, and non-cognitivism for that matter, as meaningless theory as well.5 
In addition to Ayer, American philosopher Charles Leslie Stevenson defended the metaethical 
theory of emotivism by proffering a more moderate version.  In his 1937 publication The Emotive 
Meaning of Ethical Terms, as well as later publications, including Ethics and Language (1944), 
Stevenson defended a moderate version of emotivism which is able to avoid some of the challenges 
Ayer’s version faced.  Stevenson, unlike Ayer, concedes that there is a cognitive dimension that is part of 
our everyday moral discourse on such matters as stealing, climate change or abortion.  Sticking with 
Ayer’s example of stealing, the moral proposition, “You acted wrongly by stealing that money,” is 
descriptive in that, according to Stevenson, it does give information about the speaker’s interests, mainly 
one’s disapproval of stealing.  “More accurately, ethical judgments are said to describe what the state of 
                                                 
something else.  One often made suggestion is that moral judgments express the attitudes of people making those 
judgments” (Harman 1977, 27).  Herein, Harman’s characterization of emotivism is helpful.  Borrowing his example 
from philosophy of religion, it is clear that emotivism cannot simply throw away moral terminology, reasons and 
deliberations “in the way that religious terminology is according to the atheist “(Harman 1977, 28).  In other words, 
though emotivism is sympathetic with the metaethical commitments of nihilism, it recognizes that such 
commitments do not preclude moral experiences and the importance of practical/critical reasoning.   
5 In addition to this challenge, Louis Pojman also notes another objection against Ayer’s emotive theory of ethics.  
His challenge focuses upon the theory’s position that moral disagreements are only disagreements in attitude.   
Pojman invites us to consider the normative debate concerning abortion.  This debate between those who support of 
a woman’s right to choose and those who support the fetus’ absolute right to life is, according to the emotive theory 
of morals, fundamentally a disagreement in attitude.  However, as Pojman makes clear, this metaethical 
characterization “blurs an important distinction between having reasons for changing attitudes and having causes 




interest is, was, or will be, or to indicate what the state of interests would be under specified 
circumstances” (Stevenson 1937, 494).  However, this cognitive element has only a limited, incomplete 
role when it comes to moral deliberation, discourse and conflict resolution.  For Stevenson, the primary 
nature of value judgments and propositions is emotive, and thus non-cognitive.  Accordingly, the moral 
propositions we use to convey our moral beliefs are social instruments; their meanings and uses are 
revealed through our dynamic relationships with others and how we mutually influence each other’s 
interests. 
 The metaethical theory of prescriptivism is very similar to Stevenson’s version of emotivism.  
According to R.M. Hare, moral assertions are primarily evaluative.  However, unlike Stevenson and Ayer, 
the meaning of ethical terms is not only emotive, but also prescriptive.  In The Language of Morals 
(1952), as well as Freedom and Reason (1963) Hare argues that our moral language includes the 
following features: (1) prescriptivity; (2) logical relations; (3) universals; (4) and principles (Pojman 
2009).  While the prescriptivity feature of moral language was noted by both Ayer and Stevenson, Hare 
gives a more elaborate explanation of its role in everyday moral discourse.6   
                                                 
6 According to Hare, the prescriptive feature of moral language is action guiding.  If Jones says to Smith, “Charity is 
good,” Jones is both commending charity (i.e. expressing his attitude) as well prescribing “charitableness.”  
Embedded within such moral prescriptions are moral imperatives which are signified by words like “should” or 
“ought.”  For example, the moral imperative of the prescriptive statement, “you should be charitable,” has the formal 
structure of universalizability.  However, unlike Kant’s categorical imperative – act in such a way as to be able to 
will that principle to become a universal law – Hare’s method of universalizability is not asking us to consider 
whether there is an inherent contradiction in our willing something to become a universal law of nature.  Rather, 
Hare’s universalizability entails that when we assert any moral prescription, such prescriptions must be the same in 
all similar cases.  “Universalizability is the well-known, and ancient moral principle that individuals or situations 
that are the same in all morally relevant aspects must receive the same moral treatment.  This principle, in turn, is 
based on the non-moral principle that we must treat similar cases similarly.  If one dot is red and another dot is 
indistinguishable in color, then it is also red” (Schwartz 2012, 274).  This is different from Kant in several ways.  
For example, consider Kant’s test of lying.  He claims that since we cannot universalize lying without contradicting 
our willing it to become a universal law of nature, it is absolutely wrong; and thus, all rational persons have a moral 
duty to always tell the truth.  Hare’s universalizability is not as rigid and extreme.  In regards to truth telling, his 
prescriptivism would argue that the assertion “you should tell the truth,” must be the same in all other situations that 
have similar circumstances.  If the circumstances change, then it is reasonable to conclude that our prescriptions will 
change as well.  According to Hare, “It follows from universalizability that if I know that I ought to do a certain 
thing to a certain person, I am committed to the view that the very same thing out to be done to me, were I in exactly 
his situation, including having the same personal characteristics and in particular the same motivational states” 





 In addition to prescriptivism, the most recent version of non-cognitivism to emerge is 
expressivism, as defended by Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard.  Though there are subtle differences 
in their perspectives, they generally maintain that normative utterances express a stance or attitude, and in 
doing so, influence how others comport themselves.7  Ultimately, what is unique about their expressivist 
perspectives is how they attempt to make sense of, and thus justify, the realist-seeming qualities of moral 
discourse (i.e. quasi-realism).  In short, while there may seem to be natural or intuitive qualities embedded 
within value judgments and moral utterances, which in turn lead many of us to assume the existence of 
objective moral facts, no such qualities actually exist.  Accordingly, the expressivist perspectives of 
Blackburn and Gibbard provide cogent responses to challenges and objections that some might assume to 
be complete refutations of non-cognitivism, specifically the Frege-Geach Problem.  In short, the Frege-
Geach problem deals with the formal or logical properties of sentences that contain moral terms, such as 
good or bad, right or wrong, moral or immoral etc.  For example, consider the following argument: 
P1. Killing is immoral.   
P2. If killing is immoral, then torture is immoral 
C. Therefore torture is immoral. 
Regardless of whether or not any of the premises are true, and, regardless of any link between killing and 
torture, the argument is valid.  Such validity is, as Zimmerman notes, not a trivial matter.  “The 
argument’s value consists in its conforming to a highly prized rule of inference: it is a modus ponens 
argument.  And if a modus ponens argument has true premises, it must also have a true conclusion.  
Modus ponens is valued because it is a sound form of inference” (Zimmerman 2010, 183).  Based upon 
this touchstone of logic and critical reasoning, the argument above seems to render any and all terms truth 
apt, including normative terms.  This is a problem for non-cognitivism since the “atomic sentences” in the 
above argument, “admits of the two classic truth values: true and false,” thus leaving the non-cognitivist 
                                                 
7 What distinguishes these two thinkers is that Blackburn’s version of expressivism – quasi-realism - has closer 
affinities to Stevenson’s emotivism, in that moral utterances are expressions of attitude.  Gibbard’s version on the 
other hand – explanatory expressivism and plan expressivism – is more in keeping with Hare’s prescriptivism in that 




unable to, “adopt the classical explanation of the non-trivial validity of modus ponens arguments when 
these arguments are couched in evaluative vocabulary” (Zimmerman 2010, 184).  Simon Blackburn 
explicates this point in The Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning, when he writes, “if anyone 
represented themselves as holding the combination of 'p' and 'If p then q' and 'not-q' we would not know 
what to make of them. Logical breakdown means failure of understanding” (Blackburn 1998, 72).  He 
then clarifies the link between logical breakdown and failure of understanding when he states:      
We can put the point another way. A mental state, I have said, is identified by what it 'makes 
sense' to hold in combination with it. To avow a mental state is therefore partly to express 
acceptance of certain norms. To avow anything of the form 'If p then q' is to commit oneself to 
the combination 'Either not-p, or q' and to be tied to that combination is to disavow the 
combination of p with not-q. Holding both together is therefore unintelligible. Logic is our way of 
codifying and keeping track of intelligible combinations of commitment. (Blackburn 1998, 72)  
However, from the standpoint of expressivism, none of the premises in the aforementioned argument are, 
singly, true or false; immoral and moral, like good and bad, are expressions of our feelings which are not 
truth apt. 
 Metaethics remains to be an active field in contemporary philosophy.  Recently, we have seen 
how the analytic tools within this field can be comparatively applied to non-Anglo/American 
perspectives, including Nietzsche, and non-Western traditions, such as Buddhism.  For the remainder of 
this chapter, we shall focus upon Nietzsche’s metaethics; then, in Chapter two, we shall begin making 
sense of Buddhist metaethics so to frame our metaethical inquiry into Dōgen in Chapters three, four, five 
and six.   
 §1.5 Metaethics and Comparative Philosophy 
 In the previous sections we reviewed some of the general positions in metaethics, specifically 
error theory and non-cognitivism.  And, in regards to non-cognitivism, we reviewed how this metaethical 
outlook emerged through the philosophical commitments of logical positivism, and soon evolved into 
three different versions: emotivism, prescriptivism and expressivism.  Now, since the focus of this 




Nietzsche, there is good reason not to limit our interpretation of Nietzsche’s and Dōgen’s writings to any 
of these metaethical perspectives.  As we noted in the introduction, Dōgen’s philosophy, as well as 
Nietzsche’s, is a way-seeking practice.  Since the metaethical perspectives of error theory and non-
cognitivism are motivated by truth-seeking values, it is difficult to see how they will help us clarify 
Dōgen’s writings on metaethics.   
 Notwithstanding this hermeneutical point, there are additional reasons for resisting both a non-
cognitive and error-theoretical/fictionalist interpretation of Nietzsche’s and Dōgen’s metaethics.  One 
reason in particular pertains to the nature of emotions and feelings.  While I agree with the non-cognitive 
commitment that emotions, attitudes and affects are important aspects of our moral experiences and 
expressions, I am skeptical that Dōgen and Nietzsche would agree that we can reduce moral statements to 
such.  Herein, my interpretation of Dōgen and Nietzsche’s perspective vis-à- vis affects and emotions, is 
influenced by Robert Solomon’s research in True to Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling 
Us.  I do not think the non-cognitivists are accurate in simply stating that our moral expressions are, “just 
an ‘outward’ manifestation of an emotion,” but rather, “an aspect of a continuation of the emotion itself” 
(Solomon 2007, 213).  In other words, the theory of emotions that non-cognitivists appear to be 
championing, which is no doubt influenced by David Hume, is one that maintains that 
sentiment/affect/emotions are essentially distinct from reason.  More specifically in regards to moral 
judgments, they are derived, as Hume famously argues, from sentiment, not reason (i.e., reason is slave to 
the passions).  As we shall see when we encounter Nietzsche’s will to power, and Dōgen’s philosophy of 
mystical power (Jpn. jinzu), it will become clear that they don’t share this dualistic view, vis-à-vis 
emotion/sentiment/affect vs. reason.  For understanding both Nietzsche’s and Dōgen’s perspective on the 
nature of affect and emotion, I contend that Solomon’s outlook will be most helpful whereby, “emotions 
are neither discrete entities nor distinct types but complex multijudgment processes that engage any 




 Based upon the aforementioned points, I contend that Nietzsche’s metaethics provides a more 
appropriate philosophical lens for exploring metaethics so to set up an interpretative looking-glass into 
Dōgen’s writings; in addition, this will help establish a comparative dialogue between these two 
philosophers in Chapter seven.  Why Nietzsche?  Well, as we noted in the Introduction, and as we are 
about to discover, Nietzsche’s practice of philosophy, particularly his perspectivism, is motivated by way-
seeking values that are similar to those of Dōgen.  This is particularly evidenced by his direct criticisms of 
logical positivism.  Secondly, when we examine Nietzsche’s writings in regards to the affects and the will 
to power, it is clear that Nietzsche does not hold a dualistic view that discriminates essential differences 
between reason/thinking and the affects/emotion.  Indeed, I contend that Nietzsche would be sympathetic 
with Solomon’s account of emotions; an account that maintains, “we live in and through our emotions” 
(Solomon 2007, 10).  And, in regards to the philosophical meaning of what an emotion or an affect is, I 
do think that Nietzsche would agree with Solomon’s position of neither cognitivism nor non-cognitivism; 
“it is not that emotions are judgments and therefore intelligent but rather that emotions, which are rather 
primitive, have cognitive preconditions, namely beliefs and such, but that they themselves are not 
cognitive” (Solomon 2007, 216).  Solomon’s use of ‘not cognitive’ is precisely the idea of anti-
cognitivism that I will be using to characterize Nietzsche and Dōgen’s metaethical standpoint vis-à-vis the 
nature of moral propositions. 
§1.6 The Scope of Nietzsche’s Metaethics 
While there are a variety of nuanced interpretations of Nietzsche’s writings and philosophical 
works, to sift through and compare these interpretations in order to assess their merits would lead us 
outside the scope of this project.  In the remaining sections of this chapter, we shall limit our treatment of 
Nietzsche to two areas of inquiry: (1) his perspectivism vis-à-vis the ‘death of God’ and nihilism as a 
cultural phenomenon; and (2) his philosophy of language and the primacy of affects vis-à-vis his 
metaethical views; in Chapter seven we will, in dialogue with Dōgen, explore his way-seeking-practice of 




that while Nietzsche’s metaethics is clearly in keeping with the general metaethical perspective of anti-
realism, his standpoint in regards to normative propositions are neither cognitivist nor non-cognitivist.  
And, while this opens the possibility of characterizing Nietzsche’s anti-realism as fictionalist, I will show 
that there are specific reasons for resisting this label as well.  Thus, I contend that in addition to his anti-
realism, mainly that there are no moral facts or properties, Nietzsche is simply anti-cognitivist: moral 
propositions neither describe nor command moral truths per se, but rather reveal and conceal perspectives.   
§ 1.7 Perspectivism, ‘The Death of God’ and Nihilism as a Cultural Phenomenon 
There is a scholarly consensus that Nietzsche’s philosophy is best characterized as 
“perspectivism.”  One passage that is often referenced to support this characterization is found in the third 
essay of On The Genealogy of Morals (1887): 
Henceforth, my dear philosophers, let us be on guard against the dangerous old conceptual fiction 
that posited a “pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject”; let us guard against the snares 
of such contradictory concepts as “pure-reason,” “absolute spirituality,” “knowledge in itself”: 
these always demand that we should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye turned 
in no particular direction, in which the active and interpreting forces, through which alone seeing 
becomes seeing something, are supposed to be lacking; these always demand of the eye an 
absurdity and a nonsense.  There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective “knowing”; and 
the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to 
observe one thing, the more complete will our “concept” of this thing, our “objectivity,” be.  But 
to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every affect, supposing we were capable of 
this – what would that mean but to castrate the intellect?- (Nietzsche 1967, 119) 
Based upon this passage, among a good many others, Richard Schacht has noted that, “philosophical 
thought for Nietzsche must be not only progressive and regressive by turns, but also perspectivally 
horizontal on the levels of both specificity and generality, in order to do anything approaching justice to 
the tangled complexity of human affairs” (Schact 1996, 159).  To expand upon this line of interpretation, 
Robert Solomon characterizes Nietzsche’s perspectivism in light of his use of ad hominem arguments 
when he writes: 
Nietzsche’s use of ad hominem arguments has very much to do with his much-debated 
“perspectivism.”  That is, his view that one always knows or perceives or thinks about something 
from a particular “perspective” – not just a spatial viewpoint, of course, but a particular context of 




upbringing and, ultimately, determined by virtually everything about oneself, one’s psychological 
make-up, and one’s history.  There is no perspective-free, global viewpoint, no “God’s eye” view, 
only this particular perspective.  There is, therefore, no external comparison or correspondence to 
be made between what we believe truth “in itself” but only the comparison, competition, and 
differences in quality within and between perspectives themselves.  (Solomon 1996, 195) 
In the same article, Solomon provides a cogent examination of Nietzsche’s moral philosophy through this 
perspectival looking-glass.   
Perspectivism in morals means that there is no one scale of values and no single way of 
measuring people and their virtues, but that does not mean that there is no comparing perspectives 
or that some perspectives cannot be seen as preferable to others.  Of course, that preference will 
be based on the [kind of] people who occupy it and, of course, on the person whose preference it 
is.  But when we compare the self-confident perspective of the master with the reactive 
perspective of the slave, do we really want to say that there is no reason to prefer one to the 
other?  (“Submission to morality can be slavish or vain or selfish or resigned or obtusely 
enthusiastic or thoughtless or an act of desperation, like submission to a prince: in itself it is 
nothing moral”). (Solomon 1996, 203-204)  
As this looking-glass reveals, morality is not objective, but rather, subjectively oriented to one’s 
perspective.  
It is important to note that Nietzsche’s perspectivism ought not be confused with moral 
relativism, whereby the validity of any given moral principle is relative to the individual or one’s culture.  
The first reason for avoiding this interpretation is that relativism believes that moral truths do in fact exist 
despite the fact that they are not objective.  In light of this epistemic stance, one of the challenges that is 
often advanced against relativism is that moral truths are rendered arbitrary, which is not a view 
Nietzsche maintains.  For Nietzsche, as Joseph Keeping argues in his article “The Thousand Goals and 
The One Goal: Morality and Will to Power in Nietzsche” (2011), “Morality is contingent, yes, but not 
arbitrary.” (Keeping 2011, 76).  In these final sections of this chapter we will see how Nietzsche’s 
philosophy of the will to power calibrates our values in a way that is, though contingent, not arbitrary 
which is metaethically significant vis-à-vis affects and feelings.     
 To fully appreciate Nietzsche’s perspectivism, particularly as it relates to his commitment to the 




such in light of his famous parable from The Joyous Science (1882), whereby Nietzsche introduces the 
philosophy ‘God is dead’.  
Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning light, ran to the 
marketplace and shouted incessantly, ‘I seek God!  I seek God’?  As there were many people 
standing together who did not believe in God, he caused much amusement.  ‘Is he lost?’, asked 
one.  “Did He wander off like a child?’, asked another.  ‘Or is He hiding?  Is He afraid of us?’ 
“Has He gone to sea?  Has He emigrated?’  And in this manner they shouted and laughed.  Then 
the madman leaped into their midst, and looked at them with piercing eyes and cried, ‘Where did 
God go?  I will tell you!  We have killed Him – you and I!  We are all His murderers!  […]  God 
is dead!  God remains dead!  And we have killed him!” (Nietzsche 2018, 133-134).  
 The significance of this oft-cited parable is three-fold.  First, Nietzsche’s proclamation that ‘God’ is dead 
is a metaphysical proposition in that our universe is not the creation of an omnipotent, omniscient, 
omnipresent and omnibenevolent being; and, that we are not, as the sacred scriptures state and clerical 
testimonials echo, the crown of creation.  In light of the many scientific advances in the nineteenth 
century, particularly in the areas physics and biology, Christian metaphysics became increasingly 
untenable to the point that the philosophical perspective as a whole was rendered, according to Nietzsche, 
completely erroneous.   
Nietzsche’s ‘death of God’ philosophy presented in this parable sets the stage for thinking about 
his philosophical reflections on nihilism.  However, before we do, it is important to note that just because 
we are the murderers of ‘God’ via our advances in the sciences and critical thinking, Nietzsche’s 
philosophical perspective ought not be interpreted as an off-shoot of positivism’s philosophical 
commitment that science can eliminate all metaphysical beliefs such as God and free-will, and replace 
such with objective scientific facts.  While Nietzsche does think that God, the soul, free-will, and 
objective values are no longer tenable, he does not believe that science will be able to provide a new 
foundation that is metaphysically and epistemologically certain.  For example, Nietzsche attacks 
positivism in a number of his works, including Beyond Good and Evil (1886), when he states: 
It is especially the sight of those hodgepodge philosophers who call themselves “philosophers of 
reality” or “positivists” that is capable of injecting a dangerous mistrust into the soul of an 
ambitious young scholar: these are the best scholars and specialists themselves – that is palpable 




desired more of themselves at some time without having the right to this “more” and its 
responsibilities – and who now represent, in word and deed, honorably, resentfully, and 
vengefully, the unbelief in the masterly task and masterfulness of philosophy. (Nietzsche 1966, 
123)      
Nietzsche’s criticism of positivism’s hubris in thinking that they can arrive at an objective view of reality 
is supported by another passage from Beyond Good and Evil, whereby he challenges the notion that 
modern physics can provide an unbiased interpretation of the world; “It is perhaps dawning on five or six 
minds that physics, too, is only an interpretation and exegesis of the world (to suit us, if I may say so) and 
not a world explanation” (Nietzsche 1966, 21).  Thus Nietzsche’s declaration that ‘God is dead’ is not 
only a denial of the metaphysical claims of Christianity, but also of the epistemological values of science 
and the belief in objective truth.  This is why, toward the end of the parable of “The Madman,” Nietzsche 
states the following through the embodied presence of a man possessed by crazy, yet joyful, wisdom: 
‘I have come too early,’ he then said, ‘this is not the right time.  This tremendous event is still on 
its way and headed towards them – the word of it has not reached men’s ears.  Even after they are 
over and done with, thunder and lightning take time, the light of the stars takes time, and deeds 
too take time, before they can be seen and heard.  This deed is further away from them than the 
farthest star – and yet they have done it themselves!’ (Nietzsche 2018, 134) 
Thus, what is particularly significant about the parable is not that ‘God’ no longer exists, but rather, 
“given the way in which science seamlessly slotted into the same foundational space – nobody had really 
noticed the significance of the event” (Grimwood 2011, 52-53).  In other words, “Nietzsche does not 
argue for the Death of God itself in his work in a way that would engage traditionally with the philosophy 
of religion,” rather, “He is more interested in how we, as humans, react to the event: whether we embrace 
its full significance or continue to place a similar “faith” in concepts that remain dependent upon the same 
metaphysical assumptions, such as science and/or morality” (Grimwood 2011, 53).  Because God and 
objective truth, vis-à-vis science, represent societies’ highest values, and since they are no longer tenable, 
it follows that the highest values within society have fallen out beneath themselves; they no longer exist, 
regardless of whether one has realized it or not.  Herein, we can begin to see how Nietzsche’s ‘death of 




 What does it mean to state that nihilism is a cultural phenomenon?  Building upon my treatment 
of the parable of “The Madman,” I agree with Nolen Gertz who states that, “Discovering life is 
meaningless is not nihilism for Nietzsche; rather discovering life is meaningless and yet going on with 
our lives anyway is nihilism” (Gertz 2019, 79).  In other words, “According to Nietzsche, the 
meaninglessness of life is due not to the nature of the universe, but to the nature of our culture,” (Gertz 
2019, 80).  This interpretation of nihilism as a cultural phenomenon, is shared by Maudemarie Clark in 
her article “Nietzsche’s Nihilism” (Clark 2019).  More specifically, as Nietzsche states in The Will To 
Power (1901), nihilism as a cultural phenomenon is, “That the highest values devalue themselves” 
(Nietzsche 1967, 9).8  According to Clark and Gertz, nihilism as a cultural phenomenon is tied to the 
ascetic ideals of Christianity, particularly a mode of self-denial that is believed to lead, via the will, to 
objective truth.  As Clark explains: 
But what makes the will to truth an expression of the ascetic ideal?  First, it demands self-denial.  
It requires us to give up all the comforting myths and illusions that have given life meaning or 
made it seem bearable.  Second, the self-denial is not for the sake of some natural good […] the 
self-denial required by the will to truth is being undertaken in the name of an ideal that devalues 
natural human existence and sees truth and the will to it as elevated above nature – as something 
“pure” that is not bound up with messy and natural human desires.  So the self-denial required for 
the pursuit of truth is regarded as good precisely because it is good to curb one’s desires, bad to 
indulge in those desires.  And that is the ascetic ideal.  (Clark 2019, 376) 
I am sympathetic with Gertz’s and Clark’s interpretation of nihilism as cultural phenomenon, vis-à-vis 
Christian ascetic ideals; in Chapter seven, when we consider the historical roots of the ecological crisis, 
this interpretation will be helpful for bringing Nietzsche and Dōgen in dialogue together.  Therein we will 
see how such roots are planted not only in Judeo-Christian ascetic ideals, but in any transcendental 
perspective that attempts to achieve objective truth, positivism included.  To foreshadow that inquiry, 
consider Gertz’s reflections on nihilism as a cultural phenomenon, vis-à -vis ascetic ideals, whereby all 
that is natural and earthly is denied in the form of an affirmation of the transcendent or the supernatural: 
“The elevation of the supernatural and the reduction of the natural were for Nietzsche the primary causes 
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of nihilism.  The belief in a world beyond the world of experience, in a life after death, justified the 
asceticism preached by the priests, as self-cruelty, self-denial” (Gertz 2019, 50-51).  I contend that the 
destruction we are causing to the earth’s ecosystems through our over-consumptive life-styles is 
ultimately fueled by ascetic ideals that are, through and through, nihilistic, all-too-passively-nihilistic.    
Before we transition to (2), Nietzsche’s metaethics, it is important to note that Nietzsche 
considers nihilism as a cultural phenomenon to be, “a transitional stage” (Nietzsche 1968, 11).  What this 
means is that when one realizes that one’s highest values have become devalued, one will either become 
pessimistic about the world and the prospects of what the future might hold, or, become optimistic about 
what one can imagine and create.  If the former, then one will have fallen prey to a mode of passive 
nihilism; if the latter, one will have realized, with an affirmative ‘Yes,’ active nihilism.  Let’s consider 
this distinction further. 
 In The Will To Power, Nietzsche articulates the distinction between passive and active nihilism 
succinctly.   In regards to the former, it is a, “decline and recession of the power of the spirit”; in regards 
to later, it is “a sign of increased power of the spirit” (Nietzsche 1967, 17).  I contend that this distinction 
reveals another dimension of nihilism which is opened up by the ‘cultural phenomenon’ interpretation we 
just explored.  More specifically, it opens up a vantage point into moral psychology, vis-à-vis will to 
power and his master-slave morality.  As I interpret Nietzsche, upon realizing that ‘God’ is dead, and that 
our ascetic ideals have been shown to be without a foundation, this realization will have an impact upon 
one’s psychology and affective state of being.  For some, this realization will be devastating, so much so 
that one will be prompted to feel cheated.  One might reason that because there are no objective values or 
truths, and because we will all suffer and die, as Arthur Schopenhauer reminds us in light of his all-too-
Buddhist diagnosis of human existence, it would be either wishful thinking and/or existentially foolhardy 
(i.e. vanity) to affirmatively live within this meaningless world as if it were meaningful.  
That the most perfect manifestation of the will to live represented by the human organism, with 
its incomparably ingenious and complicated machinery, must crumble to dust and its whole 




unambiguous declaration that the striving of this will is essentially vain.  If it were something 
possessing value in itself, something which ought unconditionally to exist, it would not have non-
being as its goal. (Schopenhauer 1970, 54)  
According to Nietzsche, Schopenhauer’s pessimism, as well as early Buddhism, are touchstone examples 
of passive nihilism, vis-à-vis denial of the will to live.  In The Twilight of the Idols (1888), Nietzsche 
states that Schopenhauer, “is for a psychologist a first-rate case: namely, as a maliciously ingenious 
attempt to adduce in favor of a nihilistic total depreciation of life precisely the counter-instances, the great 
self-affirmations of the “will to life,” life’s forms of exuberance” (Nietzsche 1966, 527).  Or, in regards to 
Buddhism, Nietzsche states in The Will To Power, “the weary nihilism that no longer attacks; its most 
famous form, Buddhism; a passive nihilism, a sign of weakness (Nietzsche 1967, 18).  The passive 
nihilism by which Nietzsche understands these two perspectives is important for making sense of his 
metaethics.  For example, in The Will To Power he writes: 
The philosophical nihilist is convinced that all that happens is meaningless and in vain; and that 
there ought not to be anything meaningless and in vain.  But whence this: there ought not to be?  
From where does one get this “meaning,” this standard?  At bottom, the nihilist thinks that the 
sight of such a bleak, useless existence makes a philosopher feel dissatisfied, bleak, desperate.  
Such an insight goes against our finer sensibility as philosophers.  It amounts to the absurd 
valuation: to have any right to be, the character of existence would have to give the philosopher 
pleasure. (Nietzsche 1967, 23) 
Within this metaethical reflection, Nietzsche is clearly denying the pessimistic assumption that suffering 
renders life meaningless.  If this were true, then the opposite would also be true, mainly that a life free 
from suffering and/or filled with pleasure would be sufficient for realizing a meaningful life.  Nietzsche is 
unambiguously clear throughout many of his works that pleasure or happiness are neither the goals for 
existence, nor necessary for realizing a meaningful life.  In Beyond Good and Evil for example, he states 
just the opposite: 
The discipline of suffering, of great suffering – do you not know that only this discipline has 
created all enhancements of man so far?  That tension of the soul in unhappiness which cultivates 
its strength, its shudders face to face with great ruin, its inventiveness and courage in enduring, 
preserving, interpreting and exploiting suffering, and whatever has been granted to it of 
profundity, secret mask, spirit, cunning, greatness – was it not granted to it through suffering, 




This passage shines additional light upon the moral psychology of passive nihilism, which can be 
characterized as a slave morality; and, in this normative light, we can begin to see Nietzsche’s 
philosophical hammer at work whereby, in a spirit of active-nihilism, he reassesses the values of suffering 
and happiness in order to create new ones via a moral imagination embodied by a master morality.  From 
the master morality perspective, the death of ‘God” will be a welcomed event as it will provide an 
opportunity to imagine new values, and affirmatively embrace our chances of failure as we face a future 
that is for us to determine and create.  To clarify this metaethical distinction, we shall briefly examine 
what Nietzsche means by master and slave moralities. 
 Both Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of Morals provide a clear breakdown of this 
metaethical philosophy.  For example, in Part Nine, “What is Noble,” from Beyond Good and Evil, 
Nietzsche lays bare the metaethical conclusions he has realized from his research into the history of moral 
systems and cultural beliefs: “There are master morality and slave morality” (Nietzsche 1966, 204).9  
According to Nietzsche, while there are instances whereby mixed cultures provide the opportunity for 
these two moralities to interpenetrate, the metaethical point that this master/slave philosophy is 
highlighting is this: “The moral discrimination of values has originated either among a ruling group 
whose consciousness of its difference from the ruled group was accompanied by delight – or among the 
ruled, the slaves and dependents of every degree” (Nietzsche 1966, 204).  When it comes to the moral 
values of the slaves and those who are ruled, what is good consists of values that serve as, “the only 
means for enduring the pressure of existence” (Nietzsche 1966, 207).  In the context of thinking about 
passive nihilism, Nietzsche enumerates some of the core values that are salient to a slave perspective:    
Probably, a pessimistic suspicion about the whole condition of man will find expression, perhaps 
condemnation of man along with his condition.  The slave’s eye is not favorable to the virtues of 
the powerful: he is skeptical and suspicious, subtly suspicious, of all the “good” that is honored 
there – he would like to persuade himself that even their happiness is not genuine.  Conversely, 
those qualities are brought out and flooded with light which serve to ease existence for those who 
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suffer: here pity, the complaisant and obliging hand, the warm heart, patience, industry, humility 
and friendliness are honored. (Nietzsche 1966, 207) 
On the other hand, a master morality whose value system is determined by those who rule, “the 
opposition of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ means approximately the same as ‘noble’ and ‘contemptible’” (Nietzsche 
1966, 204).  In his article, “The Internalization of Nietzsche’s Master and Slave Morality” (2003), Steve 
Kirby notes that in response to the death of ‘God’ and the dawn of nihilism, master and slave moralities 
provided two orientations towards existence: an orientation that is anti-life, and an orientation that is life 
affirming. 
For Nietzsche, that which advocates and esteems humility, self-denial, pity and the intellect is 
opposed to life.  On the other hand, that which promotes and encourages growth, strength, action, 
instinct, and the expansion and expression of power is held to be life affirming.  Nietzsche 
contends that these two quite distinct worldviews are embodied in opposing set of values, which 
he calls ‘aristocratic’ or ‘master’ morality and ‘slave’ morality. (Kirby 2003, 16) 
A key metaethical distinction between the master morality and slave morality which we will be 
examining in the next section of this chapter, as well as in Chapter seven when we bring Nietzsche and 
Dōgen in dialogue together, is that those who are masters are those who create values; “The noble type of 
man experiences itself as determining values; it does not need approval; it judges, “what is harmful to me 
is harmful in itself”; it knows itself to be that which first accords honor to things; it is value creating” 
(Nietzsche 1966, 205).  For right now, we can simply highlight key psychological distinctions between 
these two moralities.   In regards to a slave morality, such individuals live according to herd instincts and 
behaviors; “Inasmuch as at all times, as long as there have been human beings, there have also been herds 
of men (clans, communities, tribes, peoples, states, churches) and always a great many people who 
obeyed, compared with the small number of those commanding” (Nietzsche 1966, 110).  On the other 
hand, those who are masters embrace independence and solitude; “Independence is for the very few; it is 
a privilege of the strong” (Nietzsche 1966, 41). Accordingly, from the perspective of passive nihilism and 
the herd instincts/cognitive biases of the slave, the morality of masters, and their independent spirit that 




High and independent spirituality, the will to stand alone, even a powerful reason are experienced 
as dangers; everything that elevates an individual above the herd and intimidates the neighbor is 
henceforth called evil; and the fair, modest, submissive, conforming mentality, the mediocrity of 
desires attains moral designations and honors […] any high and hard nobility and self-reliance is 
almost felt to be an insult and arouses mistrust; the “lamb,” even more than the “sheep,” gains in 
respect. (Nietzsche 1966, 114)    
However, from the perspective of the master, such condemnation on behalf of a herd-mentality is, despite 
being a popularly held belief, madness; according to Nietzsche, “Madness is rare in individuals – but in 
groups, parties, nations, and ages it is the rule” (Nietzsche 1966, 90).  
Before we transition to the next section of this chapter, it is important to note that according to 
Nietzsche, one does not choose to be a slave, nor does one choose to be a master; rather, as Gertz notes, 
“who is a master and who is a slave is determined not by struggle but by birth, by who was born strong 
and who was born weak” (Gertz 2019, 42).  Thus, in light of the death of ‘God’ so too, in regards to who 
we are vis-à-vis a slave or a master, there is no free-will to choose; according to Nietzsche, “in real life it 
is only a matter of strong and weak wills” (Nietzsche 1966, 29).  From the perspective of one who has a 
strong will, the death of ‘God’ and nihilism as a cultural phenomenon provides an opportunity to ask 
ourselves, “What are the ideals in the present that we must oppose in order to create a future without 
nihilism?” (Gertz 2019 163).  It is on this point that we shall focus our attention more closely, vis-à-vis 
Nietzsche’s metaethics.  
§1.8 Language and Nietzsche’ Metaethical Hammer of Self-Overcoming 
 As we noted above, passive nihilism represents a pessimistic response to the death of god, and the 
loss of metaphysical, epistemological and ethical foundations (i.e. ascetic values); passive nihilism is a 
“recession of the power of the spirit” (Nietzsche 1966, 17).  To begin making sense of how Nietzsche 
would respond to the question, “What are the ideals in the present that we must oppose in order to create a 
future without nihilism?” (Gertz 2019 163), we can start by considering the following normative 
statement he makes in The Will To Power: “These are the demands I make upon you – however ill they 




not a critique, with the question: “why submission?” (Nietzsche 1967, 214).  Nietzsche insists that we 
must begin by being critical; rather than simply follow the normative principles that society attempts to 
indoctrinate, we should engage in a metaethical critique (i.e. active nihilism) of the values and moral 
beliefs that expect us to surrender our ‘will to live.’  We should become, as noted in Beyond Good and 
Evil, “extra moral:”  
But today – shouldn’t we have reached the necessity of once more resolving on a reversal and 
fundamental shift in values, owing to another self-examination of man, another growth in 
profundity?  Don’t we stand at the threshold of a period which should be designated negatively, 
to begin with, as extra-moral? […] We believe that morality in the traditional sense, the morality 
of intentions, was a prejudice, precipitate and perhaps provisional – something on the order of 
astrology and alchemy – but in any case something that must be overcome.  The overcoming of 
morality, in a certain sense even the self-overcoming of morality - let this be the name for that 
long secret work which has been saved up for the finest and most honest, also the most malicious 
consciences of today, as living touchstones for the soul. (Nietzsche 1966, 45) 
Nietzsche’s metaethics as a self-overcoming of traditional values is the starting point by which any 
response to the aforementioned question will be framed; and, as we shall see, the practice of self-
overcoming is itself its own goal.   Indeed, I believe that it is in light of his philosophy of self-overcoming 
that we are able to understand how metaethical inquiry is fundamental to Nietzsche’s philosophical 
practice.  Rather than proffering action guiding directives, or providing an exhaustive analysis of the 
nature of virtue and the cultivation of such, Nietzsche is interested in getting us to discover metaethics as 
a practice for ourselves.  As he states in The Joyous Science, “So far, no one has examined the value of 
that most famous of all medicines called morality, to which end one must first call it into question.  Well, 
that is precisely our work” (Nietzsche 2018, 230).  Unlike a passive nihilist, the active nihilist is one who 
has the courage to be critical in carrying out a metaethical inquiry into the nature of moral values. 
One does not have to look too hard to find examples of Nietzsche’s forceful critique and self-
overcoming of objectivist/realist ethical theories.  For example, in regards to the importance traditional 
theories of objectivism have attributed to our intentions, particularly Kant’s categorical imperative, 
Nietzsche states, “we immoralists have the suspicion that the decisive value of an action lies precisely in 




seen, known, ‘conscious,’ still belongs to its surface and skin – which like every skin, betrays something 
and conceals even more” (Nietzsche 1966, 44).  Or, more specifically in regards to cognitivism, the 
metaethical commitment that moral propositions can accurately or falsely describe reality, Nietzsche’s 
philosophy of language in general, moral language in particular, evidences anti-realist and anti-cognitivist 
leanings.  In regards to his philosophy of language, Nietzsche’s perspective is novel as he believes that 
consciousness, and an organism’s capacity for being conscious, is conditioned by an embodied capacity 
and need to communicate.  As he states in The Joyous Science, “consciousness has developed only under 
the pressure of the need for communication – that from the very beginning it has been necessary and 
useful only between man and man (especially between those commanding and those obeying)” (Nietzsche 
2018, 241).   
Herein there are several takeaways to note.  First, Nietzsche clearly believed that language, and 
our capacity to use such, is an antecedent condition for consciousness and cognition proper.  
Consciousness does not determine our ability to use language, instead, language determines our capacity 
and experience of being conscious.  We will highlight this philosophical point again in Chapter five when 
we explore the nature of language according to Zen in general, Dōgen in particular.  For right now, 
regarding this first point, we can see that language is embedded within the existence of organisms, such as 
homo sapiens, prior to their awareness of their ability to make use of such.  The second point to note is 
that Nietzsche believed that the need to communicate was motivated, metaethically speaking, by a master-
slave moral dynamic, which entails the following: (1) that all language, regardless of whether or not our 
propositions are ‘normative’, are fueled by values; and (2) the values that fuel our use of language flow 
from pre-reflective, pre-cognitive conditions that define our embodied existence.  In regards to his 
philosophy of moral language in particular, in Nietzsche’s “Epigrams and Interludes” from Beyond Good 
and Evil, he is clear that moral objectivism and cognitivism are untenable theories: “There are no moral 
phenomena at all, only a moral interpretation of phenomena” (Nietzsche 1966, 85).  According to 




interpretations to objective facts or truths, extends to morality as well.  While there is a plurality of moral 
perspectives by which one can experience the world, all of which are constituted by some dynamic 
relationship between slave values and master values, no perspective is free from one or more of the 
cognitive biases that shape our interpretation and evaluation of actions, behaviors and events.  We can 
hear an echo of this hermeneutical point in Nietzsche’s The Joyous Science, when he states, “When we 
see an image, we immediately interpret it with the aid of all the prior experiences we have ever had, in 
accordance with the degree of our honesty and fair-mindedness.  There are no experiences which are not 
at the same time moral experiences, not even in the realm of sense-perception” (Nietzsche 2018, 127).   
In short, all experiences entail some estimation of values that prevent one from ever arriving at an 
objective standpoint of truth; thus there are only interpretations and perspectives.10  However, according 
to Nietzsche, no perspective or interpretation can accurately convey our thoughts about our experiences; 
rather, they remain ineffable.  This point about ineffability is noted in The Joyous Science, wherein he 
writes: 
An insight came to me while I was walking, and I tried to capture it in the first words that came to 
mind so that it would not fly away again.  But now it remains caught in these arid and inadequate 
words, waddling about in them, and has lost all of its original liveliness.  When I look upon it 
now, I cannot imagine how I could have been as happy as I was when I first caught this bird. 
(Nietzsche 2018, 191)   
In this passage, Nietzsche’s words show how there are limitations in regards to our ability to use language 
to express thoughts and feelings, or describe reality.  Thus, Nietzsche seems to be claiming that there is 
always something ineffable about our experiences despite our ability to use words to describe or express 
such; again in The Joyous Science, Nietzsche states, “Even our thoughts cannot be entirely expressed in 
words” (Nietzsche 2018, 167).  And, in Beyond Good and Evil, he offers further analytical considerations 
about the nature of language and our limited ability to effectively use such by highlighting that, in a way 
that foreshadows Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language in the twentieth century:  
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Words are acoustical signs for concepts; concepts, however, are more or less definite image signs 
for often recurring and associated sensations, for groups of sensations.  To understand one 
another, it is not enough that one use the same words; one also has to use the same words for the 
same species of inner experiences; in the end one has to have one’s experience in common. 
(Nietzsche 1966, 216).  
Thus, according to Nietzsche, “the history of language is the history of a process of abbreviation” 
(Nietzsche 1966, 216); and, because all interpretations of facts are a result of our ability to use a particular 
language, it follows that all interpretations and perspectives are, too, mere abbreviations; they do not fully 
disclose what is real or true.   
In regards to normative matters, language does not describe moral facts or properties, nor is it 
intended to.  For Nietzsche, the words we use when we participate in a moral discourse and express value 
judgments serve as linguistic signs that refer to our affects, not mind-independent properties.  In Part 
Five, “Natural History of Morals,” from Beyond Good and Evil, for example, Nietzsche states: 
Even apart from the value of such claims as “there is a categorical imperative in us,” one can still 
always ask: what does such a claim tell us about the man who makes it?  There are moralities 
which are meant to justify their creator before others.  Other moralities are meant to calm him and 
lead him to be satisfied with himself.  With yet others he wants to crucify himself and humiliate 
himself.  With others he wants to wreak revenge, with others conceal himself, with others 
transfigure himself and place himself way up, at a distance.  This morality is used by its creator to 
forget, that one to have others forget him or something about him.  Some moralists want to vent 
their power and creative whims on humanity; some others, perhaps including Kant, suggest with 
their morality: “What deserves respect in me is that I can obey- and you ought not to be different 
from me.” – In short, moralities are also merely a sign language of the affects. (Nietzsche 1966; 
99-100) 
That language and thinking are nothing other than expressions of our affects and feelings is echoed in 
other works by Nietzsche, including The Joyous Science, “Thoughts are the shadows of our feelings – 
always emptier and simpler than these” (Nietzsche 2018, 154); and, in regards to the moral judgments that 
are formed by our use of language, Nietzsche states the following in Twilight of the Idols: 
My demand upon the philosopher is known, that he takes his stand beyond good and evil and 
leave the illusion of moral judgment beneath himself.  This demand follows from an insight 
which I was the first to formulate: that there are altogether no moral facts.  Moral judgments 
agree with religious ones in believing in realities which are no realities.  Morality is merely an 
interpretation of certain phenomena – more precisely, a misinterpretation.  Moral judgments, like 
religious ones, belong to a stage of ignorance at which the very concept of the real and the 
distinction between what is real and imaginary, are still lacking; thus “truth,” at this stage, 




never to be taken literally: so understood, they always contain mere absurdity.  (Nietzsche 1954, 
501) 
Based upon these passages, we can now begin making sense of how to characterize Nietzsche’s 
metaethical philosophy.     
  According to Brian Leiter, Nietzsche is an anti-realist.  In his book Nietzsche On Morality 
(2002), Leiter contends that, “Nietzsche’s central argument for anti-realism about value is explanatory: 
moral facts do not fit into the “best explanation” of experience, and so are not constituents of the 
objective world” (Leiter 2002, 148).  In light of the many passages reviewed above, I am sympathetic 
with this characterization; Nietzsche does not believe that there are any moral facts, properties or 
objective truths.  However, this still leaves open the following question: how should we characterize his 
standpoint on the nature of moral propositions and value judgments?  As we noted at the beginning of this 
chapter, one can be anti-realist about moral properties and truths, yet still maintain that moral propositions 
are cognitive despite their erroneous nature (i.e. error theory); in short, moral propositions are useful 
fictions (i.e. fictionalism).  In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche seems to defend this perspective when he 
writes: 
It is no more than a moral prejudice that truth is worth more than mere appearance; it is even the 
worst proved assumption there is in the world. […] Indeed, what forces us at all to suppose that 
there is an essential opposition of “true” and “false”?  Is it not sufficient to assume degrees of 
apparentness and, as it were lighter and darker shadows and shades of appearance – different 
“values,” to use the language of painters?  Why couldn’t the world that concerns us – be a 
fiction?  And if somebody asked, “but to a fiction there surely belongs an author?” – couldn’t one 
answer simply: why?  Doesn’t this “belongs” perhaps belong to the fiction, too? (Nietzsche 1966, 
46-47) 
Nadeem Hussain defends a fictionalist interpretation of Nietzsche in “Honest Illusion: Valuing for 
Nietzsche’s Free Spirits,” from Nietzsche and Morality (2007).  Hussain argues that Nietzsche’s 
metaethics is an attempt to rally his audience of free spirits to engage in a ‘fictionalist simulacrum’ of 
valuing whereby one is able to formulate value judgments while at the same time knowing that nothing is 




However, Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick disagree with Hussain’s interpretation.  They 
proffer a nuanced interpretation of Nietzsche’s metaethics in their article "Nietzsche and Moral 
Objectivity: The Development of Nietzsche's Metaethics" (2007).  They argue that while Nietzsche’s 
Human, All Too Human (1878), which is the main text that Hussain uses to develop his metaethical 
interpretation, welcomes a nihilistic interpretation of his metaethics as error theory, in The Joyous 
Science, Nietzsche’s philosophical perspective takes a non-cognitive turn.  They maintain that Nietzsche’s 
non-cognitive leanings are compatible with the objectivity of some evaluative positions.   
This nuanced interpretation is expanded upon in a different metaethical direction in Peter 
Poellner’s article “Affect, Value, and Objectivity” (2007); therein he provides a cogent metaethical 
examination of affects, and their relationship to the ‘phenomenal objectivity’ of values.  Poellner 
maintains that while Nietzsche is an anti-realist in that values are not metaphysically real; he believes that 
our conventional experiences have phenomenal objectivity in that the entities that are valuable to us are in 
some way ‘subjectively real.’  Accordingly, Poellner argues that affective states are the modes of 
experience by which we are acquainted with value, and that values are “essentially dependent on 
emotions and affective states” (Poellner 2007, 227).  In regards to the ‘phenomenal objectivity’ of values, 
he argues that, “What is objective in this sense is what is standardly presented as pertaining to the 
(everyday, phenomenal) object, just as the visible, phenomenal color of a table appears as a property of 
the table itself, and not for example, as a property of an ‘inner sensation’ (Poellner 2007, 233).   
Of these conflicting interpretations, which one, if any, is most compelling?  As I noted above, I 
am sympathetic with Leiter’s interpretation; anti-realism accurately captures Nietzsche’s metaethics.  
However, I am not sympathetic with Hussain’s fictionalist interpretation for reasons noted in Simon 
Blackburn’s article "Perspectives, Fictions, Errors, Play," (2007), as well as Alex Silk’s article “Nietzsche 
and Contemporary Metaethics” (2016).11   According to Blackburn, it is hard to see how fictionalism 
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would be able to explain Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity, which was all-too-central to his overall 
philosophical project and perspective.  Silk echoes this concern; he maintains that not only is the 
ascription of error theory to Nietzsche “undermotivated,” the fictionalist “practice of honest illusions fails 
to capture Nietzsche’s claims about value creation” (Silk 2016, 6).  In regards to error theory, Silk 
contends that such an interpretation is insufficient for it would be anachronistic. 
The metaethical questions of principal interest to Nietzsche aren’t semantic questions — 
questions about the conventional meaning of normative language. They are broadly metaphysical 
questions about the nature of normative properties. What Nietzsche is denying in the apparent 
error-theoretic passages is that there are attitude independent normative properties. Perhaps, in 
light of certain speakers’ acceptance of attitude-independence, many normative claims have 
assumed a false and psychologically deficient view of the world. But this is insufficient for an 
error theory.  One can accept a metaphysics on which nothing is valuable independent of agents’ 
evaluative attitudes, while being neutral on the semantics of whether our linguistic conventions 
assume otherwise. (Silk 2016, 7) 
And, in regards to value creation, Silk maintains that is unclear how a fictionalist metaethic is able to 
square with what Nietzsche believes to be a salient dimension of his philosophical practice, mainly the 
self-overcoming of old values, and the creation of new normative perspectives. 
Nietzsche’s task is to transform reality: it is to “mak[e] things” valuable even though they aren’t 
valuable “in themselves” (GS 299). It is puzzling why Hussain regards a fictionalist interpretation 
as well-placed to capture talk about value creation. Pretending to value doesn’t create values any 
more than riding around cackling on a broom creates a witch. A fictionalist interpretation thus 
obscures Nietzsche’s claims that there are values and that the new philosophers (in some sense to 
be explained) make this the case: “Whatever has value in the present world has […] been given, 
granted value, and we were the givers and granters!” (GS 301). Indeed, because of its 
commitment to error theory, fictionalism is inconsistent with these claims. (Silk 2016, 8) 
For these reasons, Silk contends, and I agree, that fictionalism fails to capture the nature of Nietzsche’s 
metaethics.  As an alternative to fictionalism, Silk proposes ‘constructivism’; “Constructivism treats 
normative properties as attitude-dependent […] it treats normative facts as grounded in facts about the 
(possibly counterfactual) evaluative attitudes of agents. Normative facts are nothing ‘over and above’ 
facts about agents’ evaluative attitudes” (Silk 2016, 12).  Herein, while I a sympathetic with Silk’s use of 
‘attitude dependent’, I find the label ‘constructivism’ hard to digest, mainly because it lends itself to 
metaphors that I don’t believe Nietzsche would share.  For example, when we think of constructing 




provide the architectural integrity for the entire structure.  Herein, constructivism leads one to begin 
thinking about first principles which is anathema to Nietzsche’s philosophical project.  Moreover, the 
very term ‘construct’ seems, prima facie, to be undergirded by teleological values.  For example, when 
constructing a building, there is specific goal in mind, and when that goal is realized, the construction is 
complete.  Since Nietzsche resisted teleological value commitments, perhaps it is prudent to avoid the 
constructivist label so not to give the false impression that there is some final goal that one’s efforts, vis-
à-vis value creation, is looking to achieve.12   
 In regards to Clark and Dudrick’s characterization, I don’t find their interpretation to be any 
more compelling than that of Hussain’s.  While they are right that Nietzsche does seem to be an 
objectivist on some matters, such as higher and lower types of man, I don’t think Nietzsche actually 
thought that conceptions of higher and lower types are mind-independent.  To illustrate this point, 
consider Leiter’s counter factual from Nietzsche On Morality: 
If it is an objective fact that Goethe is a higher type and, say, Hitler, is a herd animal, then the 
following counterfactual would seem true: 
 (c) If Hitler had been like Goethe, he would have been better off. 
He would have been better off because he would have been a higher type, instead of a lower type 
– and it is an objective fact that the high are really high, and the low are really low.  But this 
seemingly objective judgment – that Hitler would have been better off had he been more like 
Goethe – is a non-prudential value judgment; it is not a judgment about what is good for Hitler 
under the circumstances, but rather a judgment about what would make Hitler better off, but for 
his circumstances. In general, it seems that conceding the objectivity of “high” and “low” permits 
one to make objective non-prudential value judgments like: the good of the higher type is 
superior to the good of the lower type. (Leiter 2002, 151) 
In other words, if we follow Clark and Dudrick’s nuanced interpretation of Nietzsche’s writings on 
metaethical questions and issues, we would have to accept the normative judgment that the good of the 
master is really superior to the good of the slave.  However, this value judgment would certainly beg the 
question of how one actually knows that the values of the master are ‘truly’ superior to those of the slave?  
                                                 
12 I contend that the term ‘cultivation’ rather than ‘constructivism’ is more fitting for thinking about Nietzsche’s 
perspective value creation since it is not tied to any specific goal that is ever complete.  For example, the cultivation 




After all, as we noted from his Beyond Good and Evil, the slave views the moral values of the master as 
evil, and so the normative judgment that the good of the master is really superior to the good of the slave 
must be defended by one who believes that they are a master, which is not a mind-independent judgment.  
“For these reasons, it seems important that Nietzsche’s judgments of ‘high’ and ‘low’ do not turn out to 
be objective. […] The suggestion, then, is that Nietzsche be construed as an anti-realist about ‘high’ and 
‘low,’ just as he is about all non-prudential value concepts” (Leiter 2002, 152).  Herein, Leiter’s criticism 
can be equally extended to Poellner’s defense of ‘phenomenal objectivity;’ thus Poellner’s interpretation, 
I contend, misses the metaethical mark as well.   
But now the question we must ask is whether or not Clark and Dudrick’s non-cognitive 
interpretation is compelling?  Should non-cognitivism be included in our anti-realist interpretation of 
Nietzsche?   I contend that if we follow Solomon’s lead in regards to thinking about the nature of 
emotions and affects, then non-cognitivism is not an accurate characterization of Nietzsche’s metaethics; 
nor is sentimentalism (which is a precursor to non-cognitivism), as Michael Forster argues in “Nietzsche 
On Morality As Sign language of the affects” (2017), hermeneutically helpful either.  Based upon 
Nietzsche’s writings, it is not obvious that he would share the same interpretation of feelings, emotions 
and affects as maintained by non-cognitivism and sentimentalism.  For non-cognitivism and 
sentimentalism, there is a rigid distinction between emotions and reason; however, for Nietzsche, as he 
notes in Part Two “The Free Spirit,” from Beyond Good and Evil, to think there is a rigid divide between 
any set of opposites, including reason and emotion, is due to our language, which is incapable to telling us 
what the world is objectively like. 
Even if language, here as elsewhere, will not get over its awkwardness, and will continue to talk 
of opposites where there are only degrees and many subtleties of gradation, even if the inveterate 
Tartuffery of morals, which now belongs to our unconquerable “flesh and blood,” infects the 
words even those of us who know better – here and there we understand it and laugh at the way in 
which precisely science at its best seeks most to keep us in this simplified, thoroughly artificial, 
suitably constructed and suitably falsified world – at the way in which, willy-nilly, it loves error, 




For Nietzsche, both feeling and thinking emerge as manifestations of our will; more specifically, the will 
to power: “just as sensations (and indeed many kinds of sensations) are to be recognized as ingredients of 
the will, so, secondly, should thinking also” (Nietzsche 1966, 25).  We will provide further treatment of 
the will to power in Chapter seven.  For right now, my reasons for resisting a non-cognitivist 
characterization are two-fold.  First, the fact that Nietzsche emphasizes the importance of the affects in his 
metaethical reflections does not entail that he is a non-cognitivist of the same rank as the twentieth 
century perspectives that emerged from the philosophical commitments of logical positivism.  As we 
noted above, Nietzsche thought positivism to be motivated by ascetic ideals, which he did not share.  The 
second reason is an extension of Solomon’s nuanced interpretation of emotions from True To Our 
Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us, which avoids reducing them to mere feelings as he 
believes the twentieth century non-cognitivists do.  According to Solomon, since emotions are tied to our 
understanding of the world and our situation within it, the non-cognitivist view is only partially right; 
“The emotion is already an assertion of a moral judgment, without which it would be unintelligible” 
(Solomon 2007, 207).  I contend that Solomon’s interpretation of emotion is helpful for making sense of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy of the affects vis-à-vis moral beliefs and normative judgments; “Judgments 
already inhere in ‘pleasure’ and ‘displeasure’; stimuli are differentiated according to whether or not they 
further the feeling of power” (Nietzsche 1967, 354).  Based upon his account, perhaps our 
characterization of Nietzsche’s metaethics as anti-realist should include anti-cognitivism, rather than non-
cognitivism, and leave it at that; moral propositions do not describe moral facts nor express normative 
truths, but rather, reveal and/or conceal a perspective.   To use a metaethical label that is tied to truth-
seeking values that Nietzsche does not share will only confuse our understanding of Nietzsche, rather than 
clarify.  
§ 1.9 Chapter Summary 
In this opening chapter, we set out to familiarize ourselves with the general landscape of 




relativism/subjectivism; and (3) nihilism.  In doing so, we were able to illuminate (3), nihilism, by 
fleshing out the differences between its extreme and weak versions: error theory and non-cognitivism.  
Based upon this general inquiry, we were then able to explore important aspects of Nietzsche’s metaethics 
with the hope of clarifying where he stands in regards to the status of moral values and the nature of 
moral propositions.  We began by inquiring into his perspectivism in light of the philosophy of the death 
of ‘God;’ this allowed us to see how nihilism is a cultural phenomenon with two orientations: passive 
nihilism vis-à-vis life-denying pessimism, and active nihilism vis-à-vis life affirming optimism.  And, in 
the context of ethics, we saw how passive and active nihilism provide the psychological underpinnings for 
Nietzsche’s slave morality and master morality.  These distinctions, as we noted, are able to reveal how 
his perspectivism is oriented towards overcoming the herd instincts of passive nihilism/slave morality in 
order to create new values for the future of humanity.  From this examination we were then able to inquire 
into how this perspectivism sets the stage for making sense of Nietzsche’s metaethical commitments 
regarding the status of moral values and moral propositions.  By considering his philosophy of language 
in general, we were able to see that Nietzsche does not believe that language can accurately describe or 
explain the nature of reality, and that this philosophical contention can be extended to moral beliefs as 
well; language is ultimately limited in its ability to convey or express moral truths.  This inquiry in turn 
allowed for us to consider the important role the affects play in Nietzsche’s philosophy, which thereby 
provided a looking glass for making sense of how to characterize his metaethics.  After reviewing a 
number of metaethical interpretations from Nietzsche scholars, including Leiter, Hussain, Clark, Dudrick, 
Poellner and Silk, we concluded that while anti-realism is useful for characterizing Nietzsche’s standpoint 
on the nature of moral values and truths, neither error theory, fictionalism nor non-cognitivism are able to 
fully capture the nuances of Nietzsche’s perspectivism.  Thus, when it comes to the status of moral 
propositions, we concluded that Nietzsche is anti-cognitivist; for Nietzsche, moral propositions do not 
describe or express mind-independent normative facts/properties or truths, but instead, reveal a 




considering the different ways scholars have examined and treated Buddhist ethics through a comparative 























Buddhism and Western Moral Philosophy 
 
 2.1 Chapter Overview 
 The goal of this chapter is three-fold: (1) to consider some hermeneutical issues concerning 
scholarly interpretations of Buddhist ethics through Western ethical theories and philosophical concepts; 
(2) to examine the different ways in which contemporary scholars have interpreted Buddhist ethics within 
Theravāda and Mahāyāna traditions in light of Western ethical theories; and (3) to explore the metaethical 
implications of the Mahāyāna philosophy of emptiness, specifically in regards to the problem of justifying 
conventional value judgments and normative expressions.  In regards to (1) I situate my examination in 
light of Peter Harvey’s cautionary point that it is unlikely that one will find a clear parallel between 
Buddhist ethics and Western ethical theory; a point that is echoed by George Dreyfus and William 
Edelglass.  I then proceed to treat Damien Keown’s virtue theoretical interpretation, followed by Charles 
Goodman’s counter perspective of consequentialism, vis-à-vis utilitarianism.  Accordingly, I plan to show 
the implications their interpretations have for applied ethics by reviewing the ‘trolley problem,’ which 
will in turn invite additional considerations of some alternative normative and meta-normative ways of 
interpreting Buddhist ethics, including André van der Braak’s Nietzschean looking glass.  Then, in 
regards to (2), I will explore the nature of Buddhist ethics through various Western philosophical 
categories including virtue theory, consequentialism, deontology and particularism; in addition, I will also 
consider some metaethical interpretations of the Buddha’s normative teachings, specifically cognitivism 
as proffered by P.D. Premasiri.  Herein our inquiry will begin with a review of early Pāli discourses and 
the ethical perspective of Theravāda Buddhism, and then move on to an examination of ethical 
perspectives within Mahāyāna traditions, specifically in regards to the philosophy of emptiness and the 
bodhisattva ideal.   Finally, in regards to (3), I shall consider some critical metaethical reflections 
concerning the Mahāyāna philosophy of emptiness, specifically whether or not this non-essentialist 




justificatory account for everyday ethical prescriptions and proscriptions.  Herein, my focus will be 
centered around the anti-realist philosophies of non-cognitivism, as treated by Bronwyn Finnigan, and 
fictionalism, which I consider in light of arguments put forward by Mark Siderits, Mario D’Amato and 
Laura Guerrero.  In light of their perspectives, I bring closure to the chapter by considering Dōgen’s 
metaethics as anti-realism.  By reviewing Russell Guilbault’s and Bret Davis’ interpretations of Dōgen, I 
conclude that they succeed in explaining how Dōgen can justify normative judgments despite his 
commitment to anti-realism; mainly normative judgments are justified in light of the conventions 
(Guilbault) and the context (Davis) which they are expressed.  However, that being said, I contend that 
conventionalism and contextualism only account for what normative expressions ‘say,’ not what 
normative expressions ‘mean.’  Notwithstanding their interpretations, I conclude the chapter by 
introducing the metaethical concept anti-cognitivism, which I stipulated as a characterization of 
Nietzsche’s metaethics in the previous chapter.  I contend that anti-cognitivism provides a sufficient 
account of what normative expressions mean, and thereby how they can be justified.   
§2.2 Interpretations of Buddhist Ethics?  
 Within the scholarly forest of Buddhist ethics, Peter Harvey’s An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics 
provides a clearing into the multivalent beliefs that shape the normative world views of Buddhist 
traditions.  As an academic touchstone, Harvey’s research covers: (1) core beliefs and values taught by 
the historical Buddha and practiced by Theravāda traditions; (2) the adaptation of normative views within 
Mahāyāna traditions and schools; and (3) Buddhist applied ethics, specifically in regards to issues that 
pertain to the natural environment, economics, abortion, euthanasia, sexuality etc.  By my estimation, 
Harvey’s work is required reading for anyone interested in exploring the cultural diffusion of Buddhist 
ethics through the rich and diverse history of Buddhist texts, rituals, precepts and practices on their own 
terms.  While he draws some comparative philosophical parallels between Buddhist ethics and Western 




theories such Kantian deontology, Aristotle’s theory of virtue or utilitarianism (Harvey 2000).13  Harvey 
reasons that: 
A key aspect of Western ethical systems is that moral prescriptions should be universally 
applicable to all people who can understand them.  Buddhism, though, is generally gradualist in 
approach, so while it has ethical norms which should follow from a sense of sympathy with 
fellow beings (such as not killing living beings), others only apply to those who are ready for 
them, as their commitment to moral and spiritual training deepens (Harvey 2000, 51).        
In other words, because the normative beliefs and practices that Buddhist practitioners maintain are 
dependent upon whether, for example, one is lay practitioner or monk,14 Buddhist ethics is simply 
incompatible with the universalizability trait of normative beliefs that is salient to Western ethical 
theories.15   
 Other scholars echo Harvey’s non-reductive outlook, yet for different reasons.  In his article 
“Meditation as Ethical Activity” Georges Dreyfus notes that in comparison to other domains of 
philosophical inquiry, including logic and epistemology, “Indian Buddhist traditions never developed a 
similar systematic reflection on the nature of ethical concepts” (Dreyfus 1995, 30); and, while ethical 
concepts are used within different Buddhist traditions, they are not, according to Dreyfus, systematically 
studied and debated in ways that other issues are, such as the metaphysical status of the self (Skt. 
ātman).16  Accordingly, Dreyfus maintains that when scholars approach the subject matter of Buddhist 
ethics with the hope of describing and explaining its nature, one ought not do so by making 
straightforward comparisons between Western ethical theories and Buddhist ethics, and then expect that 
                                                 
13 It is important to note that Harvey does not consider metaethical interpretations of Buddhist ethics alongside these 
ethical theories.   
14 As Harvey notes, “The level of morality and general conduct of a monk or nun is expected to be of higher level 
than that of a lay person, because he or she has made the commitment to be ordained.  Actions which would be 
totally unacceptable for a monk or nun, such as sexual intercourse, are acceptable (within certain limits) for a lay 
person” (Harvey 2000, 51). 
15 Harvey’s hermeneutical position is echoed by Martin Adam’s standpoint that Buddhist discourses, vis-à-vis ethics, 
presuppose different conceptions of agency in light of one’s spiritual growth.  See Martin Adam, “Groundwork for a 
Metaphysic of Buddhist Morals: A New Analysis of puñña and kusala, in light of sukka.” Journal of Buddhist 
Ethics 12, (2005) pp. 62–85.    
16 Richard Hayes echoes this point in his review of Charles Goodman’s Consequences of Compassion: An 
Interpretation and Defense of Buddhist Ethics.  See Richard Hayes, “A Review of Consequences of Compassion: 




there will be clear and coherent philosophical parallels between Buddhism and Aristotelian virtue theory 
and/or utilitarian consequentialism.  As he explains, such hermeneutical expectations will likely result in, 
“the imposition of an alien scheme of thought,” upon Buddhist traditions (Dreyfus 1995, 30).  This 
cautionary point is echoed by William Edelglass in “Buddhist Ethics and Western Moral Philosophy.”  
Edelglass argues that while, “forms of Buddhist ethics share features with Western moral philosophies, 
especially virtue ethics and consequentialism,” interpreting Buddhist ethics through one ethical theory 
does not provide, “An adequate theoretical framework for grasping moral thinking in any of the major 
traditions of Buddhism and, a fortiori, the vast and heterogeneously diverse tradition of Buddhism as a 
whole” (Edelglass 2014, 477-478).  Thus, Edelglass maintains that a more fruitful understanding of 
Buddhist ethics will be realized if scholars explore different Buddhist traditions on their own terms. 
However, other Buddhist scholars, such as Abraham Vélez de Cea, have a more optimistic 
perspective regarding the prospects of generating a comparative dialogue between Buddhism and Western 
ethical theories.    In “The Dalai Lama and the Nature of Buddhist Ethics,” Vélez de Cea argues that since 
most moral philosophers are unable to critically examine Buddhist texts in their original languages, 
comparative philosophical studies are warranted so to prevent Buddhist ethics from being, 
“misunderstood and virtually ignored” (Vélez de Cea 2013, 502).  Herein, Vélez de Cea is clearly not 
alone; a number of comparative inquiries have been advanced by scholars, including Damien Keown and 
Charles Goodman, in order to show that specific Buddhist traditions share the same normative and 
metaethical foundations that are championed by a specific Western ethical theory.   
In The Nature of Buddhist Ethics, Damien Keown proffers an Aristotelian model of virtue 
theory17 as an interpretive lens for making sense of the nature of Theravāda Buddhist ethics.  According 
to Keown, there are clear parallels between Aristotle’s virtue theory and the Buddha’s teachings, 
                                                 
17 Virtue theory can be contrasted with the action-based ethical theories such as the doctrine of double effect, 
Kantian deontology and utilitarianism, vis-à-vis the emphasis it places upon the cultivation of virtue and personal 





specifically in regards to conceptions of the goal of the moral life, moral psychology and normative 
reasoning (Keown 2001).  And, in regards to Mahāyāna ethics, Keown argues that while the doctrine of 
skillful means (Skt. upāya) resembles the principle of utility18 in utilitarianism, he argues that Joseph 
Fletcher’s situation ethics19 is a more promising interpretative characterization of normative beliefs of 
Tibetan and East Asian Buddhist traditions (Keown 2001).20    Ultimately, Keown’s reasoning as to why 
Buddhism, both Theravāda and Mahāyāna, should not be interpreted through a utilitarian lens is that 
moral reasoning in Buddhism takes into account one’s intentions and motivations independently from 
their ‘utility.’   
In Buddhist ethics it is the motivation which precedes an act that determines its rightness.  An act 
is right if it is virtuous, i.e. performed on the basis of Liberality (arāga), Benevolence (adosa) and 
Understanding (amoha).  It is the preceding motivation (cetanā) which determines the moral 
quality of the act and not its consequences.  In Buddhism, acts have bad consequences because 
they are bad acts – they are not bad acts because they have bad consequences, as a utilitarian 
would maintain.  Moreover, for utilitarians motive is irrelevant whereas for Buddhists it is 
crucial.  For utilitarians a good motive may be defined as one which produces an increase in the 
specified utility.  (Keown 2001, 178) 
                                                 
18 Also known as the Greatest Happiness Principle, the principle of utility generally maintains that the rightness and 
wrongness of one’s actions is determined by the consequences, not the action itself.  Thus, when one deliberates 
upon what they ought to do in situation X, according to Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) we should do that action 
which promotes the greatest amount of happiness for those who are involved in situation X.  Herein, moral agents 
are to remain neutral when evaluating the interests of those who will be impacted by the actions they choose to act 
upon, including their own.  Bentham’s consequentialist philosophy is regarded as ‘act utilitarianism’ which can be 
contrasted with John Stuart Mill’s (1806-1873) version of ‘rule utilitarianism.’  According to rule utilitarianism, 
when deciding how one ought to act in situation X, there are certain rules that they must honor when deliberating 
how to promote the greatest amount of happiness.  Thus, unlike Bentham, Mill maintains that there are certain 
actions that one ought not do, and so, certain rules that one must follow when deciding how to act.  For a detailed 
analysis of these consequentialist philosophies, see Russ Shafer-Landau, The Fundamentals of Ethics, 3rd ed, ( New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
19 Situation ethics, also known as situationalism is often mistaken for ethical relativism.  Contrary to ethical 
relativism, which maintains that there are no universal ethical principles, Fletcher’s situation ethics contends that 
objective moral principles exist, however they ought to be applied differently depending upon the context of the 
situation (Pojman 2006).     
20 The main distinction, in so far as I can tell, between situation ethics and utilitarianism, specifically J.S Mill’s ‘rule 
utilitarianism,’ is that while both theories champion the existence of objective moral values, and in turn recognize 
that the application of such should be determined in light of the situation at hand, situation ethics does not believe 
that consequentialist moral reasoning is the only way to decide which moral principle ought to be affirmed in order 





Thus, contrary to consequentialist reasoning,21 Keown maintains that moral motivation (Pāli cetanā) in 
Buddhism, vis-à-vis normative choices, parallels Aristotle’s faculty of moral choice, prohairesis (Keown 
2001).   
 Contrary to Kewon’s interpretation, in Consequences of Compassion: An Interpretation and 
Defense of Buddhist Ethics, Charles Goodman maintains that utilitarianism provides a more compelling 
conceptual road map for making sense of Buddhist ethics within both Indian and Tibetan traditions.  One 
piece of textual evidence supporting this interpretation, specifically in regards to Theravāda Buddhism, is 
found within the Mahāsattva Jātaka, which presents a tale of the historical Buddha’s previous 
incarnations whereby, as a bodhisattva, he offers his body as food to a hungry tigress who is too weak to 
hunt and provide food for her offspring.  Herein, the motivating force for this altruistic action is 
compassion.  Goodman contends that the moral lesson from this tale is that: 
Under some circumstances, I may be confronted with the option to sacrifice my own life to 
preserve some good that has, in the grand scheme of things, even greater importance. In that 
situation, consequentialism implies that I am morally obligated to make this sacrifice. No other 
Western ethical theory— not Kantian deontology, and certainly not Aristotelian virtue ethics—
would endorse this kind of conclusion. Only consequentialism shares both the noble altruism and 
the frightening extremism of Buddhist ethics. (Goodman 2009, 54-55) 
Accordingly, Theravāda Buddhism is, as Goodman interprets such texts, best understood through a rule 
utilitarian lens.  And, in the context of Mahāyāna Buddhism, specifically Tibetan traditions, vis-`à-vis the 
bodhisattva ideal and the writings of Śāntideva (685-763 C.E.), Goodman contends that act utilitarianism 
offers students of Buddhism an effective interpretive lens;22 “Śāntideva is much more similar to certain 
                                                 
21 I contend that Keown’s characterization of utilitarianism, vis-à-vis moral motivation and reasoning, is an 
uncharitable straw man.  In other words, it is not obvious that a utilitarian is only motivated by utility; moral agents 
can have a plurality of different motivations tied to an array of values.  For example, Nordic skiers can value the 
health benefits that one consequentially realizes over time, and also be motivated by the immediate 
phenomenological experience skiing affords.  Thus, for Keown to say that utility is the only motivation a utilitarian 
can have is too simplistic; perhaps what he intends to argue is that, as a motivating force, utility ought to have 
overriding authority over other normative motivations.  
22 As I understand Goodman, since Aristotle’s virtue theory does not emphasize altruism, Keown’s interpretation 
does not provide a complete account of the altruistic nature of Buddhist ethics, despite the fact that Buddhism does 





act-consequentialist writers such as Peter Singer, who insist on the supreme moral significance of 
altruistic self-sacrifice, than to the advocates of virtue ethics and other versions of consequentialism who 
want to allow the individual some moral space to act in ways not dictated by universalist moral 
considerations” (Goodman 2009, 98).23   
                                                 
23 Herein, it is important note that Richard Hayes is not entirely convinced that the horizon in comparative 
philosophy Goodman is opening up is helpful for understanding Buddhist ethics.  In his review of Goodman’s book, 
Hayes concludes, “Many philosophers will, it seems safe to predict, disagree with Goodman’s convictions that 
Indian Buddhism is much better seen as a form of consequentialism than of a kind of virtue ethics, […] Therefore, 
one of the contributions that Goodman’s book will make is that it will stimulate others to reply with 
counterarguments and to keep the debate moving along, thus keeping the field of philosophy alive for another few 
years. Many Buddhists who read this book may well wonder why it matters at all whether Buddhism subscribes to 
virtue ethics, character ethics or one of the flavors of consequentialism; […] While Goodman’s book is 
philosophically stimulating and passionately argued, it has probably not provided a convincing case for what is 
gained by putting Western philosophical labels on the long tradition of Buddhists (most especially Mādhyamikas) 
who argued that putting philosophical labels on things is part of the problem, and not part of the solution” (Hayes 
2011, 394-395).  In regards to normative ethical theories, I tend to agree with Hayes.  There are too many disparities, 
cultural and philosophical, between Buddhist traditions and the Western philosophical perspectives of Bentham and 
Mill.  One clear distinction is that both Bentham and Mill were hedonists, albeit Mill advocated for a more nuanced 
conception of hedonism (i.e. attitudinal hedonism); and, in regards to metaethics, utilitarian hedonism is undergirded 
by objectivism/realism whereby pleasure and pain are equivalent to ‘good’ and ‘bad, and cognitivism whereby our 
moral expressions refer to mind-independent truths.  I contend that Buddhist ethics, specifically in regards to 
Mahāyāna traditions, does not share this metaethical perspective.  Herein, I do think metaethics provides a more 
fruitful horizon for comparative philosophers, mainly because the concepts in metaethics are so general that they do 
not, in principle, attempt to specify why people, Buddhist or not, choose to act and behave in the ways that they do.  
For example, the concept of paternalism, which is a conceptual category in contemporary medical ethics, is not a 
term that was used by Hippocrates (460-370 B.C.E.), the founder of modern medicine, yet nevertheless, his general 
normative vision, vis-à-vis medical practice and physician-patient relationships, was paternalistic (i.e. physicians 
know best).  However, while I do not find it problematic to use this label to characterize Hippocrates’ normative 
vision for medical practitioners, I would not attempt to use this concept to explain his health recommendations for 
both preventative and restorative health practices; those practices can be explained on their own terms without 
having to emphasize that he believed that patients in general are not deserving of the truth, or are entitled to 
‘informed consent.’  Accordingly, I encourage Hayes to consider the merits of comparative metaethical inquiry, vis-
à-vis Buddhism and Western philosophy; after all, if one maintains that conceptual labels from one cultural time 
period cannot, in principle, facilitate understanding of culturally and historically distant religious perspectives, then 
that would seem to imply that one simply cannot examine and judge other cultures, which is a normative belief, not 
a hermeneutical given.  In this dissertation, my plan is to demonstrate that one can explore Zen Buddhist ethics, vis-
à-vis Dōgen, through Western metaethical categories while at the same time examining specific practices and 
normative beliefs on their own terms.  More specifically, this inquiry will show that the reflective equilibrium 
between Western metaethics and Dōgen’s normative writings makes room for the metaethical category anti-realism 
in regards to the metaphysical status of values; at the same time, I also plan to show, in light of Dōgen’s writings, 
that when it comes to what normative expressions mean and what they say, like we saw in the previous chapter, 
none of the standard Western metaethical categories are helpful.  Accordingly, I contend that the stipulation of a 
new metaethical concept, anti-cognitivism – is warranted as I maintained it to be in regards to Nietzsche’s 





 One way to highlight the differences between these two different interpretive models of Buddhist 
ethics is by briefly turning our attention to a popular thought experiment in Western philosophy: the 
‘trolley problem.’24  This thought experiment has us imagine one person witnessing a trolley that is, due 
to mechanical failures, careening out of control and headed straight down a hill where there are five 
people on the tracks.  These five people will inevitably be killed unless the individual who is witnessing 
this event pulls a lever, thereby sending the trolley onto a spur track where there is only one person who 
will inevitably be killed.  Herein, the moral quandary this person faces pertains to the distinction between 
killing vs. letting die; is it, in other words, morally acceptable to pull the lever and kill one in order to 
save five lives, or, should one refrain from involving oneself in the causal act of killing (i.e. pulling the 
lever) and thereby let five people die from a causal event (i.e. the trolley careening out of control) that one 
is not responsible for, yet nevertheless culpable since they can act otherwise?  According to Goodman’s 
estimation, if the person standing next to the lever is a Buddhist, specifically a Mahāyāna Buddhist, then 
they ought to pull the lever since the consequences of saving five lives by killing one is more favorable 
than letting five people die.  This reasoning would extend to alternative variations of this thought 
experiment, including pushing an obese man off a bridge onto the tracks in order to stop a trolley from 
killing five lives; again, better to kill one than to let five die.  However, for Keown, though he does not 
promote a deontological interpretation of Buddhist ethics,25 he does, as noted above, highlight the 
importance of motives and intentions when it comes to moral decision making;  and, based upon the 
Buddhist precepts against killing, I suspect that he would argue that Goodman is wrong, and that the 
                                                 
24 The trolley Problem was introduced by Phillipa Foot in “Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect” (1967) as a 
way to test moral intuitions vis-à-vis Western ethical theories.  For an incisive journey into the history of the trolley 
problem and its different variations, see David Edmonds, Would You Kill the Fat Man: The Trolley Problem and 
What Your Answer Tells Us About Right and Wrong, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).   
25 It is important to note that virtue theory offers no action guiding advice for dealing with the trolley problem.  
When it comes to moral behavior and moral choices, virtue theorists find inspiration from the stories of virtuous 
people.  Thus, while the trolley problem can get one to begin thinking critically about their normative intuitions, and 
thereby shine some light on moral psychology, one ought not think that the trolley problem provides a complete 





morally preferred decision is to let five die rather than kill one.26  I draw this inference from the virtue 
theoretical commitment that it is prudent to have some understanding of the actual lives that will be 
impacted by one’s actions, specifically when one’s actions involve taking steps that will knowingly 
hasten the death of another (i.e. intentionally killing).27  Regardless of whether this inference is accurate, 
these normative theories reveal profound differences in regards to moral decision making, particularly in 
the field of applied ethics.  For example, in regards to medical ethics,28 if a Mahāyāna Buddhist physician 
were to follow Goodman’s interpretative model, then it seems to follow that they ought not resist, in 
principle, the act of killing one hospital patient so that their organs can be harvested in order save five 
lives; however, if the physician were to follow Keown’s interpretive model, such an action will be 
wholeheartedly resisted.   
 In addition to Keown and Goodman, other scholars have made contributions to the general 
pursuit of interpreting Buddhist ethics through Western ethical theories and categories.  For example, 
Abraham Vélez de Cea’s proffers a hybrid interpretation of Buddhist ethics, vis-à-vis virtue theory and 
consequentialism; Charles Hallisey defends a particularlist interpretation of the Buddha’s teachings; Jin 
Y. Park provides an interpretation of Mahāyāna ethics in light of postmodern philosophers; and, André 
                                                 
26 It is important to note that Keown does not include trolley problems in his writings on the ethics of killing in 
Buddhism.  In his article, “On Compassionate Killing and the Abhidhamma’s Psychological Ethics,” though he 
challenges Abhidhamma’s metaethical foundationalism, vis-à-vis intentional killing is always wrong, I do not think 
that his nuanced view entails pulling the lever in the trolley problem.  Indeed, ‘mercy killing’ in the context of end 
of life decisions is quite different from the normative conditions one is confronted with in the trolley problem.  See 
Damien Keown, “On Compassionate Killing and the Abhidhamma’s Psychological Ethics,” Journal of Buddhist 
Ethics, 23 (2016).  
27 By defining killing as the act of taking steps to causally hasten the death of another it follows that letting die can 
be defined as avoiding to take steps to save lives.  In other words, one ought not interpret one’s decision not to pull 
the lever as an act of killing.  Prima facie, it seems clear that killing is worse than letting die; after all, many of us 
are indirectly culpable of letting some people die since many of us could be engaged in saving lives rather than 
doing what we are doing, such as thinking through trolley problems or discussing the nature of Buddhist ethics.  
However, depending upon the situation, specifically in the context of terminal illness or an unbearable medical 
condition, one can certainly make the case that killing is preferable and that letting die is cruel.   
28 Peter Harvey provides a review of two topics in medical ethics in An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics: (1) abortion; 
and (2) euthanasia.  Both issues, as he notes, are very serious normative issues for Buddhists due to their normative 
views concerning killing, vis-à-vis karma.  Thus, when one reviews Harvey’s survey of the perspectives and policies 
for both abortion and euthanasia, particularly in South Asia and Tibet, it seems to warrant the inference that 
Buddhists do not view the world through the consequentialist lens championed by Goodman.  I draw this inference 
from the fact that utilitarian reasoning has been, and continues to be, an important theoretical model for justifying 




van der Braak interprets Zen Buddhism through the writings and philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche.  Can 
the interpretations of these scholars inform us as to how a Buddhist should respond when confronted with 
the trolley problem, and its variations?  While Vélez de Cea would likely have a nuanced position mainly 
because he recognizes that there are consequentialist aspects to Buddhist ethics, it is less clear whether 
Park and Van der Braak would be able to tell us whether a Buddhist should pull the lever or not.  This is 
so, mainly because their interpretations are more in keeping with metaethics and not ethical theory; and, 
since continental thinkers such as Nietzsche would likely be suspicious of the trolley problem itself for 
the simple reason that ‘Trolleyology’ is too abstract and contrived (i.e. ‘truth-seeking’) to give an account 
of the ‘way-seeking’ moral life.  In other words, the trolley problem reveals little, if anything, about what 
it means to live a meaningful life,29 and the amalgamation of values that are salient to the continuous 
practice of overcoming of nihilism.    
In addition to interpreting Buddhist ethics through Western ethical theories, some scholars have 
appealed to Western metaethical concepts and perspectives in order help make sense of what Buddhist 
traditions think about the metaphysical status of values.  For example, P.D Premasiri has defended a 
cognitivist (i.e. realist) characterization of Theravāda traditions, which Keown builds upon; mainly, the 
values of good and bad are mind-independent natural properties that exist, and that we can know such 
through sense experience.  In the context of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the Cowherds, which is a collective of 
Madhyamaka scholars, including Mark Siderits and Bronwyn Finnigan,30 have illuminated the field of 
                                                 
29 While normative theories, such as Kantian deontology or utilitarianism, can influence and help define one’s 
conception of a meaningful life, conceptions of meaningfulness, such as Nietzsche’s, are in no way bound to these 
theories; in fact, Nietzsche’s writings reveal that he wanted to shatter them with a hammer.  Moreover, while 
thought experiments such as the trolley problem are helpful for comparing and contrasting the doctrine of double 
effect, Kantian deontology and utilitarianism, it says nothing about the actual status of values, vis-à-vis realism or 
anti-realism, which is a central matter when it comes to ruminating upon questions about meaningfulness and 
purpose.  Thus, when confronted with the trolley problem, one will not discover any philosophical perspectives 
concerning the meaning of life tied to the tracks, embedded within the lever or embodied within the obese man on 
the bridge.  
30 As we shall see, Siderits proposes fictionalism as metaethical characterization of Madhyamaka metaethics, while 





metaethics, specifically in light of the philosophy of emptiness (Skt. śūnyatā).31  Based upon this non-
essentialist philosophy, they have attempted to identify and explain what this non-essentialist philosophy 
entails for ethics in general, and one’s ability, to provide justification for conventional normative 
judgments and expressions in particular.  Outside of the scholarly pastures of the Cowherds, other 
Mahāyāna philosophers have added additional nuance to this comparative metaethical inquiry, including, 
Mario D’Amato and Laura Guerrero.32  Finally, in the context of Zen Buddhism, which will be my focus 
in subsequent chapters of this dissertation, Bret Davis and Russell Guilbault have proffered metaethical 
characterizations of Dōgen’s ethical writings.  According to Davis, Dōgen’s ethical writings, which pivots 
from the Mahāyāna philosophy of emptiness, reveal a ‘contextualist’ perspective; for Guilbault, Dōgen’s 
metaethics, specifically in regards to providing justification of for normative judgments and expressions, 
is ‘conventionalist.’33 To get clear on these perspectives, let us now turn to closer examination of ethical 
theory and metaethics in the context of Theravāda Buddhism, which will in turn lead into assessment of 
ethical theory and metaethics within some Mahāyāna traditions, vis-à-vis, the bodhisattva ideal and the 
                                                 
31 See Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy, edited by the Cowherds, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
32 As we shall see, Mario D’Amato also advances a fictionalist interpretation like that of Siderits, while Guerrero 
denies the tenability of such.   
33 Contextualism, generally maintains the following epistemic position: actions and expressions can only be 
understood in light of the context in which they are performed.  Herein, it is important to note that while 
contextualism reveals an affinity with the anti-realist philosophy of relativism, it does not share the same perspective 
as cultural relativism or subjectivism.  For cultural relativism and subjectivism, while it is not the case that there are 
any universal objective values that are real, they nevertheless maintain that the normative truths they identify with 
are in fact true.  Based upon my understanding of contextualism, such a perspective does not go this far; instead, it 
simply maintains that we cannot, for example, understand why certain judgments and prescriptions are expressed 
independent of the context they are expressed within or in light of.  Similarly, ‘conventionalism’ maintains that 
normative beliefs, and justificatory accounts for normative prescriptions and behavior are located in the society we 
live rather than a mind-independent world that is categorically divorced from culture.  Again, based upon my 
understanding of this metaethical label, ‘conventionalism’ is not the same as cultural relativism as it stops short of 
advancing the metaethical claim that what is normatively ‘true’ for one culture is de facto true for it.  Thus, it is 
important to bear in mind that both cultural relativism and subjectivism leave room for different perspectives which 
maintain that mind-independent values exist, whereas both ‘contextualism’ and ‘conventionalism’ do not.  For 
contextualism and conventionalism, values are indeed more of a cultural artifact than cultural relativists think they 
are.  Similar to the practice of bead making amongst early communities of homo sapiens, conventionalism maintains 
that justification for making beads in certain ways is not located in a mind-independent world, vis-à-vis bead-
making truths; rather, the conventions of the community, and the context of their relationships is, according to 






philosophy of emptiness.  This will in turn set the stage for bringing closure to this chapter with a 
systematic review of the main interpretative models for making sense of Mahāyāna metaethics in general, 
Zen in particular. 
§2.3 The Buddha and Western Ethical Theory  
 Though it is generally understood among scholars that there is no term in Buddhism that is 
directly equivalent to the Western concept of ethics, a number of models have been suggested for making 
sense of the moral life (Pāli sīla) in Buddhism, a life that is, according to Barbra Clayton, “understood in 
terms of propriety, specifically the good or proper conduct associated with awakening and awakening 
beings” (Clayton 2011, 284).  In the Majjhima Nikāya, “The middle Length Discourses of the Buddha,” 
the Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta supports Clayton’s characterization of Buddhist ethics.34  Students of the historical 
Buddha’s teachings will find in this discourse an analysis of the Four Nobel Truths (Pāli ariyasacca) and 
the normative distinction between wholesome (Pāli kusala) and unwholesome (Pāli akusala) actions and 
personal character.  In regards to the latter, unwholesomeness includes: (1) killing living beings; (2) 
stealing; (3) sexual misconduct; (4) malicious speech; (5) harsh speech; (6) gossip; (7) envy; (8) ill will; 
and (9) wrong view.  These unwholesome ways of speaking, acting and viewing the world are 
conditioned by greed (Pāli lobha), hatred (Pāli dosa) and delusion (Pāli moha).  Accordingly, in order to 
realize what is wholesome, the Buddha simply instructs his disciples to abstain from the various modes of 
unwholesome behavior and thereby cultivate a perspective, vis-à-vis “right view” (Pāli sammā diṭṭhi), that 
is not fueled by greed, hatred and delusion. 
When a noble disciple has thus understood the unwholesome and the root of the unwholesome, 
the wholesome and the root of the wholesome, he entirely abandons the underlying tendency to 
lust, he abolishes the underlying tendency to aversion, he extirpates the underlying tendency to 
the view and conceit ‘I am’ and by abandoning ignorance and arousing true knowledge he here 
and now makes an end of suffering.  In that way too a noble disciple is one of right view, whose 
                                                 
34 For a succinct review of other discourses on ethics, along with a commentary, see Peter Harvey, “Theravāda Texts 
on Ethics,” In Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings, ed. William Edelglass and Jay L. Garfield, (New York: 




view is straight, who has unwavering confidence in the Dhamma, and has arrived at this true 
Dhamma. (Ñanamoli and Bodhi 2009, 133) 
Thus, by cultivating ‘right view’ one thus realizes the four “divine abodes” (Pāli brahmavihāra) 
including: (1) altruistic joy (Pāli muditā); (2) compassion (Pāli karuṇā); (3) equanimity (Pāli upekkhā); 
and (4) loving kindness (Pāli mettā).35 
 The aforementioned ethical teachings of the Buddha are, according to Damien Keown, best 
interpreted and understood through the lens of Aristotelian virtue-theory. In The Nature of Buddhist 
Ethics, Keown argues that the summum bonum in Buddhism, particularly South Asian Theravāda 
Buddhism, is nirvāṇa (Skt; Pāli nibbāna).  Since the attainment of this highest good provides the 
objective form and teleological function of the moral life for Buddhists, the nature of this moral life is, 
according to Western ethical theories, eudaimonistic, and thus best interpreted in light of Aristotle’s 
theory of virtue.   
I believe that the formal characterization of eudaimonia provided by Aristotle can be applied to 
nirvana.  Whatever nirvana is, it is indisputably the summum bonum of Buddhism and may be 
characterized, like eudaimonia, […] (a) it is desired for its own sake; (b)  everything else that is 
desired is for the sake of it; (c) it is never chosen for the sake of anything else.  This formal 
equivalence of eudaimonia and nirvana seems unexceptionable, and in fact involves little more 
than the conceptual unpacking of the notion of an inclusive goal. (Keown1992, 199) 
Notwithstanding this comparative point, Keown also builds his case for Buddhism as virtue theory upon 
an analysis of the Buddhist term kusala, which he equates with the Western idea ‘good’.  More 
specifically, Keown defines kusala as, “those things which are to be pursued if enlightenment is to be 
attained.  Its contrary, akusala, characterizes whatever is negative in this respect and is accordingly to be 
shunned.  The Buddha unambiguously urges monks to abandon what is akusala and cultivate what is 
kusala” (Keown 1992, 116).  The cultivation of kusala is itself the cultivation of those virtues or spiritual 
qualities, (e.g., the brahmavihāra’s) that will promote nirvāṇa.  Keown makes this point clear in order to 
                                                 
35 The brahmavihāra’s, also known as the “immeasurables,” according to Peter Harvey, “when developed to a high 
degree in meditation, [..] are said to make the mind ‘immeasurable’ and like the mind of the loving brahma gods” 
(Harvey 2000, 104).  Herein, loving kindness is the aspiration that all beings realize happiness, and compassion is 
the aspiration that all beings are free from suffering.  In regards to altruistic joy, one experiences happiness through 




distinguish his interpretation of kusala from that of utilitarian interpretations which have denoted it as 
“skillfulness.” 
Kusala qualities partake of nibbāna, and their cultivation transforms an ordinary man 
(puthujjana) into an Arhat.  Such qualities both reflect and promote the final good – they are 
virtues – and the most natural translation for kusala when used in the moral context is ‘virtue’ or 
‘goodness’.  It is very common for kusala to be rendered as ‘skillful’, but it should be recognized 
that this translation carries with it a specific implication for the nature of Buddhist ethics, namely 
that it is utilitarian.  Even then, it is a poor translation on aesthetic grounds, and we may note that 
utilitarian philosophers retain the traditional moral terminology of ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘right’, and 
‘wrong’. (Keown 1992, 119) 
Thus, according to Keown, the Buddha’s teachings on the moral life emphasize the cultivation of 
character and virtue36 rather than defending an action-based ethical theory37 that emphasizes principles 
and rules.38 
 Notwithstanding this virtue theoretical interpretation, the Buddha’s teachings on the moral life 
have also been examined through a metaethical lens as well.  In his article “Ideas of the Good in Buddhist 
Philosophy” (1977), P.D. Premasiri notes that the idea of the ‘good,’ in the Anglo-American tradition of 
                                                 
36 While there are some general affinities between virtue theory and Buddhist ethics in general, it begs the question 
as to why privilege Aristotle’s virtue theory rather than other versions of this “character-based” model of ethics?  
Dreyfus argues that while there is a virtue theoretical nature to Buddhist ethics, this ‘nature’ is, contrary to Keown’s 
perspective, more in keeping with the Hellenistic thinkers, including Epicurus, Pyrrho and Seneca. “The goal of the 
Buddhist tradition, freedom from negative emotions, resembles that of many Hellenistic philosophers, freedom from 
disturbance. Moreover, like Hellenistic philosophies,  Buddhist views emphasize the importance of certain virtues, 
detachment and compassion, which are both therapeutic and constitutive of the good” (Dreyfus 1995, 38).  
Notwithstanding Dreyfus’ point, one could perhaps take this comparative inquiry several strides further into the 
eighteenth century, and thereby bring the virtue theory of David Hume into this comparative area of philosophical 
inquiry.  Unlike Aristotle, yet similar to that of the Buddha, Hume denied the existence of an underlying 
self/personal identity.  Based upon this common ground vis-à-vis the metaphysics of persons, one could argue that 
Hume’s theory of virtue, rather than Aristotle’s, offers us a more promising lens for interpreting Buddhist ethics, as 
well as addressing the broad question of how to do virtue ethics without an underlying self/agent. 
37 As we noted above, Charles Goodman disagrees with Keown’s perspective; instead, he maintains that rule 
utilitarianism provides an interpretive model that is more in keeping with the Pāli canon.  See Charles Goodman, 
“Theravāda Ethics as Rule-Consequentialism” In Consequences of Compassion: An Interpretation and Defense, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
38 It is worth noting that according to David J. Kalupahana, the historical Buddha would be skeptical of affirming a 
consequentialist standpoint, such as utilitarianism or deontology since both action-based ethical theories attempt to 
determine the rightness and wrongness of actions by ascribing a rule or principle independently of specific situations 
and circumstances.  “The Buddha was not prepared to decide the rightness or wrongness of an action or a rule in 
itself. […]  For the Buddha, the rightness or wrongness of an action or a rule does not consist in its situational or 
contextual validity alone, but rather in what it does to the person or the group of people in the particular context or 
situation” (Kalupahana 1992, 102).  When we consider Dōgen’s ethics in subsequent chapters, we shall see how his 




moral philosophy has no direct equivalent in Buddhism, vis-à-vis kusala.  Premasiri’s definition of kusala 
is, “what is worthy of being pursued by human beings as an intrinsic good or as an end in itself” 
(Premasiri 1977, 356).   With this working definition, which in turn, as Keown maintains, establishes 
nirvāṇa as the summum bonum of ethics, Premasiri argues that Buddhist ethics is best understood as a 
cognitivist metaethic.  Unlike Western non-cognitivists who are quick to point out the divide between 
facts and values, Premasiri contends that no such division is reflected in the early discourses of the 
Buddha; “Buddhism does not seem to have made a distinction between fact and value” (Premasiri 1977, 
356).  Accordingly, Premasiri appeals to passages from the Anguttaranikaya and the Kālāmasutta to 
support his cognitivist interpretation of Buddhist ethics, vis-à-vis cognitive naturalism.  He maintains that 
naturalism, rather than intuitionism, is in keeping with the fact that Buddhism, “does not reject sense 
experience in preference to a higher order of knowledge to be gained by means of rational intuition” 
(Premasiri 1977, 357).   Similar to metaphysical and soteriological matters, it is by means of sense 
experience that we justify our moral beliefs.   
Unlike the cognitivist and objectivist doctrine of Plato, Buddhism does not seem to accept the 
metaphysical notion of a transcendental realm of Ideas in which the Ideal Form of the Good is to 
be discovered.  One might mistakenly think that the Buddhist recognition of paranormal 
perceptions puts Buddhism on the same epistemological footing as Platonism.  But there is 
clearly a difference between what the Buddha claims to know by means of paranormal vision and 
what Plato claims to know by means of rational intuition. (Premasiri 1977, 357)  
Thus Premasiri is committed to a version of cognitive naturalism which basically states that the term 
‘good’ actually refers to some ascertainable property, or set of properties, that objectively exist in the real 
world.   
Naturalism maintains that “good” refers to scientifically determinable relations between things.  
According to naturalism, the concept of the good can be analyzed in terms of some empirically 
ascertainable property or set of properties.  Naturalism also attempts to explain the “good” in 
terms of human needs.  According to teleological naturalism all things in nature are endowed with 
inner tendencies toward an ideal state and “good” signifies whatever is conducive to the 




According to Premasiri, as well as Keown, this particular form of naturalism – teleological naturalism – 
does not fall into the philosophical trap of the “naturalistic fallacy” wherein the term good is uncritically 
identified with some natural property.   
In a related article, “Early Buddhist Concept of Ethical Knowledge: A Philosophical Analysis,” 
Premasiri proffers an argument that he believes illuminates cognitive naturalism vis-à-vis Buddhist ethics: 
 P1. Greed, hatred and delusion lead to actions such as killing. stealing, etc.  
P2. Killing. stealing etc. lead to unhappiness.  
C. Therefore. Greed, hatred and delusion are akusala, “unwholesome.” (Premasiri 1987) 
Herein, Premasiri is clearly attempting to naturalize greed, hatred and delusion, otherwise known as the 
hindrances that condition unsatisfactory lives (Pali nīvaraṇa).  From this cognitivist interpretation, 
Premasiri claims that practitioners of the Buddha’s teachings can know that greed, hatred and delusion are 
bad because they lead to unhappiness.   
In conclusion it may be said that the implication of the moral discussion recorded in the Pali 
canonical literature is that early Buddhism considered ethically evaluative statements as involving 
genuine judgments, which can be found to be true or false.  In morals there is genuine knowledge 
to be acquired and this knowledge rests largely on empirical facts.  In maintaining this position 
early Buddhism stands with the position taken by the naturalist philosophers (Premasiri 1987, 
44). 
Ultimately, Premasiri maintains that the discourses of the Buddha and his teachings on the moral life, 
because they are cognitive, are mind-independent (i.e. realism).  
Keown shares Premasiri’s metaethical interpretation of the Buddha’s teachings; in The Nature of 
Buddhist Ethics, he posits the following metaethical conclusion: 
One important conclusion to be drawn from the Abhidharmic analysis is that virtues and vices – 
since they are dharmas – are objective and real.  They are not part of the realm of mental 
construction (prajñapti), but are actually found within the psyche.  This means that Buddhist 
ethics is naturalistic: good and bad are not abstractions to be apprehended by observers according 
to their various intuitions and sensibilities.  Nor can morals be reduced to questions of taste or 
personal preference, as suggested by Emotivism.  A final implication of this objectivisation of 
ethics is that relativism is ruled out: what is to count ultimately as good and bad is not determined 




However, in A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities, David J. Kalupahana 
maintains that while the Buddha’s teachings are best interpreted as the “middle path” between the duty-
based ethic of deontology and the non-cognitive theory of emotivism, he does not specifically affirm a 
cognitivist interpretation. 
The Buddha’s own proposal for achieving peace (araṇa) and avoiding conflict (raṇa) was the 
middle path, theoretical as well as practical.  On the theoretical side, it was a middle path between 
view points.  Thus, in epistemology, it was a middle path between absolutism and skepticism; in 
ontology, between eternalism and nihilism; in ethics, between deontology and emotivism. 
(Kalupahana 1992, 237).    
In fact, Kalupahana resists the objectivist and absolutist metaethical commitments that are part of 
cognitivist philosophies; “The Buddha seems to have realized that if the moral life meant conforming to 
an absolute moral law that can override the good life, it could bring harm to human life. […] He therefore 
advocated a position in which human life could override the moral life. […] In other words, human life is 
not made for morals; morals are made for human life” (Kalupahana 1992, 101). 
   Kalupahana is not the only Buddhist scholar who resists characterizing Buddhist ethics with the 
aforementioned ethical and metaethical terms.  Charles Hallisey, for example, argues that the theory of 
particularism serves as a fruitful interpretative model of Theravāda Buddhist Ethics.   In his article, 
“Ethical Particularism in Theravāda Buddhism,” Hallisey defends a particularlist interpretation of 
Buddhist ethics in light of Roderick Chisholm’s problem of criterion.  According to this interpretation, 
rather than approaching ethical teachings and customs of different religious traditions, such as Buddhism, 
with a theoretical method ready at hand in order to explain particular instances of moral behavior or 
specific moral teachings, we should start with some particular teaching or instance of moral behavior first, 
and from there, determine the method by which we can make sense of such.  In doing so, he thereby 
characterizes any and all interpretative models (e.g., virtue theory and cognitivism) that attempt to unveil 
the nature of Buddhist ethical theory as Methodism, “since their concern has been with identifying the 
method by which Buddhists have decided whether a particular action or character trait is a good one” 




argues, is that the Theravāda tradition is not monolithic as is evident through the diverse teachings and 
practices throughout South Asian Buddhist traditions.  Thus it is misguided to think that we can employ a 
Western ethical theory as a method for understanding, with unifying consistency and coherency, the 
nature of Buddhist ethics.  Rather than interpreting Buddhism as if it had a unifying theoretical method 
for approaching ethical matters, Hallisey proffers particularism as an alternative.  This alternative, “has 
been called particularism by Chisholm, since it says that we recognize particular instances of knowledge 
even if we do begin with criteria that would justify our confidence that this knowledge is true” (Hallisey 
1996, 38).39  Particularism, in other words, claims that we start with some instance of knowing, and from 
there, determine the method by which we know.  Thus, by moving away from conceptions of Buddhist 
ethics vis-à-vis virtue theory or cognitivism, particularism has the benefit of constructing a hermeneutical 
bridge that is sensitive to the rich diversity of South Asian Buddhism. 
  Before transitioning to Mahāyāna Buddhism, I would like to close the circle of this section by 
noting Keown’s general response to Hallisey’s charge that scholars will not find a meta-theory (e.g. virtue 
theory) for interpreting Buddhist normative beliefs.  In his article, “Some Problems with Particularism,” 
Keown states that: 
Theories operate at a higher level of abstraction and generality. Typically, they are formed though 
an intermediate process of casuistry whereby problematic situations of the kind found in stories 
are grouped and compared in order to derive moral principles. These principles are then ordered 
by moral theories, which seek to offer comprehensive explanation and justification as an aid in 
the resolution of similar moral dilemmas when they arise in future. Stories are thus the raw data 
from which ethical principles and theories are refined. Particularists, therefore, go too far in 
presenting the moral dilemmas in stories as evidence of Buddhists disagreeing over moral 
theories” (Keown 2013, 448)  
 
The basic problem with particularlism, as I understand Keown’s response to Hallisey, pertains to the 
stipulated conceptual boundaries for ethical categories, concepts and theories; particularlism, in other 
words, is too restrictive in regards to assessing and organizing the plurality of beliefs and practices which 
                                                 




are regarded with varying degrees of value and sincerity.  “The challenge for any ethical theory worth its 
salt is to give a comprehensive account of all the features of the moral landscape that common sense tells 
us are important and to resolve dilemmas when moral principles come into conflict. A theory that cannot 
give a persuasive account of why we attach importance to a plurality of factors like intention, 
consequences, duties, and virtues would be a very poor moral theory” (Keown 2013, 450-451).  Herein, I 
am in agreement with Keown on this point.  While I don’t think that the normative beliefs of Buddhist 
traditions are reducible to a single ethical theory as Keown maintains, I do think that meta-theories are 
helpful for making sense of the multivalent normative beliefs within Theravāda and Mahāyāna traditions.  
Indeed, without meta-theories, our ability to engage in cross-cultural philosophy would be radically 
crimped.  Thus, while it is presumptuous to think that a meta-theory will distill the essence of Buddhist 
ethics, as if there were such an essence in the first place, they can, if used with hermeneutical care, help 
foster a comparative dialogue with other worldly perspectives and beliefs, and thereby allow for one to 
rethink and reexamine the web of beliefs they hold, along with the cognitive biases that all too often 
undergird such.   
§2.4 Mahāyāna Ethical Theory and Metaethics: Emptiness and the Bodhisattva’s Path 
 When one sets out to explore Buddhist ethics within the various Mahāyāna traditions throughout 
Tibet and East Asia, they will have to take into account: (1) the philosophy of emptiness (Skt. śūnyatā); 
and (2) the bodhisattva ideal, as presented in the “Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras” (Skt. Prajñā-pāramitā 
sūtras).40  In regards to the former, the philosophy of emptiness is a non-essentialist philosophy that 
                                                 
40 Prajñā, or “wisdom,” refers to an ultimate (Skt. paramārtha) understanding of the reality, “which results from an 
investigation into the way things really are, what we might call ‘metaphysical’ understanding, the result of deep and 
sharp rigorous thought” (Williams 1989, 42).  Pāramitā, refers to the “perfections” of the bodhisattva, including: (1) 
giving (Skt. dāna); (2) morality (Skt. śīla); (3) patience (Skt. kṣānti); (4) effort (Skt. vīrya); (5) meditative 
concentration (Skt. dhyāna); and (6) wisdom (Skt. prajñā). The Prajñā-pāramitā Sūtras were developed by the 
Madhyamaka, “Middle Way,” tradition, sometime around the first century BCE (Conze 1999).  The central 
philosophical doctrine within these texts is emptiness (Skt. śūnyatā).  The Vajracchedikā, “Diamond Sūtra,” for 
example, shows how the logic of emptiness (A is ~A ⸫ A is A) shapes the vows of the bodhisattva, mainly to save 
all sentient beings while knowing that there are no sentient beings to be saved.  “Here, Subhuti, someone who has 





denies the existence of individual self-natures (Skt. svabhāva).41  And, in regards to the latter, the 
bodhisattva is a, “Being-for Enlightenment: one on the path to perfect Buddhahood, whose task is to help 
beings compassionately while maturing his or her own wisdom” (Harvey 2000, 123).   
 According to Peter Harvey, bodhisattvas were recognized in early Buddhism, and even still in 
Theravāda today, as heroic individuals who, “by a longer, more compassion-oriented route than that 
leading to Arhatship, sought to become eventually a full and perfect Buddha” (Harvey 2000, 123).  
However, in Mahāyāna Buddhist traditions, the bodhisattva, contrary to the arhat, is a savior being who 
postpones complete realization of nirvāṇa without remainder42 and chooses to be reborn over and over 
again in order to save all sentient beings from suffering (Skt. dukkha), and thereby realize enlightenment 
collectively (Siderits 2007).  The implications the path of the bodhisattva has in regards to ethics is 
significant; “In Mahāyāna, the concept of ethics (śīla) became broadened so as to be seen no longer as 
one component of the path; in the widest sense it encompassed the whole of it” (Harvey 2000, 130).   
According to Charles Goodman, as noted above, what is significant about Mahāyāna ethics, vis-
à-vis the bodhisattva, is that normative choices and actions are born out of consequentialist moral 
reasoning.   Contrary to deontology, which maintains that the rightness of an action resides in the action 
                                                 
and yet, after beings have thus been led to Nirvāṇa, no being at all has been led to Nirvāṇa. […] If in a Bodhisattva 
the notion of a “being” should take place, he could not be called a ‘Bodhi-being’ (Conze 1958, 56-57).  The 
philosopher Nāgārjuna (150-250 C.E.), who is one of the early founders of Madhyamaka, and who is believed to 
have rescued the Prajñā-pāramitā teachings, “from the Nether world of the Nagas” (Conze 1999, 124), maintained 
that this philosophy entails “universal skepticism.” As we shall see, this non-essentialist philosophy has profound 
metaethical implications for various traditions of Mahāyāna Buddhism.  Notwithstanding the influence 
Madhyamaka had upon the development of these texts, it is important to note the Yogacāra tradition also 
contributed to the development of these texts through later commentaries.      
41 It is important to note that the Mahāyāna philosophy of emptiness can be interpreted either literally or 
figuratively.  The Madhyamaka school of Mahāyāna Buddhism interprets this philosophy literally; all existing 
dharmas are empty of inherent self-nature, including the philosophy of emptiness as well (i.e. emptiness of 
emptiness).  However, according to the Yogācāra school of Mahāyāna Buddhism, a literal interpretation of 
emptiness entails nihilism; thus, Yogācāra maintains that the idea that all dharmas are empty should be interpreted 
figuratively (Siderits 2007).  In Yogācāra sūtras, such as the Lankāvatāra Sūtra, emptiness refers to the non-
separation of subject and object.    
42 Nirvāṇa with remainder refers to one who has achieved liberation yet still has additional years to live, whereas 
nirvāṇa without remainder refers to one who achieved such and has died without the burden of having to undergo 





itself, the action-based philosophy of consequentialism argues that it is the consequences of our actions 
that determine the rightness or wrongness of a particular act; the ends, in other words, justify the means.  
From Goodman’s perspective, there are a variety of reasons that support consequentialism as a valid 
interpretative lens into Mahāyāna ethics.  In comparison with Aristotelian virtue theory, which maintains 
a position of “agent relativity” in that, “the flourishing of each agent involves the flourishing of the small 
group of people that the agent cares about,” Buddhist canonical teachings in Mahāyāna, vis-à-vis the 
bodhisattva, emphasize “agent neutrality” (Goodman 2009, 20).  The writings of Śāntideva 
(seventh/eighth century C.E) provide some evidence for this normative outlook.43  For example, in his 
Bodhicaryāvatāra, “Introduction to the Practice of the Bodhisattva,” Śāntideva states in Chapter eight, 
“The Perfection of Meditative Absorption:” “I should dispel the suffering of others because it is suffering 
like my own suffering.  I should help others too because of their nature as beings, which is like my own. 
[…]  Without exception, no sufferings belong to anyone.  They must be warded off simply because they 
are suffering.  Why is any limitation put on this?” (Edelglass 2009, 397).44  From the perspective of 
Śāntideva, it seems as though for one to maintain ‘agent-relativity’ is itself an indicator that one has not 
fully realized the philosophy of emptiness; this is so because ‘agent relativity’ entails dualistic 
distinctions that are contrary to the nondual philosophy of emptiness. 
Another reason why Goodman champions consequentialism rather than virtue theory as a 
hermeneutical looking glass into Mahāyāna ethics is that there are a number of examples in Buddhist 
canonical teachings and narratives that are “replete with stories of bodhisattvas performing acts which do 
not appear virtuous” (Edelglass 2014, 483).   Some bodhisattvas and mahasiddha’s are reported to have 
routinely broken various precepts, including the precept against ingesting intoxicants or engaging in 
                                                 
43 Śāntideva’s philosophical perspective is born out from Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka school of thought.  His works 
are studied primarily within Tibetan Buddhist traditions.    
44 For an incisive analysis of Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra, see Stephen Harris, “Does Anātman Rationally Entail 





sexual relations.45  Their justification for this is “skillful means” (Skt. upāya-kauśalya); breaking the 
precepts and acting unvirtuously can be a skillful means for ameliorating suffering and awakening other 
sentient beings.46  Thus, Goodman characterizes Buddhist ethics as character-consequentialism, which, 
unlike other versions of consequentialism, emphasizes the cultivation of virtue for the benefit of 
promoting happiness for others (Goodman 2009).  This interpretive model recognizes that sometimes 
compromising our personal character and acting unvirtuously is good, if it will yield favorable results in 
the form of promoting happiness and ameliorating the sufferings of others. 
While Goodman’s reasoning is incisive, not all scholars are convinced that his interpretations of 
Mahāyāna ethics is accurate.  Abraham Vélez de Cea challenges Goodman’s consequentialist 
characterization of Buddhist ethics in his article, “The Dalai Lama and the Nature of Buddhist Ethics.”    
Therein, Vélez de Cea supports Keown’s virtue theoretical leanings by defending a model of Buddhist 
ethics he calls “pluralistic virtue theory.”  Herein, Velez de Cea’s characterization of Buddhist ethics is 
framed in light of the ethical writings and teachings of the Dalai Lama, who is believed to be the 
incarnation of the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara, into a comparative dialogue with Christine Swanton’s 
pluralistic approach to virtue theory.47  While Vélez de Cea recognizes that there are differences in their 
accounts and characterizations of the moral life, he nevertheless argues that there are some striking 
affinities between the Dalai Lama and Swanton which demonstrate that Buddhism is not consequentialist, 
as Goodman contends; “the Dalai Lama’s ethics includes consequentialist considerations, but it cannot be 
                                                 
45 See Keith Dowman, Masters of Mahamudra: Songs and Histories of the Eight-Four Buddhist Siddhas, (Albany: 
State University Press of New York, 1985). 
46 In An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics (2000), Peter Harvey notes that while the doctrine of skillful means allows 
for greater normative flexibility, vis-à-vis the precepts, within Mahāyāna traditions, it is not the case that such 
flexibility is completely absent from Theravāda.  That being said, there are number of examples in Mahāyāna texts 
that provide philosophical justification for the doctrine of skillful means.  For example, “Śāntideva’s Śikṣā-
samuccaya cites the Candra-pradīpa Sūtra to the effect that where the motive is to help people, there is no fault in 
an action (Ss. 163).   The Akṣayamati Sūtra is also cited as saying ‘At the time for giving once can overlook the 
practice of morality and so forth.  But for all that he must not be lax’ (Ss. 12)” (Harvey 2000, 135).  According to 
Harvey, there is no single standard or criterion for determining how much flexibility bodhisattvas should be afforded 
when performing skillful acts since, “Mahāyāna texts differ on the degree of permissiveness allowed to 
Bodhisattvas” (Harvey 2000, 135).   




reduced to consequentialism, either in general, or when facing ethical dilemmas” (Vélez de Cea 2013, 
522).  Thus, Vélez de Cea maintains, “Overall, the Dalai Lama’s ethical theory is irreducible to clear-cut 
versions of consequentialism, deontological, or Aristotelian virtue ethics.  In order to capture the unique 
complexity of the Dalai Lama’s ethics, it may be helpful to characterize it as a pluralistic approach to 
virtue ethics.” (Vélez de Cea 2013, 535) 
 Now, if we shift our focus away from Tibetan Buddhism towards East Asian Mahāyāna 
traditions, the relationship between the philosophy of emptiness and the bodhisattva ideal does not line up 
with Vélez de Cea’s interpretation.  For example, according to Jin Park, in the “Essentials On Observing 
and Violating the Fundamentals of Bodhisattva Precepts,” the Korean monk Wŏnhyo (617-686) shows 
that, “Ethical standards created through bodhisattva precepts cannot be an exception from the fact that 
things do not have self-nature.  By underscoring the true nature of precepts as empty, Wŏnhyo 
demonstrates the provisonality as well as the vulnerability of the border lines that define ethical 
categories” (Park 2009 409-410).48  For example, Wŏnhyo states: 
Precepts do not have self-nature; they are always created through other conditions.  Hence it is 
said that there are conditions.  When the conditions are mentioned, this does not indicate that 
something exists to become the cause of precepts; instead it means that things arise through 
causes.  Hence it is said that causes are not inexistent.  The nature of precepts whose causes are 
                                                 
48 It is important note that Wŏnhyo’s philosophy of emptiness is born out from Chinese Mahāyāna traditions, 
including Hua-Yen and T’ien-t’ai; his philosophy is couched within Tathāgatagarbha theory vis-à-vis the 
Awakening of Faith, (Williams 1989).  According to Yoshito S. Hakeda, “Awakening of Faith may be regarded as 
representing the highest point in the development of the Tathāgatagarbha concept in Mahāyāna Buddhism” 
(Hakeda 1967, 15).  One of the central teachings of this text is the two aspects of “One Mind”: (1) the aspect of 
enlightenment; and (2) the aspect of non-enlightenment (Williams 1989).  “The revelation of the true meaning [of 
the principle of Mahāyāna can be achieved] by [unfolding the doctrine] that the principle of One Mind has two 
aspects.  One is the aspect of Mind in terms of the Absolute (tathatā; Suchness), and the other is the aspect of Mind 
in terms of phenomena (saṃsāra; birth and death).  Each of these two aspects embraces all states of existence.  
Why?  Because these two aspects are mutually inclusive” (Hakeda 1967, 31).  Herein, the “Absolute” is 
foundational for making sense of the idea of “original enlightenment” (Jpn. hongaku) in medieval Japanese Buddhist 
thought, including Dōgen, as we shall see in the next chapter.  For example, “The essence of Mind is free from 
thoughts.  The characteristic of that which is free from thoughts is analogous to that sphere of empty space that 
pervades everywhere.  The one [without any second, i.e., the absolute] aspect of the World of Reality 
(dharmadhātu) is none other than undifferentiated Dharmakaya, the ‘Essence-body’ of the Tathāgata.  [Since the 
essence of Mind is] grounded in Dharmakaya, it is to be called original enlightenment.  Why?  Because ‘original 
enlightenment’ indicates [the essence of Mind (a priori)] in contradistinction to [the essence of Mind in] the process 
of actualization of enlightenment; the actualization of enlightenment is none other than [the process of integrating] 





not inexistent is neither material reality nor thoughts in one’s mind.  Hence, it is said that precepts 
are neither form nor the mind.  Even though they are neither form nor the mind, the precepts 
cannot be attained if separated from either form or the mind.  Even though precepts cannot be 
attained, this does not mean that they do not exist.  Hence it is said that precepts are neither being 
nor nonbeing. (Park 2009, 417) 
Emptiness, as Park notes, is salient to the moral life for East Asian Mahāyāna Buddhists; “the practitioner 
must understand the nonsubstantial nature of precepts.  Violation of the precepts does not have a 
substantial reality” (Park 2009, 410-411).  This normative perspective, which seems to resist being 
pigeonholed into a Western ethical theory such as those proffered by Keown, Goodman and Vélez de 
Cea, invites alternative interpretations, including perspectives of Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel 
Levinas.49  According to Park: 
The nonduality of form (phenomena) and emptiness (noumenon) is the ground of Mahāyāna 
Buddhist Philosophy.  When this idea is applied to ethics, it cannot but destabilize conventional 
ethical discourse.  Wŏnhyo’s discussion of bodhisattva precepts problematizes the basic 
assumptions of normative ethics.  It problematizes ethical categories by showing the provisional 
nature of precepts and revealing the limits of binary oppositions commonly employed in ethical 
discourse.  By so doing, Wŏnhyo reconceptualizes the function of ethics. (Park 2009, 412) 
Indeed, Wŏnhyo’s normative outlook, vis-à-vis problematizing essentialist assumptions and binary 
concepts, which I interpret as a pivot towards doing metaethics, is not unique to his perspective singly.  In 
Chan (Jpn. Zen) for example, similar normative leanings are revealed within the writings and sayings of 
both the Linji (Jpn. Rinzai) and Caodong (Jpn. Sōtō) traditions. 
Huang Po (d. 850), a Chan master and predecessor to the Linji lineage, promoted the doctrine of 
tathāgatagarbha, Buddha-nature, and the philosophy of “One Mind,” which he maintains is no mind at 
all (Blofeld 1958).  Accordingly, when considering ethical concepts such as good and evil, vis-à-vis 
karma, he maintains that they condition grasping and attachment, which in turn occludes realization of 
“One Mind.”   
The building up of good and evil both involve attachment to form.  Those who, being attached to 
form, do evil, have to undergo various incarnations unnecessarily; while those who, being 
attached to form, do good, subject themselves to toil and privation equally to no purpose.  In 
either case it is better to achieve sudden self-realization and to grasp the fundamental Dharma.  
                                                 
49 See Jin Park, Buddhism and Postmodernity Ethics: Zen, Hua Yen and the Possibility of a Buddhist Postmodern 




This Dharma is Mind, beyond which there is no Dharma; and this Mind is the Dharma, beyond 
which there is no mind.  Mind in itself is not mind, yet neither is no-mind. (Blofeld 1958, 34)       
As Dale S. Wright explains in Philosophical Meditations on Zen Buddhism, Huang Po maintained, “that 
the intention of Buddhism is to ‘arrest the karma-forming process of conceptual thought’” (Wright 1998, 
174).  Accordingly, in the context of the Mahāyāna idea of prajñā, which he characterizes as “intuitive 
knowledge,” Huang Po believed that dualistic thinking and concepts undermine one’s ability to directly 
experience “reality;” thus, “the essential element of Huang Po’s Zen practice must be ‘throwing off the 
burden of concepts’” (Wright 1998, 175).  Herein, the implications of this Zen perspective, vis-à-vis 
ethics, is that any normative perspective that relies upon dualistic concepts or principles will be defeating 
for practitioners.     
Hans-Georg Moeller champions this ‘beyond good and evil’ perspective in The Moral Fool: A 
Case for Amorality (2010).  One of his main arguments is that since morality is defined by dualisms (e.g. 
good and bad, right and wrong), and because all dualisms cloud one’s insight and authentic participation 
with the non-dual nature of all things, it follows that morality is not helpful for Zen practice. 
 “Do not think good, do not think evil” is the advice that is given to the Zen Buddhist 
 practitioner.  A variation of this phrase is found in Dazhu Huihai’s (late eighth/early ninth century 
 CE) Dunwu rudao yaomen lun: “Thinking in terms of good and evil is wrong; not to think so is 
 right thinking.  The same applies to all other categories of opposites – sorrow, and joy, beginning 
 and end, acceptance and rejection, dislikes and likes, aversion and love, all of which are called 
 wrong thinking, while to abstain from thinking in those categories is called right thinking.”  
 Thinking here refers to the activity of the mind during meditation – and by extension, of the 
 enlightened person who no longer suffers.  This state of mind is not so different from that of the 
 moral fool in Daoism.  One simply refrains from attaching substantial value judgments to one’s 
 perceptions, and a prime value judgment is obviously moral judgment. (Moeller 2009, 58) 
Indeed, this ‘beyond good and evil’ interpretation of Zen helps frame the anti-realist characterization of 
Dōgen’s ethics I advance in subsequent chapters, as well the comparative dialogue between Dōgen and 
Nietzsche I create in Chapter seven.  Why Dōgen and Nietzsche?  Following Masao Abe’s lead in “Zen 
and Nietzsche,” from Zen and Western Thought,50 it is their perspectivism that makes them companions 
                                                 
50 In addition to Abe, Graham Parkes has also helped set the stage Zen and Nietzsche comparative research.  See 




on a ‘way-seeking’ path; like Nietzsche’s perspectivism, which we explored in Chapter one, “This idea 
that the value of the world lies in our interpretations, and that there is no world apart from our value-
interpretations, is not essentially different from Buddhism and the Zen standpoint which holds that 
everything arises from the discriminating mind.  For when there is discrimination, value interpretation is 
involved” (Abe 1985, 139).  More recently, in his book Nietzsche and Zen: Self-Overcoming Without a 
Self, André van der Braak generates a comparative dialogue between Zen and Nietzsche in light of their 
“way seeking” practice of philosophy, vis-à-vis “self-overcoming.”   
Self-overcoming is one of the most important notions in Nietzsche’s philosophy.  For Nietzsche, 
life, conceived as will to power, is that which continually overcomes itself.  Also, as an 
individual, it is in one’s very nature as a creature of will to power that one must continually 
overcome oneself. […]  Nietzsche speaks about the self-overcoming of life, morality and 
Christianity. […] Also the Zen tradition stresses, like Buddhism in general, the importance of 
self-overcoming in order to reach awakening or enlightenment.  But Zen stresses that 
enlightenment is non-teleological; it vehemently criticizes early Buddhist conceptions of 
enlightenment as a goal to be reached.  For Zen, self-overcoming is also without a self. (Van der 
Braak 2011, 25-26) 
According to Van der Braak, the process of self-overcoming in Nietzsche’s philosophy, and self-
overcoming without a self in Buddhism and Zen, is an all-too-salient aspect of the moral life whereby one 
revaluates all values.  In the Zen tradition, Dōgen is one case in point.  
 At first sight, it would seem that a dialogue with Zen has little to offer in interpreting Nietzsche’s 
 revaluation of all values.  In the Zen tradition, there is nothing to be found that corresponds to it – 
 not surprisingly, since Nietzsche’s revaluation is closely connected to the crisis of nihilism that he 
 diagnoses in Western culture.  However, in this study we have seen that Dōgen, for example, 
 could be seen as engaging in a continuous Buddhist revaluation of values: and revaluing the 
 notion of Buddha nature, revaluing the oppositions of values: and enlightenment, practice and 
 realization, and zazen and ordinary life. (Van der Braak 2011, 180)  
Ultimately, what is central to Van der Braak’s comparative inquiry, as well as the other conceptual 
bridges constructed between Western continental thinkers and East Asian Buddhism, is that the Mahāyāna 
philosophy of emptiness overturns, as Jin Park points out, conventional moral beliefs and theories.  Thus, 
as we now turn towards a systematic assessment of current developments in Mahāyāna metaethics, we 
shall see how the non-essentialist philosophy of emptiness (Skt. śūnyatā) is pivotal for understanding the 




§2.5 Mahāyāna Metaethics: Emptiness and Values  
 While the philosophy of emptiness tends to destabilize traditional ethical theories that emphasize 
dualistic normative concepts, it does not do the same to metaethical inquiry.  This is so mainly because 
metaethics makes room for moral skepticism and non-essentialist views, such as anti-realism.  To begin 
making sense of Mahāyāna metaethics more systematically, let’s turn our attention to Nāgārjuna’s 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, specifically the final verse in the “Analysis of Views:” “I salute Gautama, who, 
based on compassion, taught the true Dharma for the abandonment of all views” (Siderits and Katsura 
2013, 334).  In their commentary on this verse, Siderits and Katsura state that “all views” refers to, “any 
theory concerning how things ultimately are” (Siderits and Katsura 2013, 334).  In other words, for the 
purposes of our inquiry, “all views” includes normative beliefs about good and bad, right and wrong.  
What this means for metaethics is that the philosophy of emptiness is clearly incompatible with realist and 
cognitivist standpoints.  Since realism believes that values are objective/mind-independent, and because 
cognitivism believes that language can accurately describe and express such values and principles, these 
metaethical leanings directly clash with Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka standpoint whereby emptiness reveals 
that nothing has an inherent mind-independent nature, and that there is ultimately nothing one can 
describe or express.  However, that being said, the question remains as to whether the philosophy of 
emptiness permits or forestalls conventional ethical discourse?  In other words, in light of the two-fold 
theory of truth in Madhyamaka, conventional truth (Skt. saṃvṛiti-satya) and ultimate truth (Skt. 
paramārtha-satya), while it may be the case that there is nothing that can be said about ethics in an 
ultimate sense, is it possible to provide justificatory support from a conventional standpoint?51   
                                                 
51 It is important to note that not all scholars are comfortable with an anti-realist interpretation of Madhyamaka 
metaethics.  See Gordon F. Davis, “Moral Realism and Anti-Realism outside the West: A Meta-Ethical Turn in 
Buddhist Ethics,” Comparative Philosophy, vol. 4, no. 2 (2013) pp. 24-53.  In addition, see ibid., “The Antipada 
Problem in Buddhist Meta-Ethics,” Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 25 (2018) pp. 185-231.  In short, Davis maintains 
that Buddhist scholars, particularly the Cowherds, have over stepped the Buddhist middle way approach to 
philosophizing by endorsing anti-realism as metaethical off shoot of the philosophy of emptiness (Davis 2018).  
Moreover, he argues that it is hard to square anti-realist interpretations with Buddhism’s commitment to universal 
compassion (Davis 2013).  In short, I am not sympathetic with Davis’ position.  In regards to over stepping the 





  Bronwyn Finnigan takes up this question in her article, “Madhyamaka Buddhist Meta-Ethics: 
The Justificatory Grounds of Moral Judgments.”  Therein Finnigan asks, “Can Madhyamaka provide a 
satisfactory justificatory basis for these Buddhist ethical views given its particular analyses of 
metaphysics and taking into account the differences in epistemological commitments that distinguish 
Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika Madhyamaka?” (Finnigan 2015, 765).52  Tom Tillemans,53 for example, 
thinks that Madhyamakas can find a justificatory basis grounded in conventional intuitions.  However, 
according to Finnigan, the reasons supporting Tillemans position are, despite their validity, unsound due 
to exegetical and philosophical reasons.  The central focus of Finnigan’s article is to expand upon the 
philosophical line of reasoning advanced by Finnigan and Tanaka in “Ethics for Mādhyamikas,” from 
Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. 
 Whether Mādhyamikas can justify the general and fundamental moral judgments from which 
 evaluative conclusions about particular actions are derived. That compassion, for example, is 
 judged as good and suffering as bad are, in general, fundamental assumptions that inform much 
 Buddhist ethical reasoning about whether particular actions count as good or bad, right or 
 wrong…Given its metaphysical and epistemological assumptions, can Madhyamaka provide a 
 satisfactory justificatory base for these most fundamental Buddhist moral judgments? (Finnigan
 2015, 766-767) 
By considering a range of metaethical positions that Madhaymaka might adopt, including intuitionism 
and cognitive naturalism, Finnigan introduces the possibility of interpreting Madhayamaka as non-
cognitivist.  While there are a number of important points that we can address within this article as a 
                                                 
contend that this is mistaken.  Instead, the middle way of Madhyamaka is, in general, neither being nor non-being, 
or, neither eternalism nor annihilationism.  In the context of metaethics, this middle way translates into neither moral 
absolutism nor amoralism.  While anti-realism is not a mean between these extremes, it does fall in between them 
by: (1) denying the existence of absolute normative truths and/or mind-independent values; and (2) preserving 
anthropogenic normative views and perspectives.  And, in regards to his point about universal compassion, it is not 
obvious to me that Buddhist compassion is born out of a mind-independent facts or truths; nor is it obvious that the 
way Buddhists express their compassion for other beings is universal in nature, and thus not dependent upon context 
of the situation at hand.   
52 Madhyamaka, “middle way,” is a school of Buddhist philosophy that was founded by Nāgārjuna in the first 
century, CE, which was influential within the development of Mahāyāna Buddhism, including Zen.  As a school of 
philosophy, Madhyamaka consists of two main traditions: 1) Prāsangika, or Consequence school; 2) Svātantrika, or 
Autonomy school.  A central philosophical distinction between these two schools is that while the former adopts a 
philosophical strategy of critically challenging the philosophical its opponents by showing how their views lead to 
undesired consequences, the latter school attempts to establish a positive philosophical thesis of its own. 
53 See Tom Tillemans: “Madhyamaka Buddhist Ethics.” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 




whole, her reflections on the prospects of a non-cognitive interpretation will help set the stage for our 
treatment of Dōgen’s metaethics. 
 Is it possible that a non-cognitivist metaethic could coherently provide justification for 
conventional value judgments and normative expressions that make up so much of the everyday world?  
Finnigan considers this possibility in light of the hurdles facing non-cognitivism, including the Frege-
Geach problem that we discussed in the previous chapter.  As a theory of anti-realism, Finnigan suggests 
the following: 
 If we were to accept a non-cognitivist analysis of moral judgments, it could be that what has been 
 causing all of our difficulties is the fact that we have been giving a metaphysical treatment to the  
 question of their justificatory status. More precisely, we have been looking to conventional truth 
 to provide some factual basis on which to justify the moral claims found in Madhyamaka 
 philosophical texts on the assumption that these claims are positive assertions that could be 
 rendered true or false in relation to such facts. Drawing on non-cognitivist insights, one might 
 alternatively argue that these claims are more correctly understood as recorded moral judgments 
 that express (dis)approval toward certain qualities, objects, or actions (cf. emotivism or 
 expressivism) and/or are veiled commands to act in the relevant ways (cf. prescriptivism). The 
 sentence ‘compassion is good’ is thus to be understood as a recorded expression of approval 
 directed toward compassion and that which is compassionate. ‘Suffering is bad’ expresses 
 disapproval toward suffering. (Finnigan 2015, 776) 
Since Madhyamaka does not believe that there are any entities that are essentially real, it follows that a 
non-cognitive interpretation of Madhyamaka, prima facie, seems warranted vis-à-vis śūnyavāda.  
However, according to Finnigan, it is less clear whether, “embracing non-cognitivism about moral 
judgments also accommodates conventional truth” (Finnigan 2015, 777).  The lack of clarity stems from 
the Frege-Geach problem.  As noted in Chapter one, the problem relates to the fact that “moral judgments 
have the appearance of descriptive claims;” and, because of this appearance, “non-cognitivists do not 
consider their analysis of moral judgments to represent accurately what ordinary folks take themselves to 
be doing when they utter such claims as ‘compassion is good.’” (Finnigan 2015, 777).  
 In addition to this analytic challenge, Finnigan also notes that a non-cognitive interpretation of 
Madhyamka might result with some form of relativism.  Since Madhyamaka maintains that there is 




interpretation of Buddhist ethics is hard pressed to give an account of such uniformity.  One could, as she 
explains, attempt to provide a causal account; “one might argue that a shared enculturation into the 
Buddhist dharma had a decisive causal influence on the uniformity of evaluative attitudes expressed by 
individual Mādhyamikas” (Finnigan 2015, 778).  Or, one might argue for some kind of evolutionary 
model, as well as appeal to a reflective equilibrium.  However, Finnigan maintains that:  
If one were to embrace this explanatory strategy […] one could not appeal to any further fact as 
justificatory grounds for convergence. Specifically, one could not appeal to some shared belief or 
common realization of the truth of the Buddha’s teachings as common ground for this generally 
held pro-attitude toward what is compassionate. This is a problem as it runs against the deeply 
held soteriological intuition that Buddhists can and do converge in evaluative attitudes, practices, 
and kinds of mental states given a correct understanding of the Buddha’s teachings (particularly 
of his views on the nature of no-self, anātman, impermanence, anitya, and dependent arising, 
pratītyasamutpāda). (Finnigan 2015, 778) 
According to Finnigan, the aforementioned challenges facing Madhyamaka, vis-à-vis moral justification, 
warrant the conclusion that they “cannot satisfactorily justify their moral judgments in terms consistent 
with their adherence to śūnyavāda” (Finnigan 2015, 778).   
 It is important to note that Finnigan does not deny the possibility of providing justificatory 
grounds for moral judgments while also remaining committed to the anti-realist commitments of 
Madhyamaka and the philosophy of emptiness.  One suggestion she offers is that, “Madhyamaka views 
on ethics might be fruitfully engaged if one were to shift focus away from a concern with the justificatory 
status of moral claims and toward the role and function of assumed values with respect to shaping ethical 
conduct (where this includes their bearing on ethical character, and affective attitudes as well as some 
conception of moral phenomenology)” (Finnigan 2015, 779).  
  In addition to metaethical non-cognitivism, the anti-realist philosophy of fictionalism has been 
proffered as a way to justify value judgments in light of conventional truth (Skt. saṃvṛti-satya).  As Mark 
Siderits argues in Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy, the reductionism of persons and the 
emptiness of all phenomena entails that there are no mind-independent truths (Siderits 2015).  




true, “if and only if it corresponds to a mind-independent reality and neither asserts nor presupposes the 
existence of anything not in the final ontology” (Siderits 2009, 60); however, from the perspective of 
mereological reductionism and the Mahāyāna philosophy of emptiness, there are no mind-independent 
truths, and so no statement is ultimately true.  This does not mean, however, that we cannot accept 
statements as conventionally true; according to Siderits, fictionalism can offer a theoretical lens for 
understanding why propositions we do not ‘ultimately’ accept at face value, but which we nevertheless 
think have pragmatic value, can be accepted ‘conventionally.’   
In his article “Why the Buddha Never Uttered a Word,” Mario D’Amato also defends a version of 
fictionalism as an interpretive lens for making sense of the epistemic status of conventional statements 
while remaining committed to anti-realism.  According D’Amato, one can, “engage in conventional 
discourse without positing that the entities referred to in such discourse ultimately exist” (D’Amato 2009, 
50). 
In any occurrence of language use, a Buddha would employ language without falling under the 
spell of words and objects – employing concepts and language in perfect accordance with 
conventional usage, while remaining aware that ultimately there are no referential objects.  We 
might describe the buddha’s mindful awareness in terms of what some contemporary 
philosophers have referred to as fictionalism. […]  According to such a fictionalist view, one 
might engage in conventional discourse without positing that the entities referred to in such 
discourse ultimately exist, for example, through adding the operator “in fiction ƒ” (or “according 
to the conventional domain”) to any truth claim.  Hence, on a mindful Buddha account, a Buddha 
may be said to use language “under erasure,” employing words while remaining mindful that 
words do not actually refer in the way they purport to – mindfully aware that referents are nothing 
more than fictions. (D’Amato 2009, 50-51) 
However, Laura Guerrero is not convinced that fictionalism is logically coherent and/or consistent for 
making sense of Mahāyāna ethics, specifically conventional propositions. 
In her article “Buddhist Global Fictionalism?”  Guerrero cogently argues against fictionalism by 
first pointing out that there are subtle differences between the ways Buddhist fictionalism can be 
interpreted when we take into account the philosophical differences between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra.  
“Yogācāra thinkers typically agree with Madhyamaka that all objects of ordinary, unenlightened, 




ineffable, and non‐conceptualizable ultimate reality that underlies the emptiness of experienced 
phenomena” (Guerrero 2018, 426).  However, notwithstanding these differences, Guerrero does not think 
the versions of global fictionalism that some Buddhist scholars have proffered, including Siderits and 
D’Amato, succeed; they do not, in short, show how conventional normative beliefs can be assessed or 
evaluated without contradicting fictionalism at its anti-realist core.  Guerrero’s main argument can be 
summarized accordingly.  If Mahāyāna fictionalism can provide normative justification for conventional 
beliefs, then that fictionalist perspective will include normative constraints that are either fictional or non-
fictional.   Now, if they are non-fictional, then that would clearly contradict the anti-realist commitments 
that the philosophy of emptiness propounds.  On the other hand, if the normative constraints are fictional, 
then one must explain why anyone ought to recognize and accept fictions purported in the everyday 
world.  At this point, while the global Mahāyāna fictionalist can appeal to another fictional constraint, 
such an appeal, however, begs the same question all over again, ad infinitum.  
The problem with globalizing this form of fictionalism is that, insofar as it simply exchanges the 
assertion of one statement with another, it relies on the non‐fictional, literal assertability of the 
prefixed statement. Fictionalisms that employ an operator ‘according to fiction f’ presume that it 
is possible to unproblematically assert the prefixed claim. […]  On the global view, like any 
ordinary statement x, a statement of the form ‘according to fiction f, x’ cannot be asserted non‐
fictionally. It must also be understood as implicitly fictional and thus in need of an operator to fix 
the actual content asserted and the context of assessment. The result is a longer statement of the 
form ‘according to fiction g, (according to fiction f, x).’ That longer statement, being also 
fictional, will also need an operator to determine the content and context of assessment, etc., ad 
infinitum. The result is that no content or context of assessment is ever fixed for the fictional 
claims and thus no claim can be asserted or assessed for truth because the iterative process never 
ends. (Guerrero 2018, 428) 
Thus, Guerrero concludes that Buddhist anti-realists ought to adopt an alternative metaethical strategy for 
explaining how conventional judgments, and normative propositions, can be assessed and accounted for.  
  In the context of Zen Buddhism, specifically Dōgen’s philosophical writings which is where we 
will be focusing our attention in subsequent chapters, alternative strategies to non-cognitivism and 
fictionalism have been proffered by Russell Guilbault and Bret Davis.  In “Emptiness and Metaethics: 
Dōgen’s Anti-Realist Solution,” Guilbault shows that anti-realism, mainly the non-existence of moral 




and that Dōgen’s philosophy can provide a road map for taking this characterization seriously.  According 
to Guilbault, “Dōgen confronts the ethics-emptiness problem in terms of Buddha-nature” (Guilbault 2020, 
958).  The ethics-emptiness problem is that Buddhist ethical concepts seem to require the existence of 
moral facts, yet the philosophy of emptiness denies the existence of such (Guilbault 2020).  If, in other 
words, one maintains that there are no non-empty phenomena or beings, it is unclear how one can justify 
any ethical concept or normative belief.  The interpretation of Dogen’s metaethics I develop throughout 
remaining chapters of this dissertation parallels Guilbault’s, mainly, “Dōgen’s conception of Buddha-
nature will not yield any objects that exist independently or have a stable essence and could thus serve as 
truth makers for moral claims” (Guilbault 2020, 961). Thus, Dōgen’s philosophy and practice of zazen 
and the realization of Buddha-nature does not posit the existence of mind-independent moral facts or 
properties; it is for this reason that Dōgen’s meatethical perspective is best interpreted as anti-realism.   
 Now, when it comes to justificatory status of value judgments and normative expressions, vis-à-
vis Dōgen’s ethical writings and monastic instructions, Guilbault thinks that Dōgen’s strategy for 
justifying normative claims, albeit the non-existence of moral facts, is to appeal to the conventions of the 
Buddhist tradition in general, Zen in particular.  For Dōgen, appeals to historical examples of monks and 
patriarchs as, “models for behavior,” is sufficient (Guilbault 2020, 966).  Thus, Guilbault maintains that 
Dōgen is a conventionalist. 
 A ‘conventionalist’ interpretation of Dōgen’s ethics is similar to Bret Davis’ contextualist 
characterization.  In “Dōgen,” Davis seems to share the anti-realist interpretation proposed by Guilbault; 
“Dōgen rejects not only egoistic but also metaphysically predetermined ideas of good and evil. The good 
is not a set of predefined rules that we need to implement, but rather arises with its concrete enactment” 
(Davis 2016, 3).  What this means according to Davis is that Dōgen’s ethics, rather than affirming moral 
relativism, whereby values are considered arbitrary and/or egocentric, resembles contextual relativism 
since, “he does give us method for awakening the state of heart and mind with which to properly judge 




2016, 3).  Herein I am sympathetic with Davis’ interpretation that zazen provides the contextualized 
starting point for engaging in normative discourse and thinking through value judgments.54  Moreover, 
what is interesting about Davis’ contextualist interpretation is that he makes room for some of the ethical 
theories treated earlier in this chapter, including consequentialism and virtue theory.  In regards to 
consequentialism, since Dōgen affirms the vow of the bodhisattva to liberate all beings from suffering, 
such an affirmation, “could be seen as providing a teleological gauge for a consequentialist ethic;”55 and, 
in regards to virtue theory,56 “Dōgen thinks that the proper thing to do in a situation is whatever an 
enlightened person would do in that situation” (Davis 2016, 3-4). 
 Whether we characterize Dōgen’s strategy for justifying value judgments as “conventionalism” or 
“contextualism,” these metaethical labels only provide an account of what normative expressions say; 
they do not clarify the meaning of normative expressions.  After all it seems plausible that one could be 
both a conventionalist and a cognitivist (i.e. normative propositions, vis-à-vis conventions are truth apt).  
However, if the anti-realist characterization of Dōgen’s ethics is valid, then cognitivism clearly will not 
serve as a counterpart without contradiction.  Thus, in light of our aforementioned treatment of Mahāyāna 
metaethics, the question remains whether we should interpret Dōgen’s writings on ethical matters through 
a non-cognitive lens, whereby any and all value judgments are reducible to feelings and attitudinal 
leanings, or should we attempt to make sense of such through a fictionalist looking glass?  I will be 
addressing this question in upcoming chapters.  Ultimately, I plan to argue that neither non-cognitivism 
nor fictionalism accurately characterize Dōgen’s metaethics.  As a counterpart to anti-realism, I plan to 
                                                 
54 In Chapter six of this dissertation I argue that zazen is, according to Dōgen, a normative practice.  Therein we 
shall see that for any given normative perspective, one side of good and bad are revealed, the other side normatively 
concealed.   
55 I am not entirely convinced that consequentialism is an important to ‘tool’ in Dōgen’s normative toolkit, vis-à-vis 
moral reasoning, despite his affirmation of the bodhisattva vows and the high regard in which held the Lotus Sūtra, 
which stresses the doctrine of skillful means.  I contend that Dōgen emphasizes non-action (Ch.wu-wei) as not 
committing (Jpn. makusa) and non-thinking (Jpn. hishiryō) instead of the calculus oriented perspective of 
utilitarianism.  I will make this point more explicit in Chapter three. 
56 For a review of Dōgen’s normative perspective vis-à-vis virtues, see Douglas K. Mikkelson, “Toward a 





show that anti-cognitivism is helpful for interpreting what normative propositions ‘mean’ and ‘say’ 
according to Dōgen; as a metaethical counterpart, moral propositions are not reducible to feelings and 
attitudinal leanings, nor are they erroneously fictitious, but instead they reveal and conceal perspectives.57 
§2.6 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter set out to: (1) broadly explore some of the hermeneutical hurdles and variegated 
perspectives surrounding the scholarly pursuit of interpreting Buddhist ethics through Western ethical 
theories; (2) examine various interpretations some contemporary scholars have proposed so to make sense 
of Buddhist ethics within Theravāda and Mahāyāna traditions; and (3) explore the metaethical 
implications of emptiness.  In regards to (1) we saw that there is no agreement amongst scholars as to 
whether Buddhist ethics is reducible to a single ethical theory within Western philosophy.  The lack of 
consensus and agreement stems from the fact that Buddhism is not a monolith; depending upon the 
tradition and the textual source, one can find evidence that will shore up either a virtue theoretical or a 
utilitarian interpretation.  In regards (2) I began this treatment with the Buddha’s ethical teachings in the 
Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta.  From there I explored Damien Keown’s virtue theoretical interpretation, vis-à-vis 
Theravāda Buddhism as ethical theory, and P.D. Premasiri’s cognitivist interpretation, vis-à-vis 
Theravāda Buddhism as metaethics.  In the process of doing so, I also considered alternative perspectives 
that provide more nuance to that of Keown and Premasiri, including Charles Hallisey’s particularlism.  
From there, I then pivoted to Mahāyāna Buddhism, specifically the philosophy of emptiness and the 
bodhisattva ideal, and explored normative perspectives in both Tibetan and East Asian traditions, 
including Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra and Wŏnhyo’s Essentials on Observing and Violating the 
Fundamentals of Bodhisattva Precepts.  In regards to Śāntideva, this inquiry showed how 
consequentialism, as proposed by Charles Goodman, can help make sense of the nature of Buddhist 
ethics, specifically the philosophy of skillful means.  And, in regards to Wŏnhyo, we saw, in light of Jin 
                                                 
57 While anti-cognitivism may sound like another form of relativism, in Chapter six I show that anti-cognitivism 
does not fall within either subjectivism or cultural relativism since both maintain that normative propositions are in 




Y. Park’s research, how the philosophy of emptiness destabilizes traditional ethical theories that assume 
foundational values and principles. In regards to (3), I began by considering how Nāgārjuna’s middle way 
perspective concerning the nature of ‘views’ sets the general stage for Mahāyāna metaethics as anti-
realism.  From there I considered both non-cognitivism and fictionalism as metaethical counterparts to 
anti-realism.  Based upon the research of Mark Siderits, Bronwyn Finnigan and Laura Guerrero, we saw 
that while anti-realism is a warranted characterization of Mahāyāna metaethics, it is less clear that non-
cognitivism or fictionalism are helpful for making sense of the status of normative propositions and 
expressions.  Accordingly, we then treated two metaethical alternatives for making sense of normative 
propositions in Dōgen’s Zen: (a) Guilbault’s conventionalism; and (b) Davis’ contextualism.  We noted 
that while these views are sufficient for making sense of what normative expressions say, they fall short 
of clarifying what normative expressions mean.  Based upon their research, I then introduced anti-
cognitivism, which I stipulated in the Chapter one, as a potential strategy so to fill that gap. 
Ultimately, the general organization of this chapter is to help introduce Dōgen’s normative 
perspective within the context of the history and cultural diffusion of Buddhism, vis-à-vis ethics.  Overall, 
this chapter showed that while it is important not to impose Western philosophical interpretations upon 
the ethical writings in Buddhist traditions haphazardly, one can, with care, open up comparative 
dialogues, vis-à-vis meta-theories, and generate new perspectives while attempting an exploration of 
Buddhist thinkers, such as Wŏnhyo and Dōgen, on their own terms.  In regards to Dōgen, the remaining 
chapters attempt to show that the stipulation of the term anti-cognitivism, a term that is not used by 
scholars working in the academic field of metaethics, reflects my attempt to understand Dōgen’s ethics 
from his way-seeking perspective.  From this perspective, ‘when one normative side is revealed, the other 









 Beginning On the Path of Revealing and Concealing:  
Situating Dōgen’s Metaethics 
§ 3.1 Chapter Overview 
I concluded the previous chapter by examining Mahāyāna metaethics, and the epistemic problem 
of whether or not an anti-realist standpoint, vis-à-vis emptiness (Skt. śūnyatā), can provide a justificatory 
account for conventional normative expressions and judgments.   After reviewing non-cognitive and 
fictionalist strategies, it became clear, in light of Finnigan’s critical analysis of the former (non-
cognitivism) and Guerrero’s incisive treatment of the latter (fictionalism), that these strategies are 
undermotivated, and thus scholars should seek out other strategies in order to solve this metaethical 
problem.  Accordingly, I considered how conventionalist (Guilbault) and contextualist (Davis) 
interpretations of Dōgen’s normative perspective, vis-à-vis anti-realism, might provide a strategy for 
doing such; however, I noted that both characterizations only provide an account of what conventional 
normative judgments say, and thus fall short in clarifying what they mean.  Thus, I proposed that anti-
cognitivism should be considered as a metaethical counterpart to anti-realism in order to specify what 
conventional normative expressions mean: conventional normative propositions are not reducible to 
feelings and attitudinal leanings, nor are they erroneously fictitious, but instead they reveal and conceal 
perspectives.  By introducing anti-cognitivism, I am not attempting to dismiss either conventionalism or 
contextualism; both strategies are effective for clarifying what Dōgen’s normative prescriptions and 
proscriptions say; for example, Dōgen’s use of normative words and concepts say a lot about Zen practice 
and monastic training.  However, I contend that the epistemic problem facing Mahāyāna anti-realism, vis-
à-vis the meaning of conventional normative propositions, can be reconciled by interpreting Dōgen’s 
metaethics as anti-cognitivism.  To begin making my case for this metaethical strategy, the objective of 
this chapter is to situate Dōgen’s metaethics in light of his practice of doing philosophy during the 




of Zen in Japan.  Herein, my focus will target his critical reflections regarding the Mahāyāna philosophy 
of original enlightenment (Jpn. hongaku) and Buddha-nature (Jpn. busshō), thereby revealing salient 
features of Dōgen’s ‘way-seeking’ metaethic, vis-à-vis his philosophy of zazen and the nonduality of 
practice and realization.  In the course of achieving this goal, I will also attempt to show how Dōgen’s 
Zen perspective differs from the ‘silent illumination’ teachings of continental Caodong teachers and 
masters, vis-à-vis complete enlightenment.  From there, I will lay out how Dōgen’s philosophy of 
Buddha-nature and time provides, as Guilbault argues, a general blue print for his metaethical standpoint 
of antirealism; a standpoint which shapes his interpretation of soteriological values, including delusion 
and enlightenment/realization.  Finally, I will conclude this treatment by also examining Dōgen’s 
perspective of the bodhisattva ideal and the doctrine of skillful means (Skt. upāya).  Therein I will show 
how his reevaluation of the doctrine of original enlightenment, vis-à-vis nonduality of practice and 
realization, provides a reevaluation of the doctrine of skillful means; thus, instead of interpreting skillful 
means a consequentialist philosophy, I contend that Dōgen interprets such in light of the East Asian 
philosophy of non-action (Ch. wu-wei).   
§3.2 Dōgen: Beginning on the Path of Metaethics 
Dōgen’s philosophical practice begins at young age as a Tendai monk at Mt. Hiei58 during the 
Kamakura period (1185 - 1333).  For a thinker such as Dōgen, as well as other religious reformers 
including Hōnen (1133-1212), Shinran (1173-1263) and Nichiren (1185-1333), all of whom began their 
Buddhist training as Tendai 59 monks at Mt. Hiei, the practice of doing philosophy at this time was 
conditioned by mappō, ‘the Decay of the Law’ which was believed to have begun toward the end of the 
                                                 
58 Located to the northeast of Kyoto, Mt. Hiei was the home for many Tendai temples, including Enryakuji where 
Dōgen trained.  During the Kamakura period, roughly ninety percent of the monks at Mt. Hiei came from 
aristocratic families (Stone 1999).  
59 The Tendai school was introduced to Japan by the monk Saichō (767-822) in 805 and became one of the two 
dominant Buddhist traditions during the Heian period; the other tradition was the Mantrayāna Shingon school, 





Heian period (794-1185) in 1052.60  According to Yoshiro Tamura, “As the Heian period drew to a close, 
the aristocratic culture began to disintegrate and the social order to collapse; the nation was beset with 
instability and disorder.  The impermanence of life, and the folly of sinfulness of humanity, loomed large, 
and many people despaired, fearing that the period of the Decay of the Law (mappō) prophesized by the 
Buddha was at hand” (Tamura 2000, 85).  Thus, in response to the cultural climate of this period, Japan 
experienced the emergence of new Buddhist schools (Jpn. Shin Kamakura Bukkyō) – Jōdo Shinshū, “True 
Pure Land,” Nichiren and Zen – which sought to provide a philosophy and practice, particularly for the 
lay majority as they were the hardest hit by the cultural and environmental turbulence and uncertainty of 
this time period (Tamura, 2000). 
Throughout Dōgen’s monastic training at Mt. Hiei, the philosophy of Buddha-nature (Skt. 
tathāgatagarbha) as presented in texts such as Awakening of Faith,61 the Lotus Sūtra62 and the 
Mahāparinirvāna Sūtra63 was a first-order concern.  According to the Tendai tradition, since Buddha-
nature is inherent within all beings, they championed the idea of original enlightenment (Jpn. hongaku)64 
rather than acquired enlightenment (Jpn. shikaku).  The doctrine of original enlightenment is born out of 
the Mahāyāna philosophy of emptiness (Skt. śūnyatā), “which transcends the dichotomy of enlightenment 
                                                 
60 According to Jacqueline Stone, “the final Dharma age (mappō) […] is often associated with belief in human 
limitations, in the depravity of the times, in salvation after death, and in the need to rely on the power of the 
Buddha” (Stone, 1999, 34). 
61 Kūkai (744-835) is recognized as the first Japanese Buddhist thinker to engage one of the central themes of the 
Awakening of Faith, mainly original enlightenment (Jpn. hongaku); such engagement shaped his conception of 
Buddha-nature whereby all beings are understood to be inherently enlightened, not just humans.  For Kūkai, the 
doctrine of original enlightenment, “is linked to the esoteric doctrines of identity with the cosmic Buddha and of 
realizing Buddhahood with this very body (sokushin jōbutsu)” (Stone 1999, 11).  As we shall see, Dōgen also 
maintained this view of Buddha-nature and the realization of Buddhahood in this very body, vis-à-vis the practice of 
zazen.   
62 According to Jacqueline Stone, “The Lotus Sūtra is central to the T’ien-t’ai/Tendai tradition, which regards it as 
the culmination of the Buddha’s teachings, preached during the last eight years of his life” (Stone 1999, 12). 
63 Not be confused with the Pāli Mahāparinibbāna Sutta, which deals with the last year of the historical Buddha’s 
life, the Mahāparinirvāna Sūtra is tied to the Tathāgatagarbha tradition of Mahāyana Buddhism.  “The 
tathāgatagarbha, the Buddha-nature, or more literally, Tathāgata-embryo or Tathāgata-womb is that within each 
being which enables enlightenment to take place.  The claim that all sentient beings have this element is the claim 
that all sentient beings have it within them to attain full Buddhahood” (Williams 89, 98).    
64 The doctrine of hongaku was developed in the Heian and Kamakura periods by Ryōgen (912-85), Genshin (942-





and nonenlightenment” (Tamura 2000, 74).   From Dōgen’s perspective,65 this doctrine was problematic 
for the following reason: “If we are primordially enlightened and consequently liberated here and now 
within this body-mind existence, then why do we have to exert ourselves at all?  What is the significance 
of intellectual, moral, cultic, and religious activities and endeavors?” (Kim 2004, 23).66  Thus, while 
Dōgen was receiving instruction in the doctrine of original enlightenment through texts such as Flower 
Garland Sūtra (Jpn. Kegonkyō), his ritual training and practice seemed to promote the idea of acquired 
enlightenment.  To maintain that Buddha-nature exists inherently, but that it is to be realized through 
monastic training, creates a duality between practice and attainment.  This duality thus presupposes that 
Buddha-nature is a ‘thing’ that can be affirmed somewhere in time and space.   
Determined to resolve this dualistic tension, Dōgen abandoned his monastic training at Mt. Hiei 
and began studying and practicing Zen at Kenninji monastery in Kyoto under the guidance of Eisai (1141-
1215), the founder of the Rinzai Zen sect (Ch. Linji) in Japan, and his disciple Myōzen (1184-1225).  
After training at Kenninji for nine years, in 1223 Dōgen traveled to China in search of a teacher who 
                                                 
65 Steven Heine characterizes Dōgen’s perspective at this time as the “informative period.”  According to Heine, 
Dōgen’s life can be broken down into five periods: (1) formative; (2) informative; (3) transformative; (4) 
reformative; and (5) Performative.  The formative period refers to his early upbringing and education in Chinese 
classics and poetry, as well as the death of his mother.  The informative refers to Dōgen’s early training as a Tendai 
monk, and his great doubt vis-à-vis Buddha-nature.  The transformative period marks the time when Dōgen traveled 
to China and trained under Master Rujing, and thereby realized Dharma transmission.  It is also during this period 
that Dōgen began to compose his writings, including the Shōbōgenzō.  The reformative period refers to Dōgen’s 
monastic life at Kōshōji temple; at this time, he composed roughly half of the entire Shōbōgenzō.  Finally, the 
performative period refers to his monastic life at Eiheiji temple, where he continued to write and edit the 
Shōbōgenzō.  According to Heine, “Over the course of the decade of the informative period, in order to resolve his 
fundamental spiritual conundrum regarding the relation between original enlightenment and the need for everyday 
practice, Dōgen is said to have studied the entire Buddhist canon multiple times” (Heine 2020, 69). 
66 It is important to note that Dōgen’s great doubt, vis-à-vis Buddha-nature and original enlightenment is not 
included in Dōgen’s writings.  As Jacqueline Stone explains, “This story appears in a hagiographical account written 
after Dōgen’s death and contains numerous problems.  Dōgen himself does not cite this ‘great doubt’ as the reason 
for his departure from Mt. Hiei.  His own writings suggest that he was troubled by the contradiction between his 
ideal of an authentic teacher and the worldly aspirations of the monks around him.  Or, he may have left Mt. Hiei in 
connection with the fact that the teacher from whom he had received ordination–Kōen, the zasu or chief abbot of the 
Enryakuji–had been forced to resign toward the end of 1213. […]  Whatever the case, it seems probable that the 
‘great doubt’ represents a hagiographical ‘reading back,’ into the beginnings of Dōgen’s career, of his later concern 





would be able to provide authentic instruction and Zen transmission.67  His journey led him to some of the 
largest Chan temples throughout China, many of which housed up to 1500 monks.  After a long search, in 
1225 Dōgen began training under Master Rujing  (Jpn. Tendō Nyōjō) (1163-1228) at Jingde Monastery on 
Mount Tiantong (Jpn. Tendō).68  It is under Master Rujing’s tutelage, vis-à-vis silent illumination,69 that 
Dōgen received dharma transmission within the Sōtō tradition (Ch. Caodong) which he eventually brings 
back, empty handed,70 to Japan.71   
In Hōkyō-ki, “Journal of My Study in China,” Dōgen provides an account of his training at Mount 
Tiantong, which included: (1) instruction in dharma transmission vis-à-vis the patriarchs and ancestors 
(e.g., Bodhidharma and Hui-neng);72 (2) a critical examination of Mahāyāna texts, such as Śūraṃgama 
                                                 
67 According to Steven Heine, “Dōgen became the second main Zen pioneer who traveled to learn the practice of 
seated meditation in Southern Song-dynasty (Nan Song) China (1127-1279), following the four-year journey of 
Eisai from 1187 to 1191” (Heine 2020, 13).  
68 Jingde Monastery on Mount Tiantong is where Master Hongzhi (1091-1157) had been abbot.  Master Hongzhi 
had a deep impact upon Dōgen’s Zen perspective.  As Taigen Daniel Leighton notes, “Hongzhi had been abbot, and 
a third-generation successor to Changlu Qingliao, a dharma-brother of Hongzhi (both were disciples of Danxia 
Zichun).  Dōgen clearly reveres Hongzhi, referring to him particularly as an ancient buddha, and says that Hongzhi 
is also the only person Rujing ever called and ‘ancient buddha.’ […]  Hongzhi’s influence on Dōgen can be seen 
most clearly in their meditation practice and in their understanding of its meaning” (Leighton 1991, xxxiv).    
69 Silent Illumination Zen (Jpn. mokushō) emerges as one of the two main streams of Chan/Zen around the middle of 
the Song dynasty through the practice and teachings of Ta-hui Tsung-kao (Jpn. Daie Sōkō) (1089-1163) (Dumoulin 
1988).  According to Taigen Daniel Leighton, “This objectless and nondualistic meditation does not involve stages 
or striving for any goal or achievement; thus it is an activity radically other than the usual worldly activity, which 
grasps and seeks for some result” (Leighton 1991, xxxiv).   
70 Returning ‘empty handed’ is a reference to the fact that Dōgen did not return to Japan with relics or texts, but 
rather a simple practice of just sitting (Jpn. shikantaza), or zazen only (Heine 2020).   
71 For a comprehensive review of the historical development of Chan/Zen, see Peter D. Hershock, Chan Buddhism. 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005).  The Caodong/Sōtō lineage that Dōgen received instruction from 
Rujing belongs to the Southern school of Chinese Chan.  This lineage is popularly characterized as the “silent 
illumination” (Jpn. mokushō-zen) tradition of Zen due to the emphasis that is placed upon seated meditation (Jpn. 
zazen).  The Linji/Rinzai tradition, which is the tradition Dōgen was first introduced to under the tutelage of Eisai, 
belongs to the Northern school of Chinese Chan.  This tradition was critical of the silent illumination practice of 
meditation, believing that it conditioned a complacent state of quietism.  Thus, instead of silent illumination 
meditation, the Linji/Rinzai tradition championed kōan-gazing meditation (Jpn. kanna-zen).  
72 To review the genealogical tables of dharma-transmission for both Rinzai and Sōtō lineages beginning with 
Bodhidharma (d. 532), see Heinrich Dumoulin, Zen Buddhism: A History vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan Publishing 





Sūtra;73 (3) the philosophy of emptiness according to Nāgārjuna;74 and (4) the practice of zazen.  In 
regards to (1), while Rujing instructs Dōgen that it is important to know the history of dharma 
transmission and the stories of the patriarchs, he cautions Dōgen not to become attached to the idea of a 
Zen school; “To call the wide road of buddhas and ancestors ‘the Zen School’ is thoughtless talk.  ‘The 
Zen School’ is a false name used by bald-head idiots, and all sages from ancient times are aware of this” 
(Dōgen 1999, 9). 
In regards to (2), after posing the following question to Rujing, “What are the sūtras that contain 
complete meaning?”, in contrast to those that are incomplete, Rujing replies to Dōgen, “Sūtras that 
contain complete meaning include descriptions of the events in the past lives of the Tathāgata.  Sūtras that 
explain only events in this world have a limited perspective” (Dōgen 1999, 11).  Embedded within 
Rujing’s response is a firm commitment to the philosophy of rebirth.  According to Dōgen’s records of 
Rujing’s instructions, to affirm Buddhist teachings while downplaying or simply ignoring the Buddhist 
philosophy of rebirth is nihilistic; “To deny that there are future births is nihilism; Buddha ancestors do 
not hold to the nihilistic views of those who are outside the way” (Dōgen 1999, 4).   
In regards to (3) Dōgen reports that he asked Rujing, “Can the negative results that come from 
delusion, external conditions, and karma really be the path of Buddha ancestors [as Nāgārjuna’s teachings 
say]?” (Dōgen 1999, 7).   Herein, Dōgen’s question seems to reveal his existential concern regarding 
                                                 
73 According to Paul Williams, while this sūtra is important within the Zen tradition, Dōgen suspected that this sūtra 
was not authentic, and should be distinguished from the Śūraṅgamasamādhi Sūtra (Williams 1989). Translated 
around the end of the second century, the Śūraṅgamasamādhi Sūtra is part of a collection of Mahāyāna sūtras that 
emphasize faith and devotion to bodhisattvas.  One bodhisattva in particular that is featured in the 
Śūraṅgamasamādhi Sūtra is a Mañjuśrī, the bodhisattva of wisdom.  “Just as Avalokiteśvara is said to incarnate all 
the Buddha’s compassion, so Mañjuśrī, manifests the other ‘wing’ of enlightenment – wisdom (Williams 1989, 
238). 
74 It is important to note that the value the Zen tradition places upon Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of emptiness is shared 
by other Mahāyāna traditions including Tantric branches of Buddhism (e.g., Shingon) and the devotional 
communities of Amitābha Buddha as they include Nāgārjuna as one of their patriarchs (Dumoulin 1988).  In the 
context of Dōgen’s Zen, Nāgārjuna’s logic of emptiness, vis-à-vis Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, provides a conceptual 
blueprint – A is ~A ⸫ A is A – for several important passages in Dōgen’s Shōbōgenzō, including the opening 





original enlightenment and licensed evil,75 which his whole being had been arrested by at Enryakuji of 
Mt. Hiei.  According to historical records,76 the doctrine of original enlightenment, particularly as it was 
affirmed at Mt. Hiei where Dōgen began his monastic training,77 seemed to legitimize antinomian 
behavior (Stone 1999).  Rujing’s response to Dōgen’s question is such that it shapes many of Dōgen’s 
later writings on karma,78 particularly those in his magnum opus, the Shōbōgenzō:  
Rujing said, “You should always trust teachings by ancestors like Nāgārjuna; their views 
are never mistaken.  As far as the negative effect of karma goes, one should practice 
wholeheartedly, and it will certainly be turned around.” […] “You should never ignore 
cause and effect.”  Yongjia said, “Superficial understanding of emptiness ignores cause 
and effect and invites calamity.”  Those who ignore cause and effect cut off good roots in 
buddha-dharma.  How can you regard them as descendants of Buddha ancestors?  (Dōgen 
1999, 7) 
And, when Dōgen asked Rujing: “The nature of all things is either good, bad, or neutral.  Which of these 
is the buddha-dharma?”, the Zen Master replied, “The buddha-dharma goes beyond these three.” (Dōgen 
1999, 9).  Herein, Rujing’s response reveals a metaethic of anti-realism; mainly, since all things are 
                                                 
75The idea of ‘licensed evil,’ as James Dobbins explains, “existed under a variety of names, and encompassed a 
number of different beliefs and practices.  The most common expression used for it was zōaku muge, ‘committing 
evil without obstruction.’  Other terms referring to it were ‘self-indulgence without remorse’ (hōtsu muzan) and 
‘flaunting Amida’s vow’ (hongan bokori)” (Dobbins 1989, 48).  Dōgen’s writings on ethics, specifically the 
Shōbōgenzō fascicle Shoaku Makusa, “Not Committing Wrongs,” which we will begin exploring in Chapter four 
and Chapter five, directly addresses this normative problem of ‘committing evil without obstruction’ (Jp. zōaku 
muge).      
76 “The tale of the Heike” (Jpn. Heike monogatari) is one such record which seems to reveal the legitimizing of 
wrongdoings.  This tale provides an account of events that unfolded due to the funeral of Emperor Nijō in ll65.  
According to Jacqueline Stone, “a dispute broke out between the monks of the Enryakuji and the Kōfukuji over 
precedence in the ritual.  The conflict escalated, and armed monks of Kōfukuji razed a number of Tendai buildings.  
Enryakuji monks retaliated by burning the Kiyomizudera, a branch temple of the Kōfukuji in the eastern part of the 
capital” (Stone 1999, 222).  While Dōgen does not, in so far as I am aware, directly reference this incident, one can 
infer that since he trained at Enryakuji, it is likely that he was aware of its history, including this event.  Moreover, 
one can infer that tales such as this influenced his nuanced views concerning ritual practices such as prostrations, 
chanting, burning incense etc.  As I will show below, Dōgen prioritizes the practice of zazen; and, while he does not 
dismiss the other religious practices and rituals, he does not believe that they are sufficient for authentically realizing 
Buddha-nature.  Indeed, the dispute within Heike monogatari is a historical incident that reflects how ritual practices 
can become an object of ideological attachment; such attachment, according to Dōgen, occludes realization of 
Buddha-nature.  
77  Dōgen was not the only monk form Mt. Hiei who was troubled by the doctrine of original enlightenment and the 
legitimizing of evil.  As Stone notes, “founders of the new Kamakura Buddhism, such as Shinran, while appreciating 
the philosophical nondualism of original enlightenment thought, recognized its moral dangers and revised it 
accordingly” (Stone 1999, 223). 
78 In Chapter five I treat Dōgen’s writings on karma in the fascicle Shinjin-Inga, “Deep Belief in Cause and Effect” 





empty, including values, the realization of the Buddha-nature is neither restricted nor reducible to these 
normative dualisms.  While a literal reading of Rujing’s response might lead one to conclude that the 
philosophy of emptiness, which is the heart of the Buddha-dharma, entails that Zen philosophy and 
practice transcends ethics, and/or permits licensed evil, I plan to show throughout this dissertation that 
such entailment is not how Dōgen understood Rujing’s metaethical perspective; one can, as I will argue 
through a close reading of Dōgen’s writings, ‘go beyond’ realist conceptions of normativity yet 
nevertheless retain a web-of-beliefs, vis-à-vis value judgments, albeit recognizing that they are not 
inherently real (i.e. anti-realism).   
Finally, in regards to (4) what makes Rujing’s instructions on the practice of meditation unique, 
particularly in light of Buddhist teachings on “mind-development” (Skt. citta-bhāvanā) vis-à-vis 
“tranquility” (Skt. śamtha) and “insight” (Skt. vipaśanā)79 meditation, is the idea of “dropping off body 
and mind” (Jpn. shinjin datsuraku).  Consider the following question and answer dialogue from Dōgen’s 
Hōkyō-ki, whereby Rujing is unambiguously clear that this practice ought not be understood from a 
partisan perspective, vis-à-vis Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna polemics: 
Rujing said, “Studying Zen is dropping off body and mind.  Without depending on the burning of 
incense, bowing, chanting Buddha’s names, repentance, or sūtra reading, devote yourself to just 
sitting.” 
I asked, “What is dropping off body and mind?” 
Rujing said, “Dropping off body and mind is zazen.  When you just sit, you are free from the five 
sense desires and the five hindrances.” 
I asked, “Is this freedom from the five sense desires and the five hindrances the same as what the 
sūtra schools are talking about?  Does it mean we are to be practitioners of both Mahāyāna and 
Hīnayāna?” 
Rujing said, “Descendants of ancestors should not exclude the teachings of either vehicle.  If 
students ignore the Tathāgata’s sacred teachings, how can they become the descendants of 
Buddha ancestors?” (Dōgen 1999, 10) 
                                                 
79 Vipaśanā, which literally means “see clearly,” parallels the “see true nature” (Jpn. kenshō) in Zen.  As Peter 
Harvey notes, the Sōtō practice of meditation of “just sitting” (Jpn. shikantaza), “can be seen as akin to the 




The teaching and practice of “dropping off body and mind” is understood to be pivotal in triggering 
Dōgen’s enlightenment experience, which in turn led to his receiving dharma-transmission.  As Hee-Jin 
Kim explains, it was in 1225 during a three-month meditation retreat whereupon a monk sitting next to 
Dōgen was forcefully admonished by the Rujing for falling asleep: 
“In zazen it is imperative to cast off body and mind.  How could you indulge in sleeping?” This 
remark shook Dōgen’s whole being to its very core, and then an inexpressible, ecstatic joy 
engulfed his heart.  In Ju-chings’s private quarters that same morning, Dōgen offered incense and 
worshiped Buddha.  This unusual action of Dōgen prompted Ju-ching to ask: “What is incense 
burning for?”  The disciple exuberantly answered: “my body and mind are cast off!”  “The body 
and mind are cast off” (shinjin-datsuraku), joined the teacher, “cast off are the body and mind” 
(datsuraku-shinjin).  Thus, Ju-ching acknowledge the authenticity of Dōgen’s enlightenment. 
(Kim 2004, 36-37) 
Herein, the if/then conditional relationship between the antecedent shinjin datsuraku80 and the consequent 
realization of the Buddha-dharma seems to have resolved the tension for Dōgen between ‘original 
enlightenment’ and ‘acquired enlightenment,’ vis-à-vis Buddha-nature.   While Rujing does not provide, 
at least within Dōgen’s records, an explanation as to how the practice of dropping off body and mind 
makes Zen meditation, vis-à-vis ‘just sitting’ (Jpn. shikantaza), different from vipaśanā, one can discern 
an explanation within Dōgen’s writings, particularly the Shōbōgenzō, as we shall see in the next section.  
Before we consider such, it is important to note that Dōgen revealed his insight, vis-à-vis dropping off 
body and mind, through a ritual practice that Rujing instructed him not to rely upon.  Coupled by the fact 
that Rujing conferred dharma transmission following this ritual performance shows that one ought not 
think that the embodied language of ritual practices is something that one should abandon wholesale, 
despite the emphasis that Rujing and Dōgen place upon the practice of ‘just sitting.’  While the language 
of ritual can lead to ideological attachments and polemical disputes, such as those at Mt. Hiei, if one 
                                                 
80 It is important to note that there is no evidence within Rujing’s writings that he actually used the phrase “dropping 
off body-and-mind.”  There is, however, textual evidence in one of his poems that he used the phrase “casting off 
dust from the mind.”  Accordingly, “It seems that Dōgen, as a non-native speaker who had difficulty deciphering the 
mentor’s words precisely, either misconstrued what Rujing said, or, more likely, deliberately altered the wording to 
reflect an indirect critique of his teacher.  Rujing’s saying seems to indicate subtle duality in that ignorance is caused 
by physical objects collecting in the mind as the source of sensations, just as dust alights and blurs the surface of a 




performs such via dropping off body and mind, Dōgen’s enlightenment experience seems to show that 
rituals are valid forms of expressing one’s sincerity and insight. 
§ 3.3 An Empty Handed Ethic      
When Dōgen returned to Japan in 1227 with the intention of establishing a new practice of Zen, 
he resided at Kennin-ji for three years whereupon he began his writing career by first composing Fukan 
zazengi, “Universal Guide to the Standard Method of Zazen.”  The opening lines of this instruction 
manual alludes to the tension between original enlightenment and acquired enlightenment; “Now, when 
we research it, the truth originally is all around: why should we rely upon practice and experience?  The 
real vehicle exists naturally: why should we put forth great effort?” (Dōgen 1994, 279).  Rather than 
dialogically explaining how the tension between original and acquired enlightenment can be reconciled, 
he simply wants to show how it can be, via shinjin datsuraku, in the following verse: 
Therefore we should cease the intellectual work of studying sayings and chasing words.  We 
should learn the backward step of turning light and reflecting.  Body and mind will naturally fall 
away, and the original features will manifest themselves before us.  If we want to attain the matter 
of the ineffable, we should practice the matter of the ineffable at once. (Dōgen 1994, 280) 
In Chapter six, we shall explore his practice of zazen in closer detail, particularly as we consider his 
philosophy of non-thinking (Jpn. hishiryō).  For right now, it is worth noting that it seems as though 
Dōgen did not think the problem of original enlightenment could be resolved via “truth-seeking” theories, 
but instead through a “way-seeking” practice.  This is perhaps tied to the fact that he realized that the 
doctrine of original enlightenment was not a philosophy that one should try to refute, abandon or dismiss; 
as Kim states, “Dogen did not question the truth of original enlightenment, but believed it with his whole 
heart and mind” (Kim 2004, 23).  Instead, the problem of original enlightenment and the idea that all 
beings have Buddha-nature arises out of our thinking (Jpn. shiryō) and dualistic interpretations.  In 
regards to the Tendai perspective in which he began his monastic training, Dōgen rejected the dualistic 
view that one could maintain the doctrine of original enlightenment while denying the importance of 




practice based upon original enlightenment,” nevertheless retained, “vestiges of the dualistic view of 
acquired enlightenment” (Kim 2004, 57).  As we shall see in upcoming chapters, Dōgen attempts to show 
that while it is the case that all beings are already enlightened, one only realizes such through practice, 
mainly zazen.  Thus, according to Dōgen, one ought not practice zazen with the hope of gradually 
acquiring enlightenment in the future; instead, one should realize that the very practice of zazen is itself 
the realization of enlightenment and embodiment of Buddha-nature.            
In 1230, Dōgen moved to an abandoned temple, An’yoin, in Fukakusa, and began composing the 
Shōbōgenzō, “Treasury of the True Dharma-Eye” beginning with the fascicle Bendōwa,81 “Negotiating 
the Way,” which explains the basic tenets of his philosophy and practice of zazen through a dialogue of 
questions and answers (Kim, 2004).82  Therein, when examining the relationship between the practice of 
zazen and shinjin datsuraku, Dōgen states, “Just sit and get the state which is free of body and mind.  If a 
human being, even for a single moment, manifests the Buddha’s posture in the three forms of conduct, 
while [that person] sits up straight in samādhi, the entire world of Dharma assumes the Buddha’s posture 
and the whole space becomes the state of realization” (Dōgen 1994, 4-5).  From Dōgen’s standpoint, the 
practice of zazen, whereby one’s attachments to mind and body fall away, is the realization of Buddha-
nature (i.e. the nonduality of practice and realization).83  However, rather than thinking that Buddha-
                                                 
81 According to Kim, “the Fukan zazengi and the Bendōwa chapter […] laid the cornerstone of his religious and 
philosophical citadel.  Upon this foundation Dōgen’s Zen Buddhism, though initially transplanted from China, 
gradually developed into a distinctively Japanese form that was the product of the symbolic model Dōgen inherited 
from Buddhist traditions, […] his own idiosyncrasies, and the social and historical peculiarities of thirteenth-century 
Japan" (Kim 2004, 40). 
82 It is worth noting that in Bendōwa, one can interpret direct philosophical parallels to the Awakening of Faith, as 
Yoshito S. Hakeda footnotes.  For example, in the Awakening of Faith it states, “The Mind in terms of the Absolute 
is the one World of reality (dharmadhātu) and the essence of all phases of existence in their totality” (Hakeda 1967, 
32).  Hakeda maintains that this verse emanates from the following passage in Dōgen’s Bendōwa: “All dharmas, 
myriad phenomena and accumulated things, are totally just the one mind, without exclusion or disunion.  All these 
various lineages of the Dharma assert that [myriad things and phenomena] are the even and balanced undivided 
mind, other than which there is nothing” (Dōgen 1994, 15-16).   
83 According to Jacqueline Stone, the Tendai philosophy of hongaku significantly shaped Dōgen’s nondual 
perspective.  She notes that, in light of Yamanouchi Shun’yu, a Zen/Tendai scholar, “Dōgen’s teaching of original 
realization and wondrous practice should be understood as belonging to the same intellectual stream as Hōchi-bō 
Shōshin’s critique of original enlightenment thought.  Shōshin, in a manner consistent with the Awakening of Faith, 





nature is something that one possesses independently, Dōgen believed that all of existence is Buddha-
nature as there is no duality between self and other.84  Before we explore his nondual interpretation of 
Buddha-nature, it is worth considering Dōgen’s reasoning as to why the practice of shinjin datsuraku is 
distinct from the meditative practice of vipaśyanā. 
In the Bendōwa fascicle, Dōgen addresses the following question:  
[Someone] asks, “Is there nothing to prevent a person who practices this Zazen from also 
performing mantra and quiet-reflection practices?” 
Dōgen frames his response to this question concerning the merits of chanting mantras85 and practicing 
“tranquility” and “insight” meditation, in light of his journey to China: 
When I was in China, I heard the true essence of the teachings from a true master; he said that he 
had never heard that any of the patriarchs who received the authentic transmission of the Buddha-
seal ever performed such practices additionally, in the Western Heavens or in the Eastern Lands, 
in the past or in the present.  Certainly, unless we devote ourselves to one thing, we will not attain 
complete wisdom. (Dōgen 1994, 16) 
As noted above, it is important to bear in mind that Dōgen does not believe that the ‘one practice’ of just 
sitting (Jpn. shikantaza) precludes other monastic praxis and rituals.  There are a number of fascicles in 
the Shōbōgenzō that highlight the value and importance of upholding rituals such as serving offerings, 
                                                 
itself.  Both Shōshin and Dōgen’s teacher Ju-ching, Yamanouchi points out, criticized the idea of original 
enlightenment as a naturalist heresy” (Stone 1999, 75). 
84 Dōgen’s conception of Buddha-nature is not unique to his perspective alone.  In regards to Early Buddhism, for 
example, Lambert Schmithausen maintains that insentient beings such as, “plants (and seeds) were probably 
regarded as a kind of borderline case, on the boundary between sentient and insentient beings, and that a theoretical, 
doctrinal decision with regard to their status was not found necessary, or was even deliberately avoided. As a 
borderline case, plants (and seeds) could be dealt with pragmatically” (Schmithausen 2009, 29).  See Lambert 
Schmithausen, Plants in Early Buddhism and the Far Eastern Idea of the Buddha Nature of Grasses and Trees. 
(Bhairahawa, Nepal: Lumbini International Research Institute, 2009).  In the context of Mahāyāna traditions, 
Shingon Master Kūkai maintained that all beings, including plants and rocks, are Buddha-nature.  “In Japan, the 
problem of Buddhahood of insentient beings – refocused as the Buddhahood of grasses and trees – garnered greater 
interest and moved in a different direction.  Kūkai saw plants and trees as participating ontologically in the five great 
elements that compose the Dharma body” (Stone 1999, 29).  The research findings of Schmithausen and Stone 
reveal that the non-anthropocentric perspective embraced by Dōgen, vis-à-vis Buddha-nature, is a perspective that 
has been part of the emergence and evolution of Buddhism proper.  I will say more about this point in Chapter seven 
as I examine Dōgen’s non-anthropocentric philosophy in dialogue with Nietzsche.     
85 In Chapter six I consider Dōgen’s nuanced critique of sūtra chanting in light of his philosophy of zazen.  In short, 
while Dōgen respected the ritual practice of chanting sūtras and burning incense, he did not believe that such 
practices were sufficient for realizing Buddha-nature.  That being said, as I noted above, Dōgen does think that ritual 





prostrations, burning incense, chanting etc.86; such fascicles include Kuyo-Shobutsu, “Serving Offerings 
to Buddhas,” and Gyoji, “[Pure] Conduct and Observance [of Precepts].”  That being said, the 
aforementioned passage makes clear that Dōgen thought that the practice of zazen, vis-à-vis shinjin 
datsuraku, is a different practice than śamatha and vipaśyanā; according to Dōgen, if we do not devote 
ourselves to “one thing,” mainly zazen, then we will not realize complete wisdom (i.e. Buddha-nature).  
Now, what makes this value judgment interesting is that ‘silent illumination’ meditation, vis-à-vis just 
sitting (Jpn. shikantaza), within the Caodong lineage is believed to have been a nondual affirmation of 
śamatha and vipaśyanā (Harvey 1990).87  Thus it seems plausible to infer that: (1) either Dōgen believed 
that the instruction he received on the practice of zazen, vis-à-vis dropping off body and mind, is a special 
transmission that was not instructed by other Zen masters; or (2) Dōgen was not sympathetic with ‘silent 
illumination’ teachings and methods.  Based upon Ishii Shūdō’s research, I contend that (2) is a warranted 
inference; as he notes in “Dōgen Zen and Song Dynasty China,” one will not find in Dōgen’s writings the 
use of the ‘silent illumination’ label so as to voice his standpoint on zazen practice (Shūdō 2012).  And, 
while it is the case that Dōgen deeply respected Master Hongzhi, a prominent teacher of ‘silent 
illumination,’ and embraced the Caodong master’s nondual affirmation of the unity of practice and 
                                                 
86 Griffith Foulk provides a cogent interpretation Dōgen’s writings on monastic rituals and practices that challenges 
the generalized interpretation that zazen, and zazen alone, defines Dōgen’s monastic perspective and practice.  See 
Griffith Foulk, “Just Sitting? Dōgen’s Take on Zazen, Sutra Reading, and Other Conventional Buddhist Practices,” 
In Dōgen: Textual and Historical Studies, ed. Steven Heine, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). pp. 75-
106.  I am sympathetic with Foulk’s main conclusion.  Dōgen advocates for the ‘one practice’ of zazen so to stress 
the importance of the embodied perspective it conditions, “especially for beginners on the Buddhist Path or those 
who had just begun to practice under a Zen master” (Foulk 2012, 105).  More specifically, “what Dōgen meant by 
‘just sitting’ was not an exclusive focus on the practice of zazen, but rather a deep-seated, unshakable insight into 
the emptiness (kū) of dharmas (hō) –that is, an awareness of the ultimately fictive nature of all mental constructs 
(hō)–which is the proper frame of mind for engaging in all Buddhist practices if one is to avoid the trap of deluded 
attachment to them” (Foulk 2012, 105).   
87 It is important to note that, according to Heinrich Dumoulin, it is difficult to give a completely clear picture of the 
method of meditation that Bodhidharma passed on to Hui-ko and subsequent patriarchs and masters.  Dumoulin 
explains that, “the unique quality of Bodhidharma’s meditation was contained in the word pi-kuan (“wall gazing”).  
Pi-kuan meditation, which is quite different from the Indian stages of dhyāna and the “steady gazing” (Skt., 
śamatha-vipaśyanā; Chin., chih-kuan, Jpn., Shikan) of the Tendai (Chin., T’ien-t’ai) school, was worthy of the 




realization, there are subtle differences in how they use the phrase shinjin datsuraku in their writings.  As 
Shūdō explains: 
Although Dōgen’s teaching is not essentially different from Hongzhi’s, and both emphasize 
“unification with Tathāgata” (inherent realization), Dōgen changes the priority to “performing the 
same practice as the Tathāgata” (wondrous cultivation).  In Hongzhi, the phrases “casting off 
mind and dust” and “entirely cast off body and mind” indicate “inherent realization.”  Even 
though Dōgen also adopted the notion of “inherent realization,” he emphasized the practice of 
“wondrous cultivation” in “casting off body and mind.”  When Hongzhi used the phrase “casting 
off mind and dust,” he used it frequently in the context of developing complete perfection.  When 
Dōgen used the phrase “casting off body and mind,” he emphasized nature as an unending 
process of cultivation and realization that refrains from the notion of complete perfection. (Shūdō 
2012, 163) 
Shūdō’s interpretation of Dōgen, vis-à-vis “incomplete perfection,” helps make sense of a key passage 
concerning practice and enlightenment in the fascicle Genjō Kōan: “When we use the whole body-and-
mind to look at forms, and when use the whole body-and-mind to listen to sounds even though we are 
sensing them directly, it is not like the mirrors reflection of an image, and not like water and the moon.  
While we are experiencing one side, we are blind to the other side” (Dōgen 1994, 34).88  I maintain that 
Dōgen’s philosophy of language89 is helpful for interpreting this verse, vis-à-vis Dōgen’s incomplete 
perfection and enlightenment.  I contend that just as there is some aspect of our experience of phenomena 
that is inexpressible despite one’s ability to express our perspectives with conventional subjects and 
predicates (i.e. one side is expressible while the other side is inexpressible) there is some aspect of one’s 
enlightenment experience that remains concealed.  There are a number of fascicles in the Shōbōgenzō that 
take up the subject matter of inexpressibility and/or ineffability, including Kattō, “The Complicated.”  My 
interpretation of Dōgen’s standpoint regarding that which is inexpressible is informed by Victor Sōgen 
Hori’s position in Zen Sand: The Book of Capping Phrases for Kōan Practice.  Hori maintains that 
inexpressibility is not unique to Zen, vis-à-vis enlightenment, but rather all experiences are in some way 
                                                 
88 See Steven Heine, “What is on the Other Side? Delusion and Realization in Dōgen’s Genjō Kōan” In Dōgen: 
Textual and Historical Studies ed. Steven Heine, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). In this article Heine 
explores a range of interpretations concerning this verse that various Dōgen scholars have proffered.  Drawing 
inspiration from scholars such Ishii Seijun’s, Heine proposes an interpretation that is, “based on the notion of 
horizontality, or the idea that the range of human perception even for the enlightened is characterized by finitude yet 
allows for enhancing and transforming this limitation as the basis of attaining transcendence” (Heine 2012, 44).  




inexpressible (Hori 2003).  Accordingly, rather than interpreting the ineffable aspects of our experiences 
as completely distinct from language, our use of words and concepts shows that ineffability is embedded 
within our everyday expressions that attempt to reveal qualitative aspects of experience.  For example, 
while words like ‘piquant’ can serve as an effective predicate for describing the flavor of fermented 
cabbage, this word will not completely reveal what the flavor of fermented cabbage is like.  Thus 
expressions such as, “it tastes piquant,” simultaneously reveal and conceal one’s phenomenal experience 
of fermented cabbage; after all, if one has never experienced fermented cabbage, nor anything that they 
would describe as ‘piquant,’ then they can certainly inquire further and ask: what is the flavor ‘piquant’ 
like?  Until one tastes fermented cabbage, words and letters will remain quite limited and ineffectual.   
And, even if one finally tastes fermented cabbage, it is not obvious that the description, “it tastes 
piquant,” lays bare the experience of such in its entirety.  Accordingly, just as the inexpressible side of 
expressions is not separate from the expressions themselves, but rather part of language, so too is 
concealment (i.e. delusion) part of enlightenment.  In other words, enlightenment for Dōgen does not 
eliminate delusion completely, but rather illuminates it (i.e. incomplete enlightenment), just as words and 
letters reveal the inexpressible (i.e. incomplete expressions).   
In addition to language, the nonduality of revealing and concealing is embedded within Dōgen’s 
philosophical treatment of time and our experience of temporality.  For example, in the fascicle Uji, 
“Existence-Time,” Dōgen states, “To grasp the pivot and express it: all that exists throughout the whole 
Universe is lined up in a series and at the same time is individual moments of Time.  Because [Time] is 
Existence-Time, it is my Existence-Time” (Dōgen 1994, 112).  I will say more about Dōgen’s standpoint 
on time in light of his philosophy of Buddha-nature below.  For right now, as I interpret this passage, 
Dōgen maintains that while there is no duality between all beings, and no duality between beings and 
time, one’s experience unfolds from a subjective perspective that is distinct from other beings and 
phenomena; hence, “we are blind to the other side” (Dōgen 1994, 34).  Thus, Dōgen’s ‘returning empty 




did not intend to teach the practice of ‘silent illumination.’  For Dōgen, while teachers of ‘silent 
illumination’ affirm a clear duality between that which is revealed and concealed, and/or complete 
enlightenment and delusion, his practice of zazen emphasizes the nonduality of revealing and concealing, 
enlightenment and delusion.  To highlight this point further, let us consider Dōgen’s normative standpoint 
concerning the body.   
 Building upon the interpretations of Hee-Jin Kim and Shigenori Nagatomo, I contend that a key 
difference between Dōgen’s practice of zazen and that of śamatha-vipaśyanā pertains to conceptions of 
the body.  For example, in “The Foundations of Mindfulness” (Pāli Satipatthāna Sutta), which is a 
touchstone for insight meditation, the value judgment that the body is foul and repulsive is salient to this 
practice, particularly in section four, “Foulness – the Bodily Parts.”90  Contrary to this value judgment, 
Dōgen’s writings emphasize a perspective whereby Buddha-nature is realized within and through the 
body (Kim 2004).  According to Shigenori Nagatomo,91 Dōgen’s practice of zazen is somatic; the practice 
of non-thinking (Jpn. hishiryō)92 via just sitting has the affective power to transform one’s embodied 
dispositional tendencies (Skt. samskāras) whereby the dualistic distinction between foulness and purity 
dissolves (Nagatomo 1992).  This standpoint concerning the somatic practice of zazen is supported by the 
teachings of the Sixth Patriarch of Zen, Hui-neng (638-713), which the Caodong lineage is a descendant 
of.  In the Platform Sūtra of the Sixth Patriarch, for example, Hui-neng states that the practice of prajñā-
pāramitā, vis-à-vis meditation, conditions an embodied realization whereby the passions are themselves 
enlightenment. 
Being apart from environment and putting an end to birth and destruction is like going with the 
flow of the water.  Thus it is called ‘reaching the other shore,’ in other words pāramitā.  The 
deluded person recites it; the wise man practices with the mind. […] Those who awaken to this 
Dharma have awakened to the dharma of prajñā and are practicing the prajñā practice.  If you do 
not practice it you are an ordinary person; if you practice for one instant of thought, your Dharma 
                                                 
90 See The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Majjhima Nikāya (Fourth edition), trans. 
Bhikkhu Ňāṇamoli and Bhikku Bodhi (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2009). 
91 See Shingennori Nagatomo, Attunement through the Body, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992). 





body will be the same as the Buddha’s.  Good friends, the very passions are themselves 
enlightenment. (bodhi). (Yampolsky 1967, 147-148)   
With a foothold planted within this body-affirming standpoint, and by appealing to tathāgatagarbha 
teachings of the “Dharma-body” (Skt. dharma-kāya),93 rather than viewing the body negatively, Dōgen 
views the body as the “whole universe,” as a Dharma-body, as Buddha-nature.  Roughly fourteen years 
after composing Bendōwa, Dōgen wrote Sanjushichi-Bon-Bodai-Bunpo, “Thirty-Seven Elements of 
Bodhi;” in this fascicle, he nondualistically overturns the idea that the body is foul, repulsive and impure:  
The reflection that the body is not pure: The individual bag of skin reflected as a body in the 
present is the whole Universe in the ten directions; because it is the real body, it is the reflection 
that the body is not pure springing up on the road of vivid action.  If not for springing up, 
reflection would be impossible. […] Thus, [body reflection] is diamond-samādhi and 
śūraṃgama-samādhi, both of which are the reflection that the body is not pure” (Dōgen 1994, 2).   
Reflecting upon this passage, Kim maintains that, “The human body, in Dōgen’s view, was not a 
hindrance to the realization of enlightenment, but the very vehicle through which enlightenment was 
realized” (Kim 2004, 101).  One can find other instances throughout the Shōbōgenzō where this 
perspective of embodiment is affirmed; for example, in Shinjin-Gakudo, “Learning the Truth With Body 
and Mind,” Dōgen states:  
The body learning the truth” means learning the truth with the body, learning the truth with a 
mass of red flesh.  The body derives from learning the truth, and what derives from learning the 
truth is, in every case, the body.  The whole Universe in ten directions is just the real human 
body.  Living-and-dying, going-and-coming, are the real human body.  Using this body to quit the 
ten wrongs, to keep the eight precepts, to take refuge in the Three Treasures, and to give up a 
family and leave family life: this is real learning of the truth.  On this basis, we speak of “the real 
human body. (Dōgen 1994, 253) 
                                                 
93 Mahāyāna ideas concerning the nature of being a Buddha was systematized by the Yogācārins into a three-body 
philosophy (Skt. Tri-kāya) sometime around the fourth century CE: (1) Transformation Body (Skt. Nirmāṇa-kāya); 
(2) Enjoyment Body (Skt. Sambhoga-kāya); and (3) Dharma-Body (Skt. Dharma-kāya).  In regards to (1) and (2), 
the Nirmāṇa-kāya refers to the bodies of earthly Buddhas, while the Sambhoga-kāya refers to, as Peter Harvey 
explains, “a refulgent subtle body of limitless form, endowed with the ‘thirty-two characteristics of a Great Man’, 
which is the product of ‘merit’ of a Bodhisattva’s training (Harvey 1990, 126).  The Dharma-kāya, according to Paul 
Williams, “is what the Buddha is in himself, what he really is, or in other words, it is generally the final, true, 
ultimate, reality or state of things” (Williams 1989, 101).  In addition to the various Tathāgatagarbha sūtras that 
invite an exploration of this three-body philosophy, including the Śrīmālādevīsimhanāda Sūtra, the Platform Sūtra 




Thus, the practice of shinjin datsuraku, whether on or off the meditation cushion, engenders a nondual 
realization whereby the body is neither inherently pure nor impure, nor is it an entity that is distinct from 
the mind.  For Dōgen, shinjin datsuraku, vis-à-vis zazen, is the realization of ‘the oneness of body and 
mind” (Jpn. shinjin ichinyo).  Thus, in the fascicle Bendōwa Dōgen states, “Remember, in the Buddha-
Dharma, because body and mind are originally one reality, the saying that essence and form are not two 
has been understood equally in the Western Heavens and Eastern Lands, and we should never dare to go 
against it. […] body and mind are not divided” (Dōgen 1994, 15).   
By overcoming dualistic conceptions of body and mind, pure and impure, Dōgen seems to have 
realized a way by which the problem of original and acquired enlightenment dissolves; and, in doing so, 
he orients his own nondual interpretation of original enlightenment and Buddha-nature in a way that 
avoids the philosophical pitfalls of the Śenkia heresy referenced in Bendōwa.94  According to Steven 
Heine, this heresy, “suggests that the integrated essence of the intangible mind or soul abides forever, 
while the evanescent body and other tangible forms of existence must perish” (Heine 2020, 23).  Dōgen 
admonished this perspective by stating, “if we learn this view as the Buddha’s Dharma, we are even more 
foolish than the person who grasps a tile or a pebble thinking it to be a golden treasure; the delusion 
would be too shameful for comparison. […] Knowing that this [wrong view] is just the wrong view of 
non-Buddhists, we should not touch it with our ears” (Dōgen 1994, 14-15).  Instead of taking this 
dualistic standpoint, Dōgen proffers a nondualistic alternative: “body and mind are originally one reality” 
(Dōgen 1994, 15).  Pivoting from this nondual perspective I contend that Dōgen intends to show that 
original and acquired enlightenment are not two, but rather one.  In the Shōbōgenzō fascicle Gyobutsu-
Yuigi, “The Dignified Behavior of Acting Buddha,” Dōgen asserts that when a non-dual conception of 
                                                 
94 As Jacqueline Stone explains, “Śenkia is said to have been a heterodox teacher, contemporary with the Buddha, 
who taught the existence of an immortal soul that reincarnates in successive bodies” (Stone 1999, 78).  Dōgen’s use 
of this name likely targeted one of his contemporaries vis-à-vis the informative and reformative periods of his life 
and monastic training.  Drawing from the Tendai scholar Hazama Jikō, Stone notes that Dōgen’s use of the Śenkia 
heresy may have been, “a veiled criticism of the idea of ‘original no birth-and-death’ (hon mushōji),” which is part 
of Tendai teachings (Stone 1999, 78).  For Dōgen, what makes this idea a heresy is, “that it is setting forth a 




“body-and-mind” is realized, the analytic problems associated with original enlightenment are no longer 
existentially vexing. 
As human consideration is short and small, so too is knowledge-based wisdom short and small.  
As a lifetime is short and pressed, so too is the intellect short and pressed – how could it fathom 
the dignified behavior of acting Buddha? […] They have never experienced the hearing of the 
Dharma through body-and-mind, and they have never possessed a body-and-mind that has 
practiced the truth. […]  The assertion that acting Buddha is neither in love with original 
enlightenment nor in love with initiated enlightenment, and is beyond not having enlightenment 
and beyond having enlightenment, describes just this principle.  Such [concepts] as mindfulness 
and being without mindfulness, or having enlightenment and being without enlightenment, or 
initiated enlightenment and original enlightenment, which are excitedly considered by the 
common men of today, are solely the excited consideration of the common man; they are not 
what has been transmitted and received from buddha to buddha. The ‘mindfulness’ of the 
common man and the mindfulness of the buddhas are far apart: never liken them.  The common 
man’s excited consideration of original enlightenment is as far apart as heaven and earth: they are 
beyond comparison. (Dōgen 1994, 41-42) 
As I interpret this passage, Dōgen maintains that the problem of original enlightenment is a pseudo-
problem born out of a ‘truth-seeking’ approach to Buddhism in general, Zen in particular.  Like all 
pseudo-problems, they arise from our use of language, and the dualistic concepts we voice.95  However, 
one ought not think that this passage shows that Dōgen wanted to discard the doctrine of original 
enlightenment altogether; indeed, he makes this point clear in the Shōbōgenzō fascicle Busshō, “Buddha-
nature,” which we will now turn our attention towards.   
§ 3.4 Buddha-nature, Temporality and Values   
Dōgen’s nondual interpretation of the doctrine of original enlightenment in the fascicle Busshō is 
framed in light Mahāparinirvāna Sūtra: 
What is the point of the World-honored One’s words that “All living beings totally exist as 
Buddha-nature”?  It is the words “This something ineffable coming like this” turning the Dharma 
wheel.  Those called “living beings,” or called “the sentient,” or called “all forms of life,” or 
called “all creatures,” are living beings and are all forms of Existence.  In short, Total Existence 
                                                 
95 In regards to acquired enlightenment, this standpoint is dualistic since it posits the distinction between means and 
ends, practice and realization.  And, in regards to original enlightenment, while this standpoint attempts to express a 
nondual philosophy by negating the duality between means and ends, thereby defending the outlook that there is 
only the “ends” (i.e. original enlightenment), this view creates a higher level duality between itself and the dualistic 
standpoint of acquired enlightenment.  Dōgen’s nondualistic thinking, vis-à-vis emptiness, maintains that acquired 
and original enlightenment are one; there is no distinction between practice and enlightenment and/or Buddhahood 




is the Buddha-nature, and the perfect totality of Total Existence is called “living beings.” […] 
Remember, the Existence [described] now, which is totally possessed by the Buddha-nature, is 
beyond the “existence” of existence and non-existence.  (Dōgen 1994, 2) 
Dōgen’s interpretation of Śākyamuni’s words within this sūtra demonstrates his acumen as critical 
thinker when he states, “We should research that he does not say ‘All living beings are the Buddha-nature 
itself,’ but says ‘All living beings have the Buddha-nature.’  He needs to get rid of the have in living 
beings have the Buddha-nature” (Dōgen 1994, 22).  Pivoting from the philosophy of emptiness, the word 
‘have’ creates a duality between beings and Buddha-nature, and in turn, a duality between practice and 
attainment.  Thus Dōgen characterizes this tathāgatagarbha philosophy as ‘without Buddha-nature’ (Jpn. 
mu-busshō), which can be understood to be equivalent to ‘emptiness Buddha-nature’ (Jpn. kū-busshō).  
As Hee-Jin Kim explains: 
What Dōgen tried to emphasize with the term “Buddha-nature of non-existence” is the emptiness 
of Buddha-nature, or the Buddha-nature of emptiness (kū-busshō), which at once transcended 
existence and non-existence.  In his discourse on Buddha-nature, non-existence (mu) and 
emptiness (ku) went hand-in-hand; the former was always spoken in terms of the latter (Kim 
2004, 133).   
This nondual interpretation of Buddha-nature is woven throughout a good many fascicles that comprise 
the Shōbōgenzō, specifically those that treat metaphysical, epistemological, ethical and soteriological 
matters.  Indeed, the subject matter of temporality and the Buddhist philosophy of impermanence (Skt. 
anitya) explored in the fascicle Uji, “Existence-Time,” reveals his nondual standpoint all too well.96  In 
this fascicle, Dōgen states, “Because [real] existence is only this exact moment, all moments of Existence-
Time are the whole of time, and all Existent things and all Existent phenomena are moments of Time” 
(Dōgen 1994, 111).  In this short passage, one can see how Dōgen’s nondual perspective has been shaped 
by his training as Tendai monk, and his scholastic understanding of the Hua-yen97 tradition (Jpn. Kegon), 
                                                 
96 For a good philosophical treatment of Dōgen’s philosophy of Buddha-nature vis-à-vis time, see Joan Stambaugh, 
Impermanence Is Buddha-Nature: Dōgen's Understanding of Temporality (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 
1990).   
97 According to Paul Williams, the Hua-yen and T’ien-t’ai traditions defined the identity of Chinese Buddhist 
philosophy.  Central to this identity was the idea of dharmadhātu, “Dharma-realm,” as presented in the Avataṃsaka 
Sūtra.  Williams states, “the dharmadhātu is the universe seen correctly, the quick-silver universe of the visionary 





particularly the “philosophy of totality”98 as presented in the Avataṃsaka, “Flower Garland,” Sūtra.99  
According to Dōgen, time is not an individual thing distinct from beings, and beings can only be 
understood through their temporal nature, vis-à-vis impermanence.  Moreover, because all beings are 
empty of a self-essence (Skt. svabhāva), it follows that all moments of time are empty as well; thus, there 
                                                 
a universe of radiance, luminosity with no shadows. […] This universe is the Buddha.  At the same time what makes 
it this universe, what gives it the flow, is emptiness” (Williams 1989, 123). Philosophically, the idea of 
dharmadhātu reflects the logic of dependent co-origination (Skt. pratītyasamutpāda) and emptiness (Skt. śūnyatā), 
particularly when one considers the idea of mutual-interpenetration.  As Peter Harvey explains, Fa-tsang (643-712 
C.E.), “illustrated the interpenetration of all things by an image drawn from the Avataṃsaka Sūtra: the jewel-net of 
the god Indra, wherein each jewel in the net reflects every other one, including their reflections of each jewel, and so 
on to infinity” (Harvey 1990, 119).  In the context of Dōgen’s non-dual perspective of time, “since the links of 
interdependence expand throughout the entire universe and at all time (past, present and future depend upon each 
other, which is to say the total dharmadhātu arises simultaneously), so in the totality of interdependence, the 
dharmadhātu, all phenomena are mutually penetrating and identical” (Williams 1989, 133).  Herein, it is important 
to note that the phenomenal nature of beings mutually penetrating is not distinct from a noumenal world, nor 
emanating from such; this point is made clear in Fa-tsang’s the Golden Lion.  In it gold is a metaphor for noumenon 
(Ch. li) and the lion is the shape (Ch. shih).  As Williams explains, “The Hua-yen noumenon, Fa-tsang’s gold, 
however, is not something above and behind phenomena.  Phenomena are not emanations from absolute noumenon. 
Rather, phenomena are noumenon – the lion is the gold, there is no gold behind the lion, the lion is not an emanation 
of gold. […] The phenomenal is the noumenal in phenomenal form” (Williams 1989, 131).     
98The ontology of oneness which the “philosophy of totality” and the idea of the dharmadhātu is affirmed by other 
Chan/Zen thinkers within Dōgen’s Sōtō (Ch. Caodong) lineage, including Hongzhi (1091-1157 C.E.).  For example, 
consider his “Noninterference in the Matter of Oneness” which certainly reflects the nondual perspective of body-
and-mind (Jpn. shinjin ichinyo) championed by Dōgen: “The matter of oneness cannot be learned at all.  The 
essence is to empty and open out body and mind, as expansive as the great emptiness of space.  Naturally in the 
entire territory all is satisfied. […] Body and mind are one suchness; outside this body there is nothing else. The 
same substance and the same function, one nature and one form, all faculties and all object-dusts are instantly 
transcendent” (Leighton and Wu 1991, 23-24).  According to Paul Williams, Hua-yen thought provided, “the 
philosophical or doctrinal articulation of Chan (Zen) meditation” (Willams 1989, 127).  More specifically in regards 
to disputes over gradual/acquired and sudden/original enlightenment, Williams maintains that, “Hua-yen, in 
common with much of East Asian Buddhism, particularly Chan, for which it provides a philosophical foundation, 
favors the teaching of sudden enlightenment.  This is not only because the Buddha-nature, the One Mind, is already 
present, pure and radiant, untainted in all sentient beings, but also because the Hua-yen doctrines of identity and 
interpenetration entail that Buddhahood is already present at the first stage of the Bodhisattva’s path to 
enlightenment. […] To Fa-tsang the Sudden Teaching was necessary because the noumenon, Suchness or Thusness, 
is beyond language and therefore beyond stages of practice, which have at the best a provisional validity.  Practice 
cannot create a state of enlightenment which is not there already, and thus there can be no causal relationship 
between practice and enlightenment.  In spite of this, there is no implication that in East Asian Buddhism those who 
hold the teaching of Sudden Enlightenment sit and wait for enlightenment to happen.  Rather, moral and meditative 
practice bring out what one already is” (Williams 1989, 134-135).      
99 It is important to note that Hua-yen masters and scholars of the Avataṃsaka Sūtra draw from Yogācāra ideas, 
including, “the three natures, and the centrality of mind, in systematizing the Sūtra’s message.  The Dharma-realm 
seen as emptiness, thusness, the Tathāgata-garbha, and the one Mind of reality, pure, perfect and bright.  It is true 
reality (Ch. li) which interpenetrates phenomena (Ch. shih) as they do each other.  Phenomena are empty, but are not 
unreal; for they are no different from li.  Emptiness is seen, not just as the antidote to all views, but as the ground for 
a positive appreciation of the concrete realities of nature, as part of a harmonious organic unity.  In tune with the 
Chinese love of harmony and nature, every item of existence is seen as worthy of respect and honor; for all is the 





is no ontological foundation or ground by which we can ultimately distinguish one moment of Existence-
Time from another moment of Existence-Time.  For Dōgen, all Existence-Time is mutually 
interpenetrating (Jpn. sōsoku-sōnyū), despite the fact, in light of points made above, that such penetration 
is partially concealed do to the fact that one’s temporal experiences are always tied to their subjectivity. 
Each individual and each object in this whole Universe should be glimpsed as individual 
moments of Time.  Object does not hinder object in the same way that moment of Time does not 
hinder moment of Time. […] When we arrive in the field of the ineffable, there is just one 
[concrete] thing and one [concrete] phenomenon, here and now, [beyond] understanding of 
phenomena and non-understanding of phenomena, and [beyond] understanding of things and non-
understanding of things. […] The three heads and eight arms pass instantly as my Existence-
Time; though they seem to be in the distance, they are [moments of] the present.  The sixteen-foot 
or eight-foot [golden body] also passes instantly as my Existence-Time; though it seems to be 
yonder, it is [moments of] the present.  This being so, pine trees are Time, and bamboos are Time. 
(Dōgen 1994, 110-111)  
This non-dual perspective of time helps shape Dōgen’s normative perspective, particularly his metaethical 
writings in the fascicle Shoaku Makusa,100 “Not Committing Wrongs;” therein he states, “Right and 
Wrong are Time; Time is not Right or Wrong.  Right and Wrong are the Dharma; the Dharma is not Right 
or Wrong” (Dōgen 1994, 99).  Indeed, what is noteworthy about this passage is that according to the 
standpoint of metaethical realism, right and wrong, good and bad, are not only believed to be mind-
independent, but also timeless, in that they are not vulnerable to change.  Based upon our aforementioned 
treatment of Dōgen’s writings on Buddha-nature and time (i.e. ji-busshō), Dōgen seems to be maintaining 
the opposite standpoint, mainly that good and bad, right and wrong, are temporal, thereby rendering value 
judgments contingent, vis-à-vis moments of Existence-Time.  What this means is that Dōgen’s standpoint 
concerning Buddha-nature and temporality positions his philosophy within the metaethical camp of anti-
realism.101 
                                                 
100 In Shoaku Makusa, we find the same Hua-yen ‘philosophy of totality’ that is present in both Busshō and Uji.  For 
example: “Someone who comes to know a single particle knows the whole universe, and someone who has 
penetrated one real dharma has penetrated the myriad dharmas.  Someone who has not penetrated the myriad 
dharmas has not penetrated one real dharma” (Dōgen 1994, 107). 




 I would like to bring closure to this treatment of Buddha-nature and time, vis-à-vis soteriological 
values, by further situating such within his ‘open-handed’ perspective noted in the previous section.  
Contrary to the Caodong masters of China, Dōgen did not champion the soteriological perspective of 
complete enlightenment; such a perspective, as his writings show, is dualistic.  Again, as he states in 
Genjō Kōan, “While we are experiencing one side, we are blind to the other side” (Dōgen 1994, 34).  
Dōgen’s philosophy of Buddha-nature echoes this non-dualistic value judgment:  
The venerable One has preached the Buddha-nature for others far and wide, innumerable times, 
and now we have quoted just one such example.  “If you want to realize Buddha-nature, you must 
first get rid of selfish pride.”  We should intuit and affirm the point of this preaching without fail.  
It is not that there is no realization; realization is just getting rid of selfish pride. (Dōgen 1994, 15-
16)  
For Dōgen, realization of Buddha-nature is not a consequence of overcoming and getting rid of delusion; 
instead, the realization of Buddha-nature is nothing other than the practice of overcoming selfish pride 
and delusion itself (i.e. incomplete enlightenment).  Herein, the soteriological values of enlightenment 
and delusion, vis-à-vis good and bad, are not essentially real; they are not, as the standpoint of anti-
realism maintains, mind-independent.  Such anti-realism, vis-à-vis soteriological values, is resoundingly 
echoed in the fascicle Daigo, “Great Realization:”  
“A person in the state of great realization” is not intrinsically in great realization and is not 
hoarding a great realization realized externally.  It is not that, in old age, [the person] meets with a 
great realization [already] present in the public world.  [People of great realization] do not 
forcibly drag it out of themselves, but they unfailingly realize the great realization.  We do not see 
“not being deluded” as great realization. (Dōgen 1994, 86) 
In this passage, Dōgen is stating that: (1) the realization of ‘great realization’ is not an inherent or 
permanent state one can enter into; (2) ‘great realization’ does not exist in the external world independent 
from one’s mind; and (3) ‘great realization’ is not independent of being ‘deluded.’  Thus, the practice of 
‘great realization,’ according to Dōgen, is itself the illumination of delusion; hence the oft cited passage 
from Genjō Kōan, “Those who greatly realize delusion are buddhas.  Those who are greatly deluded 
about realization are ordinary beings” (Dōgen 1994, 33).  Herein, the key takeaway from these passages is 




is born out from our language; “while we are experiencing one side, we are blind to the other side” 
(Dōgen 1994, 34).  Accordingly, if one reads between the lines of these fascicles, it becomes clear that 
Dōgen is encouraging his audience to “not think” (Jpn. fushiryō) about delusion and realization as if they 
are dualistically opposed; instead, one should just practice zazen, via non-thinking (Jpn. hishiryō) about 
delusion and ‘great realization,’ and thereby recognize that, “A person getting realization is like the moon 
being reflected in water: the moon does not get wet, and the water is not broken” (Dōgen 1994, 35).102   
§ 3.5 Anti-Consequentialism: Rethinking Skillful Means 
 In the previous chapter we saw that the bodhisattva ideal and the doctrine of skillful means (Skt. 
upāya) is central to Mahāyāna ethics.  So much so that Charles Goodman interprets Mahāyāna ethics, vis-
à-vis Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, as consequentialist; and, in the context of Dōgen’s ethics, Bret Davis, 
maintains that consequentialism helps explain Dōgen’s affirmation of the bodhisattva ideal, vis-à-vis the 
teleological goal to ameliorate suffering.  However, based upon Dōgen’s philosophical standpoint on 
original enlightenment (Jpn. hongaku) and his nondual perspective of practice and realization explored 
throughout this chapter, I contend that consequentialism does not accurately capture Dōgen’s 
interpretation of the bodhisattva ideal and the doctrine of skillful means (Jpn. zengyō hōben).  In other 
words, just as Dōgen’s reevaluation of original enlightenment obliterates the dualism between practice 
and realization, it also obliterates the dualism between the means and ends, vis-à-vis normative actions.  
Accordingly, since consequentialism is predicated upon firm dualistic distinctions between means and 
ends, it follows that consequentialism fails to capture Dōgen’s philosophy of skillful means and 
interpretation of the bodhisattva ideal.   
                                                 
102 In Chapter six, I examine the distinction between thinking (Jpn. shiryō), not thinking (Jpn. fushiryo) and non-
thinking (Jpn. hishiryō) in closer detail as I lay out a case for interpreting zazen as a normative practice for justifying 
conventional value judgments.  Herein, the moon, which is a metaphor for Buddha-nature, shining in the water while 
not getting wet avoids the dualistic view that Buddha-nature is something inside us (i.e. it does not get wet); and, the 
water not being disturbed by the moon’s reflection reveals and conceals the non-obstructing relationship between 





 Dōgen’s reevaluation of the doctrine of skillful means is framed in light of his sūtra learning, 
specifically Kumārajīva’s translation of the Lotus Sūtra (Skt. Saddharma Puṇḍarīka Sūtra; Jpn. Myōhō 
renge kyō) which he widely quotes or alludes to (Nishijima 1994).103  Dōgen’s studies of the Lotus Sūtra, 
which began as a Tendai monk at Mt. Hiei, influenced his interpretation of original enlightenment;104 and, 
because his Zen practice reshaped his understanding of original enlightenment, it is warranted to infer that 
his Zen practice reshaped his understanding of the teachings in the Lotus Sūtra, including the doctrine of 
skillful means.  According to Hee-Jin Kim, the doctrine of skillful means, within Mahāyāna Buddhism in 
general, has a two-fold meaning: 
Skillful means signifies the buddhas’ and celestial bodhisattvas’ compassionate means, 
expedients, and stratagems used to liberate sentient beings–by analogy, the teacher’s pedagogical 
methods to guide his/her students.  At the same time, the notion also includes those methods and 
practices employed by sentient beings (and aspiring bodhisattvas) to attain spiritual realization.  
This two-fold meaning of skillful means–one is the buddhas’/celestial bodhisattvas’ 
accommodative move for the liberation of sentient beings, and the other is sentient 
beings’/aspiring bodhisattvas’ aspirational move toward their salvific goal–developed hand-in-
hand early on in the history of the Mahāyāna in various sutras and śāstras. (Kim 2007, 30)    
My anti-consequentialist interpretation of Dōgen’s perspective, vis-à-vis the doctrine of skillful means, 
builds upon Kim’s research and position; mainly, “Dōgen’s critical assessment of the doctrine” is best 
understood, “in the context of the unity of practice and realization” (Kim 2007, 31).   
Dōgen takes up the subject matter of skillful means as presented in the Lotus Sūtra in the fascicle 
Hokke-Ten-Hokke, “The Flower of Dharma Turns the Flower of Dharma.”  In this fascicle, Dōgen treats 
the parable of the burning house, whereby three sons of a wealthy man who are unaware that they are 
trapped in a burning house as they are preoccupied and absorbed in playing games.  Herein, the father is 
able to skillfully lure them out of the house by offering them goat carriages, deer carriages and ox 
                                                 
103 According to Steven Heine, “there are several hundred instances,” within the Shōbōgenzō, “in which Dōgen 
quotes or alludes to passages culled from the Lotus Sūtra” (Heine, 2020, 163) 
104 As Jacqueline Stone explains, “In medieval Tendai texts, the triple-bodied Tathāgata of the Lotus Sūtra is 
typically referred to as ‘spontaneous’ or ‘unproduced’ (musa sanjin).  The term musa in Chinese T’ien-t’ai texts 
originally designated ‘ultimate reality that is beyond conceptualization and verbal distinctions.’  In the medieval 
Japanese Tendai tradition, it assumed the additional connotations of ‘natural’ or ‘just as it is’–in short, a synonym 




carriages (Williams 1989).  According to Paul Williams, the meaning of this parable is not hard to 
discern. “The father is the Buddha.  The burning house is the house of saṃsāra within which sentient 
beings, absorbed in their playthings, are trapped.  The Buddha offers various vehicles (yānas) as bribes, 
according to the tastes of sentient beings” (Williams 1989, 148).  In regards to the doctrine of skillful 
means, it is the consequences of getting the children out of the house that is normatively significant, not 
the means of bribery per se.  According to Steven Heine, Dōgen’s treatment of the ‘burning house’ 
parable from the Lotus Sūtra emphasizes the nonduality of delusion and awakening (Heine 2020).  For 
example, consider his concluding statement in Hokke-Ten-Hokke: 
In conclusion, in the hundreds of years since this Sūtra was transmitted into China, to be turned as 
the Flower of Dharma, very many people, here and there, have produced their commentaries and 
interpretations. […] Because the Flower of Dharma is from kalpa to kalpa, and because the 
Flower of Dharma is from noon to night, even though our own body-and-mind grows strong and 
grows weak, it is just the Flower of Dharma itself.  The reality that exists as it is a treasure, is 
brightness, is a seat of truth, is wide, profound, and eternal, is profound, is great, and everlasting, 
is mind in delusion, the Flower of Dharma turning, and is mind in realization, turning the Flower 
of Dharma, which is really just the Flower of Dharma turning the Flower of Dharma. (Dōgen 
1994, 220) 
Herein, delusion, vis-à-vis Flower of Dharma turning, is itself realization, vis-à-vis turning the Flower of 
Dharma.  More specifically in regards to a bodhisattva’s strategy to liberate sentient beings (i.e. skillfully 
lure them out of the burning house), Dōgen states: “There is mental delusion in the burning house, there is 
mental delusion just at the gate itself, there is mental delusion outside the gate, there is metal delusion just 
in front of the gate, and there is mental delusion within the gate.  Mental delusion has created ‘within the 
gate’ and ‘outside the gate’ and even the ‘gate itself,’ ‘the burning house,’ and so on” (Dōgen 1994, 211).  
According to Gudo Nishijima, ‘the gate’ symbolizes the skillful practices and methods of leading one 
from delusion to realization.  Accordingly, when Dōgen poses the following rhetorical question, “Should 
we reach the conclusion that the gate itself is merely a place of momentary passing?” (Dōgen 1194, 211), 
he is, according to Nishijima, denying means-ends consequentialist reasoning.  Such denial, vis-à-vis the 
doctrine of skillful means, is further evidenced in a subsequent passage from the same fascicle:   
So should we think that our own form and nature now are originally practicing in this world of 




and doubt, and without fear; they are simply the profound and eternal state which is original 
practice as the Flower of Dharma turning.  This seeing atoms and seeing the world of Dharma is 
beyond conscious action and conscious consideration.  Conscious consideration, and conscious 
action too, should learn Flower of Dharma consideration, and should learn Flower Dharma of 
action. (Dōgen 1994, 214)  
As I interpret this passage, Dōgen’s use of ‘conscious action’ refers to a normative emphasis upon the 
action itself (i.e. deontology), whereas his use of ‘conscious consideration’ refers to a normative emphasis 
upon the consequences (i.e. consequentialism).  According to Dōgen, the practice of the ‘Flower of 
Dharma’ is beyond this the dualistic distinction between means and ends; the dualistic distinction 
between actions and consequences does not, from his Zen perspective, apply to the doctrine of skillful 
means within the Lotus Sūtra (i.e. Flower of Dharma).   Instead, following Kim’s lead, this passage 
reveals that, “the means and the end should be treated as a pair of foci” (Kim 2007, 31-32); hence, 
“Conscious consideration, and conscious action too, should learn Flower of Dharma consideration, and 
should learn Flower Dharma of action” (Dōgen 1994, 214).   
According to Kim, Dōgen was critical of the consequentialist perspective the doctrine of skillful 
means engenders; “Perhaps the doctrine’s most disconcerting aspect, from Dōgen’s perspective, is that it 
treats any skillful action, speech, and thought as a temporary expedient for a higher end […] in 
accordance with a teleological and hierarchical way of thinking” (Kim 2007, 31).  In light of his critical 
standpoint on original enlightenment (Jpn. hongaku), and his nondual philosophy of practice and 
realization, “The teaching of skillful means has less to do with provisional expedients than it does with 
practice and study in and through the entire world of the ten directions” (Kim 2007, 31).  Based upon this 
nondualistic interpretation, “the means, hitherto merely instrumental and provisional, is now thoroughly 
revalorized as the very core of the end. […] The traditional dualism of the means and the end is recast as a 
pair of foci in place of opposites” (Kim 2007, 32).   
Thus, I do not think consequentialism, as Davis suggests, is a promising characterization of 
Dōgen’s normative perspective, vis-à-vis the vows of the bodhisattva; instead, I contend that Dōgen’s 




of his metaethical perspective, which we will begin exploring in subsequent chapters of this dissertation.  
In regards to the doctrine of skillful means, I plan to show how his metaethics, vis-à-vis ‘not committing’ 
(Jpn. makusa), which I begin unpacking in Chapter five, and the practice of zazen, vis-à-vis non-thinking 
(Jpn. hishiryō), which I explore in Chapter six, allows for Dōgen to provide a new interpretation that is in 
keeping with the East Asian philosophy of non-action (Ch. wu-wei); hence the capping phrase, “Great 
action adapts totally; in the Great Way there are no skillful means” (Jpn. Dai ⸢ki⸣ ennō, daidō muhō) (ZS 
8.267).  This philosophy, which is central to both Confucianism105 and Daoism,106 is how, “Dōgen 
freshens old bottles with new wine” (Kim 2007, 32).  In short, non-action neither affirms the action itself, 
nor the consequences, as the basis for justifying and evaluating normative behavior.  As an effortless 
mode of action, the action itself and the consequences are a pair of foci rather than a set of opposites.  
Thus, for Dōgen, what defines the nature of a bodhisattva’s actions is, rather than consequentialist 
reasoning, effortlessness, vis-à-vis non-duality of wisdom and compassion.  Such effortlessness, as we 
shall see in later chapters, is captured by colorful metaphors such as, “Like a person’s hand in the middle 
of the night searching behind for the pillow,” (Jpn. Hito no yahan ni haishu shite chinsu o saguru ga 
gotoshi) (ZS 9.21); herein this capping phrase illustrates an effortless act whereby one does not 
‘consciously consider’ the distinction between subject and object, means and ends.  
                                                 
105 In Confucianism, non-action (Ch. wu-wei) is closely associated with governance.  Consider, for example, the 
following from Book XV of The Analects: “The Master said, ‘If there was a ruler who achieved order without taking 
any action, it was, perhaps, Shun.  There was nothing for him to do but to hold himself in a respectful posture and to 
face due south,” (Lau 1979, 132).  Herein, non-action vis-à-vis facing south is an allusion to the Pole Star, which is 
referenced in Book II, “The Master said, ‘The rule of virtue can be compared to the Pole Star which commands the 
homage of the multitude of stars without leaving its place’” (Lau 1979, 63).  The image of the Pole Star, thus 
orchestrating the heavenly motions of the cosmos, captures the effortless quality of acting, via non-action.   
106 Lao Tzu’s Tao Te Ching provides a number of references to non-action (Ch. wu-wei) to characterize the 
comportment and behavior of sages and rulers.  For example: 
 Without stirring abroad 
 One can know the whole world; 
 Without looking out the window 
 One can see the way of Heaven. 
 The further one goes 
 The less one knows. 
 Therefore the sage knows without having to stir, 
 Identifies without having to see, 




For reasons noted above, I contend that Dōgen would likely dismiss ‘trolley problem’ thought 
experiments which attempt to isolate the consequences of our actions apart from the action itself.  In fact, 
I contend that he would likely think that such thought experiments do very little to improve our normative 
beliefs and behavior.  Rather than ‘thought experiments’ involving trolleys, bridges and obese men, he 
would likely stand by his advocacy for ‘experiment thinking’ via zazen so as to realize a normative 
perspective whereby normative reasoning, vis-à-vis non-thinking (Jpn. hishiryō), is not fettered to action-
based principles, such as ‘the ends justify the means.’  Such principles, as I interpret Dōgen, conceal more 
than what they reveal.  “Dōgen suggests that the very texture of the Buddha-dharma is comprised of 
passions and desires, conflicts and differences.  Reason cannot exist by freeing itself from such realities of 
the human condition any more than these realities can exist independently of the counsel of reason” (Kim 
2007, 73).  Thus, to think that action-based principles can determine what makes actions right 
independent of the context, and one’s embodied situation, is a limited normative perspective, similar to 
“sitting in a well looking at the sky” (Jpn. I ni za shite ten o miru) (ZS 4.42); indeed, from the bottom of 
the well, far too much of the ‘normative sky’ remains concealed.          
§3.6 Concluding Remarks 
 In this chapter I provided a general sketch of Dōgen’s life and philosophy in order to set up an 
inquiry into his metaethical perspective which will be carried out in subsequent chapters of this 
dissertation.  I first considered how the cultural climate of the Kamakura period, along with his studies 
and training as a Tendai monk, shaped his practice of doing philosophy.  More specifically, I showed how 
the Mahāyāna doctrine of original enlightenment (Jpn. hongaku) motivated his pursuit to practice Zen, 
which in turn led to his journey to China where he received dharma transmission from Master Rujing of 
the Caodong (Jpn. Sōtō) lineage.  From this historical review, I was able to show how Dōgen’s Zen 
perspective, which he returned to Japan with empty-handed, provided a new clearing within the 
philosophical horizon of the doctrine of original enlightenment, vis-à-vis Buddha-nature, which in turn 




other masters and practitioners within the Caodong lineage.  In short, what is unique about Dōgen’s 
alternative perspective is that: (1) the distinction between original enlightenment and acquired 
enlightenment is a pseudo-problem born out of the use of language; (2) enlightenment is never complete 
nor dualistically opposed to delusion (i.e. incomplete enlightenment); and (3) the body is affirmed as the 
vehicle for realizing ‘great realization’ and thereby actualizing Buddha-nature.  From there, I explored 
Dōgen’s philosophy of Buddha-nature in light of his philosophy of time; a philosophy, as I noted, which 
was deeply influenced by Hua-yen metaphysics.  This inquiry provided a general framework for seeing 
how Dōgen’s metaethical outlook is in keeping with anti-realism, whereby there are no mind-independent 
values that are timeless.  As my reference to the fascicle Shoaku Makusa illustrated, good and bad, right 
and wrong are contextually relative to time, and the temporal conditions beings find themselves within.  
Finally, I was able to show how Dōgen’s reevaluation of original enlightenment and non-dual 
interpretation of delusion and realization/awakening informs his reevaluation of the doctrine of skillful 
means, particularly how it is presented in the Lotus Sūtra.  Accordingly, I showed how Charles 
Goodman’s consequentialist interpretation of skillful means cannot be extended to Dōgen as Bret Davis 
attempts to do, albeit only in regards to the bodhisattva ideal. 
  In the next chapter, I develop this anti-realist interpretation of Dōgen’s metaethics further by 
exploring his characterization of normative values as ‘uncreated’ (Jpn. mushō).  By doing such, we will 
then find ourselves on secure footing for making the case that anti-cognitivism is a fruitful metaethical 
counterpart to anti-realism in regards to clarifying what our conventional value judgments mean: 
conventional normative propositions are not reducible to feelings and attitudinal leanings, nor are they 










Dōgen’s ‘Uncreated’ Metaethic 
§4.1 Chapter Overview 
The objective of this chapter is to examine Dōgen’s metaethical characterization of values as 
‘uncreated (Jpn. mushō). This characterization is proffered in the Shōbōgenzō fascicle Shoaku-Makusa, 
“Not Doing Evil,” which is specifically devoted to ethics.  I plan to argue that this characterization is in 
keeping with the Mahāyāna philosophy of emptiness, whereby all things, as well as truth claims, are 
ultimately devoid of an inherent essence and/or self-nature, notwithstanding the fact that we consider such 
to be conventionally meaningful.   For Dōgen, because emptiness is the ultimate nature of all things, 
moral values and principles are ultimately ‘uncreated.’  I contend that this characterization reveals 
Dōgen’s general commitment to anti-realism.  While there is a plurality of anti-realist perspectives, it is 
not my intention to limit Dōgen to a specific version of anti-realism (e.g., error theory, fictionalism or 
non-cognitivism) but rather emphasize that, according to Dōgen, there are no mind-independent values 
that objectively exist and/or are universally true.  As we shall see, this anti-realist standpoint sets the stage 
for making sense of Dōgen’s metaethical perspective as anti-cognitivist (i.e. moral propositions do not 
describe moral facts nor express moral truths, but instead, reveal a perspective) specifically in regards to 
the practice of non-thinking (Jpn. hishiryō), vis-à-vis the phenomenology and an embodied practice of 
zazen, seated meditation.    
§4.2 Zen Metaethics: Mushō 
 According to early Buddhist thought, all things, actions or events can be evaluated as good, bad 
or indifferent.  Dōgen begins his examination of this tripartite moral division in his fascicle Shoaku-
Makusa by citing a verse from the Āgama’s and the Dhammapada that is believed to be a “universal 
precept” of the patriarchs and Buddhas: “Avoid all evil, cultivate the good, purify your mind: this sums 
up the teaching of the Buddhas” (Easwaran 1986, 132). 




  devoutly practicing every good, 
  purifying one's own mind: 
  this is the teachings of all buddhas. (Dōgen 2011,15) 
This verse is then followed by the following passage:   
In the above quotation the term "evils" refers to [what is called] morally evil among the 
categories of morally good, morally evil, and morally undefined. Its moral nature, however, is 
uncreated. The natures of morally good and morally undefined likewise are uncreated. They are 
untainted, they are the real aspects, which is to say that these three categories of moral nature 
encompass manifold varieties of dharmas. (Dōgen 2011,157) 
To begin making sense of this passage we can begin by considering Bodiford’s translation of mushō –無
生– as “uncreated.”  For starters, this is not the only translation.  Gudo Nishijima and Chodo Cross 
translate mushō as “non-appearance,” and Shasta Abbey translates mushō as “does not arise and perish.”  
Since different translations reveal and conceal different interpretations, it is important to critically 
consider the characters that make up this key concept in Dōgen’s moral philosophy.   
 Mushō is comprised of two characters: (1) mu (無), which can be translated as nothing, or as a 
negation, such as not one, not two; and (2) shō (生), which means to be born, or to originate.  Based upon 
a literal translation of these characters, the term mushō means “not born,” or “not created.”  Of the three 
aforementioned translations, William Bodiford’s translation seems most consistent with the literal 
meaning of the characters.  To say something is “uncreated” is not entirely different from saying 
something is “not born;” the meaning is generally the same.  Moreover, Bodiford’s translation echoes 
Theravāda Buddhism’s characterization of nirvāṇa (Pāli nibbāna) as unborn (Pāli ajātaṃ); for example, 
in the Ariyapariyesanā Sutta. “The Noble Search,” it states, “Then, bhikkus, being myself subject to birth, 
having understood the danger in what is subject to birth, seeking the unborn supreme security from 
bondage, Nibbāna, I attained the unborn supreme security of from bondage, Nibbāna” (Ñāṇamoli and 
Bodhi 2009, 259).  Within the context of Mahāyāna Buddhism, Nāgārjuna’s dedicatory verse in the 




anutpādam) as a characterization of phenomena that are dependently conditioned (Skt. 
pratītyasamutpādaṃ): 
 I prostrate to the Perfect Buddha, 
 The best of teachers, who taught that 
 Whatever is dependently arisen is 
 Unceasing, unborn. (Garfield 1995, 2) 
Notwithstanding this Madhyamaka characterization of dependently arisen phenomena, the Laṅkāvatāra 
Sūtra, which draws upon the Mahāyāna persepctives of Yogācāra and Buddha-nature, equivocates the 
doctrine of emptiness (Skt. śūnyatā) with the idea of being ‘unborn’; “Again Mahāmati, what is meant by 
emptiness of self-nature?  Mahāmati, it is that all things in their self-nature are unborn, hence the 
emptiness of self-nature, and it is therefore said that things are empty in their self-nature” (Suzuki 1932, 
66).  Thus, we shall rely upon Bodiford’s translation of mushō as ‘uncreated’ for the remainder of the 
dissertation while we explore different translations of Dōgen’s Shōbōgenzō, including those of Nishijima 
and Cross, Parkes and Bielefeldt. 
 The first point to note about Bodiford’s translation of mushō is that it invites conflicting 
philosophical interpretations.  From an essentialist perspective, if something is ‘uncreated’ then it is 
permanent and eternal.  In Western philosophy, ‘God’ is characterized by Aquinas as an uncaused being, 
which implies that ‘God’ is ‘uncreated.  In early Buddhist philosophy, space (Skt. ākāśa) and nirvāṇa, 
according to Sarvastivada Abhidharma philosophy, are conceived through a similar essentialist lens; 
space and nirvāṇa are not dependently originated, but rather permanent, thus “uncreated.”  However, 
there is good reason to believe that Dōgen does not share this essentialist perspective. 
 As I noted in the previous chapter, Dōgen is a Zen thinker situated within East Asian Mahāyāna 
Buddhism; his perspective is informed by his early education in Chinese classics and sūtra studies at, “the 
Senkōbō at Yokawa-Hannyadani on Mt. Hiei, one of the most renowned centers of Buddhist studies at the 




continued to engage in a systematic study of Buddhist sūtras at the Senkōbō (Kim 2004); these sūtras 
included the Flower Garland Sūtra (Jpn. Kegonkyō), Lotus Sūtra (Jpn. Hokkekyō), Nirvāṇa Sūtra (Jpn. 
Nehangyō) (Heine 2020).  The multivalent teachings embedded within these sutras are born out of the 
philosophical streams of East Asian Madhyamaka,107 Yogācāra108 – Vijñaptimātra, ‘Consciousness-Only 
School,’ or Cittamātra, ‘Mind-Only’– and the Tathāgatagarbha109 tradition.  Two ideas embedded within 
these Mahāyāna perspectives worth considering in order to clarify Dōgen’s perspective include: (1) the 
two truths; and (2) the philosophy of emptiness (Skt. śūnyatā).   
Beginning with (2), while there are differences between how Madhyamaka and Yogācāra 
interpret the meaning of emptiness, it can be broadly construed as a philosophy of non-essentialism.  In 
regard to Madhyamaka for example, emptiness refers to the emptiness of individual dharmas; herein, 
there are no phenomenal things or ideas that have an individual/independent self-nature (Skt. svabhāva) 
simply because all things and ideas are dependently conditioned and impermanent.   In regards to 
Yogācāra, emptiness refers to the nondual and ineffable relationship between subject and object.  Herein, 
                                                 
107 In regards to the East Asian Madhyamaka, which is generally known as the ‘Three Treatise School’, there are 
three main philosophical treatises that helped shape the teachings of Buddhist traditions, including the Tendai school 
which Dōgen began his monastic training. “The Chung lun (Madhyamaka Śāstra) consists of Nāgārjuna’s 
Madhyamakakārikā embedded in a commentary said to be by an Indic teacher whose name in Chinese is give as 
Ch’ing-mu. […] The Shih-erh-men lun (Dvadaśamukha) appears in the mainto be a collection of verses drawn from 
Nāgārjuna with a commentary attributed by some to Nāgārjuna and by others to the elusive Ch’ing-mu.  The Pai-lun 
(Śata Śāstra) is a work by Aryadeva, with a commentary by another obscure figure, Vasu.  […]  Sometimes Ta-
chih-tu lun (Mahāprajñāpāramitā Śāstra) is added to the three Treatises, producing a Four Treatise School.  This 
text is attributed to Nāgārjuna. (Williams 1989, 74) 
108 In regards to Yogācāra orVijñaptimātra (Ch. Fǎxiàng-zōng; Jpn. Hossō-shū), while less influential than the 
‘Three Treatise School,’ the She-lun and Fa-hsiang schools of Cittamātra provided nuanced persepctives 
concerning the division between eight types of consciousness, “including the five sense consciousnesses plus the 
mind (manovijñāna) – a sense which on the one hand apprehends psychic events, and on the other synthesizes 
experiences supplied by the other five senses – the ‘tainted mind’ (kliṣṭamanas), and the substratum consciousness” 
(Williams 1989, 90).   Herein, the substratum consciousness (Skt. ālayavijñāna) can be seen as repository for the 
‘seeds’ (Skt. bīja) which condition the phenomenal existence of the external world, as well as one’s personal 
experiences vis-à-vis karma (Williams 1989).  In China, the main text of this philosophical tradition was a 
translation of Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā- vijñaptimātratā, “Thirty Verses on Manifestation Only” (Ch. Wéishí sānshí 
lùn sòng; Jpn. Yuishiki sanjūronju).   
109 And, in regards to Thathāgatagarbha, ‘Buddha-nature,’ this tradition emphasized the realization of, “one’s 
spiritual potential, exhortation, and encouragement, not ontology” (Williams 2000, 162).  Accordingly, “In China 
Fa-tsang in the seventrh century claimed that tathāgatagarbha tradition represents a fourth turning of the Dharma-
wheel.  In other words, the tathāgatagarbha tradition represents a different philosophical and ontological position 




as a form of idealism, Yogācāra defends the oneness of subject and object by denying the existence of 
matter and corporeality (Skt. rūpa) (Siderits 2007, 147).   
Turning our attention to the two truths, conventional truth (Skt. saṁvṛiti-satya) and ultimate truth 
(Skt. paramārtha-satya), it is important to note that these truths, as interpreted from a Mahāyāna 
standpoint, are different from early Buddhism’s perspective.  According to early Buddhism, “A statement 
is conventionally true if and only if it is acceptable to common sense and consistently leads to successful 
practice;” on the other hand, “A statement is ultimately true if and only if it corresponds to the facts and 
neither asserts nor presupposes the existence of any conceptual fiction” (Siderits 2007, 56).  In the context 
of the Mahāyāna philosophy of emptiness, particularly Madhymaka’s interpretation of such, the two 
truths become more nuanced.   In short, because all conventional statements are dependently conditioned, 
it follows that all statements are ultimately empty.  That being said, this does not mean that emptiness is 
something that can be discovered or realized singly and/or independently from that of conventional truths; 
emptiness too, because of its dependency upon conventional statements and beliefs, is empty (i.e. 
emptiness of emptiness, śūnyatā śūnyatā).  Following Siderits’ interpretation of this Madhyamaka 
standpoint, the ultimate truth is that there are no ultimate truths; instead, there are only conventional 
truths.   
To call emptiness a ‘dependent concept’ is to say that it lacks intrinsic nature.  And of course no 
statements about something that lacks intrinsic nature (such as a chariot) can be ultimately true.  
So nothing we can say about emptiness can be ultimately true.  But likewise no statement about 
non-empty things, things with intrinsic natures, is ultimately true either. […] To say all things are 
empty is to say that there is nothing that is the kind of thing that ultimately true statements would 
be statements about.  To say that emptiness is also empty is to say that no statement about 
emptiness could be ultimately true either.  The upshot is that the very idea of an ultimate truth is 
empty. (Siderits 2007, 204) 
I contend that this interpretation of the two truths is most effective for exploring Dōgen’s writings on 
emptiness, ethics and the metaethical status of moral propositions.    
While Dōgen does not expound upon the distinction of the two truths, it is evident that they are 




conventional nature of language by querying a legend found in the Mahābhārata whereby a king of a land 
called Saindhava requests four separate items from his retainers -salt, chalice, water and horse – yet all of 
which have the same name, saindhava.  Depending upon the situation, the word saindhava has different 
meanings which are determined by the interests of the speaker, in this case the king.  Speaking 
metaphorically, Dōgen states that the seeking of saindhava is “not the state of people playing stringed 
instruments with bridges glued” (Dōgen 1994, 105).  As Nishijima explains, playing a string instrument 
like the koto with bridges glued symbolizes blind adherence to fixed rules or ideas.  To have one’s bridges 
glued is to be inflexible and insensitive to the context and needs of any given situation.  Rather than 
having our bridges glued, we should recognize that the meaning of our words are contextual; and, that the 
context and interests at hand determine the subject-predicate relations we use.  If the king is thirsty, and 
requests saindhava, then the retainers bring the king water.  If the king desires to go on a tour through the 
countryside, then the word saindhava refers to a horse.  The meaning of our conventional words and 
expressions, like saindhava, are determined by their relationship to the situation and their ability to serve 
our mutual interests rather than denoting some correspondent essence/truth.  Ultimately, because all 
dualistic distinctions that result from language are empty, such truths are not mind-independent.  Herein, 
emptiness simply highlights that the things that we take to be real, either in a metaphysical, 
epistemological or ethical sense are, ultimately, not real (i.e. anti-realism).   
 For a Zen thinker like Dōgen, this “empty epistemology” is perhaps best captured by the logic of 
nonduality and the formula “A is, ~ A, therefore A.”  Non-duality for Dōgen, as Kim explains, does not 
entail a transcendence of dualism to a non-dual horizon of understanding and truth, but rather a realization 
of dualism itself (Kim 2007, 32-34).  For example, “A is ~ A ⸫ A” could be replaced with the traditional 
Zen verse: “At first mountains are mountains and rivers are rivers, then mountains are not mountains and 
rivers are not rivers; finally, mountains are mountains and rivers are rivers” (Hori 2000, 301).  This verse 
reflects various points of realization that Zen practitioners experience when they embark upon the path of 




essentialism whereby mountains have an essence that is distinct from rivers.  However, after studying 
Buddhist teachings, particularly the philosophy of emptiness, for an unspecified duration of time, one 
realizes that mountains and rivers lack an independent self-nature or essence; thus there are no mountains 
and there are no rivers.  But then, after some additional practice and philosophical rumination, one 
discovers that the negation of mountains of rivers conditions a view of “no mountains, no rivers” which is 
dualistically distinct from the view that was previous held, mainly “mountains are mountains, and, rivers 
are rivers.”  Accordingly, it follows that since dualism often leads to attachment for the simple reason that 
duality implies that there is an essence that separates things into two, including duality and non-duality, 
Zen negates the first-order negation of “mountains are not mountains and rivers are not rivers” via the 
affirmation “mountains are mountains, and rivers are rivers.”  Herein, this negation of the negation is not 
a return to the essentialist mode of thinking that one viewed the world through when they first set out to 
practice Zen.  Rather, the negation of the negation via the affirmation of “mountains are mountains, and, 
rivers are rivers” reflects the insight that dualities exist because all things are empty and non-dual.  As 
Victor Sōgen Hori explains, “If one takes non-duality to its logical conclusion, one must negate even the 
standpoint of non-duality” (Hori 2000, 301).  By negating the standpoint of non-duality we are ultimately 
negating our negation which is captured by “⸫ A,” or “Therefore mountains are mountains and rivers are 
rivers.”   
When one does this, then the distinctions and differentiations of the ordinary dualistic, 
conventional standpoint are resurrected.  The second appearance of the dualistic conventional 
standpoint is different from its first appearance.  The first appearance of the dualistic 
conventional standpoint is differentiated from the non-dual ultimate standpoint, whereas the 
second appearance of dualistic conventional standpoint is identical with the nondual standpoint. 
[…] A corollary of this logic is that nonduality never appears as nonduality; it always appears as 
duality.  For if nonduality appeared as nonduality, it would be dualistically opposed to duality.  
For similar reasons, emptiness never appears as emptiness; it always appears as form. (Hori 2000, 
301) 
In his fascicle, Genjō Kōan, Dōgen uses this “empty logic” (A is ~A ⸫ A ) to frame his characterization of 




When all dharmas are [seen as] the Buddha-dharma, then there is delusion and realization, there 
is practice, there is life and there is death, there are buddhas and there are ordinary beings. When 
the myriad dharmas are each not of the self, there is no delusion and no realization, no buddhas 
and no ordinary beings, no life and no death.  The Buddha’s truth is originally transcendent over 
abundance and scarcity, and so there is life and death, there is delusion and realization, there are 
beings and buddhas.  And though it is like this, it is only that flowers, while loved, fall; and 
weeds, while hated, flourish.  (Dōgen 1994, 33) 
Similar to the logical progression of the verse “mountains are mountains and rivers and rivers,” this 
passage unfolds according to the sequence: (1) affirmation of duality; (2) negation of duality via 
affirmation of non-duality; and (3) negation of first-order non-duality via affirmation of duality.  By 
negating the negation in (2) via affirmation in (3), Dōgen champions a view of truth that is uniquely 
Mahāyāna; the ultimate nature of things is nothing other than the conventional nature of things 
themselves.  Or as Dōgen metaphorically concludes, the ultimate nature of things is nothing other than 
flowers withering and falling, and weeds sprouting up amidst our loathing.  
   Returning to our examination of Dōgen’s characterization of values as uncreated (Jpn. mushō), it 
seems clear that from an ultimate perspective of truth, Dōgen is a moral anti-realist (i.e. there are no 
mind-independent moral truths, principles or facts; conventional statements do not correspond to mind-
independent truths).  As I noted above, the concept of unborn or uncreated (Jpn. mushō) is a popular 
characterization of the emptiness of all things and ideas.  Returning to the Lankāvatāra Sūtra, a popular 
Yogācāra text within Zen Buddhism: 
They have no reality, being manifestations of the Mind itself, and Mahamati, as they are not born 
of being and non-being, they are unborn.  Mahamati, all things are like the horns of the hare, 
horse, donkey, or camel, but the ignorant and simpleminded who are given up to their false and 
erroneous imaginations, discriminate things where they are not; therefore, all things are unborn.  
That all things are in their self-nature unborn, Mahamati, belongs to the realm of self-realization 
attained by noble wisdom, and does not belong essentially to the realm of dualistic discrimination 
cherished by the ignorant and simple minded. (Suzuki 1932, 57) 
Herein, because all discriminated phenomena are empty of an independent/inherent self-essence, such 
phenomena and causal processes are illusory, dream-like, and so, “unborn” or “uncreated.”  For Dōgen, 
this extends to moral ideas, values, principles and beliefs as well.  To argue otherwise would be 




values and normative beliefs are not.  The philosophy of emptiness denies that our conventional values, 
principles and normative beliefs are essentially real.  In keeping with this philosophy, Dōgen is an anti-
realist; the tripartite moral division of good, bad and indifference is dependent upon a myriad of 
conditions which are essentially uncreated and not real (i.e. anti-realism).  As Kim explains:   
The moral values of good, evil, and neutral did not exist in themselves or for themselves with any 
independent metaphysical status, because they were nothing more than the temporary 
configurations resulting from infinitely complex interactions of conditions.  In brief, good and 
evil did not have the self-same metaphysical ground or source; they were without self-nature 
(mujishō) and were unattainable (fukatoku), to use customary Buddhist phraseology. (Kim 2004, 
224-225) 
Thus when Dōgen states that the nature of good, evil and the undefined are ‘uncreated’ he is, I contend, 
committing himself to the metaethical view that values are not objective, nor essentially real. 
§4.3 Zen Anti-realism 
 By characterizing Dōgen as an anti-realist, I am not claiming that he saw himself as such, nor that 
he was attempting to defend anti-realism from the popular challenges advanced by proponents of realism.  
Dōgen was a Buddhist, and his conception of ethics was directly informed by the Mahāyāna teachings of 
emptiness and the two truths.  Moreover, his writings on the moral life are not intended for an academic 
audience, but rather for Zen monks and lay practitioners.  Herein, I am in agreement with Edelglass that 
we should approach the normative beliefs of Buddhist traditions, including Dōgen’s Zen, on their own 
terms.  That being said, I don’t find it problematic to characterize his metaethical outlook as anti-realist 
for the following reason.  In short, just because S does not identify with some particular standpoint X 
does not mean that X does not appropriately characterize the views in which S champions.  For example, 
Hippocrates did not make use of the term paternalism to describe his outlook on physician-patient 
relationships.  However, the fact that he did not identify with this concept does not mean that Hippocrates 
was not paternalistic when it came to treating patients.  As evidenced in the classical version of the 
Hippocratic Oath, there is no mention of a physician’s duty to fully inform patients of their medical 
condition, nor an obligation to tell them the truth.  The traditional Hippocratic Oath, notwithstanding 




“doctors know best,” which is paternalistic.  In regards to Dōgen, while he does not defend anti-realism 
per se, his metaethical outlook is nonetheless anti-realist as evidenced by his use of the term mushō to 
characterize the nature of good, bad, and indifference.   
 This anti-realist interpretation of Dōgen’s metaethics is supported by other passages within 
Shoaku-Makusa.  For example, he expounds further on the universal precept “to practice the many kinds 
of right” when he writes: “These many kinds of right are classed within the three properties as 
“rightness.”  Even though the many kinds of right are included in “rightness,” there has never been any 
kind of right that is realized beforehand and that then waits for someone to do it” (Dōgen 1994, 103).  As 
Gudo Nishijima explains, the three properties of right include the tripartite division of good, bad and 
indifference, whose metaethical nature is mushō.  Right actions are, in other words, from an ultimate 
perspective, mushō; rightness does not exist as a mind-independent property/truth.  As I interpret Dōgen, 
we ought not deliberate upon the rightness or wrongness of actions before actions themselves have been 
committed; rightness and wrongness is always relative to the situation – karmic situation – at hand; 
herein, I am sympathetic with Bret Davis’ ‘contextualist’ interpretation of Dōgen noted in Chapter two. 
Accordingly, if we are preoccupied with thinking about the nature of right action, we will not be able to 
effectively respond to circumstances that present themselves before us in ways that are often unpredicted.  
For example, one might claim that the right thing for all residents of Florida to do during a pandemic is to 
shelter in place and socially isolate; however, that normative claim might change, say, if at the same time 
a category five hurricane is threatening to cause massive destruction to residential communities; and, even 
then, our normative judgment would be based upon additional conditions, such as the architectural 
integrity of coastal homes.  In other words, there are no normative judgments nor prescriptions that are 
unconditional.  If one thinks that there are, then, it is likely that such an individual will likely miss a 
number of morally significant conditions that do arise in all-too-dynamic ways when we have to make a 
moral decision or formulate a normative judgment.  Thus, it is clear that anti-realism as mushō vis-à-vis 




one ought not affirm views that assume that what makes actions right or wrong exists independently of 
the minds who perform and are affected by such actions, or the environmental/situational conditions at 
hand.   
 Now, notwithstanding his moral anti-realism, Dōgen does not believe we are existentially 
paralyzed in our ability to formulate value judgments, nor impotent in our ability to act morally.  
Continuing from the aforementioned passage, Dōgen writes, “The myriad kinds of right have no set 
shape, but they converge on the place of doing right faster than iron to a magnet, and with the force 
stronger than the vairambhaka winds” (Dōgen 1994, 103).  For Dōgen, while there is no 
objective/universal nature of rightness that exists, when actions unfold we are still able to formulate value 
judgments in light of the conventional views that hold our web of worldly beliefs together.  That being 
said, Dōgen is clear that these conventional views are indeed relative, and so, not mind-independent: “It is 
utterly impossible for the Earth, mountains and rivers, the world, a national land, or even the force of 
accumulated karma, to hinder this coming together of right.  At the same time, the principle that 
recognitions differ from world to world, in regards to right, is the same [as in regards to wrong] (Dōgen 
1994, 103-104).  As Nishijima insightfully notes, the usual metaphor for Dōgen’s anti-realism is water, 
which finds its philosophical footing in Yogācāra thought.  In his Sansui-kyō, “Mountains and Water 
Sūtra,” water, as we conventionally understand this element, is seen as a palace from the perspective of 
fish, as a string of pearls from the perspective of gods, and as blood or pus from the perspective of 
demons.110  The conventional truth about water is relative to the worldly perspective we embody; no 
“truth” is mind-independent.  Similar to water, good and bad, right and wrong are conventionally relative, 
and ultimately empty and uncreated (Jpn. mushō).     
The essence of rightness, the essence of indifference, and so on are also uncreated, are the state 
without excess, and are real form.  At the same time, at each concrete place these three properties 
include innumerable kinds of dharmas.  In wrongs, there are similarities and differences between 
wrong in this world and wrong in other worlds.  There are similarities and differences between 
former times and later times.  There are similarities and differences between wrong in heavens 
                                                 




above and wrong in the human world.  How much greater is the difference between moral wrong, 
moral right, and moral indifference in Buddhism and in the secular world.” (Dōgen 2011, 158) 
 No doubt, characterizing Dōgen’s Zen ethic as moral anti-realism raises a number of questions 
and issues that deserve our attention, including: (1) what version of moral anti-realism best captures 
Dōgen’s metaethical perspective; and (2) if Dōgen is ultimately a moral anti-realist, can we really take 
seriously what he claims to be conventionally true about the moral life?  Or, as Finnigan states in 
reference to Madhyamaka, can Dōgen provide justification for conventional normative beliefs, including 
the role of women in monasteries or the mindfulness and care one should embody when cooking food?  
Can Dōgen’s anti-realism provide coherent reasons for recognizing certain normative constraints, albeit 
conventional?  
Proceeding with (1), it is understood that as a metaethical outlook, anti-realism is variegated. As 
we noted in the first chapter, there are a plurality of perspectives including error-theory (extreme nihilism) 
and emotivism, prescriptivism, and expressivism (moderate nihilism).  However, rather than pigeonholing 
Dōgen into a specific camp, I am content, at this point of our inquiry, in limiting our characterization of 
his metaethics to the broad stroke of anti-realism.  This general commitment, as Mark Siderits explains in 
reference to Madhyamaka thought, ultimately holds that there are no mind-independent values or moral 
principles.  In other words, contrary to moral realism which maintains that mind-independent values and 
moral truths exist, moral anti-realism contends that all values and moral beliefs are relative to the 
conceptual schemes of individuals or communities.  Dogen’s conceptual scheme is framed within the 
context of Zen practice, realizing Buddha-nature and embodying the virtues and normative vows of a 
bodhisattva.  Just as we saw in Chapter one when examining Nietzsche’s metaethics, this way-seeking 
philosophy is not in keeping with the truth-seeking values of Anglo-American metaethical circles, 
specifically logical positivism.  Moreover, it is not obvious based upon Dōgen’s writings that he would 
agree with the non-cognitive assumption that affects, sentiment/feelings/emotion are essentially distinct 
from reason.  Dōgen is clear throughout his writings that dualities such as practice and enlightenment, 




Accordingly, Dōgen would likely agree with Nietzsche that the opposition between affect and reason is 
conditioned by our language, which does not accurately capture and depict the nature of reality.  A 
philosophy of emotion as put forward by Robert Solomon, which we treated in Chapter one, is a 
perspective that Dōgen would likely champion as it does not conflict with the Zen philosophy of, the 
‘oneness of mind and body’ (Jpn. shinjin ichinyō) which we will say more about in Chapter six when we 
explore his practice of zazen.  Recall, Solomon proffers a nuanced perspective on the nature of emotion 
whereby, “emotions are neither discrete entities nor distinct types but complex multijudgment processes 
that engage any number of different ingredients along different dimensions” (Solomon 2007, 212-213).  
While Dōgen does not provide an explicit examination of affects per se, he does offer his reader, in a very 
Nietzschean way, much to ruminate upon in regards to power.  According to Nishijima’s introduction to 
the fascicle Kannon, “Avalokiteśvara,” Dōgen believed that the bodhisattva of compassion is, “a symbol 
of a life force that is more fundamental to living beings than compassion” (Nishijima 1994, 211).  This 
life force, which Dōgen characterizes as “mystical power” (Jpn. jinzu), “is born from and with that which 
is beyond consciousness, and it relies on as its real refuge that which is beyond consciousness” (Dōgen 
1994, 77).  I will also say more about this mystical power in Chapter six when we explore Dōgen’s 
phenomenology of non-thinking.  For right now it is important to note that according to Dōgen, mystical 
power, which is a normative force, vis-à-vis a bodhisattva’s vows and embodiment of compassion, is 
different from the dualistic views that non-cognitivists defend, vis-à-vis “sharp distinctions between 
beliefs and attitudes, reasons and emotions, facts and values” (Solomon 2007, 206).  After all, the 
bodhisattva’s realization of great compassion as understood by Mahāyāna Buddhism, Dōgen included, is 
inextricably tied to wisdom via insight into emptiness, and vice versa; clearly this non-dualistic metaethic, 
which is quite similar to Nietzsche’s perspectivism and will to power, is not shared by non-cognitivists, 
nor error-theorists/fictionalists. 
 Turning to the second question: if Dōgen is ultimately anti-realist, can we really take seriously 
what he claims to be conventionally true about the moral life?  Herein we find ourselves in the middle of 




of moral values as mushō, one might ask whether a moral anti-realist such as Dōgen can consistently 
proffer conventional normative judgments that have action guiding constraints as he does in various 
fascicles within the Shōbōgenzō?  Can Dōgen, or any Buddhist who is a moral anti-realist, marshal 
reasons together that are coherent and that we can take seriously while at the same time not believing that 
such reasons are ultimately real and/or true?  If Dōgen does not ultimately believe in any mind-
independent moral values or principles, how can we take seriously his conventional normative beliefs?  
Charles Goodman raises this point in his article, “From Madhyamaka to Consequentialism: A Road 
Map.” 
One way to put the problem starts with noticing that, in Buddhism, there are only two kinds of 
truth: Ultimate and conventional.  And it is clear that, according to Madhyamaka, ethical 
statements cannot possibly be ultimately true.  So they must be merely conventional.  What, then, 
does it mean to say that ethics is merely conventional?  It sounds like we would be saying that 
ethics is a social construct within each particular society, with no basis at all outside of contingent 
practices and customs of that society.  Such a claim leaves us a variety of extremely unattractive 
metaethical options, including moral relativism, ethnocentric conservatism, and error theory.  
And none of these options fits well at all with any universal ethical theory that aspires to provide 
normative guidance, however general and abstract, across places and times.  (Goodman 2016, 
141-142) 
To begin formulating a response to this problem, I think it is important to first note that it is likely that 
Dōgen, similar to Nietzsche’s perspectivism, would be suspicious of the dualistic distinction between 
normative and non-normative beliefs and perspectives.  After all, the distinction itself entails a value 
judgment between what is considered normative and non-normative.  Moreover, in light of his reflections 
on mystical power, vis-à-vis embodying the bodhisattva’s vows, it is likely that Dōgen would interpret all 
beliefs, perspectives and livelihoods as normative, through and through.  Thus, what this means is that our 
ability and willingness, from an anti-realist perspective, to take conventional normative beliefs seriously 
is no different from taking any belief seriously; we take beliefs seriously because they have the capacity 




 Secondly, as Bronwyn Finnigan111 notes in “The Nature of the Buddhist Path” (2017), the 
practice of the moral life is not to achieve some goal outside of the practice of Zen itself.  In other words, 
the justificatory grounds for Dōgen’s beliefs will not be separate from the monastic praxis and rituals of 
Zen monks, specifically zazen as we will see in Chapter six.112  As I noted in Chapter three, Dōgen’s 
metaethic, vis-à-vis means/ends or practice/attainment, is grounded in his nondual interpretation of the 
Tathāgatagharba philosophy that all beings are originally enlightened (Jpn. hongaku); for Dōgen, 
Buddha-nature is only realized via practice itself, rather than a consequence of such.  For example, 
consider the following passage from Dōgen’s Genjō Kōan, wherein he presents the parable of the wind 
and the fan: 
Zen Master Hotetsu of Mayoku-zan mountain is using a fan.  A monk comes by and asks, “The 
nature of the air is to be ever-present, and there is no place that air cannot reach.  Why then does 
the Master use a fan?” 
The Master says, “You have only understood that the nature of air is to be ever-present, but you 
do not yet know the truth that there is no place air cannot reach.” 
 The Monk says, “What is the truth of there being no place air cannot reach?” 
At this, the Master just carries on using the fan.  The monk does prostrations.  The experience of 
the Buddha-dharma, the vigorous road of the authentic transmission, is like this.  Someone who 
says that because the air is ever-present we need not use a fan, or that even when we do not use a 
fan we can still feel the air, does not know ever-presence, and does not know the nature of air.  
Because the nature of air is to be ever-present, the behavior of Buddhists has made the Earth 
manifest itself as gold and has ripened the Long River into curds and whey. (Dōgen 1994, 36-37) 
The ever-present air is nothing other than Buddha-nature, and using the fan is Zen practice, mainly zazen.  
For Dōgen, the realization of Buddha-nature is clearly constitutive with practice rather than a 
consequentialist goal which meditation serves as instrumental means.  As Kim explains, “Buddha-nature 
was not to be enfolded in, but was to unfold through, human activities and expressions” (Kim 2004, 37) 
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Dōgen’s writings on the moral life, and his normative judgments on Zen practice and 
monasticism, were drafted for his students.  Rather than attempting to establish a set of values and 
normative beliefs for all of the world to follow, he was simply presenting them to monks and lay 
practitioners who have taken the Buddhist precepts, and are committed to being a bodhisattva who “vows 
to save all sentient beings while realizing that there are no sentient beings to be saved. 
Here, Subhuti, someone who has set out in the Bodhisattva-vehicle should produce a thought in 
this manner: “all beings I must lead to Nirvana, into the Realm of Nirvana which leaves nothing 
behind; and yet, after beings have thus been led to Nirvana, no being at all has been led to 
Nirvana.”  And why?  If in a Bodhisattva the notion of a “being” should take place, he could not 
be called a “Bodhi-being.” (Conze 1958, 56-57)  
Accordingly, following Guilbault’s ‘conventionalist’ characterization, I contend that we can take Dōgen’s 
normative judgments seriously as I believe he was not only sincere in his efforts to promote such through 
his writings, including his Eihei Shingi, “Pure Standards for Eihei-ji,” specifically his “Instructions to the 
cook, Tenzokōkun, but he is also consistent and coherent in translating his metaethical reflections, vis-à-
vis mushō, into monastic instructions and action guiding directives: “As for the attitude while preparing 
food, the essential point is deeply to arouse genuine mind and respectful mind without making judgments 
about the ingredients’ fineness or coarseness. […] Cooking so called rich, creamy food is not necessarily 
superior, cooking plain vegetable soup is not necessarily inferior” (Dōgen 1996, 44).  Indeed, Dōgen took 
the role and responsibility of the tenzo quite seriously while maintaining that all values are mushō, and 
that one should not be blinded by dualistic value judgments.  
One should not see the assembled monks as good or bad, or consider them as elder or younger.  
Even the self does not know where the self will settle down; how could others determine where 
others will settle down?  How could it not be a mistake to find others’ faults with our own faults?  
Although there is a difference between the senior and junior and the wise and stupid, as members 
of a sangha they are the same.  Moreover, the wrong in the past may be right in the present, so 
who could distinguish the sage from the common person? […] If you have the spirit of not 
arranging everything into right and wrong, how could you not carry out conduct of the Way that 
directly proceeds to unsurpassed bodhi? (Dōgen 1996, 4)      
Whether one’s normative judgment pertains to preparing food or ageism, I contend that the degree of 
seriousness by which normative beliefs are accepted or rejected is dependent upon how such judgments 




cognitivists are spot on in that our emotions do play a significant role in how we internalize, wrestle with 
and embody normative beliefs; emotions give our beliefs and judgments “their depth and their meaning,” 
and this is where non-cognitivism is partially right (Solomon 2007, 204).  When one is sincere about the 
normative positions they affirm or oppose, one thereby becomes existentially invested in such; the loss of 
natural bio-diversity is a case in point.  To take environmental issues seriously conditions how we identify 
with ourselves and relate with others, and vice versa.  Accordingly, I contend it is absurd to imagine 
someone taking an environmental issue seriously, say the intersection between pollution and 
environmental racism, while at the same time being apathetic and insincere about pollution and 
environmental racism.  Feelings/attitudes/impulses are, in other words, salient for taking any moral matter 
seriously, and so it is not obvious that moral facts, properties or truths are necessary in order to embody 
such seriousness. Based upon Dōgen’s Zen perspective, wherein conventional dualistic distinctions are 
understood to be ultimately non-dual, there is good reason to believe that Dōgen felt that what he was 
writing about actually mattered, and should matter to those who choose to follow his practice of Zen 
Buddhism.   
§4.4 Justifying Our Uncreated Moral Beliefs 
 While Dōgen’s commitment to anti-realism does not undermine one’s ability to take moral 
matters seriously, we still face the following question: Can Dōgen’s antirealism justify conventional 
moral beliefs, including his monastic instructions?  As we saw in Chapter one, this metaethical question 
lays bare the main divisions between realism/cognitivism, relativism and nihilism (both extreme and 
moderate).  Then, at the end of Chapter two, we saw that this question is at the heart of a contemporary 
debate among the Cowherds.  Finnigan, in particular, contends that any commitment to anti-realism, vis-
à-vis śūnyatā, dissolves our ability to justify our conventional moral beliefs.  Since Dōgen is committed 
to anti-realism, vis-à-vis emptiness, according to Finnigan’s reasoning it follows that Dōgen would also 
be unable to provide justification for the conventional beliefs he takes seriously and is sincere about.  For 




be incongruent with the conventional view that normative judgments have the appearance of describing 
the world we live within; and (2) slip into relativism, which is incongruent with the belief in the 
uniformity of “Perfection-of-Wisdom” attitudes.  Guerreo echoes similar points in regards to fictionalism 
as well, though she is not opposed, as we saw, to finding an alternative metaethical strategy.  
Is Dōgen’s Zen-ethic impotent in its ability to justify conventional normative claims and value 
judgments?  Before we answer this question, it is important to note that Dōgen does not set out to 
theoretically justify his Zen ethic.  He does not, in other words proffer a set of arguments that justifies his 
conventional normative views.  Instead, justification for normative beliefs are constitutive of the very 
practice of Zen, specifically zazen.  For similar reasons we would not expect, say, an expert skier to 
provide reasons for valuing the practice of skiing and “skier’s etiquette” independent from the embodied 
practice of skiing itself, the justification for Dōgen’s Zen ethic is nothing other than Zen practice.  As we 
shall see in Chapter six, while monastic precepts, chanting sutras and ritual etiquette help cultivate certain 
conventional beliefs via ceremony, according to Dōgen, the practice of zazen, and the phenomenology of 
non-thinking (Jpn. hishiryō) is the soil from which all conventional beliefs grow and are cultivated from.  
For Dōgen, ‘justification’ is realized via practice (i.e. orthopraxy), and, as Guilbault maintains, the 
conventions of Buddhist traditions.   
 When it comes to justifying conventional moral beliefs, I don’t think that the two aforementioned 
challenges against moral anti-realism in general, Dōgen’s moral anti-realism in particular, are 
insurmountable.  In regards to the lack of congruency between anti-realism’s claim that there are no moral 
facts and the conventional view that normative judgments have the appearance of describing the world we 
live within, it is not entirely clear why such derails any and all anti-realist attempts to justify normative 
claims.  There are a number of conventional beliefs that were once maintained – beliefs whose 
justification were based upon the way things appear –  yet we no longer continue to hold, such as the sun 
revolving around the earth.  And, despite the lack of congruency between our current insights and the way 




justified in our conventional explanations as to why the Ptolemaic universe is an inaccurate account of the 
cosmos.  In other words, conventional views are not permanent, but rather, change over time; yet 
nevertheless, despite the changes in our conventional beliefs, we often continue to conventionally speak 
as if no change has occurred.  Just as we continue to make plans with a friend or a family member to 
‘watch the sunrise,’ from the perspective of anti-realism we can continue to make moral statements that 
appear as though they are describing the world while recognizing there are no mind-independent 
values.113  Accordingly, conventional normative statements, including “tsujigiri114 is wrong,” can be 
justified in reference to mind-dependent values, specifically our attitudinal feelings and emotions, vis-à-
vis matters one takes seriously.   
 On the other hand, the claim that anti-realism will lead to relativism, which is incongruent with 
the uniformity of “Perfection-of-Wisdom” attitudes, I don’t think is a problem that would concern Dōgen.  
Since his Zen ethic is relative to the Buddhist tradition as whole, and Zen Buddhist monasticism in 
particular, relativism per se would not strike Dōgen as a concern, prima facie. When we look to the 
stories and hagiographies of Zen masters and patriarchs, while it is recognized that there is some general 
uniformity, vis-à-vis realization of emptiness and enlightenment, a disparity does in fact remain between 
the ways in which they comport their ‘Perfection-of-Wisdom’ attitudes in the everyday conventional 
world.  For example, some masters have lived in reclusion in the mountains and others lived in urban 
centers.  Some masters have used fierce pedagogical methods and techniques when instructing students, 
while others were less strict and severe.  Some masters have engaged in antinomian behavior, while 
others have comported themselves more conservatively.  In other words, in Zen, and in keeping with the 
East Asian philosophy of coincidence of opposites, while there is a general uniformity of Perfection-of-
                                                 
113 At this point one might query whether or not this line of reasoning amounts to fictionalism.  Later in this 
dissertation I will be showing why fictionalism does not fully capture Dōgen’s metaethics.   At this point we shall 
note that my example of “watching the sunrise,” does not entail fictionalism since the speech act actually refers to an 
event that is not phenomenologically fictitious.   
114 Tsujigiri literally means “cross roads cut.”  In Medieval Japan, when a samurai warrior received a new sword 
from a swordsmith, the samurai would test out its effectiveness by attacking an innocent person, often traveling a 




Wisdom attitudes, there is also a general relativity of conventional normative commitments.  Thus based 
upon these reasons, I contend that Guilbault’s ‘conventionalism’ and Davis’ ‘contextualism’ are helpful 
for justifying normative judgments.  However, as a metaethical counterpart to anti-realism, both 
interpretations only clarify what normative expressions ‘say’; they do not, in other words, reveal the 
meaning of normative expressions and judgments.  As noted in Chapter two, I contend that anti-
cognitivism is a fruitful metaethical counterpart to antirealism for specifying what normative expressions 
and judgments mean; mainly, normative expressions do not describe normative facts (cognitivism), nor 
are they reducible to feelings and emotions (non-cognitivism), but instead they reveal and conceal 
perspectives. 
§4.5 Closing Remarks 
 In this chapter we treated some of Dōgen’s metaethical writings as presented in the fascicle 
Shoaku-Makusa, as well as Eihei Shingi.  We examined his axiological characterization of good, bad and 
indifference as ‘uncreated’ (Jpn. mushō), as well as his relativist characterization of right action.  We 
concluded that his metaethical reflections herein are best understood from the metaethical perspective of 
anti-realism, yet distinct from the anti-realist theories of error theory and non-cognitivism for the simple 
reason that Dōgen’s approach to doing philosophy is that of way-seeking, while that of error theory, 
fictionalism and non-cognitivism are motivated by truth seeking values.  In addition, we also noted that it 
was likely that Dōgen would resist the dualistic distinction between normative and non-normative 
judgments, as well as dualistic distinction between reason and affects/emotions/passions.   Accordingly, 
our inquiry in this chapter has begun to show that the justification for conventional normative judgments 
is, according to Dōgen, grounded in practice, such as monasticism and the vows of the bodhisattva, rather 
than theory.  In the next chapter we shall attempt to flesh out important features of Dōgen’s moral 
language, both from ultimate and conventional standpoints of truth.  This will in turn provide additional 
reasons, as we shall see, for resisting error theory, fictionalism and non-cognitivism as appropriate 




propositions, specifically in regards to the Buddhist philosophy of karma.   By unpacking these features in 
light of more general features of the kōan curriculum and Zen philosophy of language, vis-à-vis 
conventional and ultimate standpoints, we shall be able to deepen our appreciation of Dōgen’s anti-
realism. Such an appreciation will thereby afford us the ability to discern the syntax of his many moral 
expressions throughout the Shōbōgenzō, which in turn will support my interpretation of Dōgen’s anti-
realist metaethic as ‘anti-cognitivism’, mainly normative propositions do not describe moral facts or 
























Anti-Cognitivism: Dōgen’s Language of Morals 
§ 5.1 Chapter Overview 
In the previous chapter we examined Dōgen’s characterization of moral values as ‘uncreated’ 
(Jpn. mushō).  Therein we saw that his non-essentialist characterization of good, bad and indifference, as 
well as the duality between right and wrong action, is best understood from the perspective of moral anti-
realism.  According to this perspective (i.e. “true dharma eye”), because all things are empty, there are no 
mind-independent values or moral principles that are objectively true.  My objective in this chapter is to 
flesh out this metaethical perspective further by examining the language of morals and nature of 
normative claims according to Dōgen’s Zen perspective.  To do such, we shall frame our analysis of Zen 
language in light of scholarly works of Dale S. Wright, Victor Sōgen Hori Steven Heine and Rupert Read.  
From their insights we shall be able to clarify how Dōgen speaks about normative matters from both 
conventional and ultimate standpoints of truth, particularly in regards to normative matters, karma 
included.  Herein, our treatment will receive further assistance from Steven DeCaroli and Sūdō Brian 
Schroeder.  Finally, we shall review some additional features of Dōgen’s “practice of words and letters” 
as enumerated by Hee-Jin Kim, which will in turn set the stage for the subsequent chapter on zazen.  
Based upon these inquiries, this chapter will show how Dōgen’s standpoint regarding the limitations and 
possibilities of our ability to use language, vis-à-vis what words mean and what they say, provides a 
nuanced perspective of the concept of ineffability in general, normative propositions in particular.    
For Dōgen, while it happens to be the case that we can conventionally describe moral situations 
or behavior as good or bad, such descriptions do not reflect the existence of ultimate/objective values or 
cognitive normative truths.  However, that being said, the limitations of language do not, as we shall see, 
restrict Dōgen’s ability from engaging in normative discourse either through the use of conventional 
moral descriptions, or, through performative expressions of one’s attitudinal preferences; rather, such 




upon this analysis, I plan to characterize Dōgen’s metaethics, for similar reasons noted in our examination 
of Nietzsche in Chapter one, as anti-cognitivist.  What this means is that, according to Dōgen, moral 
propositions do not report or describe moral facts, nor do they express moral truths; and, counter to the 
outlook of non-cognitivism, they are not reducible to our feelings and emotions.  What conventional 
normative propositions do, rather, is reveal and/or conceal perspectives.    
§5.2 Fingers Pointing at the Moon: The Limits of Language 
 Zen Buddhism is popularly characterized by the capping phrase (Jpn. jakugo), “a separate 
transmission outside doctrine, not founded on words and letters” (Jpn. Kyōge betsuden furu moji) (ZS 
8.97).  From a conventional standpoint, while we can speak about objects, proffer explanations, or express 
sentiments and beliefs, Zen rhetorically maintains that these speech acts are nothing more than, as stated 
in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, ‘fingers pointing at the moon’; “As the ignorant grasp the finger-tip and not the 
moon […] so those who cling to the letter, know not my truth” (Suzuki 1932, 193).  Words and letters 
can, no doubt, direct our attention to the things and matters we care about and value, and thereby serve a 
pragmatic role in our everyday lives.  However, these linguistic tools do not reveal the ‘nature’ and/or 
truth about things themselves.  As I noted in Chapter three, the languages we speak and communicate 
through do not provide a ‘full picture’ of what things are really like; while one side is revealed, the other 
side remains concealed.  For example, in regards to the qualities of fermented cabbage, words that 
describe flavor can inform someone what to expect if they choose to try it; however, verbal descriptions, 
such as ‘piquant,’ are not sufficient for a complete understanding of what fermented cabbage tastes like.  
Thus, regardless of whether the topic of conversation is kōan or cabbage, some aspect of our experience 
remains concealed and ineffable. 
 This idea of ineffability is deeply embedded within the Zen literary tradition.  For example, 
consider this small sample of capping phrases115 that “ridicule the idea that one can comprehend Zen by 
                                                 
115 A capping phrase is, “A short commentary appended to a phrase from either the main case or the verse in a Zen 





means of written explanations” (Hori, 2003, 3): “His mouth is like a stone pedestal” (Jpn. Kuchi sōban ni 
nitari) (ZS 4.155); “The mouth is the gate of misfortune” (Jpn. Kuchi wa kore kamon) (ZS 4.156); “The 
mute eats a bitter melon” (Jpn. Asu kuka o kissu) (ZS. 5.3); “Like a mute who has had a dream” (Jpn. Asu 
no yume o uru ga gotoshi) (ZS 5.4); “Speaking without speaking, knowing without knowing” (Setsu 
fusetsu, chi fuchi) (ZS 6.148); “Speaking is not a matter of using your tongue” (Kuchi o hiraku koto wa 
zettōjō ni arazu) (ZS 7.112); “Open your mouth and at once your wrong, move your tongue and at once 
you transgress” (Kuchi o hirakeba sunawachi ayamari, shita o ugokaseba sunawachi somuku) (ZS 
8.111); “Words cannot touch it, thought cannot reach it” (Gonsen fukyū iro futū) (ZS 8.176); “Blah, blah, 
blah, blah, yes and no” (Wa-wa-ba-ba- uku muku) (ZS 8.441).  In addition to ineffability, the 
philosophical message embedded within these verses is that language taints our understanding of the 
world; ‘words and letters’ have the tendency to undermine what is already perfect by hypostatizing and 
reifying things that are, ultimately, empty of a fixed essence or nature; hence the capping phrase “He cuts 
a wound into healthy flesh” (Jpn. Kōniku o egutte kasa to nasu) (ZS 5.96).  As a result, we have the 
tendency to become “All tied up in words” (Jpn. Kuri ni bakusatsu seraru) (ZS 4.153); we become 
entangled and attached to the words, letters and concepts that we believe to reflect the world as it is.  
Ultimately, the world, as it is, cannot be spoken about; it is ineffable.  
 Notwithstanding the ubiquity of ‘ineffable Zen’ in kōan literary games and poems, Dōgen had a 
nuanced perspective of ineffability, which is evidenced in his critical interpretation of the aforementioned 
capping phrase, “A separate transmission outside doctrine, not founded on words and letters” (Jpn. Kyōge 
betsuden furu moji) (ZS 8.97); for example, in his fascicle Bukkyō, “The Buddha’s Teachings,” Dōgen 
cautions us not to take a literal interpretation of this popular characterization of Zen, which he believes to 
be logically fallacious.   
Although they have transmitted and received the fallacy of “a separate transmission outside of the 
teachings,” because they have never known the inside and outside, the logic of their words is not 
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consistent…If we speak of authentic transmission of the one mind which is the supreme vehicle, 
it should be like this.  But the fellows who speak of “a separate transmission outside the 
teachings” have never known this meaning.  Therefore, do not, through belief in the fallacy of “a 
separate transmission outside the teachings,” misunderstand the Buddha’s teaching. (Dōgen 1994, 
57-58) 
Why is this characterization of Zen fallacious?  As I interpret Dōgen, the logic is simple: not only is the 
‘separate transmission’ characterization based upon words and letters itself, but also, one cannot even 
begin to make sense of a ‘separate transmission’ that is separate from words and letters unless one has an 
understanding of the teachings themselves.  I contend that Dōgen understands the ‘separate transmission 
fallacy’ to be a version of a ‘fallacy of division.’  The fallacy of division is committed when we think that 
what is true of the whole must be true of each part116.  In the context of Zen, this fallacy is committed 
when we reason that since Zen cannot be conveyed in words and letters, none of the Buddhist teachings 
can.  Or, since reason and language cannot disseminate the nature of things themselves, it thus follows 
that reason and language, vis-à-vis the Buddha’s teachings, are useless and vain.  To adopt this fallacious 
perspective is to adopt an anti-intellectualist view of Zen that is quietist and dualistic.  Dōgen forcefully 
argues this point in the fascicle Sansui-kyō, “Mountains and Waters Sutra,” when he writes: 
Their idea is as follows: A story which involves images and thoughts is not a Zen story of the 
Buddhist Patriarchs […] What the shavelings call “stories beyond rational understanding” are 
beyond rational understanding only for them; the Buddhist Patriarchs are not like that […] If 
ultimately there is no rational understanding, the reasoning which those shavelings have now set 
forth cannot hit the target […] They do not know that images and thoughts are words and phrases, 
and they do not know that words and phrases transcend images and thoughts […] Their present 
negation of rational understanding is nothing but a false notion. (Dōgen 1994, 171-172) 
As Dōgen notes, to think that Zen experience is completely divorced from language and rational 
understanding is itself a rationally constructed view which creates a duality between effable and ineffable 
experiences and realities.117  However, as Dōgen explained, ordinary perceptions of images and thoughts 
                                                 
116 For example, it would be a fallacy of division to assume that each room within a monastery is big simply because 
the monastic building itself is big. 
117 According to Steven Heine, Dōgen’s critical thinking vis-à-vis kōan and ineffablilty is directed towards Rinzai 
Zen commentaries and interpretations.  “The main rhetorical difference from previous Chinese kōan collection 
commentaries involves conflicting views of the function of interpretation.  In ‘Mountains and Rivers Proclaiming 





are laden with rational discriminations and linguistic thought-coverings.  On the level of phenomenology, 
to think that there is some other mode of experience that completely stands outside of the dualistic modes 
of receiving and processing sensory images, crafting thoughts and asserting expressions via words and 
letters creates an even greater dualistic chasm, so much so that perhaps one might be less dualistic if they 
did not seek out a state of nonduality. 
 Dale S. Wright provides an extensive analysis of this philosophy of language in his Philosophical 
Meditations on Zen Buddhism (1998).  According to Wright, due to modern conceptions of language 
which locate such in “the derivative and subsequent roles of description and expression,” the popular 
interpretation of the role of language in Zen is “instrumentalist” (Wright; 1998, 71).  This instrumentalist 
interpretation, which is championed by John Blofeld118 and Henry Rosemont Jr119, argues that “language 
is an instrument or tool available for our use in achieving certain specific communicative goals.  
Language is a means to some other end” (Wright; 1998, 65).   
Why didn’t the Buddha just remain silent after enlightenment?  Why speak at all?  The traditional 
Buddhist answer matches Blofeld’s: the Buddha spoke out of compassion, and skillful means.  
The suffering needed assistance, and the dharma was the tool most suited to overcoming their 
pain […] Linguistic formulation of the dharma has a purpose in spite of the fact that the best Zen 
intuitions are inclined toward silence. (Wright 1998, 65) 
Wright challenges this instrumentalist interpretation of language.  He contends that language is 
“embedded in the content of our experience” (Wright; 1998, 71).  Language is not an epiphenomenon of 
our experience of the world; rather, it is imminent to experience, including non-theoretical perception of 
the external world.  
Language is present even in the “direct” perception of an object.  Language and perception “co-
arise.”  Although theoretically separable, they are indistinguishable in experience itself […] 
Awareness of what we perceive is linguistically structured, and comes to us directly in the 
perception itself […] It is true that we do perceive some things incorrectly, and that subsequently 
we alter the language through which that perception is understood.  What we initially perceive as 
                                                 
sect, whereby masters would routinely shout and slap or strike disciples with a staff as a way of shocking and 
prodding them to go beyond rational understanding by abandoning the use of intellect” (Heine 2020, 153). 
118 See John Blofeld. The Zen Teaching of Huang Po: On Transmission of Mind. New York, Grove Press, 1958. 
119 See Henry Rosemont. “The Meaning is the Use: Kōan and Mondō as Linguistic Tools of Zen Masters.” 




a meditation bell is later understood to have been an ice-cream vendor.  But both “perceptions,” 
both “correct” and “incorrect,” come to us in the form of language.  Language doesn’t guarantee 
accuracy; it just guarantees that all of our perceptions will be understood within the given context 
of language. […] Language, therefore, is not to be located only at the level of concept and 
predication.  It is also present at the level of perception in such a way that perception, language, 
and thinking are all interdependent. (Wright 1998, 71-72) 
Based upon this ‘embedded’ model of language, which no doubt echoes Nietzsche’s perspective as we 
noted in Chapter one, it would be a mistake to think that Zen’s literary references to silence are attempts 
to abandon linguistic experience for some non-linguistic mode-of-being.  For example, in kōan case 6, 
“Sakyamuni Holds up a Flower,” from the Mumonkan, “The Gateless Gate”, when the Buddha held up a 
flower without uttering a word to the assembly, though it is clear that he was not engaging in a theoretical 
discourse, the Buddha was nevertheless participating in a language game that is uniquely Zen.  As Wright 
explains, “The language of Zen is a condition without which neither the practice of Zen nor the point of 
Zen would exist” (Wright 1998, 73).   
 Wright’s non-instrumentalist interpretation of language in Zen is defended by Victor Sōgen Hori 
as well.  In his article “Kōan and Kenshō in the Rinzai Zen Curriculum” from The Kōan: Texts and 
Contexts in Zen Buddhism (2000), Hori argues that despite the rhetoric of ineffablity, language can, 
within the context of Zen practice, enable one to express the inexpressible.  In other words, rather than 
falling into the dualistic trap of thinking that one should simply remain silent on all matters related to Zen 
– nonduality and emptiness – Zen has created a literary tradition whereby words and letters give linguistic 
embodiment to ineffable experiences.  Herein, Hori’s interpretation of language in Zen can be extended to 
Dōgen; as Steven Heine explains: 
Dōgen provides a philosophy that stresses the necessity and efficacy of employing language at 
every single stage of the transmission process without ever dismissing its utility.  In contrast to 
Numerous Zen thinkers for whom language tends to conceal […] for Dōgen literary discourse 
operates as a window that divulges reality by providing an opportunity to convey authentically 
any circumstance, while recognizing that delusion invariably pervades any expression of 
realization. […] Even if all expressions are considered partial and misleading, in seeking 
realization language provides an unlimited resource for revealing the Dharma.  Existential 
awareness is articulated through each and every form of discourse, because truth is revealed in 




Thus, to think of Zen practice and experience as a mode of being that transcends words and letters is to 
think dualistically.  After all, silence is often a form of non-verbal speech; a teacher who pauses in the 
middle of a lecture to stare in silence at a student whose bodily behavior is being disruptive is a banal 
example of how silence speaks.  In the context of Zen, Shakyamuni Buddha Holding up a Flower and 
Vimalakirti’s ‘thunderous silence’ are touchstones for demonstrating how silence is linguistically potent, 
not impotent.   “The logic of nonduality,” as Hori explains, “when applied consistently, destroys the very 
notion of a separate and distinct realm of non-duality” (Hori 2000, 299).  The logic of nonduality destroys 
any distinction between linguistic/dualistic experience and ineffable/nondualistic experience.  Rather than 
thinking of Zen as a tradition that is looking to escape from language, Zen is oriented towards cultivating 
a relationship with language whereby dualistic categories of subjects and predicates can be employed in 
nondualistic ways.  Metaphorically, rather than thinking that our ‘cloudy’ experiences of the world result 
from the fact that language is itself cloudy, Zen maintains that the cloudiness, or perhaps in some cases 
the smog, that drapes over one’s experiences is conditioned by an inability to fully penetrate, realize and 
embody language, with all of its nuances.  From a non-dualistic perspective, language that occludes is 
itself the very language that illuminates; hence the capping phrase “One word wraps up the entire net of 
teachings” (Jpn.  Ikku kōshu o sadamu) (ZS 5.22).  Ultimately, it is how we use language that determines 
whether we are in a linguistic ‘fog of Zen-war.’  
 Drawing from comparative insights between Zen Buddhism and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy of language, Rupert Read also challenges the idea that the Zen phrase, “A separate 
transmission outside doctrine, not founded on words and letters” (Jpn. Kyōge betsuden furu moji) (ZS 
8.97), logically entails that Zen practice is oriented towards discovering some non-linguistic truth that will 
reveal the ‘true nature of things.’  “In Zen and Wittgensteinian practice, one does not believe that the truth 
can be said.  But one does not believe either that there is an unsayable truth…Zen and Wittgenstein, when 
seeing the world aright, take care not to make it seem like they are seeing something, or some truth, that 




would agree with, it would be a mistake to think that the ‘separate transmission’ perspective is oriented 
towards realizing a non-linguistic goal.  Rather, “the ‘goal’ is precisely to be at ease with and in the 
present moment.  The skillful means of Zen are actually already the goal, surreptitiously” (Read 2009, 
17).  This non-dual means-ends (i.e. non-instrumentalist) perspective provides an alternative way by 
which we can participate with language without reifying the concepts and things we speak about.   
And so we see, crucially, that unless the great Zen masters who have brought Zen to the West – 
and Dōgen and (I would add) Nāgārjuna – and Wittgenstein are less subtle thinkers than I take 
them to be, they cannot be ultimately saying that reality is contradictory, nor are there true 
contradictions.  For saying so makes the secret of their practice seem too like what is exactly the 
target of criticism in their practice.  A “true contradiction” is something true that one can say 
about the meaning of life or some such topic.  What Wittgensteinian 
psychology/therapy/philosophy/spiritual practice and Zen spiritual 
practice/psychology/therapy/thinking are interested in engendering is not anything that one can 
say.  Not any kind of truth…No.  Zen and Wittgenstein simply show how to change your life, 
your practice, your way, while leaving everything as it is. (Read 2009, 22-23) 
In regards to Dōgen’s language of morals, Wright, Hori, Heine and Read will be helpful for making my 
case for anti-cognitivism as metaethical counterpart to Dōgen’s anti-realism.  As I interpret Dōgen, anti-
realism does not lead to the conclusion that there is nothing we can say about the moral life.  Moral 
discourse is embedded within our everyday world and mode-of-being.  However, this does not entail that 
our discourse on values and normative beliefs is an attempt to clarify or illuminate what is morally true; it 
is not theoretical, but rather, expressive and performative, vis-à-vis revealing and concealing perspectives.  
To expand upon this “non-instrumentalist” model of language, a model that attempts to avoid the 
reification of words, letters, concepts and the things that we refer to when speaking, there are some 
additional linguistic themes tied to Zen language in general, Dōgen in particular, that deserve 
consideration.      
§5.3 How to Do Things with Zen “Words and Letters” 
 The way language is used in Zen is dependent upon the standpoint from which one is speaking.  
From a conventional standpoint, the words and letters one uses is the language conventionally used when 




because all things are understood to be empty, including language, the words and letters one uses to 
describe and prescribe X is not inherently real or true.  In Zen, one can make use of words and letters in 
either conventional or ultimate ways: crooked (Jpn. hen’i) and straight (Jpn. shōi).   
 Hen’i, is the way one speaks from the conventional world of dualistic distinctions, whereas shōi 
is the way one speaks from the ultimate standpoint of nonduality (Miura and Sasaki 1965).  According to 
Hori: 
In the Zen context […] hen’i and shōi do not distinguish two separate languages with different 
vocabularies; they distinguish two standpoints which use the same language and the same 
vocabulary but with different meaning.  When the language is being used to indicate some aspect 
of the differentiated, the manifest, the conditioned, the realm of dualism, then it is expressing the 
standpoint of hen’i.  The very same language, the very same sentence, can also be used to express 
some aspect of the undifferentiated, the unmanifest, the unconditioned, the realm of the nondual.  
When it does so, it is expressing the standpoint of shōi.  This means that the Zen kōan and Zen 
language in general are full of puns in a special sense – words and phrases that are used with both 
Conventional and Ultimate meaning.  (Hori 2000, 303)  
For example, the phrase “One doesn’t know the smell of one’s own shit,” can be expressed from both 
hen’i and shōi standpoints.  From the standpoint of hen’i, the phrase can be interpreted to mean that one is 
not aware of their own self-centeredness; however, from the standpoint of shōi, the meaning is more like 
“one is not aware of one’s own Buddha nature.”  From the perspective of hen’i, the word ‘shit’ reflects 
defilement, whereas from the ultimate perspective of shōi, because all things are empty, the very same 
word nondualistically reflects something pure; “unclean and impure, ‘one’s own shit’ indicates 
immaculately clean and pure Buddha-nature” (Hori 2000, 303); hence the capping phrase, “Without 
cutting off delusive passion, enter nirvana,” (Jpn. Fudan bonnō nyū nehan) (ZS 7.424).  This relationship 
between conventional and ultimate standpoints of language, however, raises the following question: how 
does one know which of the two perspectives one is speaking?  How does one learn ‘how’ to effectively 
and appropriately speak from the standpoints of hen’i and shōi?  According to Hori, the answer resides in 




 In his book How to Do Things With Words (1962), John Austin introduces the distinction 
between constative and performative statements.  In regards to the former, language is able to describe the 
world according to conventional subject/predicate relations, including “the table is brown,” “fire is hot,” 
and “willows are green.” Descriptive speech acts such as these carve the world up into dualities that we 
accept as either conventionally true or false.  However, not all speech acts are merely descriptive.  Neither 
“I apologize,” nor “I promise,” are describing a particular state of affairs; rather, they are performative 
acts of speaking which are not true or false.  “The term ‘performative’ will be used in a variety of cognate 
ways and constructions, much as the term ‘imperative’ is.  The name is derived, of course, from 
‘perform’, the usual verb with the noun ‘action’: it indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the 
performing of an action” (Austin 6, 1962).  In the context of Zen literature, performative expressions, 
such as “go wash your bowls” often reflect a mode of speaking from the ultimate perspective of shōi.  
From this perspective, one expresses insight into emptiness and the non-dual nature of things by speaking 
without attachment to dualistic distinctions between subject-and-object, as well as between descriptive 
and performative words and phrases.  From this ultimate perspective, the conventional rules of grammar 
and meanings of words are playfully stretched, reversed and rearranged.  For example, as Hori explains, 
the unique quality of many Zen phrases and encounter dialogues is that a single verse/statement can be 
interpreted as descriptive and performative simultaneously.    
In Hekiganroku case I, Bodhidharma’s answer “Not know!” to the emperor’s question, “Who is it 
that stands before me?” is to be understood as both a description and a performance.  As a 
descriptive, “Not know!” refuses to answer the question.  As performance, Bodhidharma presents 
nonduality itself.  In Mumonkan case 7, a monk  asked Jōshū, “I have entered the monastery.  
Please teach me.”  Jōshū asked, “Have you finished eating your rice gruel?”  The monk said, “I 
have finished.”  Jōshū said, “Go wash your bowl.”  This answer, “Go wash your bowl,” is not a 
description but a performance.  But it can be taken as performance at more than one level.  If one 
thinks that the new monk is merely asking for instruction in monastery regulations, then “Go 
wash your bowl” is a concrete performance of one such regulation.  But if we take the monk’s 
question as a direct request to Jōshū, “Show me your non-duality” in the guise of a question 
“Please teach me” then Jōshū’s “Go wash your bowl” is a performance of non-duality dressed up 





This relationship between hen’i and shōi, conventional and ultimate standpoints, descriptive and 
performative speech acts, opens up a dynamic arena of language-games whereby the meanings of Zen 
phrases are syntax dependent.   
 Zen phrases and dialogues challenge the conventional maxim “actions speak louder than words,” 
by playfully showing that words and letters are actions.  The meanings of Zen phrases and dialogues is 
contingent upon the “realization of non-duality within ordinary conventional experience […] a 
breakthrough not out of, but into, conventional consciousness” (Hori 2000 307).  “What is the sound of 
one hand clapping?”  While conventionally bewitching, this kōan, in the context of duality and non-
duality, is metaphorically meaningful.  As Hori maintains, we know the world of duality just as we know 
the sound of two hands clapping; the question Zen pushes us to consider is what is nonduality?  “What” is 
the sound of one hand clapping?  What is the “sound!” 
 Dōgen’s literary style employs many of these playful strategies to convey a nondual 
understanding through conventional subjects and predicates.  While the kōan curriculum is regarded as 
one of the salient differences between Rinzai Zen practice, where it is included, and Dōgen’s Sōtō 
tradition, wherein it is not, it would be mistake to think that kōan were not part of the Dōgen’s Zen 
perspective.  For example, Steve Heine’s Dōgen and the Kōan tradition: A Tale of two Shōbōgenzō Texts 
(1994), provides extensive research and analysis that shows: 
Dōgen’s view is that kōan as the raw material for philosophical commentary related to religious 
praxis has an innate flexibility and open-endedness of utility that does not stand in contrast to but 
derived from within the very rhetorical structure of the source dialogue itself to generate 
multidimensional implications.  He seems to suggest that the kōan should be seen not as a 
psychological tool that brings one to a labyrinthine impasse based on the paradoxically of speech 
and silence, but as a discursive means of generating shifting, self-displacing (and thereby self-
correcting) parallactical perspectives. (Heine 1994, 7)  
For example, in the fascicle Busshō, “Buddha-nature,” Dōgen treats several kōan and encounter dialogues 
central to Zen’s literary curriculum, including an exchange between the fourth and fifth patriarchs; therein 
the fourth patriarch asked the fifth, Zen master Daiman, “What is your name?”  In response: 




 The patriarch says, “What name is it? 
 The master answers, “It is Buddha-nature.” 
 The patriarch says, “You are without Buddha nature.” 
The master replies, “The Buddha-nature is emptiness, so we call it being without.” (Dōgen 1994, 
7-8) 
Now consider Dōgen’s commentary on this exchange: 
Thus, when we thoroughly investigate the words of these ancestral masters, there is meaning in 
the fourth patriarch’s saying “What is your name.”  In the past there were people described as “A 
person of What country” and there were names described as “What name” – [one person] was 
stating to another, “Your name is What!”  It was like saying, for example, “I am like that, and you 
are also like that.” 
 The fifth patriarch says, “I have a name, but it is not an ordinary name.”  In other words, 
 “Existence is the name” – not an ordinary name, for an ordinary name is not right for 
 Existence here and now.” 
In the fourth patriarch’s words, “What name is it?” “What means This, and he has dealt with This 
as What, which is a name.  The realization based on This, and the realization of This is the 
function of What.  The name is This, and is What.  We make it into mugwort tea, make it into 
green tea, and make it into everyday tea and meals. (Dōgen 1994, 8-9) 
In this commentary Dōgen is clearly playing with conventional terms in a way that expands the meaning 
of their use.  The word ‘what’ is a case in point.  By turning this interrogative pronoun into a predicate, 
Dōgen is able to creatively express the inexpressible – emptiness – through conventional words and 
letters.  We ordinarily use the pronoun ‘what’ to inquire into some matter like the time of day (What time 
is it?), or respond to an awkward situation (“What are you doing here?) etc.  By using ‘what’ as a 
predicate to characterize a subject, he is, ultimately, identifying things as an open question; ‘what’ is 
emptiness itself!  Following Steven Heine’s lead, Dōgen’s ‘wordplay,’ “takes license to alter the 
dialogues, recasting the original wording to reflect his view that reality is dynamic rather than static.  The 
immediacy of enlightenment is experienced in the words of the master’s interpretations, instead of as an 
occurrence recalled from the past or anticipated in the future” (Heine 2020, 154).   By recognizing and 
understanding this creatively nuanced philosophy of language, we will be able to make sense of Dōgen’s 





§5.4 Dōgen’s Language of Morals: “Don’t be unclear about cause and effect” 
 So far, this chapter has explored some general features of Zen’s philosophy of language in light 
of kōan literature and Dōgen’s Shōbōgenzō.  While our treatment was not exhaustive, our focus upon the 
distinction between hen’i and shōi will be particularly helpful for making further sense of Dōgen’s 
philosophy of language, specifically in regards to the nature of normative judgments and his metaethical 
views about karma. 
In the context of morality, we find Dōgen employing many of the aforementioned literary 
techniques so as to express the nature of right and wrong action.  In Shoaku-Makusa, “Not Committing 
Wrongs,” Dōgen writes from a position of both hen’i and shōi when he comments on the Buddhist verse:       
 Not to commit wrongs, 
  To practice the many kinds of right, 
  Naturally purifies the mind: 
  this is the teachings of the buddhas. (Dōgen 1994, 97) 
 
From the perspective of hen’i – conventional language – Dōgen writes: 
This teaching, as the Universal Precept of the ancestral patriarchs, the Seven Buddhas, has been 
authentically transmitted from buddhas to later buddhas, and later buddhas have received 
transmission from former buddhas.  It is not only of the Seven Buddhas: It is the teaching of all 
the buddhas.  We should consider this principle and master it in practice. These words of Dharma 
of the Seven Buddhas always sound like words of Dharma of Seven Buddhas.  What has been 
transmitted and been received one-to-one is just that clarification of the real situation at this 
concrete place.  This already is the teaching of the buddhas; it is the teaching, practice, and 
experience of hundreds, thousands, and tens of thousands of buddhas. (Dōgen 1994, 98) 
The “universal precept”120 Dōgen references here is treated as ‘something’ that can be transmitted from 
one person to another; the precept, conventionally speaking, is ‘the teaching,’ and it can be dualistically 
set apart from other teachings and practices.  However, Dōgen also treats this universal precept from the 
standpoint of shōi, thereby dissolving firm dualistic subject and predicate distinctions.  For example, 
                                                 
120 As I noted in the previous chapter, the “universal precept” is from the Dhammapada: “Avoid all evil, cultivate 




when commenting on the first line of the universal precept, Dōgen turns the meaning of ‘not committing’ 
from a performative command into a predicate, vis-à-vis emptiness-Buddha-Nature. 
The seeds of Buddhahood arise from conditions and, this being so, conditions arise from the 
seeds of Buddhahood.  It is not that wrongs do not exist; they are nothing other than not 
committing.  It is not that wrongs exist; they are nothing other than not committing.  Wrongs are 
not immaterial; they are not committing.  Wrongs are not material; they are not committing.  
Wrongs are not “not committing;” they are nothing other than not committing. […]  The Buddhas 
are neither existence nor nonexistence; they are not committing.  Such things as an outdoor pillar, 
a stone lantern, a whisk, and a staff are neither existence nor nonexistence; [they] are not 
committing.  The self is neither existence nor nonexistence; it is not committing.  Learning in 
practice like this is the realized Universe and it is Universal realization – we consider it from the 
standpoint of the subject and we consider it from the standpoint of the object.  (Dōgen 1994, 102) 
For Dōgen there are two ways in which we can speak and write about values and normative judgments.  
From the conventional standpoint, ordinary lexical meanings for subject/predicate terms are quite 
effective for specifying views and positions.  For example, in Keisi-Sanshiki, “The Voices of the River-
Valley and the Form of the Mountains,” Dōgen states that one ought not, “use Buddhism as a bridge to 
fame and gain” (Dōgen 1994, p. 90); or, in Fukanzazengi, “Universally Recommended Instructions for 
Zazen” he is conventionally unambiguous when he expresses the following capping phrase, “Don’t think 
about good or evil,” (Jpn. Isaai no zen’aku subete shiryō suru nakare) (ZS 8.27).  However, from the 
ultimate standpoint, ordinary lexical meanings and conventional uses of moral language are often 
rearranged, such as the pronoun ‘what’ or the verb ‘commit’, as evidenced in the above passages.  Herein, 
Dōgen’s ‘not committing’ performatively conditions a state of aporia which, in turn, embodies the 
conventional “Don’t think about good or evil.”  From this standpoint, Dōgen creatively expresses the 
inexpressible without having to abandon or resist language.  To make this point clearer, vis-à-vis morality 
and right action, let us turn to Dōgen’s examination of karma. 
 Since karma is central to the subject matter of ethics in Buddhism, it is no surprise that Dōgen 
treats such in a number of fascicles from both conventional and ultimate perspectives.  From the 
conventional perspective, karma and the Mahāyāna philosophy of causality is, according to Dōgen’s 




Asian philosophies, including Confucianism and Daoism: “The truth of cause and effect is not understood 
by the likes of Confucius and Lao Tzu.  It is clarified and transmitted only by buddhas and patriarchs” 
(Dōgen 1994, 194).121  In kōan literature, the philosophy of karma is framed by the tale of Hyakujo and 
the Fox in Mumonkan kōan case 2; a tale about the relationship between karma and enlightenment that 
was well favored by Dōgen as it is referenced and treated in more than one fascicle.  In Shinjin-Inga 
Dōgen provides a thoroughgoing commentary of the Hyakujo and the Fox kōan in order to challenge the 
view that Zen is a practice that transcends normative causality.  The kōan opens with an exchange 
between a Zen master and an old man, whereby the master questions the old man in a way that is similar 
to the exchange between the Fourth and Fifth patriarchs in Busshō.   
 The master eventually asks him, “What person is this standing before me?” 
 The old man answers, “I am not a person.  In the past age of Kāśyapa Buddha, I used to preside 
over this mountain.  Once a student asked me, ‘Do even people in the state of great practice fall 
into cause and effect, or not?’  I answered, “They do not fall into cause and effect.”  Since then I 
have fallen into the body of a wild fox for five hundred lives.  Now I beg you, Master, to say for 
me words of transformation.  I long to be rid of the body of a wild fox.”  Then he asks, “Do even 
people in the state of great practice fall into cause and effect, or not?” 
 Master says, “Do not be unclear about cause and effect.” (Dōgen 1994, 187-188) 
 
                                                 
121 According to Chung-ying Cheng, Confucian and Taoist philosophies of causality can be understood in the 
following ways: (1) causality as a principle of holistic unity; (2) causality as the principle of internal life-movement; 
and (3) causality as the principle of organic balance (Cheng 1991).  In regards to (1), “all things in the world are 
unified as a whole through their being continuously generated from the same source or origin. […] All things, 
therefore, are one under the image of Tao or Heaven” (Cheng 1991, 98).  In regards to (2), “all things in the world 
have an intrinsic life force which moves them in a way in which motion is not imposed from other things or a God 
but is derived from the inexhaustible source of energy of life, which is the Way” (Cheng 1991, 98).  And, in regards 
to (3), “all things and processes in the world are related in a process which proceed a balance and a harmony.  […]  
That we must understand balance in a dynamical and actual sense is crucial.  The yin-yang polarities with their 
contrary and complementary qualities clearly illustrate the example of processes toward the balance and harmony of 
things” (Cheng 1991, 99).  This tripartite theory of causality is, in light of dialectical logic, different from 
Madhyamaka theories of causation which maintains that there is no inherent distinction between causes and effects, 
and thus, no inherent causation proper (Cheng 1991).  Based upon Cheng’s research, the fact that Dōgen’s Zen 
perspective has roots in Madhyamaka, it seems reasonable that Dōgen would be critical of Confucian and Daoist 
conceptions of causality.  Moreover, one does not find within Confucian and Daoist perspectives of causality 
specific teachings that comparatively reflect Buddhist theories of karma and rebirth, which seems to be Dōgen’s 





Following from the master’s “Do not be unclear about cause and effect,” the old man is reported to have 
experienced realization.   
Dōgen centers his commentary of this kōan upon the word “transformation” – ichitengo, or “one-
turn words”122 – when he states: 
Still, people of learning in practice are not clear about the truth of cause and effect, and they make 
the mistake of idly negating cause and effect.  It is pitiful that, with the wind of decay blowing all 
around, the patriarch’s truth has slipped into decline.  “They do not fall into cause and effect” is 
just the negation of cause and effect, as a result of which the negator falls into bad states.  “Do not 
be unclear about cause and effect” evidently is deep belief in cause and effect, as a result of 
which the listener gets rid of bad states.  We should not wonder at this and should not doubt it.  
Among people of recent generations who profess to be “students of the way of Zen practice,” 
most have negated cause and effect.  How do we know that they have negated cause and effect?  
Namely because they have considered that “do not fall” and “do not be unclear” amount to the 
same and are not different.  Hence we know that they have negated cause and effect.  (Dōgen 
1994, 188-189) 
In this commentary, Dōgen is clearly speaking from a conventional standpoint of hen’i.  The claim that he 
is making is that many students of Buddhism, due to their fallacious tendency to equivocate the meaning 
“do not fall” with “do not be unclear,” have negated causality because “not falling into cause and effect” 
implies being invulnerable to conventional views of karma, such as kusala, the skillfulness which enables 
one to abstain from actions that undermine spiritual development, and punna, the beneficial accumulation 
of consequences, in early Indian Buddhism.  According to Dōgen, it is a mistake to think that Zen practice 
completely transcends the everyday conventional world.  As he states later in his commentary, “The truth 
of the present Hyakujo’s not being unclear about cause and effect is, “not to be ignorant of cause and 
effect.  So the principle is evident that if we initiate cause, we will feel the effect” (Dōgen 1994, 190).  
Since cause and effect are conventionally true, we ought not be ignorant of the many causal ways that 
                                                 
122 As Wright explains, “The focal word or phrase that seemed to embody this transformative power in an 
“encounter dialogue” came to be called a “turning word” (ch’uan-you), the word upon which the point of the 
encounter “turns” and the word holding the power to turn the mind of participants, audience, or reader” (Wright; 
1998, 102).  Indeed, the holding up of the flower, which caused Mahakasyapa to break into a smile could be seen as 
a turning word vis-à-vis silence.  “Turning words were not simply a set of particularly powerful or efficacious 
symbols.  No list of them could be produced.  All words gained their power from the situation in which they were 





living beings are affected, for better or for worse, by the way we comport ourselves.  Moreover, according 
to Dōgen, to deny cause and effect is simply to deny Buddhism proper: “Clearly we should know that to 
deny the existence of cause and effect, whether in the world or beyond the world, must be non-
Buddhism” (Dōgen 1994, 190).  Thus, from a conventional standpoint, Dōgen believes we can provide 
some justification for our normative beliefs in light of the Buddhist teachings of karma.123   
 Notwithstanding Dōgen’s conventional standpoint on, “do not be unclear about cause and effect,” 
it would be a mistake to think that he believed that there is some essence of cause and effect that is 
ultimately real and/or true, and, that our conventional way of speaking about cause and effect is the only 
way to speak about causality.  Beginning with the former, Dōgen appeals to Nāgārjuna as a ‘good 
counselor’ for understanding cause and effect: “One who has long studied under a true good counselor 
can never hold wrong opinions such as the negation of cause and effect.  We should profoundly believe in 
and admire, and should humbly receive upon the head the benevolent instruction of the ancestral Master 
Nāgārjuna” (Dōgen 1994, 191).  What we know about Nāgārjuna’s view of causality is that while it is not 
the case that causality does not exist, it is also not the case that causality is essentially real.  As Nāgārjuna 
explains in the first chapter of the Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, while causation 
conventionally exists, it is ultimately empty.  In fact, according to his analytic line of reasoning, our 
conventional understanding of cause and effect only makes sense because all causal conditions are empty.  
This empty-view of causality is perhaps best captured by Dōgen’s use of the firewood and ash metaphor 
in Genjō Kōan.  
If we become familiar with action and come back to this concrete place, the truth is evident that 
the myriad of dharmas are not self.  Firewood becomes ash; it can never go back to being 
firewood.  Nevertheless, we should not take the view that ash is its future and firewood is its past.  
Remember, firewood abides in the place of firewood in the Dharma.  It has a past and a future.  
Although it has a past and future, the past and future are cut off.  Ash exists in the place of ash in 
the Dharma.  It has a past and it has a future.  The firewood, after becoming ash, does not again 
                                                 
123 It is important to note that such justification does not imply that Dōgen is a realist from a conventional 
standpoint.  For example, one can justify their belief as to why everyone should not text and drive at the same time 
while also recognizing that there are no mind-independent values or normative truths, including that of “don’t text 




become firewood.  Similarly, human beings, after death, do not live again.  At the same time, it is 
an established custom in the Buddha-Dharma not to say that life turns into death.  This is why we 
speak of no appearance.  And, it is the Buddha’s preaching established in [the turning of] the 
Dharma-wheel that death does not turn into life.  This why we speak of no disappearance.  Life is 
an instantaneous situation, and death is also an instantaneous situation.  It is the same, for 
example, with winter and spring.  We do not think that winter becomes spring, and we do not say 
that spring becomes summer. (Dōgen 1994, 34) 
Conventionally we do say “the log” turned to “ash,” or that “winter has finally turned into spring;” these 
expressions are ubiquitous.  However, from an ultimate perspective of emptiness, there is no inherent 
firewood that exists which is transformed into ash; nor is there some ‘thing’ that we actually verify as 
‘causality’ that is independent of the instantaneous moments of things being ‘firewood’ and thereby, 
moment-by-moment, ‘turning into ash.’  Causality is empty, and so, not real. 
 In the context of Dōgen’s Shushōgi, The Meaning of Practice and Verification, Steven DeCaroli 
offers some insightful reflections on the philosophical import of the fox kōan, vis-à-vis karma.  He notes 
that, “the meaning of karma has often been misconstrued, especially in the West where it is used 
colloquially as a synonym for fate or providential justice.  Within the Buddhist context,” particularly in 
regards to Zen, “karma, which literally means volitional action or deed, has nothing to do with either 
reward or punishment, but it is rather an expression of the ego” (DeCaroli 2016; 99).  As an expression of 
the ego, we are able to make sense of the relationship between karma and enlightenment.  As DeCaroli 
explains, “To be enlightened, therefore, is not to end karma, but to alter our awareness so that karma and 
mind are no longer two things. […] Strictly speaking, then, to be enlightened is to stand in no relation 
whatsoever to karma.  Where there is no distance, there is no relation” (DeCaroli 2016, 100-101).  This 
non-dual interpretation of karma is compelling.  On the one hand it avoids the essentialist mistake of 
thinking that karma is some entity independent of us to which we are accountable.  On the other hand, it 
preserves the normative importance of karma for our everyday lives. Thus, “Karma is the name given to a 
self-generated pattern of actions that establish an inside, which manifest an outside relation to which we 
are normatively related (DeCaroli 2016, 100).  Karma is, through and through, mind-dependent, and so, 




 In the same non-essentialist light as DeCaroli, Shūdō Brian Schroeder identifies and explains the 
relationship between karma and zazen, which is central to Dōgen’s ethical practice.  As Dōgen 
prescriptively writes in the Fukanzazengi, “Universally Recommended Instructions for Zazen”, 
practitioners of zazen should not think about karmic merit or demerit; “we should not think ‘good’ or 
‘bad.’  To see it otherwise is to essentialize karma, that is, reduce it to a fixed status or understand it as 
fundamentally unchanging in its expression” (Schroeder 2016, 41).   Moreover, since karma is, as 
DeCaroli noted above, dependent upon the “self,” it logically follows that, as Schroeder explains, “to 
essentialize karma is also to do the same to the self, since the self and its actions are a unity” (Schroeder 
2016, 41).   For Dōgen, zazen opens up a non-essentialist moral perspective whereby practitioners are 
able to realize that they are not fatalistically bound to karma. 
Turning either karma or the self into any form of “essence” necessarily results in  positing a 
dualism on the metaphysical (for example, soul/body), ontological (agent/action), and 
epistemological (knower/known) levels.  From a Buddhist standpoint, such dualisms are 
conceptual formations. […] Understanding that we are not bound by karma, that we are free to 
redirect its flow or movement and thereby alter the constellation of causal relations, is a major 
aspect of the awakened mind. (Schroeder 2016, 41). 
Ultimately, this non-essentialist perspective of karma challenges several early Buddhist philosophical 
commitments, including samsāra and nirvāṇa, as well as later Mahāyāna perspectives, including the 
tathāgatagarbha, or Buddha-nature.  As I noted in Chapter three, the philosophy of Buddha-nature is tied 
to the doctrine of original enlightenment (Jpn. hongaku); one of Dōgen’s concerns with this philosophy 
was that it gave rise to licensed evil, vis-à-vis ‘committing evil without obstruction’ (Jpn. zōaku muge).  
Rather than original enlightenment providing a license to commit evil without having to face karmic 
consequneces, Dōgen’s Zen perspective of causality, vis-à-vis nonduality of practice and realization, 
maintains that the realization of Buddha-nature is not obstructed by the evil one has committed.  As I plan 
to show in the next chapter, for Dōgen, zazen is, as a normative practice, sufficient for realizing Buddha 




 This empty perspective on karma finds its expressive/performative voice of shōi in Shoaku-
Makusa, when Dōgen states:  
In becoming a Buddhist patriarch, we do not destroy the living being, do not detract from it, and 
do not lose it; nevertheless, we have got rid of it.  We cause right-and-wrong, cause-and-effect, to 
practice; but this does not mean disturbing, or intentionally producing, cause-and-effect.  Cause-
and-effect itself, at times, makes us practice.  The state in which the original features of cause-
and-effect have already become conspicuous is not committing, it is [the state] without 
appearance, it is [the state] without constancy, it is not being unclear, and it is not falling down – 
because it is the state in  which body and mind have fallen way. (Dōgen 1994, 102) 
Like we have seen in other passages, the negative use of the verb “committing” is transformed into an 
adjective for describing emptiness.  “Not committing” is the realization that the ultimate nature of things 
is empty (i.e. uncreated (Jpn. mushō)); and, in regards to karma, it is the realization of “not being unclear 
about cause and effect.”  For Dōgen this ultimate standpoint of “not committing” is contingent, as 
evidenced in the last line of the passage, upon dropping off body-mind (Jpn. shinjin datsuraku), a 
phenomenological mode of awareness that is conditioned by the practice of zazen.  In the next chapter we 
will explore Dōgen’s philosophy of zazen as a normative practice in closer detail. 
 What we can discern in Dōgen’s writings on karma is that from a conventional standpoint, hen’i, 
we are able to speak about the ordinary conditions that deserve our mindful consideration when deciding 
upon and executing a particular action.  At the same time, one can speak about karma and moral actions 
from an ultimate standpoint, shōi, whereby language itself embodies our karma, thus conditioning karmic 
situations, including encounter dialogues between Zen masters and monks.  Within these dialogues, 
words and letters are not intended to describe what is or is not the case; instead, from the standpoint of 
shōi, language is performative, and thus used in order to affect the perspective of others. As we saw in the 
fox kōan, words and expressions can have a transformative impact upon the body-and-mind of other 
beings.  To be able to fully appreciate the range of sayings and expressions Dōgen stitches together 
throughout his writings, it is important to be mindful of these ‘practices’ of words and letters.  Contrary to 
the instrumentalist model of language, the karma of words and letters is embedded within our experience 




§5.5 A Separate Transmission Outside of Ethics? 
 It is important to note before closing our treatment of Dōgen’s philosophy of language, vis-à-vis 
ethics, that hen’i and shōi do not exhaust the entirety of Dōgen’s practice of words and letters as “separate 
transmission outside the teachings.”  In his article “The Reason of Words and Letters: Dōgen and Kōan 
Language” (1985), Hee-Jin Kim identifies seven facets that constitute the dynamic nature of Dōgen’s 
philosophy of language: (1) Transposition of Lexical components; (2) Semantic Reconstruction Through 
Syntactic Change; (3) Explication of Semantic Attributes; (4) Reflexive, Self-causative Utterances; (5) 
The Upgrading of Common-place Notions and Use of Neglected Metaphors; (6) The Use of 
Homophonous Expressions; and (7) Reinterpretation Based on the Principle of Absolute 
Nonduality/Absolute Emptiness.    To flesh out each of these facets will take us beyond the scope of our 
inquiry.  However, to set the stage for the next chapter, I do think it is important to devote some attention 
to (7).   
 As Kim explains, “If there is any single principle central to Dōgen’s life and thought, it is that of 
absolute emptiness, as appropriated in the context of realization” (Kim 1985, 74).  Thus we find the logic 
of emptiness woven throughout many of Dōgen’s examinations of metaphysical, epistemological, 
soteriological and ethical matters.  In regards to his ethics, the logic of emptiness allows Dōgen to turn a 
negative imperative “Do not commit any evil” into an indicative “The enlightened one does not commit 
evil.”  In Shoaku-Makusa, Dōgen’s expression of, ‘Do not commit any evil,’ “is not to be taken as a moral 
imperative, whether self-imposed by autonomous conscience or inculcated by heteronomous impositions, 
but rather as the transformative reality of realization, whose mystery lies in one’s resolve never to commit 
any evil” (Kim 1985, 77).  As we noted in the previous chapter, all values are empty, and so, ‘uncreated’ 
(Jpn. mushō).  What this means is that, “realization both transcends good and evil and is at the same time 
profoundly involved with good and evil.  In this way, for Dōgen, morality and ethics, as well as language 




 According to Kim, as well as Van der Braak, the emptiness of moral values and normative 
principles does not entail that Zen is “a separate transmission outside of ethics.”  As Van der Braak states, 
“For Dōgen, enlightenment is not a nondualistic state of mind where good and evil have been eradicated; 
it is a nondual perspective that fully clarifies and penetrates good and evil.  Enlightenment doesn’t 
liberate us from good and evil; it increasingly confronts us with good and evil” (Van der Braak 2011, 
183-184).  To fully penetrate good and evil, as I have argued up until this point, is to recognize that good 
and evil are empty (i.e. anti-realism), which is not a complete negation of the conventional world of 
everyday value judgments and normative beliefs.  And, as noted in the previous chapter, since Dōgen is a 
relativist about conventional Buddhist ethics (i.e. it is not expected that a non-Buddhist would 
conventionally honor the precepts), the nature of normative beliefs and prescriptions in Buddhism, 
including the precepts, are not like the “thou shalt” commandments we find in Judeo-Christianity whose 
metaethical status is believed to be mind-independent.   Rather, the precepts are “vows that embody the 
way of the bodhisattva” (Van der Braak, 184).  Since taking the vows to uphold and fulfill the Buddhist 
precepts are relative to Zen practitioners/bodhisattvas, we ought not to think that vows apply to all other 
non-Buddhists.  Moreover, we ought not think that honoring the precepts and taking the vows requires 
any insight into some moral truth or principle that motivates one to uphold such.  If upholding the 
precepts is the way of the bodhisattva as Van der Braak asserts, I contend that what motivates the pursuit 
of this path is compassion, great-compassion (Skt. mahā-karuna) which is affective, not cognitive. 
 Finally, it is important to also mention that (7), “Reinterpretation Based on the Principle of 
Absolute Nonduality/Absolute Emptiness,” provides a logical basis for Dōgen’s use of negatives, which 
are salient to terms like mushō and makusa.  As Kim notes, Dōgen’s use of negation serves two functions: 
First it works as the radical negation of both components of an antithesis, avoiding the privileging 
of one over the other.  Thus it constantly rejects the reification of its own  negating activity in any 
objective, referential manner.  Second, it functions as an equally  radical affirmation of dynamic, 
creative reality in the realm of dualities and antithesis. (Kim 1985, 77) 
In the next chapter we shall see how Dōgen’s use of negatives vis-à-vis thinking is helpful for 




if we use (7) for thinking about Dōgen’s metaethical perspective, then in light of what we have covered in 
this chapter, as well as in Chapter three and Chapter four, the negative characterization of anti-
cognitivism perhaps best captures how Dōgen’s understands the nature of moral propositions.  Dōgen 
does not believe that moral propositions describe mind-independent facts or truths about the world; and, 
while he does maintain that we can communicate moral values from both conventional, hen’i, and 
ultimate standpoints, shōi, such expressions are not simply reducible to feelings as non-cognitivist 
ultimately believe.  Rather, it is likely that Dōgen would agree with Nietzsche’s perspective that language 
is an antecedent condition for conscious experiences, including our awareness of our emotional and 
attitudinal states. Thus while conventional normative judgments and propositions involve deliberation and 
reflection, from an ultimate standpoint, shōi, the performative experience is pre-reflective as there is no 
distinction between a subject and object of experience.  Herein, the performative experience could be 
understood as ascending from what Dōgen regards as power, mystical power (Jpn. jinzu), whereby words 
have the capacity to express the inexpressible.  In the context of the “abundant hands and eyes” 
metaphor124 that is often used in Zen for thinking about the vows of the bodhisattva of compassion, in his 
fascicle Kannon, Dōgen waxes poetically: “the virtue of hands and eyes should not be seeing, practicing, 
or preaching that recognizes ‘rightness’” (Dōgen 1994, 216).  Moral propositions, from Dōgen’s 
perspective are not about what is objectively or cognitively right or wrong, good or bad.  Rather, from the 
perspective of ‘abundant hands and eyes,’ “when the ineffable expresses the truth we should not expect to 
be able to express the whole of hands and eyes” (Dōgen 1994, 215).  From an anti-cognitivist standpoint, 
while there are limitations in regards to what our words mean, and what they can say, our use of language 
                                                 
124 This metaphor is quite unique.  To begin unpacking it, consider your capacity to juggle tennis balls.  Many of us 
find the act of juggling three or more balls to be difficult.  Similar to juggling, it seems incredibly daunting to 
intentionally execute the abundant hands, one thousand in total, that Kannon embodies.  To make use of abundant 
hands without getting tied up by one’s own limbs entails being able to maintain a mindful state of consciousness 
whereby there is no separation between subject and object.  In Chapter six, we shall see how this metaphor is 




proper can reveal and open up new perspectives, vis-à-vis new ‘hands and eyes;’ hence, “while we are 
experiencing one side, we are blind to the other side” (Dōgen 1994, 34).   
§5.6 Chapter Summary    
 In this chapter we examined the role and nature of language in Zen practice and literature in light 
of the Buddhist philosophy of emptiness and the logic of non-duality.  By borrowing insights from Dale 
S. Wright, Victor Sōgen Hori, Steven Heine and Rupert Read, we were able to see how language is not 
reducible to an instrumentalist conceptual scheme, but rather is embedded within our very experiences, 
including non-theoretical perception.  From this nondual perspective, which obliterates any distinction 
between linguistic and non-linguistic experiences, and in turn, overturns simplistic conceptions of Zen as 
ineffable, we were able to see how Zen language can operate on both conventional, hen-i, and ultimate, 
shōi, levels.  From the standpoint of hen-i, words and letters conventionally describe phenomenal things 
and events; from the standpoint of shōi, words and letters are the performative substance of actions and 
events.  Between these two standpoints, Zen is able to make use words of letters without reifying 
language, nor the things/events that words refer to and signify.  Hermeneutically, we saw that this 
distinction between hen-i and shōi is helpful for making sense of Dōgen’s writings on ethics.  In Shoaku-
Makusa, for example, we discovered that Dōgen is engaged in both conventional and ultimate modes of 
discourse, vis-à-vis karma; and, with the assistance of DeCaroli and Schroeder, we discovered that karma 
is, according to Dōgen’s perspective, mind-dependent, non-essentialist and relative.  With the help of Kim 
and Van der Braak, we noted that Zen is not a “separate transmission outside of ethics;” rather, the moral 
life, particularly as it is embodied by the bodhisattva’s vows, is salient to “awakening the mind.”  All in 
all, we were able to see how an anti-cognitivist interpretation of Dōgen’s language of morals is consistent 
with his anti-realist perspective that all values are mushō, which in turn finds its poetic voice through 
shōi, and our performative use and embodiment of words and letters.  In the next chapter we shall turn our 
attention to Dōgen’s writings and philosophy of zazen in order to explore the relationship between 




helps illuminate an understanding of Dōgen’s metaethical practice in ways that the anti-realist standpoints 























Mountain Still State: Normative Non-Thinking and  
The Metaethics of Meditation 
§6.1 Chapter Overview  
The goal of this chapter is to explore the philosophical interface between the Mahāyāna 
philosophy of emptiness, meditation and ethics within the context of Dōgen’s writings, particularly the 
Shōbōgenzō.  Our treatment will oscillate around Dōgen’s phenomenology of non-thinking (Ch. fēi sī 
liang; Jpn. hishiryō) that emerges from insight into the emptiness/non-essentialism of all existing things.  
In this chapter, it is my goal to defend the following argument:  
 P1. Zazen is central to Dōgen’s ethical practice/outlook. 
 P2. Non-thinking is central to Dōgen’s practice of zazen. 
 C. Therefore, non-thinking is central to Dogen’s ethical practice/outlook. 
By exploring the literature that supports this deduction, vis-à-vis zazen as a normative practice, we shall 
be able to flesh out salient features of Dōgen’s anti-realism whereby all values are uncreated/unborn (Jpn. 
mushō) and that normative propositions are anti-cognitive.  More specifically, we shall see how non-
thinking helps clarify Dōgen’s expression “not committing” (Jpn. makusa) from the fascicle Shoaku-
Makusa, as a Daoist/Zen perspective of non-action (Ch. wu-wi).  By highlighting the connection between 
non-thinking and Dōgen’s metaethics, I plan to conclude that his teachings and instructions for practicing 
zazen reveal a praxis-oriented, way-seeking philosophy that embodies anti-realist and anti-cognitive 
perspectives.  The practice of zazen is itself the authentic realization of Buddha-nature, a realization that 
is contingent upon the dropping off of body-mind (Jpn. shinjin-datsuraku), which is in turn an antecedent 
condition for revealing an attitudinal horizon of ‘great compassion’ (Skt. mahā-karuna).  Thus, by 
building upon the perspectives of various Dōgen scholars, including Hee-Jin Kim, Thomas Kasulis, 
Steven Heine, Kampū Bret Davis, Tetsuzen Jason M. Wirth, André van der Braak and Jien Erin 
McCarthy, I plan to show that the practice of zazen and the phenomenology of non-thinking is how 




are justified through practice rather than through an additional metaethical theory.  For Dōgen, this is 
precisely non-thinking (i.e. anti-cognitivism) embodied within the vows of the bodhisattva. 
§ 6.2 Zazen-Only: The Pivot of Dōgen’s Ethical Praxis 
 As I noted in Chapter three, the first essay Dōgen composed after returning from China was the 
Fukanzazengi, “Universally Recommended Instructions for Zazen.”  In it, Dōgen provides the basic 
instructions for students on the embodied technique of zazen, as well as poetic allusions to the 
phenomenology of realizing Buddha-nature via dropping off body-mind (Jpn. shinjin datsuraku).  While 
his instructions in this manual are, as Kim notes, “brief and minimalist,” Dōgen does go to great lengths 
to treat and defend the practice of zazen in other fascicles throughout the Shōbōgenzō, including 
Bendōwa, “A Talk on Pursuing the Truth,” and Zazenshin, “A Needle for Zazen.”   
 In the Bendōwa fascicle, as I noted in Chapter three, Dōgen defends the practice of zazen by: (1) 
appealing to the historical tradition of Buddhism; and (2) creating a question and answer dialogue 
whereby an unknown interlocutor presses Dōgen to explain why it is the case that zazen, and only zazen, 
is the central practice, “authentic gate,” for realization.  For example, in regards to (2), Dōgen states, “The 
Great Master Sakyamuni exactly transmitted, as the authentic tradition, this subtle method of grasping the 
state of truth, and the tathāgatas of the three times all attained the truth through Zazen” (Dōgen 1994, 7).  
According to Dōgen, the standard rituals and teachings that constitute a Buddhist way of life, for both 
monastic and lay practitioners, including burning incense, prostrations and sutra-chanting, are simply 
inferior to practicing zazen.  His defense of this normative judgment – that zazen is the authentic gate for 
realizing Buddha-nature –  is framed along virtue-theoretical lines.125  When pressed to explain why 
                                                 
125 In Chapter two, I noted that Bret Davis extends both consequentialist and virtue theoretical labels to Dōgen’s 
normative outlook and practice.  In regards to consequentialism, I argued in Chapter three that this characterization 
does not accurately capture Dōgen’s normative perspective which avoids firm dualistic distinctions between means 
and ends, action and consequences.  However, in regards to latter, virtue theory, I contend that this is a promising 




chanting sutras and reciting the names of Buddha’s ought not be regarded as causes and conditions for 
enlightenment, Dōgen states:  
Do you know for yourself any virtue that is gained from practices such as reading sutras and 
reciting names of Buddhas?  It is very unreliable to think that only to wag the tongue and to raise 
the voice has the virtue of the Buddha’s work. […] Trying to arrive at the Buddha’s state of truth 
[only] through action of mouth, stupidly chanting thousands or tens of thousands of times, is like 
hoping to reach [the south country of] Etzu by pointing a carriage towards the north.  Or it is like 
trying to put a square peg into a round hole.  Reading sentences while remaining ignorant of how 
to practice [is like] a student of medicine forgetting how to compound medications.  What use is 
that?  Those who chant endlessly are like frogs in a spring paddy field, croaking day and night.  
In the end it is all useless. (Dōgen 1994, 7-8) 
Herein, while Dōgen’s response is rhetorical and ad hominem, his standpoint is not without religious-
philosophical reasons.  Similar to receiving and upholding the monastic precepts, there is good reason to 
believe that chanting sutras and reciting the names of Buddhas are ceremonial acts.126  And while 
ceremonial acts help cultivate good character, particularly from a Confucian perspective,127 it is not 
obvious that they will condition the kinds of virtues embodied by bodhisattvas and buddha’s.  For 
example, imagine a person who has never studied Buddhist philosophy, and cannot understand the 
language of the sūtra’s that are recited daily within the monastery one is practicing.  Notwithstanding the 
fact, as I noted in Chapter three, that Dōgen valued ceremonial expressions like receiving the precepts, 
burning incense and chanting sutras, prima facie it is unclear how these ritual acts are either sufficient or 
necessary for realizing emptiness, and embodying the attitudinal state of great compassion whereby the 
boundaries between the body-mind of self-and-other ‘drop off.’  According to Dōgen, unless these 
ceremonial acts, as well as the ritual practice of zazen, are performed from a state of non-thinking, they 
                                                 
126 See David Riggs, “Are Sōtō Precepts for Ethical Guidance or Ceremonial Transformation: Menzan’s Attempted 
Reforms and Contemporary Practices,” in Dōgen and Sōtō Zen, ed. Steven Heine (NY: Oxford University Press, 
2015). Steven Heine, (2015). 188-209. 
127 According to D.C. Lau, rituals, or rites (Ch. li), “were a body of rules governing action in every aspect of life and 
they were the repository of past insights into morality.  It is therefore, important that one should, unless there are 
strong reasons to the contrary, observe them.  Though there is no guarantee that observance of the rites necessarily 
leads, in every case, to behavior that is right, the chances are it will, in fact, do so” (Lau 1979, 20).  In Book XII of 
the The Analects, for example, it states: “Yen Yüan asked about benevolence.  The Master said, ‘To return to the 
observance of the rites through overcoming the self constitutes benevolence.  If for a single day a man could return 
to the observance of the rites through overcoming himself, then the whole Empire would consider benevolence to be 




will not give rise to the realization that all beings are Buddha-nature; thus, I follow Steven Heine’s lead 
when he states: 
A crucial implication of Dōgen’s teaching is that if meditation becomes mechanical, then it too 
must be spurned; contrawise, if other practices are performed in a genuinely purposeless way, 
they should be considered exceptionally valuable techniques fully compatible with just sitting.  
The key to understanding Dōgen’s outlook is that neither zazen nor alternative practices 
constitute a direct route to awakening conceived as a final destination in a way that is derived 
from a linear view of temporality.  Instead, from the holistic standpoint of the inseparability of 
practice-realization, each approach to training represents but one of multitudes of ongoing 
manifestations of the awakened awareness of nonthinking that transpires each and every moment. 
(Heine 2020, 207-208)  
And, not withstanding Heine’s position, in his article “The Enlightening Practice of Non-Thinking: 
Unfolding Dōgen’s Fukanzazengi,” Bret Davis explains that while it is the case that Dōgen believed that 
“zazen is the most important practice,” his writings on such, “need to be tempered and counterbalanced 
by attending to the manner in which he does affirm, interpretively adapt, and promote these other 
disciplines” (Davis 2016, 201).  Dōgen’s fascicle Jukai, “Receiving the Precepts” evidences Davis’s 
point:   
Without receiving the precepts we are never the disciples of the buddhas and never the 
descendants of the ancestral masters – because they have never seen “departing from excess and 
guarding against wrong” as “practicing [Za]zen and inquiring into the truth.” The words “the 
precepts are foremost” already are the right-Dharma-eye treasury itself.  To realize Buddha and 
become a patriarch inevitably is to receive and maintain the right-Dharma-eye treasury; therefore, 
the ancestral masters who receive the authentic transmission of the right-Dharma-eye treasury 
inevitably receive and maintain the Buddhist precepts. (Dōgen 1994, 228) 
Nevertheless, according to Davis, zazen is “a touchstone and springboard” for Dōgen’s philosophy and 
practice. 
In his book, Dōgen On Meditation and Thinking: A Reflection On His View of Zen, Hee-Jin Kim 
contends that the sole reason supporting Dōgen’s staunch defense of zazen in Bendōwa and Fukanzazengi 
stems, as I noted in Chapter three, from his non-dual perspective of practice and enlightenment.  In 
Bendōwa, for example, Dōgen states: 
The thought that practice and experience are not one thing is just the idea of non-Buddhists.  In 
the Buddhist-Dharma practice and experience are completely the same.  Practice now is also 




of the original state of experience. […] Because practice is just experience, the experience is 
endless; and because experience is practice, the practice has no beginning. (Dōgen 1994, 12) 
Herein, Dōgen addresses two interrelated religious-philosophical issues: (1) the doctrine of hongaku, the 
teaching of ‘original enlightenment’; and (2) the debate over sudden vs. gradual enlightenment.  
Beginning with the former, Kim128, Abe129, Kasulis130 and Davis131 have identified and explained how the 
doctrine of original enlightenment vexed Dōgen early in his monastic career as a Tendai monk at Mt. 
Hiei.  The problem: if all beings are already enlightened, then why must one practice Buddhism?  Why 
must one go through monastic training, perform ceremonial rituals, study and chant sutras, etc.?  
Consequently, because no one at Mt. Hiei could provide a satisfactory answer to this critical question, 
Dōgen began his journey along the path of Zen; a path that leads to a nondual soteriology whereby 
original enlightenment is realized through, and only through, ongoing practice.132  In regards to the latter 
issue, sudden vs. gradual, Dōgen is clear to avoid the teleological view of gradualism which is contingent 
upon the duality between means and ends; and, he is also careful to avoid the antinomian perspective, vis-
à-vis committing evil without obstruction (Jpn. zōaku muge), that can potentially ensue after having a 
                                                 
128 Hee-Jin Kim, Eihei Dōgen: Mystical Realist (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2004). 
129 Masao Abe,  A Study of Dōgen: His Philosophy and Religion (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 
1992). 
130 Thomas P. Kasulis, Zen Action/Zen Person (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1981). 
131 Bret Davis “The Enlightening Practice of Non-Thinking: Unfolding Dōgen’s Fukuanzazengi.” In Engaging 
Dōgen’s Zen: The Philosophy of Pracrice As Awakening, edited by Tetsuzen Jason M. Wirth, Shūdō Brian 
Schroeder, and Kanpū Bret W. Davis (Boston: Wisdom Publication, 2016) 199-224.   
132 According to Jacqueline Stone, original enlightenment in medieval Tendai Buddhism was influenced by Hua-yen 
(Jpn. Kegon) esoteric teachings, particularly Shih Mo-ho-yen lun (Treatise interpreting the Mahāyāna), which is 
believed to be a commentary composed by Nāgārjuna on the Awakening of Faith (Stone 1999).  “This treatise 
relativizes the distinction drawn in the Awakening of Faith between the ‘mind as suchness’ and the ‘mind as arising 
and perishing’ by postulating a third term, the ‘nondual Mahāyāna’ (pu-erh mo-ho-yen, funi makaen) in which both 
are subsumed” (Stone 1999, 11).  During the Kamakura period, Tendai interpretations of this text was shaped by 
Kūkai’s appropriations, whereby original enlightenment is, rather than a potential to realize enlightenment that is 
inherent within deluded minds, “the ontological basis of the nonduality of beings and the Buddha” (Stone 1999, 11).  
Thus, the Tendai perspective of original enlightenment in which Dōgen’s thinking was entangled maintained that, “it 
is no longer merely an abstract principle but the actual, true aspect of all things (ji jissō) (Stone 1999, 37).  And, as 
Hee-Jin Kim notes, “the doctrine of original enlightenment was accompanied by a cognate doctrine of ‘this body 
itself is Buddha’ (sokushin-jōbutsu), which was likewise radicalized by Japanese Buddhism.  This tenet accepted the 
immediate enlightenment of the psycho-physical existence with all its particularities, which were not, as Zen 
Buddhists would say, ‘a finger pointing to the moon,’ but the moon itself, or to put it differently, not the 
accommodative manifestations of the Body of Law (dharmakāya; hosshin), but the Body of Law itself.  This 
doctrine of esoteric Buddhism, both Shingon and Tendai versions, influenced the ethos of the time.  Mundane 





sudden experience/insight into the emptiness of all things.133  Because practice and enlightenment are the 
same according to Dōgen, his perspective avoids the dualistic trappings of both sudden and gradualist 
views.  Herein, the pivot of Dōgen’s Zen, vis-à-vis the non-duality of practice and enlightenment, is 
zazen-only (Jpn. shikantaza). 
 It is from this non-dual relationship between practice and enlightenment, vis-à-vis zazen, that we 
are able to make sense of Dōgen’s praxis oriented ethic.  As Kim notes:  
The problem of enlightenment cannot be properly understood without considering the problem of 
morality and ethics.  Morality and enlightenment were inseparably related to one another, so 
much so that one without the other was not authentic so far as Dōgen was concerned.  For nirvana 
was not beyond good and evil as it is usually – indeed, too often  – interpreted in the popular 
parlance, but was rather a mode of existence with a definite moral commitment that was realized 
in and through the realm of good and evil (and cause and effect as well), and yet was undefiled by 
them.  The secret to this undefiled freedom lay in the method of the total exertion of a single thing 
(ippō-gūjin), which appropriated the traditional Buddhist ideas of emptiness and nonduality, 
                                                 
133 The Tendai meditation techniques that Dōgen practiced during his early training as monk at Mt. Hiei were likely 
influenced by the continental T’ien-T’ai text The Method of Concentration and Insight (Ch. Ta-ch’eng chih-kuan fa-
men) which is ascribed to Hui-ssu (514-577), the second patriarch of the T’ien T’ai school and proponent of the 
Lotus Sūtra (Chan 1963).  Therein it states, “By concentration is meant to know that all dharmas (elements of 
existence), from the very beginning have no nature of their own.  The neither come into nor go out of existence.  
Because they are caused by illusion and imagination, they exist without real existence.  But the existence of existent 
dharmas is the same as nonexistence.  They are only the one mind, whose substance admits no differentiation.  
Those who hold this view can stop the flow of erroneous thought.  This is called concentration” (Chan 1963, 398).  
Herein, ‘concentration’ (Skt. śamatha; Ch. chih) is then accompanied by ‘insight’ (Skt. vipaśyanā; Ch. kuan), which 
according to the text, “is meant that although we know that [things] originally do not come into existence and at 
present do not go out of existence, nevertheless they were caused to arise out of the mind’s nature and hence are not 
without a worldly function of an unreal and imaginative nature.  They are like illusions and dreams which [seem to] 
exist but really do not.  This is therefore called insight….It means to base and concentrate on the one mind in order 
to practice concentration and insight (Chan 1963, 399).  Herein, concentration and insight open a clearing for 
realizing original enlightenment, or Buddha-nature; “the Pure Mind is realized in substance, the nature which is 
without duality is harmonized through principle (li, rational nature of things), these and all sentient beings are 
harmoniously identified to form a body of one single character” (Chan 1963, 404).  Indeed, Dōgen’s Zen perspective 
in the Shōbōgenzō echoes these ideas, including his characterization of moral values as uncreated (Jpn. mushō).  
That being said, Dōgen, along with other Tendai contemporaries (e.g. Shinran) from Mt. Hiei, believed that insight 
into the emptiness of all dharmas can condition an antinomian attitude of licensed evil.  The idea of licensed evil is 
embedded within “Tendai Original Enlightenment Discourse” (Jpn. Tendai hongaku ron), which included ideas such 
as ‘karma is precisely liberation’ (Jpn. gō soku gedatsu) (Stone 1999).   The idea that ‘karma is precisely liberation,’ 
“represents a specific formulation of the broader idea that the dharmas, being empty, are mutually encompassing.  
Thus it can only be grasped on the basis of insight into the nondual nature of reality” (Stone 1999, 219).  Thus, 
according to Hee Jin-Kim, “When one denied any metaphysical hiatus between principle and phenomenon, 
however, even the profoundest Mahāyāna doctrines became dangerously indistinguishable from crude and 
irresponsible acceptance of whatever existed in the world, at the sacrifice of spiritual exertions.  In fact, a number of 
dangerous misinterpretations of these doctrines were rampant toward the close of the Heian period and were 
especially flagrant among worldly minded Buddhist monastics who attempted to rationalize the pursuit of their 
selfish interests.  Furthermore, an exclusive claim of faith, which required no strenuous religious moral exertion, 




existentially, practically, and religiously, rather than theoretically […] In brief, spiritual freedom 
and moral commitment were inseparably intertwined in Zen, as far as Dōgen was concerned. 
(Kim 2004, 216-217)  
Kim’s position, which I am sympathetic with, can be set up accordingly: 
 
 P1. If zazen practice is the pivot for realizing enlightenment, and enlightenment is 
nondualistically related with ethics, then zazen is the pivot for ethics.    
P2. Zazen is the pivot for realizing enlightenment. 
P3. Enlightenment is nondualistically related with ethics. 
 C. Therefore zazen practice is the pivot for ethics.  
To flesh this argument out further, and thereby see if the premises supporting the conclusion are 
acceptable, we shall turn our attention to Dōgen’s philosophy of non-thinking (Ch. fēi sī liang; Jpn. 
hishiryō). 
§6.3 Phenomenology of Zazen: Thinking of Not-Thinking 
 The practice of zazen, seated meditation, distinguished Dōgen from other leading Buddhist 
thinkers during the Kamakura period.  Without the practice of the “mountain-still state,” as Dōgen often 
characterizes zazen, there is no transmission of the ‘Right-Dharma-eye treasury.’  For example, consider 
the following passage from Zazenshin, “A Needle for Zazen:” 
To say that the dharma of the Buddha has been transmitted from the Western Heavens to the 
Eastern Earth implies the transmission of the seated Buddha, for it is the essential function [of 
that dharma].  And where the dharma of the Buddha is not transmitted, neither is seated 
meditation.  What has been inherited by successor after successor [in this transmission] is just this 
message of seated meditation; one who does not participate in the unique transmission of this 
message is not a Buddha or a Patriarch.  (Dōgen 1988, 197) 
Now there is much that can be stated about the phenomenology and philosophy of Dōgen’s zazen 
practice, particularly in regards to the body.  To give a comprehensive treatment of his reflections will, 
unfortunately, bring us well beyond the scope of this dissertation.   Thus we shall focus our attention upon 




 In both Zazenshin and Zazengi, “Standard Methods of Zazen,” as well as the Fukanzazengi, 
Dōgen’s characterization of zazen is presented through the following encounter dialogue. 
Once, when the Great Master Hung-tao of Yüeh shan was sitting [in meditation], a monk  asked 
him: “What are you thinking, [sitting there] so fixedly?” 
 The Master answered, “I am thinking of not thinking.” 
 The monk asked, “How do you think of not thinking?” 
 The master answered, “Nonthinking.” (Dōgen 1988, 188-189) 
 
What does the master mean by “non-thinking,” and how is it related with the other modes of thinking 
(Ch. sī liang; Jpn. shiryō) and not thinking (Ch. bù sī liang; Jpn. fu-shiryō)?  To begin unpacking this 
question, let us proceed by looking at Dōgen’s interpretation of this encounter dialogue: 
The master answered, “Nonthinking.”  Although the employment of nonthinking is crystal clear, 
when we think of not thinking, we always use nonthinking.  There is someone in nonthinking, 
and this someone maintains us.  Although it is we who are [sitting] fixedly, [our sitting] is not 
merely thinking: it presents itself as [sitting] fixedly.  Although [sitting] fixedly is [sitting] 
fixedly, how could it think of [sitting] fixedly.  Therefore, sitting fixedly is not the measure of the 
Buddha, not the measure of awakening, not the measure of comprehension.  (Dōgen 1988, 189) 
For starters, according to our everyday conventional view-point, ‘thinking’ is discriminative and dualistic.  
As Kim explains: 
In his writings, Dōgen employs a number of notions that broadly denote discriminative thinking – 
nenryo, nenkaku, ryochi, ryochi nenkaku, chikaku, fumbetsu, shiyui, shiryō, and so on, although 
they vary in their connotations and nuances.  The common thread running through them is 
activities of consciousness and the intellect that “divide” and “split” the seamless reality, in order 
to designate negative significations.  (Kim 2007, 83)  
Davis echoes Kim’s point when he explains that shiryō, “connotes a kind of discriminative thinking that 
calculates and evaluates” (Davis 2016, 216).  For Dōgen, thinking is how we engage the world from a 
dualistic perspective; and, in the context of normative judgments our thinking is crooked, hen’i.  That 
being said, the dualistic nature of thinking does not entail the conclusion that the goal of Zen practice is to 
transcend our cognitive deliberations about life, death and authentic engagement with the world.  No 
doubt, discriminative thinking can condition a tendency to reify things, concepts and beliefs as if they had 




To Dōgen’s credit, delusion and enlightenment alike are rooted in discriminative thinking.  Like it 
or not, you are bound to discriminate and differentiate things, events, and relations, in a myriad of 
different ways.  The activities of discrimination may be self-centered, discriminatory, and 
restrictive.  Yet, discriminative activities, once freed of substantialist, egocentric obsessions, can 
function compassionately and creatively. (Kim 2007, 84-85)   
Based upon Kim’s interpretation of thinking, we can draw the conclusion that, for Dōgen, dualisms 
between ‘yours and mine’, ‘now” and then’, ‘good and bad’ etc. are not, from an uncritical perspective, 
conceived of as dualisms at all.  Rather, they are uncritically accepted to be how things exist.  Yet, upon 
critical analysis, one can come to realize, via zazen, that such dualisms only exist because they are empty 
and nondual.  
 Based upon this interpretation of thinking, how are we to understand Dōgen’s use of ‘not-
thinking’ (Ch. bù sī liang; Jpn. fushiryō)?  If distinct from thinking, then not-thinking seems to create 
another dualism which paradoxically contradicts the original intention to avoid duality.  Thomas Kasulis 
helps clarify the distinction between thinking and not thinking through a Western phenomenological lens.  
In his chapter “Phenomenology of Zazen,” from Zen Action/Zen Person, he states that thinking has the 
noetic attitude of either affirming or negating; it is, in other words, positional, and the noematic content 
are conceptual objects.  Similar to thinking, ‘not thinking,’ is also positional, yet only in a negative sense.  
Not thinking “in its ‘absolute sense’ (that is, in its technical usage here) is simply the negation or denial of 
“shiryō” (Kasulis 1981, 72).  Herein, the noematic content of not thinking is ‘thinking’ itself, which is 
objectified, and thus to be negated.  According to Kasulis, “this form of denial is problematic.  From what 
standpoint, we might ask, can we speak of the denial of thought?  Is not that denial itself a thought?” 
(Kasulis 1981, 73).  Both Hung-tao and Dōgen are aware of this paradox.  Rather than interpreting Hung-
tao’s ‘not-thinking’ as a dualistic alternative to that of ‘thinking,’ there is a more nuanced logic at play 
here.  The fact that thinking is dualistic does not entail that insight and realization, via zazen, is going to 
be attained by abandoning ‘thinking’ through some kind of non-dualistic ‘not-thinking.’  Yakusan’s ‘not-
thinking’ is saying just this.  ‘Not-thinking’ is not some alternative to ‘thinking,’ but rather, another mode 




 Kim echoes Kasulis’ insight as well.  As he notes in his thoroughgoing treatment of thinking and 
not-thinking, the latter is not primordial, transcendent or quietist; “Not-thinking neither precedes nor 
succeeds, nor is outside, nor behind thinking” (Kim 2007, 88-89).  As Kim interprets Dōgen’s use of not-
thinking in light of the Mahāyāna philosophy of emptiness, an interpretation that I share, he also explains 
how Dōgen makes use of not-thinking as a way of ‘negotiating’ his practice without reifying such as a 
foundation for thinking and/or mind.   
For Dōgen’s part, he neither psychologizes nor metaphysicizes not-thinking, but instead, treats it 
soteriologically in order for it to serve as a radical critique of thinking and as a window to new 
horizons of thinking.  In short, not-thinking is neither the psychological nor the metaphysical 
ground of thinking, but is simply a focus – a conceptual construct.  That said, not only are those 
functions of not-thinking inherent in thinking itself (according to the pan-Buddhist logic we are 
now familiar with) but are intimate with  thinking (according to Dōgen’s logic of intimacy).  
Intimacy does not signify a fusion of not-thinking and thinking, as in, say, the mystical 
“coincidence of opposites,” nor does it mean a conglutination of them.  Differences between them 
are alive, not obliterated, and still, the two soteric foci are intimate in their dialogical communion.  
Intimacy is a special relationship between the two foci that is practiced despite and/or because of 
their differences and tensions. (Kim 2007, 89)        
Based upon this examination we now find ourselves facing the following question: how does one think of 
not-thinking if it is not a state of mental blankness?  The answer, as documented in Zazenshin, is ‘non-
thinking’ (Ch. fēi sī liang; Jpn. hishiryō). 
 Non-thinking, in Dōgen’s Zen, is the pivot of his practice of zazen and his metaethical 
perspective.  Indeed, as we shall see, non-thinking is how the conceptual threads we have investigated in 
the fascicle Shoaku-Makusa are woven together; it is the practice of non-thinking that one realizes: (1) 
that all values are ‘uncreated’ (Jpn. mushō); (2) that what determines the ‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’ of 
actions is, contrary to both consequentialism and deontology, dependent upon whether one engages and 
interacts with others via non-action (Ch. wu-wei) or not-committing (Jpn. makusa), vis-à-vis ‘dropping-




of ‘nonspeaking’ (Jpn. hiogen)134 whereby value judgments are revealed and concealed.    However, 
before bringing these threads together, a few points should be noted about non-thinking as the ‘thinking 
of not-thinking.’   
 For starters, returning to Kasulis’ phenomenological interpretation of ‘thinking’ and ‘not 
thinking,’ Kasulis characterizes ‘non-thinking,’ or ‘without thinking’ as non-positional, vis-à-vis noetic 
attitude.  In other words, non-thinking neither affirms nor negates thinking itself.  “Without thinking is 
distinct from thinking and not-thinking precisely in its assuming no intentional attitude whatsoever: it 
neither affirms nor denies, accepts nor rejects, believes nor disbelieves.  In fact, it does not objectify 
either implicitly or explicitly” (Kasulis 1981, 74-74).  Based upon these formalized distinctions between 
thinking, not-thinking and non-thinking/without thinking, Kasulis contends that ‘without thinking’ is a 
more basic mode of consciousness than the former positional modes.   
In this respect, the noetic content (or act aspect) of without-thinking is completely different from 
that of thinking or not thinking.  Even though without-thinking circumvents all objectification, it 
is nonetheless a mode of consciousness, and through reflection on a without-thinking act, one 
may isolate aspects of its formal contents.  The point, though, is that at the time of without-
thinking’s actual occurrence, those contents were neither affirmed nor negated – they were 
merely an unobjectified presence without any conscious or unconscious attitude directed toward 
them.  In short, it is non-conceptual or prereflective mode of consciousness. (Kasulis 1981, 75)   
In a similar philosophical light as Kasulis, Davis states: 
In thinking of not-thinking, we are aiming our intentional mind at its own ground, at nonthinking, 
and thus turning it into a contentless object of thought, into a kind of relative or privative 
nothingness.  But nonthinking is in truth an “absolute nothingness” in the sense of an essentially 
indeterminate field of nondual awareness, a field which underlies or encompasses the 
determination of thinking, not-thinking and thinking of not-thinking. (Davis 2016, 218-219) 
I contend that this mode of thinking as non-thinking best characterizes the phenomenology of zazen as a 
normative practice.   
                                                 
134 Herein, I am following Steven Heine’s use of the term nonspeaking.  According to Heine, “This notion refers to 
the capacity to disclose the Dharma in a way that is unlimited by the usual distinction between speech and verbosity 
or silence and reticence, since both modes of communication are ultimately avenues for conveying genuine 




 Non-thinking as a normative practice can be first understood in light of ‘right thinking.’  Hee-Jin 
Kim identifies non-thinking with ‘right-thinking’ (Jpn. shoshiryō) which is, “one of the categories in the 
eightfold right path (hasshōdō) that leads to the cessation of suffering and the attainment of nirvāṇa” 
(Kim 2007, 91).  This hermeneutical move is indeed significant for: 
It implies that right thought is not only to be practiced simultaneously in conjunction with the 
seven other categories of the path (i.e., right understanding, right speech, right action, right 
livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration), but also is the kernel of them 
all, that is of the Buddhist path to liberation.  This is quite a novel reinterpretation of the eightfold 
path as the early Buddhist teaching of praxis.  (Needless to say, that thinking in this context 
involves not only cognitive qualities, such as conceptualization, reflection, deliberation and 
criticism, but also affective ones, such as feeling, emotion volition and desire).  Furthermore, in 
the context of the three divisions of the eightfold path – morality, meditation and wisdom (kai-jō-
e) – Dōgen singles out right thought from the division of wisdom.  He takes it to be the essence of 
meditation, as if he were overriding the conventional arrangement of right effort, right 
mindfulness and right concentration under the division of meditation. (Kim 2007, 91-92) 
As Kim notes, the tripartite division of the Buddhist eightfold path – morality, meditation and wisdom – 
are, according to Dōgen, unified through right-thinking as non-thinking, which is realized through zazen.  
I am sympathetic with this interpretation as it is well supported by Dōgen’s reflections on the eight-fold 
path in fascicle Sanjushichi-Bon-Bodai-Bunpo, “The Thirty Seven Elements of Bodhi.”  When reflecting 
upon right thinking, we find an all too familiar encounter dialogue on thinking and not thinking in the 
following passage: 
When [we] establish this thinking, the buddhas of the ten directions all appear.  So the 
manifestation of the ten directions and the manifestation of buddhas, are just the time of the 
establishment of this concrete thinking.  When we establish this concrete thinking we are beyond 
self and transcending the external world; at the same time, in the very moment of the present, on 
thinking concrete facts we go straight to Vārānasi.  The place where thinking exists is Vārānasi.  
An eternal Buddha says “I am thinking the concrete state of not thinking.”  How can the state of 
not thinking be thought?  “It is different from thinking.”  This is right consideration, right 
thinking.  To break a zafu is right thinking. (Dōgen 1994, 15) 
Similarly, right thinking, as Davis explains, “is rooted in the nonthinking of zazen” (Davis 2016, 220).  
And, as a component of the eight-fold path, I contend, and plan to show, that non-thinking is the central 




Dōgen’s Zen are able to realize and embody the justification of their moral beliefs and normative 
judgments.   
 
§6.4 ‘Not-Doing’ Metaethics as A Practice of Non-Thinking 
  Having reviewed the phenomenology of thinking in the context of practicing zazen, we can now 
begin an examination of Dōgen’s way-seeking metaethic of non-thinking.  In doing so, we will be able to 
clarify Dōgen’s normative proclamation of ‘not committing’ (Jpn. makusa), as well as his anti-cognitivist 
practice of nonspeaking, in light of zazen.   
In his treatment of Shoaku-Makusa, Kasulis contends that “Dōgen’s project of affirming 
traditional moral values and ideals while denying essentialist distinctions between good and evil is built 
upon his phenomenology of zazen” (Kasulis 1981, 94).  From this ‘empty-foundation,’ we discover the 
relationship between Dōgen’s non-thinking/without-thinking and ‘not-doing/without-committing.  In the 
context of practicing zazen, when a practitioner has realization, the moral imperative of shoaku-makusa 
“is no longer an imperative; it is now a description of without thinking” (Kasulis 1981, 95).  William 
Bodiford echoes this metaethical point in the introduction to his translation of Shoaku-Makusa: 
It is as if ‘Thou shalt not kill’ is taken first as a moral imperative and by living one’s life 
accordingly, one is transformed so that ‘thou shalt not kill’ becomes no longer an imperative, but 
a descriptive statement about what one will not do because of what one has become.  At that point 
the distinction between good and evil as principles disappears because there is no longer a need 




As I understand Kasulis and Bodiford, Dōgen’s use of makusa as a descriptive statement, rather than a 
performative command, is his way of incorporating the Confucian135 and Daoist136 philosophies of ‘non-
action’ (Ch. wu-wei) into his metaethical perspective of zazen as a normative practice.    
Of the East-Asian Buddhist traditions, part of what makes Chan/Zen unique is its syncretism of 
Buddhist, Confucian and Daoist philosophies and perspectives;137 in regards to Dōgen’s Zen, religious 
syncretism also includes Japan’s native religious tradition of Shinto as well.138  Within both Confucianism 
and Daoism, the philosophy of non-action (Ch. wu-wei), as I noted in Chapter three, is pivotal.  For 
                                                 
135 In Confucianism, non-action (Ch. wu-wei) is normatively tide to the philosophy of ‘the rectification of names 
(Ch. Zhèngmíng).  This philosophy, according to Chung-ying Cheng, “may be said to embody in a nutshell all main 
ideas of the Confucian humanistic ideal of achieving good government on the basis of individual moral-self-
cultivation and social ethical edification.  Confucius hoped that a ruler would set a moral personal example for 
people to emulate so that the ruler would sit facing the south like the pole star and the people would behave 
themselves in good order.  This is a kind of ‘doing nothing’ (wu-wei) but with the ruler as an ‘unmoved mover,’ not 
the tao, which in any case is not confined to a particular person nor simply unmoved but instead spontaneously self-
moving.  To rectify names combines both the implicit appeal to ‘do nothing’ and the explicit appeal to ‘do 
something’ for creating and maintaining good government” (Cheng 1991, 43). 
136 In Daoism, the philosophy of non-action (Ch. wu-wei) reflects a natural mode of comportment whereby one 
either: (1) allows ‘nature’ or the ‘Way’ (Ch. Dao) to unfold without interference; or (2) acts naturally and 
effortlessly in accordance with the ‘nature’ or the Way.’  As Wing-Tsit Chan explains, “Whereas in other schools 
Tao means a system of moral truth, in this school it is the One, which is natural, eternal, spontaneous, nameless, and 
indescribable.  It is at once the beginning of all things and the way in which all things pursue their course.  When 
this Tao is possessed by individual things, it becomes its character or virtue (te).  The ideal life for the individual, 
the ideal order for society, and the ideal type of government are all based on it and guided by it.  As the way of life, 
it denotes simplicity, spontaneity, tranquility, weakness, and most of all, non-action (wu-wei).  By the latter is not 
meant literally ‘inactivity’ but rather ‘taking no action that is contrary to Nature’–in other words, letting Nature take 
its own course” (Chan 1963, 136).   
137 In regards to Confucianism, according to D.T. Suzuki, “The difference between Confucian scholars and Zen 
masters was that the Confucians based their philosophy on the native system, while the Zen Buddhists adhered to 
their own although they adopted the Confucian vocabulary. […] It me be said that the difference between the two 
classes of mind lay in the placing of emphasis.  The Zen monks interpreted the Confucian texts in the Indian fashion, 
so to speak–that is, more or less idealistically–and they were not averse to commenting on Buddhist literature from 
the Confucian point of view” (Suzuki 1959, 43).  And, in regards to Daoism, according to Heinrich Dumoulin, “The 
wisdom teachings of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu–or ‘philosophical Taoism’ as it is called in the European literature in 
order to distinguish it from ‘popular Taoism’–provided one of the best bridges of understanding between Chinese 
thought and Buddhism” (Dumoulin 1988, 65). 
138 Japanese Buddhism in general, Zen in particular, is a syncretism of: (1) Confucianism; (2) Buddhism; and (3) 
Shinto.  “One remarkable fact deserving notice,” according to Suzuki, “is that Shintoism, which is regarded as the 
official embodiment the national spirit of Japan, did not assert itself as doctrinally independent of either 
Confucianism or Buddhism” (Suzuki 1959, 57).  In fact, as Jacqueline Stone explains, the syncretism between 
Buddhism and Shinto was tightly tied to the doctrine of original enlightenment.  For example, “In the myths related 
in the eighth century imperially commissioned chronicles Kojiki (Record of ancient matters) and Nihon Shoki 
(Chronicles of Japan), when the Sun Goddess hid herself in the rock cave, all was in darkness.  The opening of the 
rock cave, which restored light to the world, is here likened to the revelation of original enlightenment” (Stone 1999, 




example, in The Analects, the ideal Confucian ruler is one who, in light of comporting oneself with the 
Dao, the ‘Way,’ and thereby receiving the mandate of heaven, rules by doing nothing; “The Master said, 
‘The rule of virtue can be compared to the Pole Star which commands the homage of the multitude of 
stars without leaving its place” (Lau 1979, 63).  And in Daoist literature, specifically the works of 
Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu), we discover that the ideal image of the sage is one who realizes ‘non-action’ as a 
normative practice, vis-à-vis embodying the Dao.  For example, consider the following passage from the 
essay “Preserving and Accepting:” 
 Merely situate yourself in nonaction, 
 And things will evolve of themselves. 
 
Slough off your bodily form 
Dim your intelligence 
Forget all relationships and things; 
Join in the great commonality of boundlessness. (Chuang Tzu 1994, 99) 
To begin unpacking this passage in order to see how it helps us make sense of Dōgen’s perspective of 
not-doing/without-committing, there are some preliminary points that we should note about the nature of 
‘negative actions’ proper.  Herein, Gilbert Ryle’s “Negative Actions,” from On Thinking (1979) will be 
helpful. 
The first question we must ask is whether a particular mode of behavior can be regarded as a 
negative act, and if so, in what ways?  For example, positive actions are actions that an agent voluntarily 
intends in order to achieve some positive or negative end.  Simultaneously, positive actions always 
involve not doing something else.  If I am weeding the garden, then I am not riding a bicycle, or reading a 
book, or drinking coffee with a friend, which are certainly activities that I could be doing.  Moreover, if 
we characterize negative actions as ‘actions’, “which consist in the agent’s intentional non-performance 
of some specifiable actions,” then consequently, one will find themselves simply doing something else 




application of a familiar point about negation in general. […] The negativity title or description of a 
negative ‘action’ specifies only that one particular thing that an agent is not doing […] it is non-committal 
about what else in particular he is doing” (Ryle 1979,108).  Thus, Ryle concludes that what we think of as 
‘negative actions,’ such as abstaining from eating meat or procrastinating, should not be thought of as 
actions at all, but instead, as actualities.  ‘Negative actions,’ as Ryle states, “seem not to qualify as actions 
proper, for the reason that the full story of a positive action would report it with its full complement of 
inter alia chronological, behavioral, technical, circumstantial details, while the full story of a negative 
‘action’ would be specific only about the particular thing that the agent did not do” (Ryle 1979, 108).  
Accordingly, since we understand, for example, what a ‘non-smoking’ sign means, and so, ipso facto, 
understand the conditions that support believing whether or not the ‘sign’ is currently being respected, it 
thus follows that what we conventionally characterize as a non-action, in this case ‘not smoking,’ is, as 
Ryle contends, an actuality.  Based upon this line of reasoning, how should we interpret the Daoist/Zen 
philosophy of non-action (Ch. wu-wei)? 
If we interpret non-action as an actuality, vis-à-vis non-duality of subject-object/agent-action, 
then I think Ryle’s analytic points are helpful.  We ought not to think of non-action as a particular action 
that is distinct from other actions; rather, non-action is the actualization/realization of the dropping-off of 
body and mind (Jpn. shinjin datsuraku) which is not a specific act unto itself.  Dropping off body and 
mind, and the embodiment of non-action, is to be realized when one is walking, sitting working and 
reclining; in Zen, non-action is to be actualized and realized through the ritual performance of self-
overcoming, vis-à-vis all of our daily actions.139  As a mode of embodiment, non-action is effortless flow 
and play.  As an effortless flow, whereby our projects and daily tasks become opportunities for play, non-
action is realized when there is no longer a duality separating subject and object, or agent and action.  As 
                                                 
139 The philosophy of non-action (Ch. wu-wei) is presented in The Record of Lin-Chi.  For example, Lin-chi (Jpn. 
Rinzai) states, “Followers of the Way, the Dharma of buddhas calls for no special undertakings.  Just act ordinary, 
without trying to do anything particular.  Move your bowels, piss, get dressed, eat your rice, and if you get tired, 




Burton Watson states in his introduction to the Chuang Tzu, “In such a state, all human actions become as 
spontaneous and mindless as those of the natural world.  Man becomes one with nature […] and merges 
himself with the Tao, or the Way, the underlying unity that embraces man, Nature, and all that is in the 
universe” (Watson 1964, 6).   
We will be saying more about flow and play in Chapter seven.  For right now, returning to the 
passage cited above from “Preserving and Accepting,” we can begin making sense of Dōgen’s ‘not doing’ 
or ‘not committing.’ In the first two lines – “Merely situate yourself in nonaction, and things will evolve 
of themselves” (Mair 1994, 99) – nonaction is the prescribed mode of action by which one is to comport 
their lives.  Contrary to not doing anything at all, nonaction refers to a mode of being whereby 
subject/object duality dissolves, thereby opening up a nondual horizon whereby our embodied self can 
spontaneously act with grace and nimbleness.  Similar to a dancer who has perfected their steps, or a 
musician who has mastered a good many scales and chords, the Daoist sage or the Zen master is able to 
act freely without thinking.  The relationship between ‘not doing’ and ‘without thinking’ is noted in the 
remaining lines of the aforementioned verse whereby we are to “slough off bodily form.”  Herein, the 
similarities between the use of this Daoist phrase and Dōgen’s genjō perspective in general, his 
philosophy and practice of zazen in particular, are striking. ‘Dropping off body and mind,’ is a phrase 
Dōgen uses throughout the Shōbōgenzō, including Genjō Kōan, Fukanzazengi, and Shoaku-Makusa.  In 
the context of zazen, Dōgen states, “Therefore we should cease the intellectual work of studying sayings 
and chasing words.  We should learn the backward step of turning the light and reflecting.  Body and 
mind will naturally fall away, and the original features will manifest themselves before us” (Dōgen 1994, 
280).  Or again, in the context of ethics, vis-à-vis mushō140 and the karma of “not committing,” Dōgen 
states: 
Cause-and-effect itself, at times, makes us practice.  The state in which the original features of 
this cause-and-effect have already become conspicuous is not committing, it is [the state] without 
                                                 




appearance, it is [the state] without constancy, it is not being unclear, and it is not falling down – 
because it is the state in which [body and mind] have fallen away. (Dōgen 1994, 101). 
We will say more about Dōgen’s use of this ancient Daoist phrase below in the next section of this 
chapter as it is arguably the pivot of Dōgen’s zazen and the ethical practice of non-thinking, which is what 
distinguishes Dōgen’s ethics from ethical theories and metaethical positions in Western philosophy.  As 
Kasulis notes, “Western ethics has generally developed a thinking or not thinking approach to morality;” 
Dōgen’s ethics, however, which dynamically pivots from “without thinking,” emphasizes the 
“prereflective aspects of experience” (Kasulis 1981, 98).  What we can take away from this comparative 
examination is that by transforming the imperative shoaku-makusa into a descriptive statement, as Kasulis 
and Bodiford suggest, we are able to discover that Dōgen is breathing new life (i.e. expanding our 
understanding) into this ancient Daoist ethical perspective of wu-wei, nonaction.  More specifically, and 
in keeping with Zen’s syncretic legacy, Dōgen is inviting us to rethink Buddhist moral prescriptions from 
a non-dual perspective whereby the separation of subject and object has “fallen away” and the moral 
distinction between agents and actions dissolves, thus allowing for “the original features to manifest” 
(Dōgen 1994, 208).  In short, non-action is how one normatively comports oneself upon having realized 
Buddha-nature via dropping off body-and-mind.  To flesh this out further, let’s turn our attention to 
Dōgen’s moral reflections on the cultivation of ‘Bodhi-mind’ (Jpn. bodaishin) and the determination to 
realize complete enlightenment. 
§6.5 Anti-Cognitivism: Bodhi-Thinking as Ethical Non-Thinking 
 In his fascicle Shinjin-Gakudo, “Learning the Truth With Body and Mind,” Dōgen notes the 
relationship between non-thinking, as the establishment of ‘Bodhi-mind’ (Jpn. bodaishin) and ethics. 
This is the establishment of the Bodhi-mind, it is the naked mind moment by moment, it is the 
mind of the eternal buddhas, it is the normal mind, and it is the triple world as one mind.  There is 
learning the truth through casting aside these kinds of mind, and there is learning the truth 
through taking them up.  In such instances, the truth is learned through thinking, and the truth is 
learned through not thinking. [...] To scale the city walls and go into the mountains is to leave one 
mind and enter another.  That the mountains are being entered is “Thinking the concrete state of 
not thinking.”  “That the world is being abandoned is “Non-thinking.”  To be amassing this state 




There are several points to note so to get clear on this passage.  First, Dōgen explicitly claims that the 
establishment of ‘Bodhi-mind’ is made real by way of thinking of not thinking.  Herein, our awareness, 
thoughts and feelings are dynamically intimate within each moment of our practice (i.e. “the naked mind 
moment by moment”).  The second point to note is that Dōgen is careful not to carve out any 
metaphysical distinctions between “non-thinking,” (Jpn. hishiryō) and “not thinking” (Jpn. fushiryō).  As 
he poetically expresses, thinking about not thinking is itself entering the mountains, while non-thinking is 
the world being left behind and abandoned.  The mountains being entered and the world being left behind 
are not two separate actions; entering into a monastic community is itself leaving the world behind.  
Similarly, non-thinking is not a different mode of thought or state of consciousness separate from the act 
of thinking about not thinking; they are, rather, co-dependent and empty.  However, though they are 
empty, they are realized in the everyday (i.e. conventional) world of causality and impermanence.  
 By drawing the conceptual bridge between non-thinking and ‘Bodhi-mind’ (Jpn. bodaishin) 
Dōgen is able to highlight the relationship between ‘Bodhi-mind’ and ethics.    
Establishment of the Bodhi-mind is beyond existence and beyond non-existence; it is beyond 
good, beyond bad, and beyond indifference; it does not originate from a reward state, and it is not 
always impossible for gods and sentient beings to realize.  It is simply that, in time with time, we 
establish the Bodhi-mind.  Because [the establishment] is not concerned with circumstances, in 
the very moment of establishment of the Bodhi-mind, the whole dharma world establishes the 
Bodhi-mind.  (Dōgen 1994, 251-252) 
There are several important points worth noting here.  The first pertains to karma.  According to Dōgen, 
our karma, in regards to the conditions and circumstances we now find ourselves in, does not, as I noted 
in the previous chapter, obstruct realization.  Karmic conditions and circumstances, because they are 
empty, do not inherently obstruct whether we realize the Buddha-dharma or not.  As Dōgen subsequently 
states in the same fascicle, “Even in states such as those of hell, hungry ghosts, animals, asuras, we 
establish the Bodhi-mind” (Dōgen 1994, 252).  The establishment of the ‘Bodhi-mind’ is itself the very 
moment of practicing zazen; the very moment of thinking of not thinking via non-thinking.  That being 




and perhaps attune our mode-of-being within the six-fold world of gods, humans, hell beings, hungry 
ghosts, animals and asuras: “[The establishment] seems to turn circumstances around, but circumstances 
are not aware of it” (Dōgen 1994, 252).  Thus, ‘Bodhi-mind’ (Jpn. bodaishin), vis-à-vis non-thinking, is 
not, notwithstanding the denial of objective moral values, transcendent to the moral life per se.  
 Pivoting from the aforementioned treatment of karma, the second point worth noting concerns the 
relationship between ‘Bodhi-mind’and normative values.  As Dōgen explains in the above passage, “The 
establishment of the Bodhi-mind is beyond existence and beyond non-existence; it is beyond good, 
beyond bad, and beyond indifference” (Dōgen 1994, 252).  While one might question how there could be 
a relationship between ‘Bodhi-mind’ and ethics if the cultivation of the “enlightened mind” is beyond 
good, bad and indifference, when we consider Dōgen’s reflections on karma, the relationship seems 
reasonably consistent.  According to Dōgen, since karmic circumstances have no bearing upon 
establishing ‘Bodhi-mind’ it would be a contradiction to state that the establishment of such – ‘bodhi-
mind’ – is contingent upon the objective existence of good, bad, and indifference.  Since the 
establishment of ‘bodhi-mind’ via non-thinking, is empty – ‘beyond existence and non-existence’ – it is 
through non-thinking that the nature of morality is realized as uncreated (Jpn. mushō) and the practice of 
not-doing/without-doing (Jpn. makusa) is embodied.  In keeping with Van der Braak’s interpretation of 
Dōgen, the metaethical commitments of ‘uncreated’ values and the action guiding directive of non-
action/without-committing do not entail that Zen practice is completely ‘beyond good and evil.’  Thus, as 
Kim explains, Dōgen’s normative perspective, “is neither heteronomous ‘Thou shalt not’ nor the 
autonomous ‘I ought not’ but is non-contrivance.  Morality, if it is to be authentic, should and can arise 
spontaneously from enlightenment. […] When morality becomes effortless, purposeless, and playful, it 
becomes a nonmoral morality that is the culmination of Zen practice of the Way in which morality, art, 
and play merge together” (Kim 2004, 228).    In other words, Dogen’s normative perspective, vis-à-vis 
nonduality of practice and original enlightenment (Jpn. hongaku), does not permit one to commit evil 




thinking about good and evil from the standpoints of consequentialism or deontology, Dōgen’s 
metaethical standpoint directs us to penetrate good and evil via non-thinking.    
Dōgen’s metaethical standpoint of anti-realism vis-à-vis non-thinking can be further clarified 
through the Shōbōgenzō fascicle Sanjushichi-Bon-Bodaui-Bunpo, “Thirty Seven Elements of Bodhi.”  
Consider the following passage whereby Dōgen employs the tools of critical thinking in order to 
challenge the realist view that a ‘wrong’ could exist, mind-independently, at some future time, which in 
turn would allow for us to prevent such from happening. 
What is called bad does not always have established forms and grades; the term has been 
established land by land and sphere by sphere.  Nevertheless, prevention of that which has not yet 
occurred is called the Buddha-Dharma, and we have received its authentic transmission. […] 
Now, let us inquire, at the time when bad has not occurred, where is it?  To say that it will exist in 
the future is to be forever a non-Buddhist of nihilism.  To say that the future becomes the present 
is not an insistence of the Buddha-Dharma: the three times would have to be confused.  If the 
three times were confused, all dharmas would be confused.  If all dharmas were confused, real 
form would be confused.  If real form were confused, buddhas alone, together with buddhas, 
would be confused.  For this reason we do not say that the future will, in future, become the 
present.  (Dōgen 1994, 6) 
In this passage, Dōgen proceeds by noting what he thinks is a metaethical given: values are contextually 
relative.141  From one land to the next on this heavenly sphere, to the lands of other heavenly spheres, 
badness, as well as goodness and indifference, have different “forms and grades.”  As I interpret Dōgen’s 
relativism, it is not the case that there are different moral truths that are discovered by different cultures or 
individual subjects; instead, the relativity of values simply entails that values are always mind-dependent, 
thus situated in relation to circumstances that arise co-dependently.   In keeping with Guilbault’s 
‘conventionalism’ and Davis’ ‘contextualism’, as I interpret Dōgen, relativism does not entail amorality, 
but rather demands nuanced thinking on our part as critical thinkers.  Thus, by drawing a clear 
metaethical line in the ‘Zen sand’, Dōgen employs a Nāgārjunian line of Middle-Way reasoning in order 
                                                 
141 Davis’ contextual relativism is not only evidenced here, but in the fascicle Kenbutsu, “Meeting Buddha;” therein 
Dōgen states, “When we act, we act following circumstances” (Dōgen 1994, 195).  By emphasising circumstances, 
rather than principles or consequentialist values, Dōgen’s conception of moral actions is situational, contextual and 




to critically evaluate the concept of bad, vis-à-vis time.  Embedded in his analysis is the following 
problem: if badness really exists, then where does it exist when it has not occurred?  To say that it does 
not exist now, but that it will in the future, is unacceptable from Dōgen’s position of anti-realism, mainly 
because moral realism entails the existence of permanent self-natures (Skt. svabhāva) that ontologically 
define things and qualities like badness; thus if it does not exist now, then how can we ever imagine it 
coming into being in the future (i.e. coming into being implies impermanence, and thereby contradicts 
moral realism).  On the other hand, Dōgen notes that if we say that moral qualities such as badness exist 
in the present and that the future becomes the present, then we are in even murkier philosophical waters 
for we are now begging the following question: at what time does the future become the present?  It does 
not make sense that the future becomes the present in the past simply because, in regards to badness, there 
would be no reason to try and prevent bad from coming into existence in the future since its existence is 
in the past.  Neither can we say that the future becomes the present in the ‘present’ for then we would be 
committed to the view that the wrongs that have not occurred are occurring right now, in the present 
moment.  Finally, we cannot say that the future becomes the present in the future for the simple reason 
that it is absurd.  
 Dōgen’s treatment of ‘preventing bad that has not occurred’, which no doubt echoes Nāgārjuna’s 
style of reductio ad absurdum reasoning, goes further into the metaphysics of time, as well as into 
epistemological questions regarding sense perception and empirical observation (i.e. naturalism) in a way 
that creatively advances his metaethical standpoint of anti-realism.   
Let us inquire further: what thing does “bad that has not yet occurred” describe?  Who has known 
or seen it?  For it to be known and seen, there must be a time of its non-occurrence and a time of 
something other than its non-occurrence.  In that case, it could not be called something that had 
not yet occurred.  It would have to be called something that has already vanished.  Without 
studying under non-Buddhists or śrāvakas and others of the small vehicle, we should learn in 
practice the prevention of bad that has not yet occurred.  All the bad in the Universe is called “bad 
that has not yet occurred,” and it is bad that does not appear.  Non-appearance means yesterday 




His first question highlights a skeptical point: if bad that has not occurred exists, then “badness” would 
have to exist in the present moment; however, it does not make sense to speak of a future non-existing 
thing actually existing in the present moment.  His second question is framed in light of traditional 
Buddhist theories of knowledge: if bad that has not yet occurred ‘really exists,’ then not only must it refer 
to something, we must clarify how we know it exists.  Either we know it through sense perception or not.  
If by way of sense perception, then we have the untenable consequence of perceiving a qualitative ‘thing’ 
such as badness prior to its actually occurring.  If we do not know through sense perception, then our 
knowledge must either be grounded by some inference or intuition.  However, the latter, intuition, can be 
dismissed simply because intuition is not part of early Buddhist theories of knowledge.  Nor can the 
former, inference, be affirmed as a live-option since instances of valid inference are always based upon 
something that has occurred and has been seen.  Since what happens in the future is of a class of things 
and events that have not occurred, there is no experience of such that would allow for us to infer and 
thereby prevent such things as badness from occurring.   
Critics of Dōgen might argue that events from the past, and that which occurs in the present 
allows for us to set a general precedent to thereby legalistically infer the badness of future occurrences.  
As evidenced in the passage, Dōgen is aware of this realist perspective, for it would entail the following: 
“yesterday preaching and established rule, today preaching the same rule, as well as tomorrow.”  
However, as Dōgen states at the end of the passage with a ‘Humean’ twist, the truths of rule preaching 
yesterday need not hold true for tomorrow; “yesterday preaching and established rule, today preaching an 
exception to the rule” (Dōgen 1994, 6).  While Dōgen does not deny the effectiveness of inference, he 
does not think we should conclude that moral beliefs once accepted in the past will continue to be 
accepted in the future by the same individual, sangha or secular society.  As Dōgen states, badness, 
goodness and indifference are not only mushō, uncreated, but ‘non-appearance’ (Jpn. fushō) as well.  The 




because the present moment does not have any temporal duration, good, bad and indifference are 
simultaneously concealed and revealed as non-appearance.    
 In light of these metaethical reflections, Kim’s characterization of the ethical spirit of Dōgen’s 
Zen as non-dogmatic and non-conformist seems accurate (Kim 2007, 93).  To characterize Dōgen’s ethics 
as non-dogmatic and nonconformist precludes any characterization of Dōgen as a moral objectivist who is 
committed to the universal status of moral values and principles.  This contention is supported by 
additional characterizations advanced by Kim, including “open-ended” and “dynamic” (Kim 2007, 93).  
To characterize Dōgen as open-ended, Kim seems to imply that there is no fixed set of values, principles, 
precepts or moral truths that exist before or after any moral “situation.” Herein, Kim seems to be echoing 
the undetermination thesis in philosophy of science, which states that for “any theory that makes 
reference to posited unobservable features of the world in its explanatory apparatus will always encounter 
rival theories incompatible with the original theory but equally compatible with all possible observational 
data that might be taken as confirmatory of the original theory” (Sklar 1999, 702).  To help flesh out the 
meaning of Kim’s use of open-endedness, we shall appeal to the interpretative lens of moderate moral 
skepticism.   
Dōgen’s moderate moral skepticism is best understood in light of his overall skeptical outlook.  In 
the fascicle Kuge, “Flowers in Space,” we are presented with some of Dōgen’s finest poetic prose 
concerning the subject matter of truth, skepticism and our knowledge of the external world.  In Zen, 
‘flowers in space’ is a metaphor for the illusory nature of phenomena and the external world.  Regardless 
of whether one is a Buddha or not, according to Dōgen, all beings see the world as ‘flowers in space.’ 
There is what is seen by clouded eyes, what is seen by clear eyes, what is seen by the Buddha’s 
eyes, what is seen by the patriarchs’ eyes, what is seen by the eyes of the truth, what is seen by 
blind eyes, what is seen by three thousand years, what is seen by eight hundred years, what is 
seen by hundreds of kalpas, and what is seen by countless kalpas.  All these see flowers in space, 
but space itself is multifarious, and flowers are diverse. (Dōgen 1994, 14) 
Herein, Dōgen’s perspectivism reveals a general skepticism regarding our ability to objectively 




Nietzsche, mainly that ‘facts’ are never understood independently from our interpretations; ‘facts’ too are 
mind-dependent.  Dōgen alludes to this when he states, “Remember, the buddhas in the ten directions are 
not unreal;” meaning it is not the case that they are essentially non-existent, “they are originally just the 
flowers in our eyes” (Dōgen 1994, 19).142  However, that being said, Dōgen recognizes that this illusory 
world of flowers in space is not random nor arbitrary; “The world has causes, and the world has effects.  
We enact cause-and-effect that is this world, and we accept the cause-and-effect that is the world” (Dōgen 
1994, 10).  And, based upon the causal regularities we conventionally perceive through this world of 
‘flowers in space,’ we are able to formulate inferences despite our recognition that they do not reveal 
mind-independent truths; thus, Dōgen states: 
This exact moment of flowers arriving is never a random event.  Apricot and willow flowers 
inevitably bloom on apricot and willow trees; looking at [apricot and willow] flowers we can 
identify apricot and willow trees, and looking at apricot and willow trees we can distinguish 
[apricot and willow] flowers.  Peach and plum flowers never bloom on apricot and willow trees.  
Apricot and willow flowers bloom on apricot and willow trees, and peach and plum flowers 
bloom on peach and plum trees.  Flowers in space blooming in space are also like this; they never 
bloom on other things and never bloom on other trees.  Looking at the various colors of space 
flowers, one imagines the limitlessness of space fruits. (Dōgen 1994, 14-15)   
If we interpret this passage in light of the two truths, while there is no ultimate truth that one can realize 
about the nature of reality, causal regularities do afford us the ability to formulate conventional judgments 
regarding fruits that grow on trees vs. fruits that grow on vines; hence, Dōgen’s moderate skepticism 
which, as I contend, includes normative matters as well.  While we may not be able to know what is 
ultimately right or wrong, good or evil, so that all moral judgments for any given situation are completely 
                                                 
142 Dōgen’s skepticism in Kuge has roots in Awakening of Faith.  In the second chapter of this Mahāyāna text, “The 
Correction of Evil Attachments,” it states, “All evil attachments originate from biased views; if a man is free from 
bias, he will be free from evil attachments” (Hakeda 1967, 74).  Herein, human bias, vis-à-vis evil attachments, 
include: (1) belief in the self (Skt. atman); and (2) belief that external world is ‘real’ (Hakeda 1967).  In other words, 
according to the Awakening of Faith, realism proper engenders evil attachments; thus, to overcome evil attachments, 
one must affirm an anti-realist perspective.  “[The way to correct this error is] to understand clearly that ‘empty 
space’ is a delusive concept, the substance of which is nonexistent and unreal.  It is merely predicated in relation to 
[its correlative] corporeal objects.  If it is taken as a being [termed nonbeing], a negative being, then it should be 
discarded, because] it causes the mind to remain in samsara.  In fact there are no external corporeal objects, because 
all objects are originally of the mind.  And as long as there are no corporeal objects at all, ‘empty space’ cannot be 
maintained.  All objects are of the mind alone; but when illusions arise, [objects which are regarded as real] appear.  





‘case-closed’ matters a priori, such skepticism does not preclude our ability to formulate conventional 
moral beliefs of right and wrong, good or bad; judgments and beliefs, as well as the inferences we 
formulate from them, quite often work just fine in fostering deep personal relationships and civic 
responsibilities that matter to us as ‘flowers in space.’  We are able to formulate moral imperatives and 
express our judgments as they are relative to our attitudinal leanings.  However, that being said, while 
such expressions are conventionally pragmatic and relative to our attitudinal leanings, I do not believe 
Dōgen would consider such expressions to be ‘true’ in the sense of what is true for one culture is ‘true’ 
despite being false for another culture.  In fact, in Kuge it is clear that Dōgen wants to avoid any position 
that either affirms or completely denies ‘truth’ proper; “To turn one’s back on the Truth is wrong, and to 
approach the Truth is also wrong” (Dōgen 1994, 17).  And, as we have seen in both Chapter four and 
Chapter five, Dōgen avoids using strong epistemic terms such as ‘truth’ in the context of normative 
issues.  
 Based upon Dōgen’s skeptical outlook, particularly in light of his anti-realist leanings, one might 
conclude that Dōgen is an error theorist or fictionalist; that moral propositions expressed in Zen literature, 
kōan and encounter dialogues are either completely erroneous and false, or pragmatic fictions.  There are 
several reasons why I think these metaethical characterizations fail to capture Dōgen’s perspectivism.  
First, in regards to error theory, Dōgen would likely argue that there is no firm duality between what is 
‘true’ and what is ‘false’ as thinkers such as J.L. Mackie maintain.  In fact, in Kuge, Dōgen alludes to this 
very point when he poses the question, “Is there anyone who knows that this wrong is also the truth?” 
(Dōgen, 1994, 17).  Thus, I do not think error theory captures Dōgen’s perspective regarding the status of 
moral propositions, such as ‘don’t think about good or bad’ when practicing zazen, or preparing and 
serving meals for fellow monks.  And in regards to fictionalism, it is not obvious that Dōgen thinks that 
his normative instructions to the tenzo, or his instructions on how to practice zazen, are useful fictions 
either; the fact that Dōgen wrote prolifically on ‘all matters Buddhist,’ and invested his being-time in a 




that he did not view his perspectivism as a mere fiction.  After all, if we examine fictionalism through 
Austin’s analytic lens of descriptive and performative speech acts, we discover that for any given 
normative speech act, it is either a false description of reality or a performative lie, or both (e.g., Bill 
Clinton’s “I did not have sex with that woman!”).  As we have noted, Dōgen’s Way-seeking approach to 
ethics is not an attempt to describe the nature of reality; thus it is unlikely that he considered his 
Shōbōgenzō to be anything like a novel, fable or myth.  And when we consider his writings from a 
performative lens, it is also not obvious that he considered himself to be liar or ‘bullshit’ artist.  In his 
insightful book On Bullshit, Harry G. Frankfurt provides a crisp analytic treatment of the subtle 
differences between these two modes of deception; according to Frankfurt, “Lying and bluffing are both 
modes of misrepresentation,” however, “the bullshitter is faking things” (Frankfurt 2005, 46).   
For these reasons, I contend that the cognitivist standpoints of error theory and fictionalism fall 
short in being able to capture Dōgen’s nuanced metaethical perspective.  According to Dōgen, the 
conventional truths and normative beliefs that we express are tailored to human needs, desires and 
conceptions of individual and collective flourishing; they are not independent from human perspectives 
and interpretations.  Thus, due to the dynamism of perspectives and interpretations, humans invent and 
create values through language, rather than discover and objectively describe such.  And, in regards to the 
other anti-realist perspective, non-cognitivism, we have already noted three reasons for resisting this 
characterization.  They include: (1) the disparity between the Way-seeking perspective of Dōgen, vis-à-
vis path of the bodhisattva, and the truth-seeking perspective of Anglo-American metaethics; (2) the 
disparity between the fact that non-cognitivists maintain firm distinctions between feelings and reason, 
while Dōgen’s philosophy of emptiness denies any absolute distinction between the two; and (3) that 
moral propositions are not, as non-cognitivism maintains, reducible to feelings, but rather, in light of the 
vows of the bodhisattva, arise from a more primal, prereflective force which is realized through non-
thinking and the not-doing mode of being that is salient to zazen practice.  This normative practice, which 




day lives, is anti-cognitive.  Accordingly, rather than attempting to find an additional theory to explain 
how anti-realism in general, Dōgen’s anti-realism in particular, can justify normative judgments about the 
conventional world, perhaps grounding such in practice, mainly zazen, will be fruitful ‘apricot blossoms 
and willow flowers.’  For this reason, I believe anti-cognitivism is an appropriate characterization of 
Dōgen’s perspective regarding what normative statements mean, and what they say.143   
The fact that Dōgen’s ethics is not reducible to either of error-theory/fictionalism or non-
cognitivism does not mean, as noted in previous chapters, that certain concepts and ideas that Western 
metaethical theories use to think about the nature of values and moral beliefs are unhelpful for examining 
Dōgen’s perspective.  In regards to non-cognitivism in particular, the emphasis it places upon the 
embodied affects provides a helpful lens for interpreting Dōgen’s practice of ethics, vis-à-vis zazen, as 
well as his sensitivity to the dynamism of perspectives that constitute the human and “more-than-human-
world.”  As evidenced in a good many fascicles including “The Mountains and Waters Sutra,” Sansui-
kyō, and “Insentient Beings Preach Dharma,“ Mujo Seppo, Dōgen’s open-ended, egoless perspectivism is 
non-anthropocentric as it pluralistically includes the perspectives of fishes, birds, mountains and rivers.144 
From the perspective of non-thinking, one becomes attuned to the realization that one’s perspective, sub 
specie aeternitatis, is simply one perspective amongst a good many; thus there are no normative 
judgments or expressions that are cognitively true.  In the context of the practice of non-thinking it is 
                                                 
143 As I noted in Chapter two and Chapter three, Guilbault’s conventionalism and Davis’ ‘contextualism’ are 
effective for clarifying what normative propositions say, vis-à-vis Dōgen’s metaethics; however, they fall short in 
clarifying what our normative expressions mean.  Notwithstanding their interpretations, I contend that anti-
cognitivism does both. 
144 In Chapter seven, I will be examining the metaethical position of non-anthropocentrism more closely; and, 
because this concept is closely associated with the applied ethics discipline of environmental ethics, I will attempt to 
generally situate Dōgen in relation to some leading thinkers in this field that have proffered different versions of 
non-anthropocentrism.  In short, non-anthropocentrism maintains that humans are not inherently more valuable than 





clear that Dōgen’s perspectivism is not entangled within cognitivist truths and/or principles; rather, it is 
dynamically somatic and embodied.145 
As I noted in Chapter three, Dōgen maintains, specifically in the Bendōwa fascicle, that the 
practice of zazen is distinct from the meditative practices of concentration (Skt. śamatha) and insight 
(Skt. vipaśanā); what distinguishes such is Dōgen’s conception of the body.  Contrary to early Buddhist 
perspectives, vis-à-vis meditation and the “The Foundations of Mindfulness” (Pāli Satipatthāna Sutta), 
whereby the body is viewed as repulsive and foul, in the Sanjushichi-Bon-Bodai-Bunpo fascicle, “Thirty-
Seven Elements of Bodhi,” Dōgen views the body as a vehicle for liberation.  As Van der Braak explains:  
In zazen, a situation is created in which the drives cultivate themselves.  As Yuasa puts it, the 
departure point of cultivation assumes not the mind dominating the body, but rather, the body’s 
dominating the mind.  To sit in meditation is to carry out this attitude.  Zazen facilitates an 
attitude where the conscious mental process can take a step back, and the body can dominate the 
mind.  The question could arise, what is it that puts the body in the right situation?  And what 
recognizes what is the right situation?  The Buddhist answer to this would be: bodaishin, the drive 
toward awakening.  Bodaishin manifests itself as a conscious intention to practice zazen but is 
itself a result of a particular configuration of the bodily drives.  Therefore, bodaishin cannot be 
cultivated directly; it will develop as the body is further cultivated. (Van der Braak 2011, 76).   
Ultimately, Dōgen’s perspective of zazen as an embodied practice, vis-à-vis ‘this body itself is Buddha’ 
(Jpn. sokushin-jōbutsu) reflects a paradigm shift within East Asian Buddhist traditions, such as T’ien-T’ai 
(Jpn. Tendai) and Hua-Yen (Jpn. Kegon).  For example, in a T’ien T’ai text on meditation, The Method of 
Concentration and Insight (Ch. Ta-ch’eng chih-kuan fa-men), it states: 
As to the function of concentration and insight:  It means that because of the accomplishment of 
concentration, the Pure Mind is realized in substance, the nature of which is without duality is 
                                                 
145 As I noted in Chapter three, the emphasis Dōgen places upon the body, vis-à-vis the practice of zazen, has been 
explored by Dōgen scholars Shigenori Nagatomo and André van der Braak.  In the next chapter we will see how 
their perspectives of embodiment help clarify Dōgen’s non-anthropocentrism.  For right now it is worth noting that 
from Dōgen’s perspective, the body has greater priority over that of the mind, vis-à-vis zazen.  As Van der Braak 
explains, “In zazen, a situation is created in which the drives cultivate themselves.  As Yuasa puts it, the departure 
point of cultivation assumes not the mind dominating the body, but rather, the body’s dominating the mind.  To sit in 
meditation is to carry out this attitude.  Zazen facilitates an attitude where the conscious mental process can take a 
step back, and the body can dominate the mind.  The question could arise, what is it that puts the body in the right 
situation?  And what recognizes what is the right situation?  The Buddhist answer to this would be: bodaishin, the 
drive toward awakening.  Bodaishin manifests itself as a conscious intention to practice zazen but is itself a result of 
a particular configuration of the bodily drives.  Therefore, bodaishin cannot be cultivated directly; it will develop as 





harmonized through principle (li, rational nature of things), these and all sentient beings are 
harmoniously identified to form a body of one single character.  Thereupon the Three Treasures 
are merged together without being three, and because of this the Two Levels of Truth are fused 
without being two.  How calm, still and pure!  How deep, stable and quiet!  How pure and clear 
the inner silence!  It functions without character of functioning, and acts without character of 
acting. (Chan 1963, 404). 
In this passage, the T’ien T’ai patriarch Hui-ssu (514-577) does not promote a philosophy and practice of 
śamatha and vipaśanā whereby the body is normatively viewed as repulsive, but rather as a part of the 
nondual nature of existence, vis-à-vis three bodies of the Buddha.146In the context of Dōgen’s Zen, I 
contend that the embodiment of zazen, vis-à-vis non-thinking, is itself an expression of a particular 
perspective; more specifically in regards to the justification of conventional normative judgments, the 
embodiment of the ‘mountain still state’ is anti-cognitive.   
As a metaethical counterpart to anti-realism, I contend that anti-cognitivism, vis-à-vis zazen, is a 
sound characterization of Dōgen’s metaethics; normative propositions in general, the somatic 
expressivism of zazen in particular, do not describe mind-independent facts, nor do they express mind-
independent truths, but rather reveal and conceal perspectives.  Thus, normative utterances are, following 
Steve Heine’s lead, a mode of ‘nonspeaking’ via non-thinking; “Expressivity is […] a crucial component 
of Dōgen’s ongoing religious quest to realize enlightenment and accomplish the accompanying 
pedagogical mission of transmitting the Dharma to a new generation of followers studying Zen in a 
remote country” (Heine 2020, 148).  
The Treasury thus serves the dual function of being a caretaker or guardian of tradition, 
introducing and propagating Chinese approaches in the Japanese context, and a disrupter or 
reformer of this legacy, producing a substantial body of work that –in irreverent, tables-turning 
fashion characteristic of Zen discourse–is continually undermining and revising traditional 
standpoints.  Dōgen’s insightfully critical handling of Chan literary materials that often originated 
in the oral delivery of lectures or sermons constitutes an approach to nonspeaking designed to 
stymie the stereotypical views of disciples and reorient their minds toward a state of nonthinking 
that explores all possible perspectives without being fixated on any specific option. (Heine 2020, 
147)   
                                                 
146 Notwithstanding this perspective of embodiment, Hui-ssu notes that the manner by which this non-dual mode of 
concentration and insight is realized is itself a mode of non-action that parallels Dōgen’s philosophy of ‘without 
committing’ (Jpn. makusa) noted above; “It functions with character of functioning, and acts without character of 




As a normative mode of expression, zazen is neither a dualistic mode of speaking, vis-à-vis thinking, nor 
a quietist retreat from speaking via not-thinking; rather, it is an anti-cognitivist mode of ‘nonspeaking’ via 
non-thinking.  By following the instructions of: (1) sitting in half or full lotus posture; (2) wearing loose 
clothing; (3) placing the hands in line with the naval and keeping the body erect; (4) pressing the tongue 
against the roof of the mouth, and with the mouth and teeth closed allowing for one’s breath to pass 
effortlessly in and out of the nose; and (5) keeping the eyes open in a fixed gaze, one is able to realize the 
embodied affective state of ‘non-thinking,’ that is beyond the dualities of rationality and irrationality, 
speaking and not speaking.  Non-thinking is, in other words, affectively realized through thinking of not-
thinking; it is an affective awareness that transforms thinking from its anthropocentric orientation to its 
non-anthropocentric/egoless perspectivism.147  Thus, rather than interpreting the embodied awareness of 
non-thinking as the suppression of thinking and speaking, non-thinking is constantly intimate with all of 
the dualisms and discriminatory thoughts that constitute our thinking speaking; “Nonthinking is not 
opposed to thinking […] it is the open field of awareness that encompasses and engenders thinking” 
(Davis 2016, 219).  
§ 6.6 The Ethical Practice of “Dropping-off Body-Mind”  
 The mode of non-thinking that is realized in the mountain-still state of practicing zazen is 
captured by additional verses in both the Zazenshin and Zazengi.  Beginning with the latter, Dōgen writes, 
“Cast aside all involvements and discontinue all affairs.  Good is not thought of, evil is not thought of.  It 
is not mind, intellect or consciousness; it is not thoughts, ideas or perceptions.  Do not intend to make 
                                                 
147 Kim identifies and explains Dōgen’s nonanthropocentric modes-of-thinking when he states: “Along this line of 
thought, thinking is also said to be exerted by “the mind of the entire great earth” (jindaichi no kokoro), by “the 
mind of trees and stones” (bokuseki shin), by “the mind of mountains and rivers and the great earth (seng daichi 
shin), by “the mind of the sun, moon, and stars” (nichigetsu seishin shin ), and “by the one mind of all dharmas” 
(issaihō isshin).  Elsewhere Dōgen uses the expression “thinking of the ten directions (jippō shiyui).  All these 
locutions are not whims of fantasy.  On the contrary, Dōgen’s mystic vision situates thinking firmly in the context of 
existentiality and temporality of the human condition.  Better yet, the logic of intimacy between self and the 




Buddha; slough off sitting still” (Dōgen; 1988, 177).  With these instructions, Dōgen echoes the poetic 
prescription made in verse ten of Seng Ts’an’s On Believing In Mind: 
 Abide not with dualism, 
 Carefully avoid pursuing it; 
 As soon as you have right and wrong, 
 Confusion ensues, and Mind is lost. (Conze 1959, 172) 
For Dōgen, if one’s zazen practice is consumed by thinking about moral ideas, values, principles or 
judgments, then one’s sitting will only perpetuate psychological grasping and clinging.  The duality of 
good and evil is like an illusion, or a mirage; they are nothing other than ‘flowers in our eyes.’  To 
philosophically entertain such concepts is not only distracting, but can also undermine our ability to rid 
ourselves of our obsessive attachments to moral views, as well as the ‘mind’ that conceptualizes such.  
 The ‘mind,’ according to Dōgen’s Zen, is empty.  Any habits of thinking that condition a view of 
mind that is otherwise (i.e. essentialism) should be “cast off” (Jpn. datsuraku).  Herein, one might argue 
that these instructions for practicing zazen imply that metaethics is something we must let go of, leave 
behind, and do away with.  However, I believe that any attempt to transcend metaethics is a metaethical 
position of its own kind.  Moreover, in light of Dōgen’s reflections on the characterization of Zen as a 
‘separate transmission’ which we explored in Chapter four, to think that zazen situates us in a position 
whereby metaethics is no longer a practice, or something one should have never engaged at all, would be 
blinded by dualistic thinking.   Dōgen’s emphasis upon zazen, non-thinking and dropping off body and 
mind, is metaethical; however, the central difference between Dōgen’s metaethics and Anglo-American 
metaethics is a difference in the practice of doing philosophy itself.  Truth-seeking metaethics views the 
practice of philosophy as a means to arrive at ‘truth.’  Way-seeking metaethics on the other hand 
understands ‘truth’ to be the practice of philosophizing itself; “The Truth is the approaching and the 





 How does one “cast off” dualistic thinking that reifies subject and object, mind and body?  Dōgen 
anticipates this question in the Fukanzazengi when he states, “We should learn the backward step of 
turning light and reflecting.  Body and mind will naturally fall away, and the original features will 
manifest themselves before us” (Dōgen 1994, 280).  What is significant here is the capping phrase 
“turning back the radiance,” (Jpn.ekō-henshō) (ZS 4.54), which is regarded as an antecedent condition for, 
“dropping off body and mind” (Jpn. shinjin datsuraku).  According to Dōgen, dropping off body and 
mind is realized if, and only if, “we learn the backward step of turning light and reflecting.”  But what 
does it mean to turn back the radiance and reflect?  To answer this question, let us consider the well-
known analogy of the lamp.   
 Just as an oil lamp can illuminate objects in a room, our minds illuminate the external world of 
mountains, rivers, rocks and trees; and, just as oil lamps illuminate their own form of flickering in relation 
to the other phenomena that they are illuminating, our minds illuminate our own mode of thinking.  
Hence Dōgen’s perspectival verse from Genjō Kōan: “When we use the whole body-and-mind to look at 
forms, and when we use the whole body-and-mind to listen to sounds, even though we are sensing them 
directly, it is not like the mirror’s reflection of an image, and not like water and the moon.  While we are 
experiencing one side, we are blind to the other side” (Dōgen 1994, 34).  Herein, according to Dōgen, our 
perspective of the world is always limited to our momentary situation; “To grasp the pivot and express it: 
all that exists throughout the whole Universe is lined up in a series and at the same time is individual 
moments of Time.  Because [Time] is Existence-Time, it is my Existence-Time” (Dōgen 1994, 112).  In 
other words, while there is nothing inherently distinct between our moment-by-moment perspective of the 
world and that of any other perspective within the greater web of beings, we nevertheless experience the 
world from our perspective.  In the context of turning back the radiance (Jpn. ekō henshō) we can only 
turn back the radiance of our own awareness and perspective; our self-awareness is not that of birds nor 
fishes, mountains nor rivers, nor other humans.  However, that being said, the phenomenological state of 




when we turn back the radiance and “let our own body-and-mind, and the body-and-mind of the external 
world, fall away,” the Buddha’s truth is realized (Dōgen 1994, 34).  And while turning back of the 
radiance is something that we can experience from our own perspective of existence-time, our words and 
letters, and how we use them, can trigger a ‘turning’ of the radiance (i.e. turning words) in the 
perspectives of both oneself and others.148  
 Turning back the radiance upon itself involves the intentionality of directing our awareness 
towards itself rather than towards those entities and beings that fill our awareness of the external world.  
This phenomenological technique of zazen does not, however, illuminate something new, such as a 
hidden or concealed property or formula about ourselves and/or the universe as a whole.  Similar to the 
nature of good, bad, and indifference, the mind is ‘uncreated’ (Jpn. mushō).  While we are aware of 
ourselves having experiences of the great many ‘flowers in space,’ we can never experience our 
‘awareness’ singly, or as an independent thing.  Turning back the radiance, in short, is the 
phenomenological embodiment of realizing that all values are ‘uncreated’ (Jpn. mushō); turning back the 
radiance, I contend, is how Dōgen’s non-thinking is realized via zazen.  As Davis explains through the 
popular Zen metaphors of clouds and sky: 
When we are told to “think of not-thinking,” we, who in our delusion identify ourselves with the 
stream of cloudy consciousness, are being asked to turn our attention to the sky, which cannot but 
first appear, from the perspective of the cloudy discriminating mind, as a contentless, formless 
void.  But as we engage in the “backward step,” as we disidentify with, detach ourselves from, or 
“drop off” the body-mind, that is, as we let dissipate the clouds of our discriminatory, intentional 
thinking/feeling/willing, and as we thereby awaken to the open space of awareness that has 
always already been there underneath the passing clouds, we realize our true self, our original 
face, is the clear and open sky surrounding, and making room for the passing clouds. (Davis 
2016, 223). 
                                                 
148 Herein, the idea of ‘turning words’ (Jpn. ichitengo) is directly referenced in Dōgen’s Kenbutsu fascicle, “Meeting 
Buddha.”  For example, he states, “we should make it seen and heard ceaselessly through our own ears and eyes, we 
should get free of it through our own body, mind, bones, and marrow, and we should make it clear through our own 
mountains, rivers, and Universe.  Such is the action of learning the state of Buddhist patriarchs.  Do not think that, 
because it is your own speech and conduct, it cannot make your own eyes clear.  Being transformed by our own 





For Dōgen, directing our awareness upon ‘awareness’ itself, sub specie aeternitatis, reveals a “mirroring” 
of phenomena, “which reflects things as they show themselves without distortion” (Davis 2016, 223).  As 
Dōgen states in Kokyo, “The Eternal Mirror:” 
What all the buddhas and all the patriarchs have received and retained, and transmitted one-to-
one, is the eternal mirror.  They have the same view and the same face, the same image and the 
same cast, they share the same state and realize the same experience.  A foreigner appears, a 
foreigner is reflected – one hundred and eight thousand of them.  A Chinaman appears, a 
Chinaman is reflected – for a moment and for a thousand years.  The past appears, the past is 
reflected; the present appears, the present is reflected; a Buddha appears, a Buddha is reflected; a 
patriarch appears, a patriarch is reflected. (Dōgen 1994, 239-240)  
Thus the practice of mirroring via non-thinking is to be, “totally engaged in the vicissitudes of life with all 
its ups and downs […] on the basis of impartial compassion, rather than on the basis of egoistic craving 
and loathing” (Davis 2016, 223).  To flesh out this practice of ‘mirroring,’ vis -à-vis non-thinking, we 
shall conclude this chapter with a review of the bodhisattva’s vows as a way of ‘justifying normative 
beliefs, while recognizing that there are no normative beliefs to be justified.’ 
  
§6.7 Justifying Normative Beliefs: The Path & Vows of the Bodhisattva 
 As noted above, Dōgen’s practice of zazen and phenomenology of mirroring is believed to be 
connected, according to Davis, with impartial compassion.  Some critics might argue that this practice and 
phenomenology is inadequate for justifying value judgments, vis-à-vis real world problems (e.g., 
reproductive rights, natural resource management, economic justice etc.).  Since zazen is the casting-off 
of dualistic thinking based on impartial compassion, it seems to follow that any dualistic judgment, 
including “Bernie Madoff is a miser and cheat,” is both ‘dualistically deluded’ and without justificatory 
support.  All justificatory claims for any normative judgment will be dualistic.  If zazen, and the 
phenomenology of non-thinking is to cast-off dualistic distinctions, then it becomes unclear how the 




 My response to this challenge pivots from Jien Erin McCarthy’s treatment of Dōgen’s Shushōgi 
Paragraphs 22-23, and reflections on compassion.  According to McCarthy:  
Dōgen’s compassion, whether for people, or animals, or water and trees, cannot be read as an 
ethical “system” – we will not find rules or imperatives here.  Rather, we find an orientation from 
which to frame the problems – an orientation from which to figure out what the right thing is to 
do…and this will be exceedingly difficult, given that the nondual interconnectedness of 
everything means that “us” versus “them” or “wrong” versus “right” or “good” versus “evil” – 
the very frameworks we most often use to work out the “right” thing, the “beneficial” deed – 
must be abandoned. (McCarthy 2016, 157-158) 
Dōgen’s impartial compassion, vis-à-vis non-thinking, does not find justificatory support from dualistic 
moral principles, but rather through the vows and practice of the bodhisattva that are relative to 
Mahāyāna Buddhism in general, Dōgen’s Zen in particular.  In general, the bodhisattva is, “one on the 
path to perfect Buddhahood, whose task is to help beings compassionately while maintaining his or her 
own wisdom” (Harvey 2000, 123).  Herein, the path is succinctly encapsulated by the four vows: 
 However innumerable sentient beings are, I vow to save them.  
 However inexhaustible the defilements are, I vow to extinguish them. 
 However, immeasurable the dharmas are, I vow to master them. 
 However incomparable enlightenment is, I vow to attain it. (Conze 1959, 183-184) 
In regards to the first of the four vows, the wisdom of the bodhisattva “does not, in carrying out his 
infinite great compassionate deeds, consider that there is any ultimately, inherently existing being who is 
helped” (Williams 1989, 50).  As stated in the Diamond Sutra: 
As many beings as there are in the universe of beings…all these I must lead to Nirvana…And yet, 
although innumerable beings have thus been led to Nirvana, no being at all has been led to 
Nirvana… If in a Bodhisattva the notion of a ‘being’ should take place, he could not be called a 
‘Bodhi-being’. (Conze 1958, 25) 
Reflecting upon this vow in the context of Dōgen’s Shushōgi, Tetsuzen Jason M. Wirth states that: 
This vow is not a mere resolve.  It is the arousal of an aspiration to move beyond oneself (one’s 
ego-self) to an awakened self, which is simultaneously an affirmation in compassion of one’s 
love for oneself as all beings and for all beings as oneself. […] In the Mahāyāna tradition, the 
bodhisattva ideal, awakening to oneself as dying to oneself by awakening to oneself as all others, 
is the awakening of the full spectrum of the heart and mind, the realization of bodhicitta.  For 




from the outside.  The self with its interior and its environmental exterior has simultaneously been 
cast away and has fallen away to the awakening of the great earth itself. (Wirth 2016; 130) 
From the perspective of Dōgen’s Zen, the bodhisattva’s path of “selfless compassion is what is naturally 
expressed when one acts in a spontaneous way – from one’s underlying Buddha-nature – free from 
reflection and desire, which come from self-centeredness” (Harvey 2000, 144). 
 The non-dual logic of selfless compassion, vis-à-vis the vow to save all sentient beings knowing 
that there are no sentient beings to be saved, is predicated upon the realization that the bodhisattva’s 
compassionate efforts are not centered upon actual persons, for Buddhist wisdom entails the insight that 
there are no persons or things that are not empty.  The bodhisattva’s compassionate efforts are, rather, 
oriented towards ameliorating suffering proper.  As Mark Siderits explains, “Once I overcome the illusion 
of self, I will see that my desire to prevent my own pain is really just a desire to prevent pain, period” 
(Siderits 2007, 82).     
For Dōgen, this metaethical insight is realized through the practice of four social relations, 
including: (1) free giving; (2) kind speech; (3) helpful conduct; (4) cooperation.  Rather than seeking to 
justify our moral behavior/comportment with others by way of top-down reasoning, “what Dōgen does 
offer us is an orientation for living, a way of being-in-the-world” (McCarthy 2016, 155).  In the 
Shōbōgenzō fascicle Bodhaisatta-Shishobo, “Four Elements of Bodhisattva’s Social Relations,” Dōgen 
alludes to the non-dual logic of selfless compassion – the embodied/affective attitude of 
interconnectedness – as he identifies and explains these social relations.  For example, in regards to the 
free-giving, “in becoming giver and receiver, the subject and object of giving are connected” (Dōgen 
1994, 30).  Or, when considering the social relation of cooperation, Dōgen writes: “The task [of 
cooperation] means, for example, concrete behavior, a dignified attitude, and a real situation.  There may 
be a principle of, after letting others identify with us, then letting ourselves identify with others.  [The 
relations between] self and others are, depending on the occasion, without limit” (Dōgen 1994, 33).  In 
other words, while there might be, as Dōgen indicates, a principle that follows from our social relations 




practice that realizes that, “there are no permanent and atomic (independent) selves or entities.  All 
dharmas (entities) are interrelated and interconnected.  All dharmas arise through all other dharmas.  
Thus, there can be no absolute distinction between self and other.  Every aspect of the self is thoroughly 
interrelated with every other: its environment, other beings, and other dharmas” (Putney 2016, 160).  
Moreover, because of the interconnectedness between self and other, it follows that the way we comport 
ourselves towards others, and the deeds that we commit in our everyday world of social relations, will 
reverberate back upon “oneself” (i.e. for every action there is an equal opposite reaction).  As McCarthy 
explains: 
This same interconnectedness that makes figuring out the “right” deed to do so terribly complex 
also brings back those deeds to benefit us, when performed from a place of selflessness, from the 
prereflective consciousness that one attains through zazen, which enables us to respond with an 
ethics of spontaneous responsiveness.  And responding from this place of selflessness allows the 
action to benefit us too. (McCarthy 2016, 158)   
Thus it is from the normative state of non-thinking that one is able to realize the social relations of the 
bodhisattva, whereby the body-mind of self and others are “cast off.” 
 Some critics, as McCarthy notes, may find this justificatory appeal, vis-à-vis the practice of zazen 
and non-thinking, simplistic and “naïve” (i.e. “what goes around comes around”).  If we expect 
justification to be “systematic,” then perhaps this critique is justified.  That being said, this criticism 
would not be limited to Dōgen alone, but would extend to Western ethical theories, including 
utilitarianism, which maintains that one ought to “act so as to promote the greatest good for the greatest 
number,” as well as Kantian ethics, which maintains that one must “act so as to never treat another 
rational being solely as a means to some other ends.”  In fact, most theories of justification, aside from the 
ethical logarithm of the Doctrine of Double Effect,149 will appear to be too simplistic in light of the 
                                                 
149 The doctrine of double effect is a duty-based ethical theory that argues that it is never morally permissible to 
commit a bad act so to bring about favorable consequences.  Thus the rightness of any action is dependent upon 
whether action itself is right or good.  However, there are circumstances whereby doing what is right will bring 
about a double effect of good and bad consequences.  For such circumstances, which would include terminating a 
pregnancy so to save the life of a mother, the doctrine of double effect maintains that one may perform such an act 





complicated issues and problems that currently loom.  Thus, I am inclined to agree with McCarthy’s 
defense of Dōgen; “to say ‘do beneficial deeds and they will come back to you’ may not be particularly 
profound,” however, that does not erase the fact that, “to pursue such an attitude of compassionate 
responsiveness, where there are no signposts but your own heart, is anything but trite” (McCarthy 2016, 
158).  The world is not ready-made with moral principles/facts/truths; it is, rather, a world that is 
perpetually changing on social, cultural and environmental horizons.  Thus the path of the bodhisattva in 
such a world ought not, as we saw in the previous chapter, ignore cause and effect.  Through the 
embodied practice of non-thinking, we are able to realize a non-dual relationship between self and other 
whereby our karmic relationships are undetermined, yet thoroughly interconnected.            
§ 6.8 Chapter Summary 
 We saw in this chapter that zazen is central to the moral life for Dōgen.   The priority Dōgen 
places upon this moral practice, which he believes to be the only way in which the virtues of Buddhist 
patriarchs and bodhisattvas are realized, is defended by his phenomenological reflections on thinking, not 
thinking and non-thinking.  Herein we saw that the practice of non-thinking, according to Dōgen, is not 
divorced from dualistic thinking itself, but rather underlies such just as the sky underlies clouds. We 
discovered that this interpretation of non-thinking provides a praxis-oriented justificatory account for 
conventional normative beliefs, vis-à-vis social and environmental relations.  Accordingly, this chapter 
showed how Dōgen’s anti-realist and anti-cognitivist perspectivism is unique, comparatively speaking, on 
the stage of world-philosophy.  His metaethics begins and ends in practice.  And while one can, no doubt, 
derive principles from the practice of non-thinking and impartial compassion (e.g. “what goes around 
comes around”), such principles are not entirely helpful unless one is practicing the embodied method of 
zazen, and even then, such principles seem uninspiring, and thus less motivating, compared to ‘what’ is 
being ‘reflected’ before one’s mind: the emptiness and non-duality of self and other. 
                                                 
bad effect; 3) that the bad effect is not a means by which the good effect is realized; 4) that the good effect is 




  Our inquiry into zazen as a normative practice showed that Dōgen’s anti-realist perspective is 
neither an error theory, nor fictionalist, nor non-cognitivist.  In regards to error theory, we noted that 
Dōgen does not share the same dualistic outlook as error theorists, vis-`a-vis firm distinctions between 
truth and falsity.  In regards to fictionalism, we saw that, in light of the distinction between descriptive 
and performative speech acts, it does not seem obvious that Dōgen conceived of his writings and 
normative judgments to be either: (1) fictitious descriptions about the world; or (2) performative 
misrepresentations (e.g., a liar, con artist and/or bullshit artist).  And, in regards to non-cognitivism, as I 
noted in chapter three, due to the duality this metaethical view assumes between affects and reason, as 
well as facts and values, it became clear that this perspective does not clearly capture Dōgen’s embodied 
practice of zazen.  Thus, rather than putting forward another metaethical theory to show how anti-realism 
can provide justificatory support for conventional normative judgments, Dōgen proffers a practice 
instead.  This normative practice, particularly when considering the nature of normative propositions, I 
contend, is best characterized as anti-cognitive.  From the perspective of non-thinking, normative 
propositions are not intended to report moral facts about the world, nor to express normative truths; 
instead, normative propositions are the ‘entangled vines,’ kattō, whereby perspectives are, depending 












Non-Anthropocentric Value Creation: Dōgen and Nietzsche’s Faithfulness to 
the ‘Great Earth’ 
§7.1 Chapter Overview 
The examination of metaethics I carried out in Chapter one revealed that Nietzsche’s writings on 
normative issues is best characterized as anti-realism.  And, as a metethical counterpart, vis-à-vis the 
nature of normative propositions, I argued that that anti-cognitivism, rather than error theory/fictionalism 
or non-cognitivism, helps clarify Nietzsche’s perspective that normative utterances do not describe moral 
facts, nor do they express normative truths, but instead, they reveal and conceal perspectives.  Then in 
Chapter two, after a review of the various ways scholars have interpreted Buddhist ethical views through 
Western philosophies and ethical theories, I proceeded to unpack Dōgen’s metaethics in Chapters three, 
four, five and six.  Therein, I argued that Dōgen’s writings on the moral life – specifically the nature of 
moral values and normative propositions, karma and the practice of zazen – is best characterized as an 
East-Asian version of moral anti-realism, which can be fruitfully approached, as was the case with 
Nietzsche, through the lens of anti-cognitivism.  Now, the objective of this chapter is to open up a 
comparative dialogue between Dōgen and Nietzsche. 
  The comparative dialogue I will foster between these thinkers will proceed by highlighting the 
background of Buddhism and Nietzsche scholarship in general, Zen/Dōgen and Nietzsche scholarship in 
particular.  This will allow for me to build off of the insights of scholars such as Graham Parkes and 
André van der Braak, specifically Van der Braak’s characterization of Dōgen and Nietzsche’s 
philosophical outlook as non-essentialist, non-teleological and non-anthropocentric.   In addition, I will 
also explore some salient themes and ideas regarding the metaethical practice of value creation from a 
Nietzschean perspective, which will in turn help illuminate how Dōgen incorporates the creation of new 
values into his Zen perspective.  Then, in light of the three aforementioned metaethical labels Van der 




non-anthropocentrism by considering Lynn White Jr.’s argument that the ecological crisis, as we know it, 
is a result of anthropocentrism, particularly Judeo-Christian anthropocentrism.  According to White, if we 
are to realize a sustainable solution to this crisis, we either have to: (1) rethink the philosophical 
underpinnings of Judeo-Christianity, or (2) find and adopt a new perspective.  By affirming (2) through 
the looking-glass of Dōgen-Nietzschean metaethical value creation, I will sketch out a metaethical profile 
of non-anthropocentrism that can provide a road map for overcoming a “crisis of meaning” that is 
ostensibly reflected through contemporary lifestyles that are environmentally degrading.  For Dōgen and 
Nietzsche, this profile consists of perspectivism, passions and play; and, while there are some 
philosophical affinities between this profile of non-anthropocentrism and the normative standpoints of 
biocentrism, ecocentrism and deep ecology, I plan to show that Dōgen and Nietzsche are best interpreted 
on their own terms rather than being lumped within any of the three philosophical camps in contemporary 
environmental ethics. 
§7.2 Nietzsche and Buddhism 
 Much has been written on the comparative interfaces between Nietzsche and Buddhism.  While it 
is widely recognized that Nietzsche was highly critical of early Indian Buddhism, thus characterizing such 
as nihilistic,150 there have been a number of philosophical parallels drawn between this nineteenth century 
                                                 
150 Nietzsche’s characterization of Theravāda Buddhism as nihilistic is made clear in number of works, including 
The Antichrist.  Therein he states, “With my condemnation of Christianity I should not like to have done an injustice 
to a religion which is related to it and the number of whose followers is even greater; I refer to Buddhism.  As 
nihilistic religions, they are akin, – they are religions of decadence, –while each is separated from the other in the 
most extraordinary fashion” (Nietzsche 2000, 23).  As noted I noted in Chapter one, nihilism is a cultural 
phenomenon whereby the highest values within society are realized to be erroneous.  According to Nietzsche, this 
cultural phenomena conditions two perspectival modes of existing: (1) active nihilism; and (2) passive nihilism.  In 
regards to the former, the realization that the highest values in society are not objectively real (i.e. anti-realism) 
gives rise to, “increased power of the spirit;” whereas, in regards to latter, the realization that all values are without 
any metaphysical foundation engenders a, “decline and recession of the power of the spirit” (Nietzsche 1967, 17).  
Based upon Nietzsche’s characterization of Buddhism as nihilism, Robert Morrison states: “To ask whether 
Buddhism is or is not a form of passive nihilism is to ask whether the summum bonum of Buddhism, nirvāṇa, can be 
understood in this sense.  In other words, is the seeking after the goal of nirvāṇa ‘a sign of weakness’, a 
consequence of the ‘decline and recession of the power of the spirit’ and a pervading ‘state of depression’ that 
comes from seeing that the world does not have the value we thought it had?” (Morrison 2000, 30).  Morrison 
contends that Nietzsche’s characterization of Buddhism as nihilistic – passive nihilism – is due to Hermann 





forerunner of existentialism and this heterodox tradition of ancient India.  For example, riding the 
coattails of Freny Mistry’s Nietzsche and Buddhism (1981), Robert Morrison argues in Nietzsche and 
Buddhism: A Study in Nihilism and Ironic Affinities, that there are indeed striking affinities between 
Nietzsche and Buddhism, particularly in regards to self-overcoming and mind development; “The 
Buddhist version of self-overcoming reveals what can be described as a progressive unfoldment of energy 
and ‘power.’  It involves the unfolding of new configurations of energy and power each of which, […] 
can be viewed as the unfolding of a series of new ‘selves’” (Morrison 1997, 195).  Thus, it is Morrison’s 
contention that Nietzsche’s dim view of Buddhism as nihilistic might have been more favorable if he had 
had access to the updated translations of the early sutras that we have today.  Moreover, he 
counterfactually implies that had he had such access, he would have discovered a method of self-
overcoming which his perspectivism failed to provide.   
Although self-overcoming as consciously taken up by the individual is the central theme of 
Nietzsche’s answer to nihilism, it is not sufficiently worked out; he has left no clear, detailed 
account of how self-overcoming is to be achieved, left no guiding examples of his method or 
methods. (Morrison 1997, 158-159) 
Morrison’s conclusion, however, has received criticism from other scholars working in this comparative 
field.  Graham Parkes gives a scathing critique of Morrison’s research, arguing that it is rife with 
historical inaccuracies and questionable interpretations/understandings of Nietzsche’s philosophical 
works, specifically the body, vis-à-vis self-overcoming.  According to Parkes:  
When one goes beyond the question of influence to comparative studies per se, later Buddhism 
provides […] even more fertile ground. The extension of the comparison to Mahāyāna schools of 
Buddhist philosophy, which has already been well begun by Japanese scholars, promises even 
                                                 
Doctrine, His Order, trans. W. Hoey, (London: Williams and Norgate, 1882).  Morrison maintains that, “if 
Oldenberg had not mistranslated the term vibhava-taṇhā or ‘thirst for annihilation’ as der Vergänglichkeitsdurst or 
‘thirst for impermanence’, but translated it more correctly as Selbstvernichtungsbegehren or ‘thirst for self-
annihilation’, given that this thirst for annihilation is considered to be an unskillful state to be abandoned, Nietzsche 
might have paused to reconsider whether Buddhism actually taught a nihilistic doctrine or not.” (Morrison 2000, 
51).  Notwithstanding Morrison’s research, Nietzsche did interpret Buddhism as passive nihilism, not active 
nihilism.  In in The Will To Power, Nietzsche states, “the weary nihilism that no longer attacks; its most famous 
form, Buddhism; a passive nihilism, a sign of weakness” (Nietzsche 1967, 18).  Finally, it is worth noting that 
Nietzsche’s views of Buddhism were informed by his interpretation and critique of Arthur Schopenhauer; 
Schopenhauer believed that his views on suffering, his philosophy of denial of the will to live, and his general 




greater increases in our understanding of Nietzsche, Buddhism, and--more important--ourselves 
and the world” (Parkes 2000, 6).   
Parkes’ conclusion is supported by his earlier publications such as “Nietzsche and Nishitani on the Self-
overcoming of Nihilism” (1990), and Nietzsche and Asian Thought (1991).  
Since Morrison’s publication, Antoine Panaïoti has advanced a comparative dialogue between 
Nietzsche and early Buddhism in Nietzsche and Buddhist Philosophy.  Rather than simply listing 
philosophical affinities and differences between Buddhism and Nietzsche, he employs the comparative 
method in order to fuse the horizons between Nietzsche and Buddhism into a new perspective for 
confronting the challenge of nihilism, “on the discursive plane of the medical discourse” vis-à-vis 
“healthy vs. sick types” (Panaïoti 2013, 13).  Ultimately, Panaïoti’s work marks a progressive step in the 
area of comparative philosophy whereby the enumeration of affinities and differences is allotted a 
peripheral goal.   
§7.3 Nietzsche and Zen 
 I am sympathetic with Parkes’ hermeneutical contention; East Asian Mahāyāna Buddhism 
provides a richer, more fertile ground than that of early Indian Buddhism for engaging Nietzsche within 
the broader field of comparative philosophy.  For starters, when one encounters Nietzsche’s literary 
works, particularly his maxims and aphorisms from Human, All Too Human, and, The Wanderer and His 
Shadow, one quickly discovers a tenor of pith and wit that echoes the expressive style of Zen capping 
phrases (Jpn. jakugo) and the non-dualistic wisdom of bodhisattvas, hermits and sages.  In his “Assorted 
Opinions and Maxims” from Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche states: “You must learn how to emerge 
out of unclean situations cleaner, and if necessary to wash yourself with dirty clean water” (Nietzsche 
1986, 230).  Herein, Nietzsche’s non-dual perspective captures a salient theme in Zen Buddhism, mainly 
the nonduality of sacred and profane boundaries vis-à-vis delusion and enlightenment, samsāra and 
nirvāṇa; from a Zen perspective, “delusive passions are themselves enlightenment,” (Jpn. bonnō soku 




5.188), “he washes jade in muddy water,” (Jpn. Deisui ni gyokuseki o arau) (ZS 5.261).  Moreover, just 
as Zen resists dualistic distinctions between means and ends, for example “Not apart from right-here, 
always clear,” (Jpn. Tōsho o hanarezu tsune ni tannen) (ZS 7.346), in The Wanderer and His Shadow, 
Nietzsche echoes a non-teleological perspective whereby, “Not every end is the goal.  The end of a 
melody is not its goal; and yet: as long as the melody has not reached its end, it also hasn’t reached its 
goal. A parable” (Nietzsche 1986, 360).   
One can discern additional parallels between Nietzsche’s aphoristic style and Zen in regards to 
the body and overcoming our passions.  For both Nietzsche and Zen, the body which hosts a constellation 
of passions that can pull us down, is also the very same body that can elevate.  The following Zen verse 
evinces this very point: “The whole body is illness, the whole body is medicine,” (Jpn. Tsūshin kore yami 
tsūshin kore kusuri) (ZS 7.312).  In light of this capping phrase, consider what Nietzsche has to say about 
overcoming the passions in Daybreak: “One can dispose of one’s drives like a gardener and, though few 
know it, cultivate the shoots of anger, pity, curiosity, vanity as productively and profitably as a beautiful 
tree on a trellis” (Nietzsche 1977, 335).  In this passage, Nietzsche’s gardening metaphor (i.e. our body as 
the soil and our passions are cultivated plants) reveals a philosophy of embodiment whereby our very 
passions provide the basic ingredients for self-mastery.  And, when it comes to self-mastery via self-
overcoming, similar to the Zen maxim, “Practitioners of the Way, just sit!” (Jpn. Dōshi kou sunawachi za 
seyo) (ZS 5.281), Nietzsche reminds his audience that, “Lying still and thinking little is the cheapest 
medicine for all sickness of the soul and, if persisted with, grows more pleasant by the hour” (Nietzsche 
1986, 293).  In regards to embodiment, again, similar to Zen, Nietzsche’s standpoint holds the body in 
higher regard compared to rationality and world views/convictions.  The four-character capping phrase 
“He’s lost his head, he believes in reflections” (Jpn. Kōbe ni mayoi, kage o tomu) (ZS 4.192), is all-too-
Nietzschean when it comes to epistemology and the convictions we view the world through; “He who has 
not passed through different convictions, but remains in the belief in whose net he was first captured, is 




(Nietzsche 1986, 200).  Finally, on the horizon of time, vis-à-vis the eternal recurrence of the same, we 
find a Zen distillation of the life affirming standard that is central to Nietzsche’s perspectivism: “Make 
one moment of thought an eternity,” (Jpn. Ichinen bannen ni shi sare) (ZS 5.18).  We can compare this to 
Nietzsche’s motto from Ecce Homo: “My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one 
wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity.  Not merely to bear that what 
is necessary, still less conceal it – all idealism is mendaciousness in the face of what is necessary – but 
love it” (Nietzsche 1967, 258).  Thus, based upon our inquiry into Nietzsche and Dōgen throughout this 
dissertation, I contend that their metaethical persepctives is succinctly expressed within the folloing 
capping phrase: “I have no ‘thou shalt’ or ‘thou shalt not,’ (Jpn. Ka mo naku fuka mo nashi) (ZS 5.35). 
 In addition to this selection of maxims and aphorisms, one can identify other philosophical 
parallels between Nietzsche and Zen which open up a comparative dialogue along the following horizons: 
(1) philosophy as a praxis; (2) self-overcoming of nihilism; (3) phenomenology of non-thinking; and (4) 
ethics and non-anthropocentric value creation.  Michael Skowron, for example, examines the theme of 
self-overcoming, vis-à-vis ‘post religious’ religiosity and ethics in Nietzsche, Buddha, Zarathustra: Eine 
West-Ost Konfiguration.  In addition to Skowron’s comparative research, particularly between 
Nietzsche’s proclamation of the ‘death of god’ and the Zen maxim “when you see the Buddha, kill the 
Buddha” (Skowron 2006, 143), in Nietzsche and Zen: Self-overcoming Without a Self, André van der 
Braak addresses many of these themes, and more, by exploring the works of Nietzsche in dialogue with 
Mahāyāna and Zen thinkers such as Nāgārjuna, Linji, Dōgen and the Kyoto School philosopher, Keiji 
Nishitani.   
One argumentative thread woven through Van der Braak’s research is that a comparative 
dialogue between Zen and Nietzsche is fruitful because both perspectives can be considered philosophies 
of self-overcoming in four different ways.  First, in a theoretical sense, both Nietzsche and Zen view self-
overcoming as the pivot for doing philosophy.  In regards to Nietzsche, “life conceived as will to power, 




of will to power that one must continually overcome oneself” (Van der Braak 2011, 25).  And, in regards 
to Zen, self-overcoming is tied to the overcoming of delusion and realizing enlightenment.  However, 
unlike early Buddhist conceptions of enlightenment, “Zen stresses that enlightenment is non-teleological; 
it vehemently criticizes early Buddhist conceptions of enlightenment as a goal to be reached” (Van der 
Braak 2011, 26).  Second, in a performative sense, rather than attempting to establish a theoretical system, 
the writings of Nietzsche and Zen attempt to bring about “a self-overcoming in the reader” (Van der 
Braak 2011, 26).  Herein, the idea of the philosopher as a physician or therapist is apropos.   Third, in a 
self-referential sense, both Nietzsche and Zen never view their practice of doing philosophy as unfolding 
in some linear, teleological fashion.  For thinkers such as Dōgen and Nietzsche, their praxis-based, way-
seeking style, “continually overcomes itself…continually contradicts and leaves behind earlier positions 
and perspectives, and goes to great lengths to avoid being frozen into a system” (Van der Braak 2011, 
26).  Finally, in a self-expressive sense, the practice of self-overcoming for Nietzsche and Zen is itself 
“viewed as a celebration…a philosophy of laughter and play” (Van der Braak 2011, 27).   
 In addition to Parkes, Skowron and Van der Braak, other scholars have helped foster a 
comparative dialogue between Nietzsche and Zen, including Bret Davis, “Zen After Zarathustra: The 
Problem of the Will in the Confrontation between Nietzsche and Buddhism,” Manu Bazzano, Buddha is 
Dead: Nietzsche and the Dawn of European Zen, and Jason Wirth, Nietzsche and Other Buddhas: 
Philosophy After Comparative Philosophy.  Notwithstanding the comparative insights proffered by Davis 
and Bazzano, Wirth’s work has opened up a new horizon of philosophical inquiry that leads readers back 
to the prephilosophical soil in which the roots of philosophy grow; “In the co-illuminating confrontation 
in which Nietzsche emerges as a kind of Buddha, he and other Buddhas do so simultaneously revealing 
the prephilosophical ground of any possible philosophy” (Wirth 2019, xvii).   Wirth’s exploration of 
Nietzsche in dialogue with other Buddhas —Arthur Schopenhauer, William James, Gilles Deleuze, 
Dōgen, Shinran, Hakuin, and Hajime Tanabe—helps set the stage to ruminate on the practice of 




Of the many insightful points Wirth notes, perhaps the idea of philosophy as medicine and the subject 
matter of food are most profound, particularly from the vantage points of Nietzsche and Dōgen; 
“Thinking is about health and nutrition, just as the Buddha’s teachings were medicine.  Lost amid such 
cursed idealism, food remains necessary yet curiously inconspicuous” (Wirth 2019, 80).  In regards to 
Nietzsche, Wirth states: 
Nietzsche’s understanding of Great Health refused the paradigm that health is absence of disease 
and poison.  The same holds true for his understanding of nutrition and digestion.  A nutritious 
diet is not the automatic result of ingesting what the medical industrial complex and Big Pharma 
prescribe as health food.  Not only does diet depend on attuning to the singularities of one’s own 
body and using a hammer against the ideology of health, but it also relies on being able to digest 
and process what one eats so that it transforms food into nourishment.  […] Since thoughts 
happen in the body and not in a spiritual stratosphere, thought can also be metaphorically 
nutritious.  Food for thought – thought that can be ruminated and digested – is critical for 
philosophy.  Nietzsche regarded his decadent era as dyspeptic, unable to digest the death of God 
and its poisonous nihilism.  Self overcoming, active forgetting, and active nihilism […] can be 
understood as digestion metaphors, the capacity to process poison […] into healthy modes of 
thinking and living. (Wirth 2019, 82) 
And in regards to Dōgen, Wirth highlights Dōgen’s instructions to the monastery cook (Jpn. tenzo), and 
the joyful mind (Jpn. kishin) that accompanies the preparation of food for monks.  “Joy is the realization 
that one can just prepare food.  The tenzo does not have to dream of paradise to take joy in preparing 
food.  Even when the ingredients are meager and the prospects for satiation are dim, it is enough to 
simply be able to practice in the kitchen.  This is the tenzo’s version of amor fati and her gratitude for 
things just as they are” (Wirth 2019, 90-91).  From a Dōgen-Nietzschean perspective of ‘philosophy after 
comparative philosophy,’ “Food does not hide itself.  Lacking the true Dharma eye, it is we who do not 
see food. […]  It is not that we don’t just see food, but that we don’t see at all, and hence we do not even 
see that we do not see.  If one cannot see food, one cannot see anything.  If one sees at all, one sees food” 
(Wirth 2019, 91).  Herein, I am quite sympathetic with the comparative dialogues that Wirth orchestrates; 
I contend that one’s inability to see food, which is no doubt evidenced by our industrial agricultural 
system and packaged food choices, is itself a symptom of one’s inability to see the ‘Great Earth’ as the 
non-philosophical source of meaning and value; it is a result, in other words, of our anthropocentrism.  




Nietzsche and Dōgen.  By examining their philosophies in dialogue together, particularly their metaethics 
of value creation, we will be able to see how our examination of a philosophical text through a different 
cultural lens can open up new meanings, insights and subsequent questions.  To set the stage for this 
comparative dialogue, let us first examine the metaethical practice of value creation from a Nietzschean 
perspective, which will in turn help illuminate Dōgen. 
§7.4 Will-to-Power and Value Creation 
   The will to power is pivotal for making sense of Nietzsche’s writings on ethics in general, the 
values of an active nihilist, vis-à-vis master morality, in particular.151  For example, in Beyond Good and 
Evil, the will to power appears quite prominently, as in Part One “On The Prejudices of the Philosophers,” 
where Nietzsche states, “A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength – life itself is will to 
power” (Nietzsche 1966, 21).  As Bernd Magnus and Kathleen Higgins state in “Nietzsche’s Works and 
Their Themes,” when the will to power is understood as the ontological ground for Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism, “one can read the quest of each thing for its own power, or enhancement, as inherently 
situated, ontologically located in a position that is distinct from that of every other entity” (Magnus and 
Higgins 1996, 48).  That being said, some Nietzsche scholars, including Bernard Reginster and Ivan Soll, 
argue that Nietzsche was primarily interested in understanding the will to power in psychological terms, 
particularly in response to Schopenhauer’s pessimism and passive nihilism.   
 In his book The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche On Overcoming Nihilism, Reginster defends the 
view that the will to power is a psychological thesis, as it is realized through our overcoming resistance 
and the creation of values.  Ivan Soll, in his article “Nietzsche’s Will To Power As a Psychological 
Thesis: Reactions to Bernard Reginster,” shares this general outlook; however, he believes that there are 
some analytic particulars that Reginster overlooks.  By briefly considering the differences in their 
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interpretations of Nietzsche’s will to power as a psychological thesis we will be in a better position to 
understand the metaethical significance of Nietzsche’s philosophy of value creation. 
 According to Soll, will to power as a psychological theory is a central pillar of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy as a whole; and, like Reginster, he believes that the will to power is best understood as 
‘overcoming resistance.’  However, Soll does not think that Reginster goes far enough to specify what 
‘overcoming resistance’ entails, but rather leaves this ambiguous definition unexamined.   
One can read Nietzsche (1) as claiming that the overcoming of resistance is a necessary condition 
for the satisfaction of the will to power, that is, for the experience of one’s power, or (2) as 
claiming that power is the overcoming of resistance – and nothing else.  I believe it should be 
read in the first way rather than the second.  Reginster unfortunately reads it in the second way, as 
if it supplied a definition of power, rather than just as stating a necessary condition of the 
satisfaction of the will to power.  (Soll 2012, 123-124) 
Soll’s reasoning for making this distinction is tied to the metaethical issues of moral motivation.   
When Nietzsche became engaged in developing a theory in which power was posited as the 
ultimate motivation of all behavior, the ultimate satisfaction of all desire, and consequently the 
source of all value, he initially argued that what we really want is power rather than pleasure and 
the avoidance of pain, without specifying whether it is a state of being powerful or the experience 
of our own power that we want.  As he continued to develop his thesis, however, he became 
aware of this distinction, which he initially had ignored, and chose to refine his thesis by opting 
for an experiential variant.  What we want, he claims, is more power, but more precisely, the 
experience of power. (Soll 2012, 124) 
While Soll’s more specified interpretation of the will to power compared to Reginster’s might seem hair 
splitting, the distinction is quite significant, particularly when one considers the difference between 
conceiving power as an ‘activity’ or as a ‘capacity.’  Contrary to Reginster’s interpretation of overcoming 
resistance as an activity, Soll understands such as a capacity; “A power is what enables various sorts of 
actions; it is not the actions themselves” (Soll 2012, 126).152  In Nietzsche’s The Will To Power, he states, 
“The will to power can manifest itself only against resistances; therefore it seeks that which resists it” 
(Nietzsche 1967, 346).  To seek out resistances and thereby evaluate that which shall be overcome, entails 
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powerful capacity to command, and yet, because this individual is not aware that they have royal powers to 





having a capacity to execute one’s will to power.  And, when it comes to the actual experience of 
overcoming any resisting force, one realizes such as a feeling; “When we do something there arises a 
feeling of force, often even before the deed, occasioned by the idea of what is to be done (as at the sight 
of an enemy or an obstacle to which we feel ourselves equal): it is always an accompanying feeling” 
(Nietzsche 1967, 350).  As a psychological thesis, Nietzsche argues that, “the will to power is the 
primitive form of affect, that all other affects are only developments of it” (Nietzsche 1967, 366).       
 The importance Nietzsche places upon value creation is coherently tied to his philosophy of 
power itself; for Nietzsche, “Value is the highest quantum of power that a man is able to incorporate – a 
man: not mankind!” (Nietzsche 1967, 380).  As an aspect of our psychology, it is our values, vis-à -vis 
what we say ‘yes’ and ‘no’ to, that have the greatest weight and forceful capacity to motivate us to act in 
self-determined ways.  Accordingly, the creation of that which is most forceful is what Nietzsche finds to 
be a defining psychological trait of a master morality that will provide a philosophy for the future, a 
future that contains new life affirming values to live by; “Toward new philosophers; there is no choice; 
toward spirits strong and original enough to provide the stimuli for opposite valuations and to revalue and 
invert “eternal’ values” (Nietzsche 1966, 117).  While the revaluation of values is prominently featured in 
his later writings, including Ecce Homo and The Antichrist, according to Thomas Brobjer, Nietzsche had 
already begun developing this yes-saying philosophical perspective within The Joyous Science: “In this: 
that the weights of all things must be determined anew” (Nietzsche 2018, 172).  And, as Brobjer states, “It 
was Nietzsche who coined the German word ‘Umwerthung’ (revaluation), and he was the first thinker to 
use the associated expressions ‘Umwerthung aller Werthe” and ‘Umwerthung der Werthe’” (Brobjer 
2010, 14).   Thus, metaethical inquiry was central to Nietzsche’s practice of doing philosophy as he, 
“frequently turns other questions such as epistemological and ontological ones into axiological ones, 
making values pivotal in his thinking” (Brobjer 2010, 12).  Metaethically, the revaluation of values can be 
understood, according to Brobjer and André van der Braak, as an attempt to: (1) transvaluate old values 




transform contemporary values into their opposites; and (4) return to pre-Christian values, which 
Nietzsche believed to be a healthier type.  According to Van der Braak, “these four interpretations are 
ideal types, and a mixture of them probably gives the most insight into the nature of Nietzsche’s project” 
(Van der Braak 2011, 179).  The scope of this philosophical project, particularly when he was writing 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, is specifically oriented around the ideas of the eternal recurrence of the same and 
the Űbermensch, or ‘overman.’   
The eternal recurrence of the same and the overman provide a philosophical lens for 
understanding how the will to power is a psychological thesis that embodies a yes-saying attitude in 
response to the death of ‘God’ and ascetic ideals.  Beginning with the former, the eternal recurrence 
reflects a metaphysical world similar to that of samsāra, the eternal wheel of rebirth according to 
Hinduism and Buddhism, whereby there is no beginning nor end to existence, and, each life is reborn over 
and over, again and again.  However, what makes Nietzsche’s philosophy of the eternal recurrence of the 
same novel in comparison is that he does not include the conception of rebirth that Hinduism and early 
Buddhism champion, whereby our actions in this life determine what our future lives will be like.  The 
eternal recurrence of existence, according to Nietzsche, will remain the same.  How one lives today will 
mirror how one will live in every future recurrence of existence; everything, will be completely the same.  
As a cosmological possibility rather than a theory per se,153 the eternal recurrence of the same provides a 
revaluation of Christian cosmology and metaphysics, vis-à-vis teleology, whereby we will all continue to 
                                                 
153 Similar to the will to power which is best interpreted as a psychological thesis rather than a metaphysical theory, 
the eternal recurrence of the same is, I contend, best understood as a metaethical thought experiment for testing our 
moral psychology, vis-à-vis will to power.  While some scholars, including Linda Williams and Joseph Palencik, 
believe that the eternal recurrence of the same welcomes cosmological interpretations, it is not my intention to 
evaluate the merits of their reasoning.  That being said, their interpretation is philosophically inviting.  In “Re-
evaluating Nietzsche’s Cosmology of Eternal Recurrence” (2004), they contend that “Nietzsche may have presumed 
that with a finite number of combinations, eventually every combination state will either occur or be rendered 
impossible. When this happens, the combination series (the world) ends. With no other possible combinations 
available, nothing more can happen according to whatever Nietzsche believes “conditions” the universe” (Williams 
and Palencik 2004, 404).  Based upon this belief, they maintain that it follows that “every world is a recurrence, but 
not necessarily of the immediately preceding world.  Nietzsche’s belief in infinite time expresses this, due to every 
possible world series needing to arise eventually. When events occur, their connectedness precludes others from the 
realm of possibility and thus necessitates that the world must end, and with this reasoning Nietzsche can then argue 




walk the pathways of our lives again, and again and again for an eternity; “And return and walk in that 
other lane, out there, before us, in this long dreadful lane – must we not eternally return?” (Nietzsche 
1954, 270).  In addition to sameness, while both Hinduism and early Buddhism champion a philosophy of 
transcendence, mokśa according to Hinduism and nirvāṇa according to Buddhism, for Nietzsche, one 
cannot escape nor transcend this existence. 
I contend that Nietzsche intended for us to ruminate upon the eternal recurrence of the same as a 
metaethical thought experiment/parable, vis-à-vis value creation.  Herein, my contention pivots from 
Gabriel Zamosc’s interpretation in “Life, Death and Eternal Recurrence in Nietzsche’s Zarathustra.”  In 
this article Zamosc argues, contrary to the cosmological interpretation, that “the doctrine of Eternal 
Recurrence is best understood as a parable concerning the creative will, the will to power, of which the 
individual human being, while he is alive, is merely a surrogate.  What recurs is the moment of action, 
which Nietzsche describes poetically as a moment of transitory death and resurrection; a moment that the 
living agent must repeat eternally while he remains alive” (Zamosc 2015, 1).  If it is the case that our 
existence will repeat itself over and over again for an eternity, we are now prompted to ask ourselves how 
one ought to live so that one can say ‘yes’ to this existence for an eternity.154  
 As a metaethical thought experiment, it is clear from Nietzsche’s notes that the practice of value 
creation is how one embodies a ‘yes saying’ spirit vis-à-vis amor fati.  For example: 
1. The idea [eternal recurrence]: the presuppositions that would have to be true if it were true.  
Its consequences. 
2. As the hardest idea: its probable effect if it were not prevented, i.e., if all values are not 
revalued. 
3. Means of enduring it: the revaluation of all values.  No longer joy in certainty but in 
uncertainty; no longer “cause and effect” but the continually creative; no longer will to 
preservation but to power; no longer the humble expression, “everything is merely 
subjective,” but “it is also our work! – Let us be proud of it!” (Nietzsche 1967, 545)   
                                                 
154 According to Zamosc, “To embrace Eternal Recurrence is to love the fate of being incarnations of the will to 
power that must eternally return to themselves while they remain in existence. This love of fate liberates our will 
and allows us to pursue the ideal of the Übermensch (superhuman) by inoculating us against the fantasy of believing 
that one day we will transcend our human condition. We will never escape our humanity, which will follow us like a 






In (1), Nietzsche is clear that this idea is not scientifically proven, but rather a perspective that has 
consequences, specifically moral consequences.  For example, one might immediately cringe when one 
realizes that every embarrassing, difficult and painful moment will be repeated for an eternity; one might 
indignantly engage in hand wringing about the status of current political affairs and pop-culture’s social-
media trends and habits; one might fall into despair about having to eternally face environmental 
degradation and species extinction over and over again for an eternity.  In other words, depending upon 
the individual’s perspective, the eternal recurrence provides a set of conditions that can condition one to 
fall prey to pessimism and passive nihilism.   The fact that a good many individuals value the idea and 
achievement of a goal, and because many religions, Christianity and early Buddhism in particular, include 
goals within their webs of belief, vis-à-vis the metaphysical and moral structure of the universe, it seems 
likely that a good many individuals will not be optimistic regarding the prospects and purpose of living 
this existence over and over, again and again.  But it is precisely this teleological value system that the 
very idea of the eternal recurrence of the same is reevaluating.  In regards to (2), Nietzsche understands 
that this thought experiment is hard to endure for reasons noted by Van der Braak; “The thought of the 
eternal recurrence as the greatest heavyweight serves as a personal instrument to assist in de-valuing all 
values.  To philosophize with the thought of the eternal recurrence as a hammer means to demolish all 
cultural ideals based upon some utopian future” (Van der Braak 2011, 182).  And in regards to (3), again, 
to quote Van der Braak, “If Nietzsche’s philosophy of the eternal recurrence is to get off the ground, a 
revaluation of values is indispensable […] The revaluation of values is an inner process of 
transformation” (Van der Braak 2011, 182).  As an inner process of transformation, in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra the revaluation of values is reflected in “Of the Three Metamorphoses,” and is embodied in 
the Űbermensch; “Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman – a rope over an abyss.  A dangerous 
across, a dangerous on-the-way, a dangerous looking back, a dangerous shuddering and stopping” 
(Nietzsche 1954, 126).  In light of this dangerous crossing-over, let us now pivot to an examination of the 




 Who is the overman?  As Nietzsche states in The Joyous Science, someone who does not restrict 
their moral imagination according to a standard of right or wrong action:  
Let us confine ourselves, therefore, to the purification of our opinions and value judgments, and 
to the creation of our own standards of goodness – but let us no longer brood over the ‘moral 
worth of actions’!  Yes my friends!  The time has come for us to turn away in disgust from all this 
nonsense of some standing in moral judgment over others […] We however, want to become who 
we are – something new, unique, incomparable, self-legislating and self-creating.  (Nietzsche 
2018, 214-215)     
According to Nietzsche, self-overcoming, the creation of new values and the realization of the overman, 
because of the resistances one faces along this path of doing philosophy, is fueled by suffering.  However, 
rather than viewing suffering as that which is to be avoided, pitied or labeled bad, Nietzsche’s philosophy 
of the overman is a revaluation of the Christian and early Buddhist perspective of suffering and pity.  
Moreover, not only is the overman the type of person that will be fearless in the face of suffering, and 
thereby say ‘yes’ to such, the overman is one who also, contra traditional values, says ‘yes’ to the 
passions for they are the source from which our virtues are cultivated; “Once you suffered passions and 
called them evil.  But now you have only your virtues left: they grew out of your passions.” (Nietzsche 
1982, 148-149).  In regards to prudential values and the character traits that define the overman, while 
they are generated and cultivated from our capacity to overcome resistance via will to power, our 
experience of such is realized through our affects.155  For example, when we consider the self-overcoming 
                                                 
155 It is important to note that some scholars are skeptical towards any attempt to provide a coherent interpretation of 
the role of the affects in Nietzsche’s metaethics in general, moral psychology in particular.  In his article “Against 
Nietzsche’s ‘Theory’ of Drives,” Tom Stern argues that since Nietzsche failed to provide a coherent account of the 
‘drives,’ particularly as they relate to thought and action, one ought not think that there is a single theory for making 
sense of this aspect of moral psychology.  According to Stern “His ‘drive’ terminology is confusing; his skepticism 
about drives and actions is as far-reaching as the knowledge he claims (and needs) to have about them; the relation 
between drives and conscious deliberations is expounded in an overwhelming variety of different and often 
contradictory ways. This much is clear: if ‘success’ in philosophical writing means the production of an exegetically 
plausible, unique, and philosophically robust theory—the sort of thing that many scholars have aimed to produce 
from him—then it must be acknowledged that Nietzsche failed in this case. On that assumption, one should abandon 
him as philosophical psychologist and/or produce one’s own, Nietzsche-inspired theory (provided the clash with 
Nietzsche is acknowledged)” (Stern 2015, 138).  In this dissertation, my goal is not to provide a single theoretical 
lens for making sense of what Nietzsche states about the drives; instead, I am simply attempting to show that what 
he does say about the drives, particularly in regards to values, reveals an anti-realist and anti-cognitivist perspective.  
Such a perspective does not provide a positive account or theory of the nature of values and/or moral psychology.  
Rather, similar to the Mahāyāna philosophy of emptiness which does not provide a positive account of the nature of 
existence as an alternative to the essentialist philosophies it negates, anti-realism and anti-cognitivism reveal what 




of one’s former beliefs that are the byproduct of our affects and moral valuations, Nietzsche states in 
Beyond Good and Evil, “The will to overcome an affect is ultimately only the will of another, or several 
other, affects” (Nietzsche 1966, 86).  And when we consider his reflections regarding one’s self-
overcoming of the passions, Nietzsche states the following in The Wanderer and His Shadow: 
The man who has overcome his passions has entered into possession of the most fertile ground; 
like the colonist who has mastered the forests and swamps.  To sow the seeds of good spiritual 
works in the soil of the subdued passions is then the immediate urgent task.  The overcoming 
itself is only a means, not a goal; if it is not so viewed, all kinds of weeds and devilish nonsense 
will quickly spring up in this rich soil now unoccupied, and soon there will be more confusion 
than ever was before. (Nietzsche 1977, 233) 
For Nietzsche, overcoming our passions is not an ascetic ideal of eliminating the passions in order to 
achieve a goal of being-passionless (e.g., Stoicism); rather, overcoming the passions is a process of 
transformation, or sublimation.  As Karl Jaspers explains, “To become a higher person for Nietzsche 
requires a process of sublimation wherein one transforms “coarse drives into refined ones,” such as the 
transformation of sexual desire into love (amour-passion)” (Jaspers 1965, 137).  Nietzsche’s revaluation 
of values reveals a perspective whereby the passions in general, specific affects such as anger in 
particular, are not inherently terrible.  Rather, the situation determines whether our passions become 
devastating torrents, or lead to ‘good health’ and self-mastery.  
 Nietzsche’s philosophy of value creation is helpful for illuminating Dōgen’s philosophical 
practice of value creation in general, non-anthropocentric value creation in particular.  While Dōgen does 
not actually use metaethical terminology such as ‘value creation,’ it is quite clear that as a practice the 
creation of new values is salient to his establishing a new-religious movement/practice for the Japanese 
people.  Indeed, this is evidenced through his practice of self-overcoming, vis-à-vis Buddha-nature, 
original enlightenment (Jpn. hongaku), and normative values, such as skillful means (Skt. upāya).156  For 
example, in regards to normative values vis-à-vis the precepts, as we saw in the previous chapter Dōgen 
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seeking’ philosophy, which in turn provided a new and different perspective of Zen enlightenment than that of 




resists a fundamentalist/foundationalist outlook; “Dōgen interprets the Buddhist precepts not as a ‘thou 
shalt,’ but as vows that embody the bodhisattva. […] The values of good and evil do not exist in 
themselves for Dōgen, but are the temporary configurations resulting from ever-changing conditions.  
Therefore, to conform to these values is not a matter of following rules (from the other-oriented 
perspective) or even of moral deliberation (from a self-oriented perspective)” (Van der Braak 2011, 184-
185).  Thus, Van der Braak concludes with the following comparative insight, mainly “For Nietzsche as 
well as Dōgen, the self-overcoming of morality does not refer to an escape from or relativization of 
mundane existence (including its evil aspects), but to a more inclusive, affirmative perspective on duality” 
(Van der Braak 2011, 186).  Pivoting from this comparative point, let us turn our attention to their 
metaethical perspective of non-anthropocentric value creation. 
§ 7.5 Dōgen, Nietzsche and Non-Anthropocentrism 
Our focus in this chapter is to see how Dōgen’s and Nietzsche’s metaethics might help us to 
articulate a non-anthropocentric conceptual scheme so that contemporary society can rethink their 
anthropocentric relationship with the earth.  Within the field of environmental ethics, which is a discipline 
of applied ethics that includes metaethical inquiry,157 there have been a number of non-anthropocentric 
perspectives advanced by scholars in order to provide a new horizon by which humankind can reevaluate 
their relationship with other species and ecosystems.  For example, Peter Singer158 and Tom Regan159 
have defended animal rights perspectives that call into question the exploitation of animals for: (1) 
agriculture; (2) medical research; (3) sport; and (4) entertainment.  Going one stride further, Paul 
                                                 
157 As I noted in the introduction, in light of J.S. Mill, metaethical inquiry and applied ethics are not mutually 
exclusive; they are not, in other words, normative silos.  Anthropocentrism is an example of such overlap.  While the 
concept ‘anthropocentrism’ is salient to the applied arena of environmental ethics, it is a metaethical concept.  In 
principle, anthropocentrism maintains that humans are at the center of moral consideration, which in turn entails that 
the interests of humans inherently override the interests of other species and natural phenomena and ecosystems.    
158 See Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: The Definitive Classic of the Animal Movement (New York: Harper Collins, 
2009). 
159 See Tom Regan, All That Dwell Therein: Animal Rights and Environmental Ethics (Berkeley: University of 





Taylor160 defends a biocentric outlook whereby all life forms, regardless of whether such is sentient 
and/or has interests (i.e. subjects of life), are to be regarded as direct moral patients.  And ecocentrists 
such as Aldo Leopold,161 Holmes Rolston III,162 Baird Callicott,163 Bill Throop and Ned Hettinger164 have 
defended a normative perspective whereby, in addition to non-human biotic components of nature, 
elemental beings, such as water and air, as well as whole ecosystems (e.g., bogs and wetlands) are 
included within one’s compass of moral consideration.  Despite the differences between these 
perspectives, these normative standpoints share the basic commitment that humans are not the crown of 
creation, and that human interests do not inherently override the interests of other beings.  
In addition to, though notwithstanding, the aforementioned normative perspectives, deep 
ecologists such as Arne Naess,165 Bill Devall,166 George Sessions167 and David Abram168 have advanced a 
non-anthropocentric outlook that not only attempts recalibrate animal, land use and natural resource 
policies, but also provides a ‘way seeking’ path of attunement, vis-à-vis the more-than-human-world.  I 
contend that what generally distinguishes deep ecological thinking from other non-anthropocentric 
perspectives is similar to how virtue theory is distinguishable from the action-based normative 
perspectives of deontology and utilitarianism; like virtue theory, deep ecologists maintain that the 
cultivation of one’s character is a first-order concern.  However, unlike Aristotle’s virtue theory, deep 
ecologists maintain that the earth bears incorporation into our everyday comportment, life style and 
                                                 
160 See Paul Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton University Press, 1986). 
161 See Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949). 
162 See Holmes Rolston III, Conserving Natural Value (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). 
163 See Baird J. Callicott, In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1989). 
164 See Ned Hettinger and Bill Throop, “Refocusing Ecocentrism: De-emphasizing Stability and Defending 
Wildness,” In Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and Application, Sixth ed. Ed. Louis Pojman And Paul 
Pojman (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2012). 
165 See Arne Naess, The Ecology of Wisdom: Writings by Arne Naess, ed. Alan Drengson and Bill Devall, (Berkeley, 
CA: Counterpoint Press, 2010). 
166 See Bill Devall, Deep Ecology: Living As If Nature Mattered, (Layton, UT: Gibbs Smith, 1985). 
167 See George Sessions, Deep Ecology for the 21st Century: Readings On the Philosophy and Practice of New 
Environmentalism, (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1995).   





mode-of-being so as to realize a meaningful ‘existence-time.’  And, in contradistinction to J.S. Mill, deep 
ecologists maintain that there is wisdom to be learned from ‘nature’, vis-à-vis normative ‘thinking’ and 
‘dwelling.’  Herein, the existential horizon that deep ecology opens up is, prima facie, an inviting 
perspective for considering Dōgen and Nietzsche in dialogue together.  That being said, I do not think that 
Dōgen and Nietzsche can be pigeonholed within deep ecology proper.169  One reason supporting this 
contention is that the normative platform of deep ecology maintains the existence of objective/intrinsic 
value in nature; for Dōgen, as well as Nietzsche, while one can value nature intrinsically, their 
metaethical commitments to anti-realism clearly destabilizes any belief in objective/intrinsic value.  
Accordingly, rather than restricting our treatment of these anti-realist/anti-cognitivist thinkers to any of 
these versions of non-anthropocentrism, vis-à-vis contemporary environmental ethics, we shall explore 
how a Dōgen-Nietzschean perspectivism helps support a mode of value creation, via creative play, that 
can expand our moral imagination about the question of life’s meaning, which I contend to be tied to the 
ecological crisis.  Thus I plan to show how a Dōgen-Nietzschean perspective on the question of life’s 
meaning can lay bare a “way-seeking” path towards overcoming the ideological perspective of 
anthropocentrism which is responsible for the deteriorating health of the earth.170    
                                                 
169 In his article “Voices of Mountains, Trees, and Rivers: Kūkai, Dōgen, and a Deeper Ecology,” Graham Parkes 
argues that it would be a hasty generalization to lump the non-anthropocentric perspectives of East Asian Mahāyāna 
thinkers, such as Dōgen, within the environmental camp of deep ecology.  I am sympathetic with Parkes’ thesis, 
however for a different reason.  According to Parkes, while deep ecology draws inspiration from East Asian 
philosophies such as Daoism and Buddhism, it is not entirely clear that their interpretations of such are accurate.  
Notwithstanding Parkes’ position, I contend that deep ecology has inherited the ecocentric standpoint (e.g. Aldo 
Leopold, Baird Callicott and Holmes Rolston III) that there is a ‘balance’ of nature whereby the ‘good’ of 
ecosystems is to be realized through the beauty, integrity and stability of ecosystems (Leopold 1949).  The notion 
that nature is stable, or that there is a balance to nature, is a myth.  See John Kircher, The Balance of Nature: 
Ecology’s Enduring Myth (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).  Thus, contrary to ‘ecocentric 
essentialism’, I am more sympathetic with Hettinger and Throop’s ecocentric perspective whereby instability, 
fecundity and wildness is the ecological norm (Hettinger and Throop, 2012).  If deep ecology were to emphasize this 
instability model of ecosystems, it is likely that they would have to rethink their normative commitments, including 
the belief that all beings have objective/intrinsic value.  Ultimately, I contend that it is this deep ecological 
commitment –the existence of objective/intrinsic value – forestalls any attempt of reducing Dōgen’s non-
anthropocentric views, or those of Nietzsche, to deep ecology.   
170 As I noted above, one of the reasons why Dōgen and Nietzsche invite a comparative dialogue that goes beyond 
the mere listing of philosophical affinities is that their practice of doing philosophy is one of self-overcoming, vis-à-
vis religion and ethics/culture.  As Van der Braak writes in the epilogue of Nietzsche and Zen: Self-overcoming 





In order to set the stage for this comparative dialogue, it is important to identify the scope of non-
anthropocentrism for both Dōgen and Nietzsche?  For Dōgen, non-anthropocentrism is not so much an 
overtruning of Theravāda171 and Mahāyāna172 conceptions of nature, but rather a shift towards 
deemphasizing soteriological values that are centered upon human acheivement.  Thus, rather than a 
difference in kind, Dōgen’s attitudes toward ’nature’, vis-à-vis non-anthropocentrism, is a difference in 
degree in comparison to early Buddhism and his Mahāyāna predecessors.  Herein, my characterization of 
Dōgen’s non-anthropocentrism builds off of Malcolm David Eckel research in “Is there a Buddhist 
Philosophy of Nature?”; according to Eckel, Buddhist anthropocentrism, “is genuinely concerned with the 
human achievement of human goals” (Eckel 1997, 341).  Thus, “Beneath the evident differences between 
the Indian and East Asian traditions lie a commitment to the view that human beings work out their fates 
through the development and purification of their own minds” (Eckel 1997, 340).  Eckel does however 
                                                 
Nietzsche, Christian redemption, for Dōgen, Buddhist enlightenment), criticize its orthodox meaning as a final state 
beyond suffering, purge it of its metaphysical and transcendent connotations, and revalue its meaning out of this 
worldly orientation.  Rather than present a new version of “the Zen experience” as a new attempt at radical 
transcendence or a new conception of religious experience, Dōgen’s immanent transcendence, his radical 
phenomenalism, can serve to overcome the implicit dichotomies in Western modes of thought between inner and 
outer, mind and body, meditation and ritual, individual and society, spiritual and secular, and “religious life” and 
“ordinary life” (Van der Braak 2011, 191). 
171 The concept of nature in early Buddhism, according to Lily de Silva, “means everything in the world which is not 
organized and constructed by man.  The Pāli equivalents which come closest to ‘nature’ are loka and yathabhuta.  
The former is usually translated as ‘world,’ while the latter literally means ‘things as they really are.’  The words 
dhammata and niyama are used in the Pāli canon to mean ‘natural way or way’” (De Silva 2000, 91).  See Lily de 
Silva, “Early Buddhist Attitudes Toward Nature,” In Dharma Rain: Sources of Buddhist Environmentalism, ed. 
Stephanie Kaza and Kenneth Kraft (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2000) pp. 91-103.  
172 According to William LaFleur, Mahāyāna conceptions of nature are rooted within the, “universalism and logic of 
interdependence” (LaFleur 2000, 110).  See William LaFleur, “Enlightenment for Plants and Trees,” In Dharma 
Rain: Sources of Buddhist Environmentalism, ed. Staphanie Kaza and Kenneth Kraft (Boston: Shambhala 
Publishing, 2000) pp. 109-116.  In light of LaFleur’s research, I contend that Mahāyāna Buddhist attitudes toward 
nature are not different in kind from that of Theravāda, but rather a difference in degree.  For example, based upon 
Lambert Schmithausen’s research, in early Buddhism, plants and seeds were regarded as borderline cases vis-à-vis 
sentience.  However, in the context of East Asian Mahāyāna Buddhism, rather than being classified as borderline 
cases, plants are included within the class of beings that have Buddha-nature (Schmithausen 2009).  According to 
LaFleur, the inclusion of plants within the class of beings that have Buddha-nature, “dissolved the whole 
sentient/insentient distinction” (LaFleur 2000, 109).  By dissolving the duality between sentient and insentient 
beings thereby led to the inclusion of elemental beings such as rocks and water and the whole environment within 
the class of beings that have Buddha-nature (Shmithausen 2009).  For a thoroughgoing examination into the 
diverging perspectives and normative attitudes towards plants in Theravāda and Mahāyāna Buddhism, see Lambert 
Schmithausen, Plants in Early Buddhism and the Far Eastern Idea of the Buddha-Nature of Grasses and Trees ( 





note that there is a paradox embedded within this perspective since the goal of human achievement in 
Buddhism, mainly nirvāṇa, requires the realization of no-self, as well as honoring moral precepts that 
prohibit killing other beings, including non-human sentient creatures, and cultivating, “a fundamental 
respect for life in all its forms” (Eckel 1997, 342).  And, in the context of Mahāyāna Buddhism, this 
paradox becomes magnified in light of the philosophy of interdependence;173 in short, Eckel maintains 
that since the philosophy of interdependence is, “such a crucial part of Buddhist ethical theory,” it follows 
that there is, “good reason to be skeptical of any form of centrism” (Eckel 1997, 344).  In other words, the 
philosophy of interdepedence as presented, for example, in The Flower Garland Sūtra not only undercuts 
anthropocentrism, but also non-anthropocentric perspectives, including biocentrism and ecocentrism.  
Accoridngly, if non-anthropocentrism is destabilized by Mahāyāna philosophies, then it seems, according 
to Eckel’s reasoning, unclear how Mahāyāna Buddhism in general, Zen in particular, could provide 
normative directives and prescriptions, vis-à-vis biocentrism or ecocentrism, for society to modify their 
anthropocentric values and exploitive habits. 
I welcome Eckel’s skepticism and critical thinking.  When considering Dōgen’s non-
anthropocentrism, my intention is not to reduce such to any of the centrist persepctives, including bio-
centrism, ecocentrism and deep ecology despite the fact that there are aspects of eco-philosophical 
thinking in Dōgen’s writings that parallel these Western theories of environmental ethics.174  Moreover, 
because Dōgen’s non-anthropocentric perspective is tied to Mahāyāna Buddhist soteriology,175 one will 
                                                 
173 In regards to the Mahāyāna philosophy of interdependence, vis-à-vis non-duality, LaFleur states that, “By 
definition bodhi would have to be shared by all sattva: every kind of being and phenomenon there is.  Strictly 
speaking, delusion begins when man thinks he is separable from his world or his environment, when he wants only 
some kind of private ‘peace of mind. […] The whole mood and mode of Mahāyāna philosophy was to use logic to 
chop up logic’s penchant for chopping up the world into multiple, disparate, and easily lost pieces” (LaFleur 2000, 
111).   
174 For example, in his article “The Japanese Concept of Nature in Relation to the Environmental Ethics and 
Aesthetics of Aldo Leopold,” Steve Odin shows that the East Asian Mahāyāna philosophy of nonduality is 
embedded within the ecocentric land ethic of Leopold and Callicott;  according to this normative standpoint, “things 
in nature are not separate, independent, or substantial objects, but relational fields existing in mutual dependence 
upon each other, thus constituting a synergistic ecosystem of organisms interacting with their environment” (Odin 
1997, 92-93).        
175 See Miranda Shaw, “Nature in Dōgen’s Philosophy and Poetry,” In The Journal of the International Association 




be unable to appreciate the depth of his non-anthropocentric thinking if one were to interpret such in light 
of land use ethics, vis-à-vis natural resource conservation and wilderness preservation; after all, Dōgen 
was not an environmental scientist, nor an environmental activist, but rather a Buddhist monk who was 
concerned with soteriological status of non-human beings and entities.  In light of Dōgen’s soteriological 
values, according to Miranda Shaw, his philosophy of nature is best characterized as a mode of horizontal 
transcendence.   
What is horizontal transcendence?  And, if such is an appropriate characterization of Dōgen, can 
we extend this label to Nietzsche?  According to Shaw, horizontal transcendence refers to a mode of 
persepctivsim whereby, “one moves beyond the limits of a former situation and attains a new perspective 
or understanding, perhaps even on a universal scale” (Shaw 1985, 129).  Contrary to ‘radical 
immanentalism,’176 Shaw maintains that, “transcendence is present in his thought as an experiential 
category. In order to experience an event in its thusness, one has to experience a breakthrough of 
awareness. One has to transcend the illusory boundaries of one's ego, "dropping body and mind," in order 
to attain the unitary mode of vision described in Dōgen's poetry and sermons” (Shaw 1985, 128).  While I 
share Shaw’s interpretation that Dōgen’s philosophy of nature involves the experience of overcoming 
formerly held views and beliefs, I am not sympathetic with ‘transcendence’ as an appropriate 
characterization of his non-anthropocentric philosophy.  In short, it is not obvious that the overcoming of 
one’s formerly held beliefs and views entails transcendence of such in a way that they are obliterated 
from one’s normative thinking and deliberations.  Instead of transcendence, I contend that one creatively 
integrates their formerly held views into their new perspective in a way not unlike the process of 
metamorphosis that amphibious beings, such as frogs, undergo; just as a frog reabsorbs its tail from its 
former tadpole mode of existence instead of discarding such, I contend that the process of overcoming 
former perspectives involves the reabsorption of one’s former views in order to give rise to a new 
                                                 
176 Shaw’s use of ‘radical immanentalism’ is in light of the fact that Dōgen did not conceive of Buddha-nature as 




perspectivism.  Notwithstanding this reason, I also contend that Shaw’s characterization is teleological, 
which is not in keeping with Dōgen’s non-teleological philosophy, vis-à-vis realizing Buddha-nature.  
Indeed, what is unique about Dōgen’s perspectivism is that it involves continuous self-overcoming vis-à-
vis delusion and enlightenment (i.e. ongoing non-teleological metamorphosis).  Thus, I contend that 
‘metamorphosis’, rather than transcendence, is a preferable characterization of the experiential process of 
arriving at any new perspective.  The advantage of this characterization is that the process of 
metamorphosis preserves the transformative aspect of one’s perspectivism while at the same time 
remaining immanently tied to the concrete here and now, vis-à-vis impermanence; the overcoming of 
one’s former beliefs, via metamorphosis, reveals an imminent, ‘this-worldly’ perspectivism whereby all 
beings, including mountains, trees, rivers, stone lanterns etc. are Buddha-nature.   
For Nietzsche, it is upon proclaiming that ‘God is dead’ that he proceeds to overcome the history 
of Western philosophy that is entrenched in Christian ascetic values; herein, his practice of overcoming, 
via philosophizing with a hammer, included overcoming anthropocentric conceptions of meaning and 
value.  Since Christianity proffered a transcendent conception of meaning whereby humankind is the 
crown of creation within the Great Chain of Being, the question of life’s meaning was never a matter of 
philosophical concern as God’s ‘ways’ and ‘divine plan’ are beyond our grasp.  In fact, as evidenced in 
Ecclesiastes, it is a mistake to even try to understand the purpose of our existence and the meaning of life: 
“For in much wisdom is much vexation, and he who increases knowledge increases sorrow” (Ecclesiastes 
1:8 [ESV]). However, ‘this stage setting’ collapses with the ‘death of God’ along with the ‘old tablets’ by 
which our morals and values are foundationally supported.  That being said, rather than residing in a state 
of passive nihilism, Nietzsche’s practice of self-overcoming led to a non-anthropocentric perspectivism.  
No longer do we need some conception of life’s meaning that is wrapped up with metaphysical 
transcendence and otherworldly hopes; rather, we can passionately and playfully live this life through an 
embodied, ‘light-footed,’ non-dualistic relationship with the earth.  Herein, similar to the experience of 




an all too fitting characterization of Nietzsche’s ‘way-seeking’ practice of value creation.  The Three 
“Metamorphoses of Spirit” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, clearly supports this interpretation.  The 
perspective of the camel, which is burdened by the heavy load of ‘thou shalt’ eventually becomes 
reabsorbed as an ‘I will,’ vis-à-vis the perspective of the lion, which in turn is reabsorbed by the yes-
saying spirt of the ‘child.’  Thus, it is in regards to Nietzsche and Dōgen’s practice of self-overcoming 
perspectives, via metamorphosis, that makes them philosophical companions on the path of comparative 
philosophy, vis-à-vis non-anthropocentrism.      
§ 7.5 Environmental Crisis As A Crisis of Meaning 
 With regard to our current relationship with the earth, I want to argue that our current 
environmental crisis, which is fueled by the self-centered pursuit of ‘fame and gain,’ is the embodiment of 
a crisis of meaning due to anthropocentrism.  Herein, I am sympathetic with Jason Wirth when he writes 
in the preface of Mountains, Rivers, And The Great Earth: Reading Gary Snyder and Dōgen In An Age of 
Ecological Crisis, “our unhinged relationship to the earth is a question of etiquette, of ethics, of finding a 
more sacred manner of wayfaring, of clear-eyed compassion for who and where we are” (Wirth 2017, 
xvii).177   In addition to Wirth, I am also sympathetic with Shigennori Nagatomo’s position, that dualistic 
                                                 
177 Gary Snyder’s essay, “Nets of Beads, Webs of Cells,” demonstrates a ‘clear eyed’ attempt to wrestle with the 
many normative tensions, vis-à-vis social/economic/environmental constraints, that are illuminated by a ‘live 
deliberately’ sustainable lifestyle that affirms Buddhist precepts and normative ideals.  According to Snyder, “The 
primary ethical injunction of Buddhism is known as the First Precept.  It is against hurting and taking life, […] Not 
eating flesh is a common consequence of this precept in the Buddhist world, which has largely consisted of agrarian 
peoples.  This has posed a thorny question for normally tolerant Buddhists in the matter of how to regard spiritual 
life of people in those societies for whom eating fish or animals may well be a matter of economic necessity.  My 
own home place is beyond the zone of adequate water and good gardening soil, so my family and I have grappled 
with this question, even as we kept up our lay Buddhist life” (Snyder 2000, 346).  Based upon my experience of 
homesteading in the hills of Vermont for the past fifteen years, I deeply appreciate Snyder’s efforts to negotiate a 
sustainable livelihood that goes beyond simple ideals and practices that all too often ignore the hard realities of 
human overpopulation, scarcity of natural resources and economic inequality.  “As a student of hunting and 
gathering cultures, I’ve tried to get some insight into fundamental human psychology by looking at the millennia of 
human hunting and gathering experience. […] When I kept chickens, we maintained the flock, the ecology, and the 
economy by eating excess young roosters and, at the other end of the life cycle, by stewing an occasional elderly 
hen.  In doing this I experience one of the necessities of peasant life worldwide.  They (and I) could not but run their 
flocks this way, for anything else would be a luxury–that is to say, uneconomic. […] The very distinction 
‘vegetarian/nonvegetarian’ is too simple.  Some populations, especially in India and Southeast Asia, are deliberate 
Buddhist and Hindu vegetarians, but most of the rest of the people of the Third World are semivegetarians by 





thinking conditions a perspective whereby humans think of themselves as ‘beings-outside-of-nature’ (Jpn. 
shizengai sonzai).  In “The Logic of Not: An Inivitation To a Holistic Mode of Thinkin From An East 
Asian Perspective—An Essay In Celebration of Roger Ames On the Occasion of His Retirement,” 
Nagatomo states: 
The difficulties we face today in addressing environmental issues have their root in this 
prioritization promoting dualism that generates an oppositional mode of understanding the 
relationship between nature and ourselves. If human beings pursue nature solely for the sake of 
satisfying their own ego-interests, which ego-logical thinking may promote, nature thus 
understood is objectified nature, and not nature that provides the foundations of life for human 
beings. Human beings and nature are understood in dualistic terms, where humans are thought to 
be in control of nature, but the current global environmental issues suggest that we are being 
controlled by nature instead. This occurs clearly as a consequence of distancing human beings 
from nature as a result of the objectification of nature. Pursuing nature for the sake of egotistical 
human interests creates an imbalance in the activity of nature, by overextending our desires 
beyond what our environment can provide. (Nagatomo 2018, 1256-1257) 
As Nagatomo maintians, “Dualism is a logical consequence of accepting either-or logic as the model for 
understanding human reality” (Nagatomo 2018, 1242).  Accordingly, since either-or logic presupposes 
essences, vis-à-vis law of identity, and because fixed essences, according to both Dōgen and Nietzsche, 
are not real, to interpret the world through this logical lens alone will condition erroneous conceptions of 
existence, including metaethical the standpoint of anthropocentrism.   
In previous chapters we have seen how Dōgen’s commitment to the philosophy of emptiness 
(Skt. śūnyatā) challenges the ultimate validity of either-or logic.  In regards to Nietzsche, one can glean a 
                                                 
grains and vegetables alone and get adequate nutrition, it is to be applauded.  But there are people of high latitudes, 
of the grasslands and deserts and the mountains, who have always had to live by a mixed food economy. […] As for 
modern food production, although it is clear that the beef economy of the developed world is a wasteful luxury, it is 
doubtful that the Third World could easily get by without cows, chickens, pigs, sheep, and the life of the sea” 
(Snyder 2000, 348).  As I interpret Snyder’s ‘Buddhist environmental ethic’, while there are affinities between his 
perspective and the non-anthropocentric philosophies of animal rights/welfare, biocentrism, ecocentrism and deep 
ecology, I don’t think we can pigeonhole him within such.  The main reason supporting this contention is that 
Snyder wants to avoid a firm commitment to action guiding directives, such as those proffered by Singer, Regan, 
Leopold and Taylor; and because the perspectives of other non-anthropocentric philosophies, including Rolston, 
Hettinger and Throop are not motivated by Buddhist philosophies, such as Hua-yen’s philosophy of totality and the 
Buddhist image of Indra’s Net, there is good reason not to restrict our interpretation of his writings to such, despite 
the value Snyder places upon ecological thinking.  And finally, in regards to Deep Ecology, it is not clear to me that 
Snyder’s outlook, as reflected in the aforementioned passages, is an endorsement of the normative platform 
proffered by Naess, Devall and Sessions.  Thus Snyder’s holistic approach to environmental values, beliefs and 




glimpse of his epistemology and logic in The Joyous Science, whereby he challenges its foundations.  For 
example, he writes in, “Origin of the Logical,” that the foundations of logic, mainly the law of identity, is 
itself an illogical principle since nothing in nature is completely identical.  
How did logic arise in the human head?  Doubtless, out of illogic, a domain which must 
originally have been immense.  Countless beings who inferred differently from the way in which 
we do now perished; and yet they may have come nearer to the truth!  For example, whoever was 
not able to identify the ‘same’ often enough with regard to food or predators, whoever subsumed 
too slowly or cautiously, had less chance of survival than those who responded to similar cases by 
immediately guessing that they were identical.  The prevailing tendency, however, was to treat 
similar cases as identical – an illogical tendency since nothing is identical – and it was this which 
created the initial foundation for logic.  In order for the notion of substance to arise (something 
indispensable to logic, although in the strictest sense nothing real corresponds to it), for the 
longest time it was likewise necessary for the mutability of things not to be seen, not to have been 
perceived; those creatures who did not see with exactitude had an advantage over those who saw 
everything ‘in flux’.  By itself, a skeptical tendency, the exercise of excessive caution in making 
inferences, is extremely dangerous.  No living creature would have survived unless the opposite 
tendency – the tendency to affirm rather than to suspend judgment, to err and invent rather than to 
wait and see, to accept rather than to reject, to jump to conclusions rather than to do justice – had 
not grown extraordinarily strong” (Nietzsche 2018, 125). 
Nietzsche’s epistemic ruminations in the Joyous Science undergo further digestion in Beyond Good and 
Evil as well:   
The falseness of a judgment is for us not necessarily an objection to a judgment; in this respect 
our new language may sound strangest.  The question is to what extent it is life-promoting, life 
preserving, species preserving, perhaps even species-cultivating.  And we are fundamentally 
inclined to claim that the falsest judgments (which include synthetic judgments a priori) are the 
most indispensable for us; […] To recognize untruth as a condition of life–that certainly means 
resisting accustomed value feelings in a dangerous way; and a philosophy that risks this would by 
that token alone place itself beyond good and evil. (Nietzsche 1966, 12).   
Herein, Nietzsche’s perspective is, similar to Dōgen’s, quite nuanced.  For Dōgen, while either-or 
reasoning does not reveal corresponding truths about the world, it is, particularly in the context of 
language, indispensable to our everyday lives.  Similarly for Nietzsche, while the law of identity does not 
reflect how the world is in itself, it is effective (i.e. pragmaitic truth) for promoting species survival.  That 
being said, Nietzsche cautions his audience not to think that this is the only perspectival lens by which the 
world can be experienced; hence “Our New Limitlessness” from The Joyous Science, “But I think 
nowadays we are at least far from the ludicrous presumption of decreeing from our corner that only 




to us, in so far as we cannot deny the possibility that it contains limitless interpretations” (Nietzsche 2018, 
272).  However, by recognizing that the world consists of a plurality of interpretations that are seemingly 
limitless, Nietzsche shares Dōgen’s outlook whereby, “While experiencing one side, we are blind to the 
other side” (Dōgen 1994, 34); “We cannot see around our own corner; it is hopeless curiosity to want to 
know what other forms of intellect and perspectives might exist” (Nietzsche 2018, 272).  As I interpret 
Dōgen and Nietzsche, while it is the case that dualistic logic is indispensable to living our lives, and while 
we are unable to completely shed our human perspective of the world, this does not necessarily entail the 
metaethical commitments of anthropocentrism.  In other words, for Dōgen and Nietzsche, while our 
perspective of the world, and the value judgments we express, are anthropogenic (i.e. they are born out of 
our human perspective; they are human-mind-dependent), such anthropogenesis does not entail that 
humans are inherently more valuable than other non-human beings, or that they ought to be (i.e. 
anthropocentrism).178   
I contend that both anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism are anthropogenic metaethical 
conceptual schemes by which we can prioritize values and interact/participate with the more-than-human-
world.  Thus, it is based upon this interpretation that I wholeheartedly resist the metaethical standpoint of 
William Murdy, who maintains that environmental values ought to be prioritized according to an 
anthropocentric metaethical lens.  According to Murdy, anti-anthropocentric philosophies, including the 
perspective I am promoting, are self-contradictory since any attempt to embrace an anti-anthropocentric 
perspective actually leads to a more anthropocentric outlook than ordinary anthropocentrism.   In his 
article “Anthropocentrism: A modern Version,” Murdy notes that while anthropocentrism is pejorative in 
most publications on environmental ethics, it is not as concerning as many philosophers make it out to be.  
According to Murdy, if we agree that all species ought to be allowed to carry out their natural 
evolutionary role, then anthropocentrism, which is the philosophy that values mankind more highly than 
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any other species or being in nature, is ‘natural.’  After all, according to Murdy, all species naturally value 
themselves more than other species (i.e. “all earthly beings are speciocentric); “spiders are to be valued 
more highly than other things in nature – by spiders.  It is proper for men to be anthropocentric and for 
spiders to be arachnocentric.  This goes for all other living species” (Murdy; 1975, 281).  Thus, if anti-
anthropocentrism is committed to the moral belief that all species ought to be viewed as a part of nature, 
and should be able to exist naturally, then mankind cannot be viewed as an exception; we too are a part of 
nature.  Accordingly, since all species are naturally speciocentric (i.e. they value their own species more 
than others), it logically follows that humans ought to be anthropocentric.  To comport ourselves 
otherwise would be unnatural and thus set mankind apart from nature.  Anthropocentrism is, as Murdy 
sees it, our speciocentric perspective.   
 In light of my position noted above, mainly that both anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism 
are anthropogenic, my general response to Murdy is informed by Joel Feinberg’s standpoint against 
psychological egoism.179  Psychological egoism argues that there are no genuine altruistic acts because 
acting altruistically is an action that is motivated out of self-interest (e.g., Jones’ interest to act in order to 
benefit Smith is an interest Jones has, therefore it is not altruistic).  The problem with this deterministic 
line of reasoning is that it confuses having certain interests on the one hand, and putting oneself at the 
center of such interests on the other.  No doubt, humans can put the interests of others before one’s own.  
Moreover, while altruistic perspectives are an expression of one’s interests (i.e. mind-dependent), such 
does not entail that one’s own interests are at the center of such judgments, expressions and choices.  I 
contend that the same reasoning applies to anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism; while both 
metaethical standpoints are anthropogenic, such anthropogenesis does not entail that humans are ‘the 
crown of creation’ and that we are morally superior.  Notwithstading this general criticism, I am not 
convinced that non-anthropocentric perspectives are unnatural for the reason Murdy categorically affirms, 
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mainly all earthly beings are speciocentric.  For starters, while the concept ‘arachnocentric’ makes sense 
to us because we have the capacity to think in the abstract, sub specie aeternitatis, and recognize the 
existence of whole species, Murdy fails to demonstrate that this is a capacity shared by spiders, or any 
other non-human species for that matter.  To borrow language from Dōgen, Murdy seems to assume that 
our anthropogenic interpretation of phenomenal beings, including spiders, reveals all that there is to know 
whereby nothing remains concealed.  Notwithstanding the fact that spiders have individual interests, it is 
an epistemic leap to conclude that the presence of individual interests reveals speciocentricism.   
Indeed, anthropocentrism is a speciocentric philosophy; thus non-anthropocentric theories of 
value simply contend that this is an egoistic and chauvinistic moral outlook, similar to sexism or racism, 
yet at the ‘whole-species-level.’  While anti-anthropocentric philosophies are anti-speciocentric, this is 
not, as Murdy believes, unnatural.  If nature includes the myriad capacities that various species exhibit, 
then the capacity to think non-anthropocentrically is very much part of nature.  Moreover, since one only 
needs to find one instance that contradicts the categorical word ‘all’ in order to reject any categorical 
premise, I contend that since there have been a number of human individuals, including Dōgen and 
Nietzsche, that have not affirmed a speciocentric perspective, Murdy’s major premise that ‘all earthly 
beings are speciocentric’ is not an acceptable premise.180   
While I do agree with Murdy that anthropocentric values and concerns can motivate humans to 
take action against environmental degradation and climate change, I am not convinced that it is an 
effective approach for setting the metaethical stage for doing applied ethics, vis-à-vis the environment. 
Despite the many warnings that continue to echo since Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962), the majority 
of humanity continues to anthropocentrically double down on its consumptive and wasteful way of life 
with little regard for the more-than-human-world.  Recently, the Intergovernmental Science-Policy 
                                                 
180 My reconstruction of Murdy’s argument against anti-anthropocentric perspectives is as follows: 
 P1. All earthly beings are speciocentric. 
 P2. Humans are an earthly being. 




Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) has reported that around one million animal 
and plant species are now threatened with extinction over the next two decades.  The loss of biodiversity 
at this level is greater than at any other time in human history.  According to the IPBES, while the data is 
existentially concerning, there is room for hope; we can make a difference, and help prevent this massive 
dieback of biodiversity.  However, action needs to be taken at both local and global levels, specifically in 
regards to economic and environmental policy.181  The IPBES highlights five areas in which we need to 
begin making drastic changes: (1) land and sea use; (2) exploitation of organisms; (3) climate change; (4) 
pollution; and (5) invasive alien species.  Notwithstanding their assessment and recommendations, I do 
believe we need to go even deeper; we need to completely rethink our general attitude and perspective of 
humankind, and our relationship to the more-than-human-world.  In other words, how we use the land, 
and the ways we exploit animals etc. are a manifestation of a particular ideology that maintains the 
inherent importance of humankind over that of non-human species and beings (i.e. anthropocentrism).  To 
try and change our behavior without rethinking and overcoming our perspectives seems dubious; and, to 
think that we can rely upon science to innovate our way out of this crisis without realizing a radical shift 
in our consumptive lifestyles would be nothing other than an anchor bias grounded in ascetic ideals.  
After all, the IPBES report is not entirely surprising as there have been many reports and warning signs 
highlighting the connection between contemporary human behavior/lifestyles and environmental 
degradation.  Why have we continued to double down on natural resource exploitation and 
overconsumption, despite the ecological destruction and pollution we know we are causing?  In what 
follows I will argue that the answer is anthropocentrism. 
In his essay, “The Historical Roots of the Ecological Crisis” (1967), Lynn White Jr. maintains 
that we can trace the origins of the ecological crisis back to Judeo-Christianity.  His basic argument is: 
 P1. Anthropocentrism is the primary cause of the ecological crisis. 
                                                 





P2. Christianity is the most anthropocentric religion/world-view. 
C. Therefore Christianity is the primary cause of the ecological crisis. 
It is not my goal to defend or challenge White’s conclusion, for to do such would take us beyond the 
scope of this chapter.  Rather, I would like to advance an argument that is similar to White’s in order to 
bring Dōgen and Nietzsche into the fold of White’s subsequent reflections concerning our ability to 
overcome the ecological crisis.  The argument I shall present proceeds by acknowledging (P1) of White’s 
argument as an acceptable premise, yet avoids in singling out Christianity as the culprit as he does in (P2). 
 P1. Anthropocentrism is the primary cause of the ecological crisis. 
P2. Transcendentalism is the most anthropocentric world-view. 
C. Therefore, transcendentalism is the primary cause of the ecological crisis. 
Thus I contend that the cause of anthropocentrism results from a more general philosophy of 
transcendentalism, which is embedded in Christianity.   
What is transcendentalism?  According to E.D. Klemke, transcendentalism is an amalgamation of 
three theses: 
(1) There exists a transcendent being or ultimate with which man can enter into some sort of 
relation. 
(2) Without such a transcendent ultimate, and the relation of faith to it, human life lacks 
meaning, purpose and integration. 
(3) Without such meaning or integration, human life is not worthwhile.  (Klemke 2008, 188).   
 
Now, before addressing the transcendentalist perspective on the meaning of life from a Zen/Nietzschean 
vantage point, it is important to explain why transcendentalism gives rise to anthropocentrism, and why 
anthropocentrism is responsible for the ecological crisis we are currently realizing.  First, since the 
meaning of life is conferred upon us by a transcendent being, many view themselves, as evidenced in the 
sacred books of religious traditions that champion transcendentalism, with a sense of metaphysical 
privilege and entitlement; they view themselves as being created in God’s image, as being the crown of 




transcendentalism conditions exists as an amalgamation of different cognitive biases – psychological 
impulses that cause people to unconsciously draw conclusions about any given topic and without 
sufficient evidence – including: (1) egocentric bias; (2) self-interest bias; (3) story-fitting bias; and (4) 
anchoring bias.  As an amalgamation of different cognitive biases, the unconscious belief in our cosmic 
importance within the greater narrative of transcendent meaning is largely responsible for the current 
ecological crisis.   
Going back to the beginning of the modern period and the ‘utopian vison’ of Francis Bacon, this 
cognitive bias has motivated the unrelenting drive to ‘control nature,’ thereby engendering 
anthropocentric theories, such as Descartes’ philosophy that ‘all animals are machines.’  And, following 
the marriage of science and technology, as well as the birth of industrial manufacturing and capitalism, 
anthropocentrism has transformed the world’s ecosystems and atmosphere in such a way that the future of 
humanity is at stake.  Indeed, anthropocentrism is all too sinister; even in the face of pollution, natural 
resource depletion, species extinction, and climate change, humanity continues to anthropocentrically 
double down on a business as usual trajectory.  Why are they doubling down?  Well, perhaps it is because 
the majority of the world’s population who believe in some version of transcendentalism remain confident 
that everything will work out in the end.  After all, the ways of the transcendent are greater than what we 
can fathom; and, while some environmental problems might be concerning, the destruction of this world 
is not a first order concern due to the fact that eschatology and an after-life fit into transcendental life-
narratives.  Now, at this point it is important to note that I do not believe that simply denying the 
tenability of the three theses of transcendentalism will cause one to begin taking measures to overcome 
their consumptive ways of living.  Indeed, there certainly are people who don’t subscribe to the three 
theses of transcendentalism, and who are vexed by environmental problems, yet nevertheless do not 
attempt to change the drum beat of our ecologically destructive march.  Their situation is perplexing, and, 
no doubt, teetering on the edge of absurdity, mainly because for one to be vexed about ecological 




habits and life-style, evidences a clear discrepancy between one’s aspirations/attitudinal leanings (i.e. 
desiring a cleaner planet) and one’s actions so to realize those desires.182  In addition to absurdity, this 
existential state is, as Nietzsche would likely maintain, passively nihilistic.     
 Both Dōgen’s and Nietzsche’s way-seeking philosophies can be properly characterized as ‘non-
transcendentalist.’  In regards to Dōgen, as already quoted in the introduction of this dissertation from 
Genjō Kōan: “To learn the Buddha’s truth is to learn ourselves.  To learn ourselves is to forget ourselves.  
To forget ourselves is to be experienced by the myriad dharmas.  To be experienced by the myriad 
dharmas is to let our own body-and-mind, and the body-and-mind of the external world, fall away” 
(Dōgen 1994, 34).  In other words, the realization of Buddha-nature is neither beyond nor transcendent 
from the everyday world of this ‘Great Earth.’  And, throughout Nietzsche’s literary works, one will 
encounter his critique of “transcendentalism,” vis-à-vis Christianity, which thereby sets the stage for a 
philosophy of meaning that is born out from and imminent with, via metamorphosis, the earth.  For 
example, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche writes: 
Behold, I teach you the overman.  The overman is the meaning of the earth.  Let your will say: 
the overman shall be the meaning of the earth!  I beseech you my brothers, remain faithful to the 
earth, and do not believe those who speak to you of other worldly hopes!  Poison-mixers are they, 
decaying and poisoned themselves, of whom the earth is weary: so let them go. (Nietzsche 1954, 
125) 
For Nietzsche, to overcome transcendentalism and thus live as a ‘free-spirit,’ one shall begin by saying 
yes to life on the horizon of the eternal recurrence of the same. “Amor fati: let that henceforth be my 
love!... And all in all, to sum up: I wish to be at any time hereafter only a yea-sayer!” (Nietzsche 1954, 
213).   
                                                 
182 Joel Feinberg shines comedic light on this existential state of absurdity, a state whereby one actively takes steps 
to frustrate their desires, with the following tale: “the tale is told of a workman who opens his lunch pail every noon, 
examines his sandwiches, and comments; ‘Ugh, tuna fish again.’  Finally, after weeks of witnessing this ritual, a 
fellow worker asks, ‘Why don’t you have your wife make you some other kind of sandwich?’ to which the worker 
replies, ‘Oh, I’m not married.  I make my own lunches’ (Feinberg 2018, 153).  What makes this tale funny is that, 
assuming the worker is not cognitively impaired, he knowingly takes steps to frustrate his own desires.  With all of 
the data available in regards to environmental degradation, for one to be aware and vexed by such and not attempt to 




 In addition to characterizing Dōgen and Nietzsche as anti-transcendentalist, I want to treat three 
related themes that are salient to their ‘way seeking’ philosophies: perspectivism, passion, play.  Rather 
than anchoring our conception of meaning to some “transcendent” being/principle, a ‘this worldly 
perspectivism,’ fueled by the passions, and a flow of playfulness that molds and shapes our projects and 
livelihoods, is sufficient for living well.  This does not mean that those who do champion this criterion 
will view the world non-anthropocentrically.  However, if one’s world-view is not grounded in a 
transcendentalist conception of meaning, then one’s perspective will not be psychologically anchored to 
anthropocentrism, thus making it possible for “way-seekers” to cultivate their moral imagination, vis-à-
vis active nihilism, in order to overcome human-centeredness, and thereby include the more-than-human 
world within their way-seeking-journey of perspectivism, passion and play.   
Indeed, this is where we realize the value of reading Dōgen and Nietzsche in dialogue together: 
they provide a source of inspiration for overcoming our anthropocentric cognitive blinders.  As White 
writes, “What we do about ecology depends on our ideas of the man-nature relationship.  More science 
and more technology are not going to get us out of the present ecological crisis until we find a new 
religion, or rethink our old one” (White 2013, 10).  That being said, White does not think Zen Buddhism 
is a possible alternative to the transcendentalism of Christianity, mainly because Zen, “is as deeply 
conditioned by Asian history as Christianity is by the experience of the West” (White 2013, 10).   
I disagree with White’s position; I do think that Zen Buddhism, particularly Dōgen’s 
perspectivism, can open up a non-anthropocentric, nondualistic conception of man-nature relationship for 
Western audiences to practice.  While Dōgen is a difficult thinker to make sense of, even for academic 
audiences who are well versed in Buddhism and East Asian philosophies, his practice of words and letters 
are readily accessible, through new translations and commentaries, for those willing to invest their ‘being-
time.’  And, when we read Dōgen in dialogue with thinkers such as Nietzsche, we come to realize that his 
practice of words and letters goes beyond the dualistic distinctions between Western and Eastern cultural 




vantage points for viewing the man-nature relationship, specifically in regards to perspectivism, passion 
and play, which we will now turn. 
§7.6 Non-Anthropocentric Value Creation: Perspectivism, Passion & Play 
 The non-anthropocentric vantage points that Dōgen and Nietzsche share ascends from their 
perspectivism.  Beginning with Dōgen, his Sansui-kyō, “Mountains and Waters Sutra,” is a touchstone for 
making sense of his non-anthropocentric perspective.  While there are many fascicles throughout the 
Shōbōgenzō that also express non-anthropocentric value commitments, Sansui-kyō reveals Dōgen’s 
practice of doing philosophy to be a practice of self-overcoming.  As Parkes explains, “Dōgen says that 
viewing the world from the usual anthropocentric standpoint is like looking through a bamboo tube at the 
corner of the sky.  For a fuller experience, he recommends entertaining the perspectives of other beings, 
such as mountains, drops of water, celestial beings, hungry ghosts, dragons and fish” (Parkes 2009, 86).  
For example, consider the following passage whereby he overturns our anthropocentric view of 
mountains, a view that regards such as an insentient being inherently distinct from humanity:183 
Mountains do not lack the qualities of mountains.  Therefore they always abide in ease and 
always walk.  You should examine in detail this quality of the mountains walking.  Mountains’ 
walking is just like human walking.  Accordingly, do not doubt mountains’ walking even though 
it does not look the same as human walking.  The Buddha ancestors’ words point to walking.  
This is fundamental understanding.  You should penetrate these words. (Dōgen 2009, 87).   
                                                 
183 As I noted in Chapter three, Dōgen’s non-anthropocentric perspective is part of a general philosophy of nature 
which other Japanese Buddhists affirmed, including Saichō (767-822) and Kūkai (774-835).  As Jacqueline Stone 
explains, this philosophy of nature has roots planted within Chinese Mahāyāna Buddhism; “Tao-sheng (d. 434), 
disciple of the great translator Kumārajīva, argued that Buddha-nature is inherent even in the icchantika, people of 
incorrigible disbelief who lack the aspiration for enlightenment; Chi-tsang (549-623) of the San-lun school argued 
that insentient beings have the Buddha-nature as well. […] However, even among those Chinese Buddhists who 
upheld the possibility of the realization of Buddhahood by insentient beings, this was thought to depend on the 
realization of Buddhahood by sentient beings: because self and the outer world are nondual, when the practitioner 
manifests Buddhahood, so will that person’s environment” (Stone 1999, 29).  Thus, Dōgen’s non-anthropocentrism 
is not different in kind from his Japanese and Chinese Buddhist predecessors; nor is it different in kind from 
Theravāda Buddhists who consider trees, plants and seeds as borderline cases vis-à-vis sentience, as Lambert 
Schmithausen’s research shows.  That being said, I contend that Dōgen’s non-anthropocentric perspective is unique 
in that he does not believe that an insentient being’s realization of Buddha-nature is solely dependent upon a sentient 
being’s realization of such.  For Dōgen, not only do insentient beings, such as mountains and waters, realize 
Buddha-nature on their own, but they can condition awakening and realization within the perspectives of sentient 




According to Parkes, Dōgen’s Zen is a practice of overcoming “our unexamined prejudices and 
conventional modes of experience,” so that, “we can come to appreciate the natural world as the 
actualization of the Buddha Way” (Parkes 2009, 85).  However, as Parkes notes, not only are natural 
phenomena such as mountains, waters, plants and stones a “locus of enlightenment but also sources of 
wisdom and companions on the Buddha Way;” and so, “if we wantonly destroy them for our benefit, we 
actually thereby diminish our own opportunities for fulfillment” (Parkes 2009, 86).  Thus it is through this 
‘earth-sangha perspectivism’ that all beings within the natural world are realized as ‘fellow travelers’ 
along the ‘Way,’ which in turn attunes our perspectives to feel a deeper sense of moral responsibility, vis-
à-vis care, for the more-than-human-world.    
 Dōgen’s non-anthropocentric sentiments can be extended to rivers, streams and droplets of water 
as well; “It is not only that there is water in the world, but there is a world in water.  It is not just in water.  
There is also a world of sentient beings in clouds” (Parkes 2009; 91).  From a contemporary 
anthropocentric perspective, rivers, lakes and oceans exist in either two ways: (1) as a resource to fuel our 
consumptive lives; or (2) as sink for disposing and flushing refuse.184  In other words, water is here to 
serve our needs for drinking, food, energy, recreation and waste disposal.  This does not mean that those 
who affirm anthropocentrism cannot value nature intrinsically.185  As Dale Jamieson states, “An 
anthropocentrist or sentientist can value forests, mountains, jungles and wild rivers. […] The richness and 
complexity of an evaluational structure do not depend solely on whether one is an anthropocentrist, 
sentientist, biocentrist, ecocentrist, or whatever.  They also depend enormously on one’s experience of the 
world and what values one recognizes” (Jamieson 2008, 155).186 That being said, I contend that the 
intrinsic value an anthropocentirst believes nature to possess is contingent upon human interests, and 
                                                 
184 My characterization of anthropocentric conceptions of nature, vis-à-vis nature as a ‘source’ and as a ‘sink’ is 
borrowed from Dale Jamieson’s Ethics and the Environment: An Introduction (2009).   
185 Dale Jamieson identifies four senses of intrinsic value.  They include: “(1) intrinsic value as ultimate value; (2) 
intrinsic value as moral considerability; (3) intrinsic value as inherent value; and (4) intrinsic value as independence 
from valuers” (Jamieson 2009, 154).   




oriented around human narratives that have overriding authority, vis-à-vis axiology.  Indeed, the crassness 
of anthropocentrism has karmic consequences that ought not be ignored; our failure to include water as a 
moral companion within our web of beliefs only diminishes our ability to flourish and thereby realize the 
Buddha-dharma.  As Dōgen writes in Keisei-sanshiki, “Voices of the Valleys, Forms of the Mountains,” 
“The voices of the river valley are the Wide and Long Tongue, the forms of the mountains are nothing 
other than his pure body” (Dōgen 1994, 86).187   
Similar to Sansui-kyō, the fascicle Mujō Seppō, “Insentient Beings Preach the Dharma,” is 
another textual example that evidences non-anthropocentric value creation in Dōgen’s philosophy.  For 
example, Dōgen writes that when it comes to hearing the dharma preached by insentient beings, we ought 
not assume that preaching must always conform to our sentient biases and anthropocentric values; “We 
should not learn that the manner in which the insentient preach the Dharma must necessarily be as in the 
case of the sentient” (Dōgen 1994, 115).  From an anthropocentric perspective, when we hear the phrase 
“insentient beings preaching the dharma,” one is tempted to think that “the rustling trees in the forest, and 
the opening and falling of leaves and flowers, are the non-emotional beings preaching the dharma” 
(Dōgen 1994, 115).  When it comes to listening to insentient/non-emotional beings preaching the dharma, 
such is heard, not through our ears, but rather through our eyes; “When we learn in practice the founding 
Patriarch’s words hearing sound through the eyes, the place where the sound of the non-emotional 
preaching the Dharma is heard is the eyes themselves; and the place where the sound of the non-
emotional preaching the Dharma is realized, is the eyes themselves” (Dōgen 1994, 122).  Through our 
embodied experience of zazen as non-thinking (Jpn. hishiryō), one realizes there is no essential dualism 
between man and nature, between sentient and insentient.  This point is well presented in his fascicle, 
Hotsu-Mujoshin, “The Establishment of the Will to the Supreme:” 
What is described here as “the mind” is the mind as it is.  It is the mind as the whole Earth.  
Therefore it is the mind as self-and-others.  The mind in every instance – the mind of a person of 
the whole earth, of a Buddhist patriarch of the whole Universe in the ten directions, and of gods, 
                                                 
187 In Sartrean terms, if we simply treat water as a being-in-itself, rather than a being-for-itself, then we will be 




dragons, and so on – is trees and stones, beyond which there is no mind at all.  These trees and 
stones are naturally unrestricted by limitations such as “existence,” “non-existence,” “emptiness,” 
and “matter.”  With this mind of trees and stones we establish the [bodhi-]mind and realize 
practice-and-experience – for the mind is trees and the mind is stones.  By virtue of this trees as 
mind and stones as mind, thinking here and now about the concrete state of not thinking is 
realized.  (Dōgen 1994, 254).    
 Thus, as Dōgen expresses in other fascicles, “all beings are themselves Buddha-nature.”  
Dōgen’s conception of Buddha Nature is “the “entirety of being,” for the “Total Existence is the 
buddha nature” (Dōgen 1994, 2); and, in the context of value creation, Dōgen’s conception of Buddha-
nature is in keeping with both Saichō and Kūkai as they all stand on the same non-anthropocentric 
platform.188  However, what is novel about Dōgen’s practice of non-anthropocentric value creation, vis-à-
vis Buddha-nature, is the embodied practice of zazen as “the Buddha-nature’s equal practice” (Jpn. 
busshō togaku).   For example, consider the following passage from Busshō: “The point of this equal 
practice of balanced wisdom is not that as long as the practice of balance does not hinder the practice of 
wisdom there is clear realization of the Buddha-nature in their equal practice.  [The point is that] in the 
state of clearly realizing the Buddha-nature there is practice which is the equal practice of balance and 
wisdom” (Dōgen 1994, 25).  Thus, I contend that non-anthropocentric value creation as the realization of 
Buddha-nature is Dōgen’s affirmative response to overcoming nihilism, vis-à-vis time.  In other words, 
rather than temporality and impermanence robbing us of value and meaning, as Schopenhauer’s passive 
nihilism maintains, they are nothing other than Buddha-nature.  For Dōgen, because all beings are the 
embodiment of Buddha-nature, and because all beings are impermanent, it follows that impermanence is 
Buddha-nature; “The sixth patriarch preaches to disciple Gyosho, ‘That without constancy is the Buddha 
nature” (Dōgen 1994, 13).  And, in the context of metaethics, Dōgen states, “That which has constancy is 
the mind that divides all dharmas into good and bad” (Dōgen 1994, 13).  As I interpret Dōgen, Buddha-
nature cannot be realized by thinking about good or bad; in fact, the realization of Buddha-nature is the 
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salient to Japanese Buddhist thought since Saichō (766-822), the founder of the Tendai school and is 




self-overcoming of absolute distinctions between good and bad, right and wrong.  And, to echo our 
examination of karma in chapters five and six, according to Dōgen, the realization of Buddha-nature is 
not contingent upon karma; “object-and-subject as living beings-and-Total-Existence is completely 
beyond ability based on karmic accumulation, beyond the random occurrence of circumstances” (Dōgen 
1994, 2).   
Let us turn to Nietzsche now.  Thus Spoke Zarathustra is, like Dōgen’s Sansui-kyō, a touchstone 
for understanding Nietzsche’s non-anthropocentric perspectivism.  It is a touchstone not because 
Nietzsche wrote this masterpiece while walking the mountains of Sils Maria, nor because the main 
character, Zarathustra, lives in the mountains with his serpent and eagle and spends his time speaking to 
the more-than-human-world.  Rather, it is Zarathustra’s message “be faithful to the meaning of the earth,” 
a message that is the pivot for our self-overcoming, and thus realizing the Űbermensch.  “Once the sin 
against God was the greatest sin; but God died, and these sinners died with him.  To sin against the earth 
is now the most dreadful thing, and to esteem the entrails of the unknowable higher than the meaning of 
the earth” (Nietzsche 1954, 125). 
It is important to note that the practice of realizing the overman via terra-faith is, like the cycles 
of the earth, non-teleological.  Indeed, there is a Sisyphean quality that is part of perpetual self-
overcoming, particularly when framed on the horizon of Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence of the same.  
However, that does not undermine our ability to celebrate this very life.  Just as we can celebrate the 
changing of the seasons while recognizing there is no final teleological finish line that the earth crosses, 
we can celebrate our situation as beings that are always in the process of becoming.  And, while the 
process may be painfully arduous, as if we are pushing boulders up mountains, we ought not to despair.  
The Űbermensch, while never realized in a fixed cognitive sense, but instead, embodied as “way-seeking” 
grace and flow, is the kind of being that says yes to this life and does not desire a transcendent 




conceptions of nirvāṇa are presented.  Indeed, the philosophical parallels between Nietzsche and 
Mahāyāna Buddhism in general, Zen in particular, reflect this life affirming perspective.  
 The bodhisattva, vowing to save all sentient beings, knowing that there are no sentient beings to 
be saved, all the while recognizing that this vow entails the life-long career of innumerable rebirths, 
embodies the same logical conditions as Nietzsche’s “overman,” mainly endless toil, that comes to 
nothing (i.e. non-teleological).  Indeed, these conditions provide the general logical pattern of our 
planetary ecosystems: endless processes that come to nothing.  Thus, Zarathustra’s message of “be 
faithful to the earth” is nothing other than one becoming, in a non-anthropocentric way, what one is.  We 
too, are of the earth; the mountains and waters and all phenomenal things are ourselves vis-à-vis the same 
existential predicament.  The embodied cyclic pulse and patterns of all beings are creatively woven into a 
collective narrative of endless toil that comes to no end or goal; a narrative that is succinctly expressed in 
the Zen capping phrase, “Work hard and accomplish nothing,” (Jpn. Rō shite kō nashi) (ZS 4.668).  
 In addition to perspectivism, the embodied passions in both Dōgen and Nietzsche provide a 
horizon for attuning ourselves to the more-than-human world.  Continuing with Nietzsche, his notion of 
the will to power refers to what ultimately underlies the passions, and it is that which propels all 
organisms to passionately will themselves to live.  The creative expressions of will-to-power, according to 
Nietzsche, is evidenced in the organic processes of all life forms.  For example, in The Will to Power 
Nietzsche writes:  
Greater complexity, sharp differentiation, the contiguity of developed organs and functions with 
the disappearance of the intermediate members – if that is perfection, then there is a will to power 
in the organic process in virtue of which dominant, shaping, commanding forces continually 
extend their bounds of their power and continually simplify within these bounds: the interpretive 
growths. (Nietzsche 1968, 342)   
Or again in a similar passage, he states that biological concepts like species preservation is nothing other 
than a more basic drive, a more basic force and/or will-to-power: “Physiologists should think again before 
positing the “instinct of preservation” as the cardinal drive in organic creature.  A living thing wants 




basic drive which defines all life forms, as well as inorganic phenomena at the atomic level, is reflected in 
basic organismic drives such as hunger: 
One cannot ascribe the most basic and primeval activities of protoplasm to a will to self-
preservation, for it takes into itself absurdly more than would be required to preserve it; and, 
above all, it does not thereby “preserve itself,” it falls apart – The drive that rules here has to 
explain precisely this absence of desire for self-preservation: “hunger” is an interpretation based 
on far more complicated organisms ( - hunger is a specialized and later form of the drive, an 
expression of a division of labor in the service of a higher drive that rules over it). (Nietzsche 
1968, 345) 
It is not possible to take hunger as the primum mobile, any more than self preservation.  To 
understand hunger as a consequence of undernourishment means: hunger as the consequence of a 
will to power that no longer achieves mastery.  It is a by no means a question of replacing a loss – 
only later, as a result of the division of labor, after the will to power has learned to take other 
roads to its satisfaction, is an organism’s need to appropriate reduced hunger, to the need to 
replace what has been lost. (Nietzsche 1968, 345)     
Thus the will-to-power is not a privileged mode of being for humans alone; rather, all living beings 
partake in the dynamic evolution and expression of both exploitative and adaptive forces that allow 
beings to flourish.   Accordingly, it follows that Nietzsche’s philosophy of value-creation, which is an 
offshoot of the will to power, is non-anthropocentric.  To live in a way that is “true and faithful to the 
earth” is to recognize that our drives, appetites and aspirations (i.e. the passions) are not the teleological 
crown of creation, but rather expressions of a nondual biological process in which all beings partake.  As 
Van der Braak states, “Will to power is Nietzsche’s new conception of nature without the dualistic 
oppositions of subject and object, knower and known, epistemology and ontology.  Instead, will to power 
conceives all of nature engaged in active interpretation” (Van der Braak 2011, 64).   
 Similar to Nietzsche, in Dōgen’s Zen, the body and the passions are central for practice-
realization; from the vantage point of Dōgen’s “way-seeking” philosophy, the body is inextricably tied to, 
as we saw in the previous chapter, the practice of zazen.  “In zazen, a situation is created in which the 
drives cultivate themselves…Zazen facilitates an attitude where the conscious mental process can take a 
step back, and the body can dominate the mind” (Van der Braak 2011, 76).  For Dōgen, there is no 




ichinyō); again, from Hotsu-Mujoshin, “In the [oneness of] body-and-mind, the bodhi-mind is being 
established further” (Dōgen 1994, 256).  Through the practice of zazen, realization of Buddha-nature via 
dropping-off body-and-mind (Jpn. shinjin datsuraku) “is the result of a particular configuration of bodily 
drives” (Van der Braak 2011, 76).  Herein, the embodied realization of Buddha-nature via zazen and the 
practice of non-thinking give rise to a new, heightened perspective that overturns anthropocentric thinking 
proper, and advances a practice that is, as we noted in the previous chapter, free from dualistic 
conceptions of agent and actions, or intentions and consequences.  The realization of Buddha-nature is 
inextricably tied to the practice of non-doing (Ch. wu-wei), or without committing (Jpn. makusa).  As we 
will see below, non-doing is salient to the embodiment of play; however, before we examine such, it is 
important to explain further just how pivotal non-anthropocentrism is for making sense of Dōgen’s 
metaethical perspective, as well as for understanding the embodied impact his writings can have upon his 
audience.  
In his article, “Walking with Mountains, or What Shōbōgenzō and Dōgen Mean to Me,” Glen 
Mazis examines Dōgen’s non-anthropocentric perspective, vis-à-vis thinking, as a way to address what he 
believes would be Dōgen’s view of contemporary society, and its deluded conception of material bodies 
in general, human embodiment in particular.  According to Mazis:  
The Dharma is taught by all things, because we are embodied beings, and they can speak to us 
directly through our senses and bodies made of the same coming together of things.  Yet this 
dharma teaching or radiation of Buddha-nature is not recognized by us in our clouded state of 
body-mind, because we see grass, trees, soil, fences, and walls as “objects.”  Our culture insists 
on the idea articulated by Descartes that objects are beings we experience as resistant to us since 
they are self-subsistent beings encountered by self-subsistent, perceiving self…When we practice 
zazen, we see more clearly this tragic falling away from who we are in our dominant culture’s 
advertisements and endless projects to master and gain, and in how it leads us to consume always 
to achieve status, while in doing so we relinquish the ongoing nourishment of the senses that are 
cleared from [what] Dōgen calls the “flowering in the air” or the “walking mountains.” (Mazis 
2016, 55) 
Herein, Mazis provides a comparative bridge to Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, whereby the 
Cartesian separation between body and mind (i.e. self) is overturned with a non-dual perspective of the 




sage – whose name is self.  In your body he dwells; he is your body” (Nietzsche 1954, 146).  Based upon 
this perspective of the body, Nietzsche recognizes that thinking is not an ontic quality that is unique to 
humans; rather, similar to Dōgen’s non-anthropocentric perspective, Nietzsche’s The Joyous Science 
includes the more-than-human world within the ‘architecture of thinking:’  
The time is past when the Church possessed the monopoly of reflection, when the vita 
contemplativa had always in the first place to be the vita religiosa…I know not how we could 
content ourselves with their structures, even if they should be divested of their ecclesiastical 
purposes: these structures speak far too pathetic and too biased speech, as houses of God and 
places of splendor for supernatural intercourse, for us godless ones to be able to think our 
thoughts in them.  We want to have ourselves translated into stone and plant, we want to go for a 
walk in ourselves when we wander these halls and gardens. (Nietzsche 2018, 180)   
Thus it is on the horizon of our embodied passions that both Dōgen and Nietzsche, in dialogue together, 
can help attune contemporary society that has become divorced from their embodied existence.  As Mazis 
poignantly states:   
Mistaken ideas about the body can be witnessed within our culture emerging in the problems of 
compulsive material consumption; an epidemic of obesity, spreading addictions to alienated sex, 
drugs, alcohol, the internet, frenzied entertainment, and other distracting activity; child abuse, 
elder abuse, animal abuse, and so on – in a long and saddening list of social ills that testify to 
clouded perception arising from mistreated and misunderstood embodiment. (Mazis 2016, 54) 
No doubt, when we observe the impact Covid-19 has made upon the global community in general, 
American society in particular, Mazis’ point about misunderstood embodiment could not be more 
accurate.  Covid-19 has revealed a great deal about the embodied health of America’s individual citizens, 
constitutional democracy, and socio-economic policies (e.g., a for profit health-care system and insurance 
market).  Indeed, I cannot think of a better time for American society to follow Dōgen’s instructions and 
invest their ‘being-time’ into just sitting, practicing non-thinking, turning back the radiance, and 
dropping-off their minds-and-bodies so to faithfully reconnect themselves to the meaning of the ‘Great 
Earth.’  Indeed, ‘just sitting’ should be part of our survival guide during this pandemic as it is a practice 
that inherently embraces ‘shelter in place’ and ‘social distancing’ protocols.  Such a practice is not only 
prudent when considering the ethics of public health, but it just might help foster a reevaluation of 




Finally, through our embodied passions, practitioners of a Dōgen-Nietzschean-way-seeking-
philosophy can go beyond the need for ‘ultimate meaning’ through a creative spirit and the embodied 
flow of “play” (i.e. creativity-art-work).  This comparative horizon is well identified by Van der Braak in 
the chapter, “The Child,” from Nietzsche and Zen.  However, before we explore this last comparative 
horizon, an analysis of the significance of play for realizing non-transcendent meaning deserves some 
reflection.   
The metaethical significance of play is cogently presented in Moritz Schlick’s essay, “On the 
Meaning of Life;” in it, he defends ‘play’, vis-à-vis a spirit of youthfulness, as a how-to, way-seeking 
answer to the question of life’s meaning.  His defense, which is in direct response to the pessimist’s 
challenge that all life is meaningless and vain (i.e. Schopenhauer), finds its foothold in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra189.  According to Schlick, “life means movement and action, and if we wish to find a 
meaning in it we must seek for activities which carry their own purpose and value them, independently of 
any extraneous goals” (Schlick 2018, 64).  Play is a mode of engagement that meets this criterion of 
meaning.  When we are engaged in activities of play, there is no ultimate division between means and 
ends.  Play, as Schlick states, is an activity which takes place entirely for its own sake, independently of 
its effects and consequences (Schlick 2018).  And, while ‘youth’ is often erroneously equivocated with 
age, particularly childishness, according to Schlick youth is, in contrast with those who are “teleologically 
serious and work-minded,” nothing other than “devotion to the deed, not the goal” (Schlick 2018, 69).  
Thus, the youthful spirit, engaged in creative projects and playful activities, is able to realize, joy. 
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche advocates for three of the existential ingredients that 
Schlick highlights for realizing meaningfulness: (1) youth; (2) play; (3) joy.  Beginning with (1), the 
                                                 
189 While Schlick is affiliated with the Vienna school of logical positivism rather than a scholar of Nietzsche, his 
standpoint on the question of life’s meaning is constructed out of Nietzsche’s philosophy.  In regards to 
Schopenhauer’s pessimism, which is itself a passive nihilism, according to Schlick, “We know how Nietzsche, for 
example, sought to conquer this pessimism…Nietzsche, the Nietzsche of Zarathustra, saw the meaning of life.  For 
if it be said that henceforth the ultimate value of life, to him, was life itself, that obviously says nothing clear and 
does not find right expression for the deep truth which he then perceived or at least suspected.  For he saw that life 




image of the “child” as the third and final metamorphosis of the spirit clearly stands out.  Having 
overcome the transformational stages of the camel and the lion, the child metaphorically represents a 
youthful spirit whose mode-of-being involves: “forgetting oneself, innocence, play and a sacred Yes” 
(Van der Braak 2011, 127); “The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-
propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred “Yes.”  For the game of creation, my brothers, a sacred “Yes” 
is needed: the spirit now wills his own will, and he who had been lost to the world now conquers his own 
world” (Nietzsche 1954, 139).  Herein, perhaps the embodied expressions of dance and laughter best 
captures the comportment and disposition of the youthful ‘child-spirit.’  For example, in the fourth part of 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche writes: 
You higher men, the worst about you is that all of you have not learned to dance as one must 
dance – dancing away over yourselves!  What does it matter that you are failures?  How much is 
still possible!  So learn to laugh away over yourselves!  Lift up your hearts, you good dancers, 
high, higher!  And do not forget good laughter.  This crown of him who laughs, this rose wreath 
crown: to you my brothers, I throw this crown.  Laughter I have pronounced holy; you higher 
men, learn to laugh! (Nietzsche 1954, 407-408) 
Becoming a child is again a Christian image from the New Testament, as Nietzsche was all too aware.  
However, rather than framing this image of the child in reference to the kingdom of heaven and Christian 
holiness, Nietzsche frames it both non-teleologically and non-anthropocentrically.  As he states in the 
“Ass Festival,” “To be sure: except ye become as little children, ye shall not enter into that kingdom of 
heaven…But we have no wish whatever to enter into the kingdom of heaven: we have become men – so 
we want the earth” (Nietzsche 1954, 428).   Wanting the earth, from the perspective of the child, is 
calibrated in light of his ‘thought of thoughts’, the eternal recurrence of the same.  Thus, from the 
perspective of a ‘child,’ there is nothing beyond this life itself that is desirable.  This earthly existence is 
itself sufficient and complete.   
 Nietzsche’s notion of the eternal recurrence of the same provides the philosophical ingredients for 
understanding his philosophy of play.  Similar to play, whereby the ends of our activities reside in the 




view of existence.  From the perspective of the eternal recurrence of the same, the future is the past, and 
the past is the future, and will remain to be so for an eternity.  Upon realizing this, and thereby saying 
“Yes” to our Sisyphean-like fate, vis-à-vis amor fati, the youthful character of the child becomes 
absorbed within the present moment of play.  Now, we noted earlier that music is a touchstone for play, as 
the goal of music resides not at the end of a melody, but within the means of playing it; thus, from 
Nietzsche’s perspective, music can be played by both musicians who perform, and the audience who 
listens and dances.  Ultimately, it is the latter – the audience who listens and dances –  that Nietzsche 
references as a paradigmatic example of being a child.  The child is one who has heard the melody of the 
will to power flowing from the orchestra of the earth and through the audience; and, in so far as audience 
members have ears to hear, they immediately embody the melody through rhythmic dance.  Just as the 
goal of playing a melody does not reside at the end of the melody, the goal of dancing, according to 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, resides in the embodied, grace-infused motions of dancing itself. 
A man’s stride betrays whether he has found his own way: behold me walking!  But whoever 
approaches his goal dances.  And verily, I have not become a statue:  I do not yet stand there, 
stiff, stupid, stony, a column; I love to run swiftly.  And though there are swamps and thick 
melancholy on earth, whoever has light feet runs even over mud and dances on swept ice.  Lift up 
your hearts, my brothers, high, higher!  And do not forget your legs either.  Lift up your legs too, 
you good dancers; and better yet, stand on your heads. (Nietzsche 1954, 406) 
Herein it is through the spirit of play, vis-à-vis dance, that one is able to realize embodied joy. 
Just as the eternal recurrence of the same frames Nietzsche’s philosophy of play, it affords us the 
opportunity to overcome suffering; our youthful spirit of play transforms, via reabsorption, our sorrows 
into moments of joy.  Unlike happiness, joy is not teleological; rather, joy is the realization of the will to 
power flowing through us as we actively engage in projects of worth.  Nietzsche’s conception of joy finds 
its embodied distillation in the ‘child,’ which having realized its metamorphosis from a camel and lion, is 
in a perpetual state of becoming and overcoming.190  Metaphorically, the youthful child represents all that 
                                                 
190 Nietzsche introduces the three metamorphosis of spirit in the first speech in part I from Thus Spoke Zarathustra.  





is joyful, all that is, in a Nietzschean sense, a mixture of laughter and tears.  The youthful child, that 
knows how to play, who takes risks and is willing to suffer in order to stretch their imagination and 
expand their perspectives, embodies an enthusiasm for life as eternal-joy. 
 As we turn our attention to Dōgen, it is important to note that the image of youth and the spirit of 
playfulness is ubiquitous within East Asian philosophies in general, particularly Daoism and Zen.  In 
Daoism, we find the image of the child as a metaphor for possessing virtue: “One who possesses virtue in 
abundance is comparable to a new born babe” (Lao Tzu 1963, 62).  Or, in Zen, the encounter dialogues 
(Jpn. mondō) between Zen masters, patriarchs and students are themselves playful language games 
whereby participants “use language in a manner that undercuts and transcends the recognized limits of 
language;” thus, in response to questions such as “does a dog have buddha-nature?”, the ideal response 
strives to “make their point through demonstration rather than argument, and the ideal is to sustain a 
lively pace that does not tolerate self-conscious reflection or calculation” (Kraft 1991, 31).  Within these 
philosophies, the logic of playfulness noted above is tied to non-action (Ch. wu-wei).  Accordingly, while 
normative issues are matters we take seriously and are sincere about, they are also matters that can be 
joyfully engaging. 
In addition to mondō, the aesthetic traditions of Zen, too, are glazed and fired with play (Jpn. 
yuge).  This is particularly evidenced in the many aesthetic depictions of Hotei, who is popularly regarded 
as an incarnation of the bodhisattva Maitreya, Miroku.  From the perspective of Zen practitioners, “The 
playfulness of Hotei is what allowed him to transcend such obstructions as the distinction of the 
transcendent realm of practice and the mundane world of the marketplace at the busy crossroads of the 
                                                 
dwells.  […] In the desert, the camel transforms into a lion, who is able to defeat the dragon of “thou shalt” […] But 
even the lion is not capable of creating new values because it is too identified with its new found autonomy of ‘I 
will.’ […] Therefore the lion voluntarily let’s go of its newfound autonomy, and, as Nietzsche puts it, ‘goes under.’  
It literally overcomes itself and is transformed into a child” (Van der Braak 2011, 23).  Now, it is either the case that 
the child is a teleological goal of self-overcoming, or not.  If the former, then ‘the child’ would be an aberration to 
Nietzsche’s general philosophical perspective, which is non-teleological.  If the latter, then it follows that how one 
realizes oneself as a youthful spirit that embodies joy and play is something that will have to be overcome as well.  I 
contend that a non-teleological conception of ‘the child’ is preferable; thus, self-overcoming is an ongoing task or 




world, enabling him to reenter the world of samsāra and again participate freely in everyday social and 
political relations” (Parker 1999, 201).  Accordingly, the spirit of play and playful transformation became 
salient, particularly during the Muromachi period, to aesthetic traditions including poetry, calligraphy and 
landscape paintings which defined the culture of the ‘hermit at court.’  For example, consider the role 
Hotei plays in the famous Ten Ox Herding Pictures.  The pictures, which are accompanied by a poetic 
verse referencing a stage in Zen practice and the realization of Buddha-nature (i.e. finding the ox), 
conclude with an encounter with Hotei as one “Enters the marketplace with extended hands.” 
 With bare chest and feet, you come to the market. 
 Under dirt and ash, your face breaks into a laugh. 
 With no display of magic powers 
 You make withered trees burst into flower. (Mumon 2004, 95)   
Commenting on this verse in a series of lectures delivered at Myoshin-ji, master Mumon Roshi states: 
Hotei reveals everything and has nothing to hide.  He needs no shirt; he needs no title.  Exposing 
hairy chest down to his naval, barefoot he walks the streets of town or heads for the outskirts.  
Since people will be nervous if he shows he has attained satori, he does not reveal that he has 
mastered the discipline nor does he show any trace of learning.  He just laughs like a great fool, 
daubed with dirt and covered with ashes.  That laugh!  How would you describe it?  “Laughing 
fills your face.”  He laughs so hard you think that his jaw would fall off.  People who come in 
contact with that laugh return to their original good nature and awaken to their budhhahood.  
Though he does not preach or lecture, everyone who sees his old monk’s face is saved. (Mumon 
2004, 100) 
In Zen, Hotei represents all that is youthful, playful and joyful; no doubt, paralleling Nietzsche’s message 
in Zarathustra: “I love him whose soul squanders itself, who wants no thanks and does not give back 
again: for he always bestows and would not preserve himself […] I love him whose soul is overfull so 
that he forgets himself, and all things are in him” (Nietzsche 1954, 127-128). 
 The spirit of playfulness in Dōgen is most explicitly revealed through his literary works and style 
of philosophizing.  As we saw in Chapter five, his practice of words and letters is, according to Kim, 
framed in light of kōan and encounter dialogues between Zen masters.  As Dōgen saw it, traditional 




enlightenment; (2) “predilection for an intellectual and intuitive ‘seeing into one’s nature’ (kenshō) as if 
‘seeing’ and ‘nature’ were two different phenomena” (Kim 2004, 80-81); and (3) the assumption that 
kōan are, compared to other literary genres, irrational.   
In this view, the mind, confronted with kōan, or formulized nonsense, was systematically 
frustrated in its intellectual functions, and finally deconditioned so as to permit the release of the 
primitive psychic forces hitherto pent up in it, which was necessary for the experience of 
enlightenment.  Such an instrumentalist view of kōan was closely related to the corollary view of 
reason in general and of language and symbols in particular, which was by and large negativistic. 
(Kim 2004, 81) 
Through his practice of words and letters, which can be described as genjō kōan, Dōgen attempts to 
overcome traditionalist perspectives of kōan by realizing that words and letters are not, “things that the 
intellect manipulates abstractly and impersonally, but rather, things that work intimately in the existential 
metabolism of one who uses them philosophically and religiously in a special manner and with a special 
attitude” (Kim 2004, 88).  Thus, by overcoming an instrumentalist perspective, Dōgen’s practice of words 
and letters vis-à-vis kōan, “was to carefully and compassionately pursue the reason of non-sense, for 
kōans were not just ordinary nonsense or meaningless expressions, but symbols of life and death […] 
kōans functioned not only as nonsense that castigated reason, but as parables, allegories, and mysteries 
that unfold the horizons of existence before us.  In this sense they were realized, though not solved” (Kim 
2004, 80).  
 The playfulness of Dōgen’s practice of words and letters is most explicitly evidenced, as I noted 
in Chapter five, in his transposition of lexical components, and the semantic reconstruction through 
syntactic change (Kim 2007).  Beginning with transposition of lexical components, Dōgen frequently 
reshuffles such, vis-à-vis traditional Buddhist phrases and Zen verses, in order to show that the lexical 
components themselves, “are as dynamic and versatile as reality itself in their infinitely variegated 
configurations and possibilities (Kim 2007, 65).  The famous Buddhist notion, “Mind itself is Buddha,” is 
one such example whereby he explores the different arrangements by which the four lexical elements can 




reconstruction through syntactic change, we find that Dōgen’s technique is perhaps best evidenced in the 
fascicle Busshō whereby he transforms the traditional verse from the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, “All sentient beings 
without exception have Buddha-nature,” into “All sentient beings, all existence, are Buddha nature” (Kim 
2007, 67).  As Kim explains, this playful spin on words and letters achieves two things.  First, it 
overcomes the idea of Buddha-nature as a potentiality.  Second, it overcomes a limited anthropocentric 
and biocentric conception of Buddha-nature so to include insentient beings, all existence for that matter, 
as Buddha-nature (Kim 2007, 67).  Herein, such creative expressions (Jpn. dōtoku) attune us “to not only 
take into consideration semantic possibilities in metaphors, images, gestures, and moral and aesthetic 
activities in the human realm, but also those possibilities in the activities of nonhuman and nonliving 
realms” (Kim 2004, 83). 
 Less explicitly, two other components of Dōgen’s practice of words and letters, his use of 
reflexive and self-causative utterances, as well as the upgrading of commonplace notions and using 
neglected metaphors, reveals the depth of playfulness as a nondual practice-realization of kōan literature.  
Beginning with the former, “In Zen the statement of identity is quite common place and frequently used 
in order to suggest the nonduality of equality and differentiation, of emptiness and form, and so on” (Kim 
2007, 70).  The logic for these statements is born out of a dialectical logic of identity and difference that is 
woven throughout the Diamond Sūtra: A is ~A, ⸫ A is A.  According to this logic, our conventional 
descriptions about the world are riddled with essentialism whereby delusion is distinct from realization.  
However, upon realizing that all things, because they are empty, are without an essential identity that 
distinguishes one thing from another, one concludes that there is neither delusion nor realization. Now, 
because this negation of conventional perspectives is itself a view, albeit a negative one, it can become 
something that one can reify and cling to.  To overcome such, this first order negation is met by a second 
order negation via affirmation whereby the conventional world is restored, thereby preserving dualisms 




This nondualistic play on words thus carries over another component of this philosophy of 
language, mainly his upgrading common place notions and using neglected metaphors.  The word kattō, 
“entwined vines,” is one example.  Traditionally, kattō is a word that carries pejorative connotations, vis-
à-vis passions, desires, language and theories.  Metaphorically, the term evokes images of entanglement 
and bondage, thereby referencing one’s entrapment within dualisms and delusion.  Dōgen, however, 
“adopts this image to describe the type of communicative relationship between master and disciple,” 
thereby suggesting, “that the very texture of the Buddha-dharma is comprised of passions and desires, 
conflicts and differences” (Kim 2007, 73). 
 Notwithstanding Dōgen’s practice of words and letters, he also emphasizes the realization of the 
spirit of play, or ‘wondrous activity,’ within the everyday world of tasks and projects.  This is evidenced 
in the fascicle Jinzu, “Mystical Power,” whereby Dōgen cites the words of the Zen layperson Ho-on: “The 
mystical power and wondrous function, carrying water, lugging firewood” (Dōgen 1994, 75).  
Commenting on this verse, Dōgen down plays the popular characterization of mysticism and mystical 
power as cognitive/transcendent mode of seeing and understanding the world and ourselves.  Rather, 
mystical power is a mode of non-thinking which we embody, via the passions, throughout our daily 
interactions, encounters and self-motivated/self-powered (Jpn. jiriki) projects and pursuits.   
Carrying water means loading water and fetching it.  There being our own work and self-
motivation, and there being the work of others and the motivation of others, water is caused to be 
carried.  This is just the state of mystically powerful Buddha.  We can say that knowing is 
Existence-Time, but the mystical power is just the mystical power.  Even in a person’s not 
knowing, that state of Dharma does not fade and that state of Dharma does not die.  Although the 
person does not know it, [that] state of Dharma is the Dharma itself.  Although [the person] does 
not know that carrying water is the mystical power, the state of carrying water as mystical power 
does not regress. (Dōgen 1994, 75) 
The everyday world of projects, tasks and chores is a ‘playground’ for practice-realization, vis-à-vis not 
committing (Jpn. makusa).   As Van der Braak states, “In Zen, practice and realization in the midst of 
daily activities constitutes liberation. […] All work takes on the character of play or, as Dōgen calls it, 




paragraph 29 of the Shushōgi; therein he points out how the difference between our conception of work 
and play is born out of our subjective tendency to think teleologically, which in turn clashes with the 
basic fact that many of our tasks, like washing dishes and folding laundry or doing zazen, are, in a 
Sisyphean fashion, repetitious (i.e. endless toil that amounts to nothing/more of the same). 
If we think about it, the way we so often structure our experience and activities – we distinguish 
fulfilling ends from burdensome chores in order to achieve our goals – this condemns us to a 
great deal of drudgery.  If we refrain (as Dōgen would encourage us to do) from dividing the 
world up into means and ends; for example, if we approach the clearing of the sleeping area as an 
occasion for enjoying life, would that not shift the perspective and enrich our experience?  Part of 
what makes tasks like this into chores is the perception that we are having to do the same this 
over and over again – whether it is making the bed, washing dishes, or cleaning the room.  But it 
does not take prolonged reflection to realize that things are always different every time, and each 
situation is in fact unique.  It is just that we tend to overlook this because our eye is on some 
future purpose. (Parkes 2016, 174) 
Rather than dualistically carving our daily activities up into means/ends, subject/task, Dōgen advocates 
for a non-dual, playful mode of embodied engagement as mystical power.   
As we already noted, ‘mystical-power-as-play’ is specifically addressed in the fascicle Kannon, 
“Avalokitśvara,” wherein Dōgen proposes the idea that Kannon is more than just a symbol of compassion, 
but is a bodhisattva that represents the embodiment of “a life force that is more fundamental to living 
beings than compassion” (Nishijima 1994, 211).  In the opening passage, Dōgen cites a question posed by 
master Ungan Donjo in a conversation with master Dojo Enchi: “What does the Bodhisattva of Great 
Compassion do by using his limitlessly abundant hands and eyes?” This question marks the beginning of 
an encounter dialogue between the two masters whereupon: 
Dojo says, “He is like a person in the night reaching back with a hand to grope for a pillow.” 
Ungan says, “I understand, I understand.” 
Dojo says, “How do you understand?” 
Ungan says, “the whole body is hands and eyes.” 
Dojo says, “Your words are nicely spoken.  At the same time, your expression of the truth is just 
eight or ninety percent realization.” 
Ungan says, “I am just like this.  How about you, brother?” 




In this mondō, the phrase “he is like a person in the night reaching back with a hand to grope for a 
pillow,” metaphorically captures the non-duality of subject and object vis-à-vis everyday experience, 
including carrying water and lugging firewood.  When asleep, one does not cognitively think to oneself, 
“I need a pillow,” and then, intentionally grope for it.  Rather, the whole body is able to ‘see’ the pillow, 
and then, with the whole body, ‘grope’ the pillow.  There is, in other words, no ego-centered perspective 
whereby the pillow, or a piece of firewood, is recognized as something objectively distinct from one’s 
perceiving body.  When we use this ‘playful perspective’ of mysticism to make sense of how the 
bodhisattva Kannon is able to compassionately use his 1000+hands and 1000+eyes, the answer, 
notwithstanding the apparent difficulty of gracefully and coordinately making use of his limbs and 
processing sense data, is non-thinking.  Kannon’s acts of compassion, which flow from a mystical power 
that is terra-genic (i.e. dharmakaya, or earth-body of the Buddha), are not acts motivated by dualistic 
“pity;” rather, they are motivated by the nondual embodiment and interconnected flow between “subject 
and object” (i.e. non-action), a flow that is embodied in the “extraordinarily ordinary” experiences of 
carrying water or splitting and lugging firewood.   
 Dōgen and Nietzsche’s philosophy of meaning as ‘perspectivism, passion and play’ maintains 
that the earth and the entirety of the more than human world bears incorporation.  This outlook is novel 
for within much of the contemporary literature on the question of life’s meaning, the issue of 
anthropocentrism remains largely unaddressed.  In dialogue together, both Dōgen and Nietzsche show 
that the ‘Great Earth’ is a salient component of human flourishing; our connection to the diversity of all 
beings enhances our perspectives, passions and our spirit of play.  So much so that without such intimacy 
and connectivity, the depth of our sense of meaning erodes.  Stated differently, while one might have a 
subjective sense of meaningfulness through perspectivism-passions-play, if this sense of meaningfulness 
is realized without ever having a close connection to the earth, I believe we can infer that their sense of 
meaningfulness would have been enhanced and deepened had they cultivated an intimate relationship 




 I contend that the earth bears incorporation into our conception of meaningfulness simply 
because it elevates and enhances our perspectives, our passions and our spirit of playfulness.    It is for 
this reason that the philosophies of Dōgen and Nietzsche are so desperately needed for this current 
generation whereby ecological destruction and ‘doomsday’ scenarios, vis-à-vis climate change and 
pandemics loom.  As ecologists tell us in light of the IPBES report on biodiversity, we cannot throw more 
science and technology at the crisis; rather, we need to rethink our life-styles.  While this solution is not 
new, it has been existentially resisted, perhaps with the help of cognitive dissonance.   Rethinking our 
life-styles implies making sacrifices within our materialistic, consumptive and wasteful lifestyles; and, 
because sacrifices are interpreted, at least from a perpetual growth perspective of capitalism, as a loss, the 
message of life-style reform/overcoming has been a tough sell for the consumptive ‘herd-instincts’ of our 
global village.  By exploring Dōgen and Nietzsche in dialogue together, we have the opportunity to 
realize deep-green-meaning whereby a metamorphosis of our life-styles is not a sacrifice, but instead an 
existential gain; by exploring Dōgen and Nietzsche in dialogue together, we have the opportunity to 
realize that, “The great earth is beyond any ⸢dust⸣” (Jpn. Daichi sen’ai o zessu) (ZS 5.235). 
§.7.7 Chapter Summary 
 In this chapter I attempted several comparative philosophical tasks.  First, by assessing the 
development of comparative scholarship between Buddhism and Nietzsche in general and, Zen/Dōgen 
and Nietzsche in particular, I was able to show that this area of comparative inquiry goes beyond the mere 
enumeration of affinities and differences vis-à-vis metaphysics, epistemology and ethics.  Specifically, in 
regards to Dōgen and Nietzsche, in dialogue together these two thinkers open up a new horizon for 
practicing philosophy and generating new insights.  This is particularly the case in regards to value 
creation.  Therein, we explored Nietzsche’s philosophy of ‘will to power’ as psychological thesis with 
specific attention devoted to the transformative process of realizing new values, vis-à-vis Űbermensch, 
through his metaethical thought experiment: the eternal recurrence of the same.  This transformative 




Accordingly, we were able to see how this perspective helps illuminate Dōgen’s practice of creating new 
values.  By building on the comparative scholarship of Parkes and Van der Braak, I was able to show how 
our inquiry into their metaethics helps reinforce the characterization of their philosophies as non-
essentialist, non-teleological and non-anthropocentric.  Specifically, in regards to non-anthropocentrism, I 
argued that for Dōgen and Nietzsche their perspective is not reducible to the non-anthropocentric 
perspectives that have dominated contemporary discussions in environmental ethics (e.g. biocentrism, 
ecocentrism and deep ecology).  Accordingly, I also showed that William Murdy’s arguments against 
non-anthropocentric philosophies fail to demonstrate that we ought not take seriously the non-
anthropocentric perspectives as we attempt to ameliorate the current ecological crisis we, as a global 
community, are currently facing.   From this inquiry I was then able to take up White’s thesis concerning 
the origins of the ecological crisis which, as I noted earlier, maintains that Judeo-Christianity is the most 
anthropocentric religion/world-view; and, because the roots of the ecological crisis are a result of 
anthropocentrism, it follows that the ecological crisis as we know it is a result of Judeo-Christianity.  I 
reformulated his thesis/argument by substituting transcendentalism for Judeo-Christianity in order to cast 
a broader net so as to include any world view that attempts to defend teleological meaning or purpose 
outside of this very existence.  Accordingly, and in contradistinction to White’s belief, I argued that 
Dōgen’s Zen, particularly in dialogue with Nietzsche, can provide a philosophical outlook that can help 
us overcome the crisis of meaning that our anthropocentric lifestyles generate.   
 Finally, by bringing Dōgen and Nietzsche in dialogue together so to address and thereby 
overcome anthropocentrism, I was able to reveal three salient features of their praxis-oriented 
philosophies: perspectivism, passion and play.  I contend that these three non-transcendental 
philosophical practices are, in light of ruminating upon the works of Dōgen and Nietzsche, sufficient for 
realizing meaning and purpose that is ever changing, dynamic and fully intimate with the earth itself.  
Ultimately, what we are able to learn from this comparative dialogue is that anti-realism in general, and 




values for us to practice.  Quite the contrary, they open up new horizons for practitioners of philosophy to 
say “YES” to life whereby, “On the mountains, rivers, and the great earth, not a speck of dust” (Jpn. 






















“Not Committing” Value Judgments, “Not Doing” Metaethics 
§7.1 Summary  
How can Dōgen’s anti-realist metaethical outlook, coupled with a nuanced theory of anti-
cognitivism, in dialogue with Nietzsche’s writings, contribute to contemporary Western meta-ethical 
debates, especially regarding non-anthropocentric value creation?  This has been the main research 
question around which this dissertation has been framed.  In order to answer this question, I have 
attempted to interpret Dōgen’s writings in a metaethical way that: (1) is anti-realist in regards to the status 
of moral values, and anti-cognitivist with regard to the meaning of moral judgments and propositions; (2) 
constitutes an “active” moral nihilism with regard to moral ontology and value creation; (3) constitutes a 
moral skepticism with regard to moral epistemology.   
To realize this interpretation, in Chapter one, “Anti-realism in Contemporary Metaethics and 
Nietzsche,” we began by examining the philosophical commitments of anti-realism in general, error 
theory and non-cognitivism in particular so to set the stage for a metaethical examination of Nietzsche.  
We saw that Nietzsche’s metaethics encompasses the following philosophical horizons: (1) perspectivism 
vis-à-vis the death of ‘God’ and nihilism as a cultural phenomenon; (2) anti-realist commitments vis-à-vis 
the nature of language and the role of the affects; and (3) the practice of self-overcoming via will to 
power, revaluation of values, and value creation.  We discovered that the anti-realist characterization is 
useful for characterizing Nietzsche’s metaethics in light of his perspective regarding moral 
facts/properties and mind-independent normative truths.  However, we also noted that both error theory, 
fictionalism and non-cognitivism fall short in being able to capture the nuances of his perspectivism vis-à-
vis the will to power.  Accordingly, I proposed ‘anti-cognitivism’ as an alternative characterization that 
strikes a middle-way between error theory/fictionalism and non-cognitivism, vis-à-vis the nature of moral 




ineffability, Nietzsche’s anti-cognitivism maintains that language and moral propositions cannot describe 
nor express mind-independent normative truths.  Ultimately, the anti-realist and anti-cognitivist lens I am 
proffering for interpreting Nietzsche’s metaethics provides a coherent addendum to Van der Braak’s 
characterization of Nietzsche, as well as Dōgen, as non-essentialist, non-teleological and non-
anthropocentric.   
In Chapter two, “Buddhism and Western Moral Philosophy,” we reviewed the different ways in 
which Buddhist ethical perspectives have been interpreted through Western ethical theories, and in what 
ways Buddhist meta-ethics in general can provide new and fruitful perspectives within this arena of 
scholarship.  I began by treating the hermeneutical debate concerning the merits of interpreting Buddhism 
through Western ethical theories, specifically Aristotelian virtue theory and consequentialism.  Then, by 
examining the normative and metaethical perspectives in both Theravāda and Mahāyāna texts and 
traditions I was able to show that other interpretations, in addition to virtue theory and consequentialism, 
including pluralistic virtue theory and particularism provide additional nuance for interpreting the ‘nature’ 
of Buddhist ethics.  More specifically in regards to Mahāyāna Buddhism, I showed the philosophy of 
emptiness (Skt. śūnyatā), particularly in the context of East Asian traditions such as Chan/Zen, opens up 
alternative interpretations, including the continental perspectives of Nietzsche, whereby the 
objective/cognitivist standards of normative evaluation are overcome.  This in turn set the stage for a 
more systematic analysis of Mahāyāna metaethics; by engaging the works of Finnigan, Siderits, D’Amato 
and Guerrero specifically the metaethical challenge of providing a justificatory account for conventional 
normative judgments while recognizing that all things, including normative values are empty.  In regards 
to Finnigan, we saw that while anti-realism is generally accepted as an appropriate characterization for 
Madhyamaka, it is not clear that non-cognitivism can account for conventional judgments and normative 
beliefs.  However, Finnigan does suggest the possibility of finding justificatory grounds through an 
appeal to moral practice and phenomenology, rather than ethical theory, per se.  Finally, we also 




and D’Amato, as well as some of the challenges, as enumerated by Guerrero, against this characterization.  
According to Guerrero, Buddhist anti-realism should consider other metaethical strategies for justifying 
conventional judgments and beliefs.  It is in light of this advice, as well as Finnigan’s suggestion to 
consider the possibility of finding justificatory grounds for normative beliefs via practice, that I 
introduced Dōgen’s metaethics by considering Guilbault’s ‘conventionalist’ and Davis’ ‘contextualisit’ 
interpretations.  In light of their research, I concluded that both interpretations are promising metaethical 
counterparts to Dōgen’s anti-realist metaethics, specifically in regards to providing justification for 
conventional normative beliefs.  However, I noted that these characterizations only assist us in making 
sense of what normative expressions say; thus they do not clarify what normative expressions mean.  
Accordingly, I stipulated the metaethical concept anti-cognitivism to do just this; for Dōgen, normative 
expressions do not describe mind-independent facts/truths, nor are they reducible to feelings and beliefs, 
but instead they reveal and conceal perspectives.  
In Chapter three, “Beginning on the Path of Revealing and Concealing: Situating Dōgen’s 
Metaethics,” I provided the philosophical backstory of Dōgen’s life as a Buddhist thinker during the 
Kamakura period, as well as a religious reformer and founder of the Sōtō (Ch. Caodong) tradition of Zen 
in Japan.  Herein, I framed this backstory in order to begin my inquiry into Dōgen’s metaethics in 
subsequent chapters.  I treated his critical reflections regarding the Mahāyāna philosophy of original 
enlightenment (Jpn. hongaku) and Buddha-nature (Jpn. busshō), thereby revealing salient features of 
Dōgen’s ‘way-seeking’ metaethic, vis-à-vis his philosophy of zazen and the nonduality of practice and 
realization; accordingly, I showed how Dōgen’s Zen perspective differs from the ‘silent illumination’ 
teachings and practice of continental Caodong teachers and masters, vis-à-vis complete enlightenment.  
Moreover, I also showed how Dōgen’s philosophy of Buddha-nature and time provides, as Guilbault 
argues, a general blue print for his metaethical standpoint of antirealism.  Finally, I concluded this 
treatment by also examining Dōgen’s perspective of the bodhisattva ideal and the doctrine of skillful 




nonduality of practice and realization, provides a reevaluation of the doctrine of skillful means.  Thus, 
instead of interpreting skillful means a consequentialist philosophy, I contend that Dōgen interprets such 
in light of the East Asian philosophy of non-action (Ch. wu-wei).   
In Chapter four, “Dōgen’s Uncreated Metaethic,” I framed my examination of Dōgen’s 
metaethical characterization of moral values – good, bad and indifference – as mushō, ‘uncreated,’ as well 
as his relativist characterization of right action.  Based upon a close reading of the fascicle Shoaku-
Makusa, I concluded that his axiological reflections are best understood from the metaethical perspective 
of anti-realism, which is a characterization that is in keeping with the Madhyamaka philosophy of 
emptiness.  At the same time, I was careful not to pigeonhole Dōgen’s anti-realism into either error 
theory, fictionalism, nor non-cognitivism.  Specifically, in regards to non-cognitivism, I argued that 
Dōgen’s perspective does not invite the conclusion that moral propositions are reducible to feelings and 
emotions as if feelings and emotions are inherently distinct from reason.  As I stipulated, anti-cognitivism 
is the metaethical position that maintains that moral propositions do not describe moral facts nor express 
normative truths, but rather they reveal and conceal a normative perspective that is not truth-apt.  
In Chapter five, “Anti-cognitivism: Dōgen’s Language of Morals,” I provided a treatment of the 
role and nature of language in Zen practice and literature in light of the Buddhist philosophy of emptiness 
and the logic of non-duality.  Based upon the perspectives of Dale S. Wright, Victor Sōgen Hori, Steven 
Heine and Rupert Read, we were able to see how language is not reducible to an instrumentalist 
conceptual scheme, but rather is embedded within our everyday experiences, including non-theoretical 
perception.  This non-dualistic philosophy of language, which overturns popular conceptions of Zen as 
ineffable (i.e. “a separate transmission not founded on words and letters”), is able to show how Zen 
language can operate on both conventional and ultimate levels, hen’i and shōi, thereby providing an 
ability to meaningfully participate in normative discourse.  And, in light of the distinction between 
descriptive and performative speech acts, I continued to make the case that his nuanced perspective is best 




that examine the nature of karma, vis-à-vis right action; therein we saw that an anti-cognitivist 
interpretation helps show that Dōgen’s metaethics is a way-seeking practice of realizing the bodhisattva’s 
vows.  By building off of DeCaroli’s and Schroeder’s interpretations, we discovered that Dōgen’s 
perspective of karma is mind-dependent, non-essentialist and relative to the Buddhist tradition.  And, with 
some help from the writings of Kim and Van der Braak, we noted that rather than a “separate 
transmission outside of ethics,” the moral life for Zen, Dōgen in particular, is embodied through 
“awakening the mind.”  
 In Chapter six, “Ethical Non-Thinking and the Metaethics of Meditation,” I examined how zazen 
is, according to Dōgen, central to practicing ethics. By exploring the philosophical interface between the 
Mahāyāna philosophy of emptiness, meditation and ethics within the context of Dōgen’s writings, my 
treatment pivoted around Dōgen’s phenomenology of non-thinking that manifests from a practitioner’s 
insight into the emptiness/non-essentialism of all existing things.  The main argument we thereby set out 
to defend was: 
 P1. Zazen is central to Dōgen’s ethical practice/outlook. 
 P2. Non-thinking is central to Dōgen’s practice of zazen. 
 C: Therefore, non-thinking is central to Dogen’s ethical practice/outlook. 
As I proceeded to flesh out my defense, I discovered that the practice of zazen and the phenomenology of 
non-thinking is how conventional moral discourse and normative prescriptions are justified; for Zen 
practitioners, the justification of moral beliefs is realized in practice, not grounded in theory.  For Dōgen, 
I concluded, this is precisely non-thinking embodied within the vows of the bodhisattva.  By drawing the 
connection between non-thinking and Dōgen’s metaethics, we were also able to see why his moral 
philosophy vis-à-vis zazen can be fruitfully illuminated through the lens of anti-cognitivism.  Dōgen’s 
way-seeking practice of doing philosophy, specifically his writing on the nature of moral values as 




committing/non-action, wu-wei, is oriented towards realizing the vows of the bodhisattva.  Accordingly, 
we also saw that Dōgen’s normative teachings and instructions for practicing zazen do not invite 
cognitivist interpretations such as error theory or fictionalism.  In light of Dōgen’s philosophical 
commitments to emptiness, it is likely that he would characterize this metaethical view as form of 
essentialism due to the rigid divide it assumes between truth and falsity.   
For Dōgen, the ethical practice of non-thinking, which is not the negation of thinking proper, as 
the authentic fulfillment of the bodhisattva’s vows, is fueled by compassion.  However, such fuel is not 
fully realized until one has realized that all phenomenal things and events are empty, and that there is no 
inherent/essential separation between subjects and objects of experience.  For Dōgen, as well as for the 
practitioners of Zen to whom he was writing for, it is the state of compassion, arising from our insight 
into emptiness, that ought to define the practice of ethics.  Herein, compassion is not an isolated feeling, 
sentiment or mood set apart from other feelings.  
Finally, in Chapter seven, “Non-Anthropocentric Value Creation: Dōgen and Nietzsche’s 
Faithfulness to the Great Earth,” I began my comparative inquiry between Dōgen and Nietzsche by 
exploring some recent trends in Buddhism and Nietzsche scholarship in general, and Zen/Dōgen and 
Nietzsche in particular.  By going beyond the mere enumeration of affinities and differences vis-à-vis 
metaphysics, epistemology and ethics, I was able to show that, when brought into dialogue together, 
Dōgen and Nietzsche open up a new horizon for practicing philosophy and generating new insights.  
More specifically, by building off the comparative scholarship of Parkes and Van der Braak, I was able to 
show how our inquiry into their metaethics helps reinforce the characterization of their philosophies as 
non-essentialist, non-teleological and non-anthropocentric, particularly as I engaged White’s thesis that 
Judeo-Christian anthropocentrism is cause of the ecological crisis.  As White maintains, since Judeo-
Christianity is the most anthropocentric religion/world-view, and, because the roots of the ecological 
crisis are a result of anthropocentrism, it follows that the ecological crisis as we know it is a result of the 




White’s causal argument to cast a broader net in order to include any world view that attempts to defend 
teleological meaning or purpose outside of this very existence.  Accordingly, and in contradistinction to 
White, I argued that Dōgen’s Zen, particularly in dialogue with Nietzsche, can provide a philosophical 
outlook that can help us overcome the crisis of meaning that is generated by our anthropocentric 
lifestyles.  Thus, by bringing Dōgen and Nietzsche in dialogue together in order to address and overcome 
anthropocentrism, I revealed three salient features of their praxis-oriented philosophies: perspectivism, 
passion and play.  A livelihood of perspectivism, passion and play is, as I interpret Dōgen and Nietzsche, 
sufficient for realizing meaning and purpose that is ever changing, dynamic and fully intimate with the 
earth itself.  And so, based upon the conclusions drawn in the earlier chapters, it becomes clear that anti-
realism in general, and anti-cognitivism in particular, does not paralyze our ability to formulate ethical 
judgments, create new values and thereby proffer a moral imagination for rethinking the present and 
looking ahead to the future.   
§7.2 Subsequent Reflections: Philosophy After Comparative Philosophy 
 So where do we go from here?  What comes next now that this comparative inquiry has reached 
its terminus?  Perhaps Jason Wirth’s digestive metaphor provides the best response: “Philosophy after 
comparative philosophy ruminates on philosophy itself” (Wirth 2019, xxix).  In other words, just as a cow 
or a goat cannot digest food without a second chewing, we need to digest the metaethical perspectives, 
prescriptions and practices explored in this dissertation slowly, and transform Dōgen and Nietzsche into 
philosophical cud.  By chewing again, and again, the nutrients and medicinal properties of their writings 
can be absorbed and embodied.  
Diet and food choices are, no doubt, all too effective for both treating and preventing illness.  
However, this philosophy of ‘wellness’ is dependent upon our ability to digest well.  If one has a gluten 
allergy, for example, then organic homemade bread is not medicine, rather, it is poison.  If Zen and 
Nietzsche, particularly Dōgen and Nietzsche in dialogue together, are medicine, then this dialogue is, as 




stupidity, ideological fixations, stinginess, greed, aggression, self-obsessiveness, and servility to the status 
quo” (Wirth 2019, xxi).  Ultimately, this variegated horizon of turmoil is, I contend, the horizon of 
applied ethics, and this where I see Dōgen, in dialogue with Nietzsche, being able to contribute new 
insights, particularly within: (1) environmental ethics; (2) medical ethics; (3) work and business ethics; 
(4) and conversations about life’s meaning.   
By emphasizing a turn towards applied ethics, I am following the critical thinking perspective of 
Evan Thompson as presented in his Why I Am Not A Buddhist (2020).  In it, Thompson challenges 
contemporary scholarly efforts to sanitize Buddhist meditation for Western audiences by claiming that 
meditation is a science of the mind.  Rather than viewing meditation as science of mind, Thompson 
defends a normative interpretation of mindfulness and meditation.  For example, when it comes to 
understanding the nature of mind via meditation, “The answers must come from the Buddhist “mind 
doctrine,” that is, from Buddhist philosophy, which is not just descriptive but also inherently normative (it 
makes value judgments) and soteriological (it is concerned with salvation and liberation)” (Thompson 
2020, 33). Thus, according to Thompson, “The concepts of nirvana (nirvāna) and awakening (bodhi) 
aren’t scientific concepts; they are soteriological ones.  They aren’t psychological constructs whose 
validity can be established through measurement” (Thompson 2020, 34).  Ultimately, I am sympathetic 
with Thompson’s standpoint that meditation is a normative practice.  Approaching Buddhist meditation, 
zazen specifically, as a normative/soteriological practice, rather than a science of the mind, has the 
potential to open up more fruitful opportunities for letting go of our emotional/attitudinal attachments, 
compulsive habits of overconsumption, and disembodied relationship with the ‘Great Earth.’   In regards 
to (1), environmental ethics, we have already noted the non-anthropocentric perspective these thinkers 
share in Chapter seven; and, Wirth’s Mountains, Rivers, and the Great Earth; Reading Gary Snyder and 
Dōgen In An Age of Ecological Crisis (2017), has already revealed the merits of this kind of comparative 
dialogue so to help attune us to the more-than-human-world in new ways.  No doubt, a more expansive 




carried out in Chapter seven is warranted.  I contend that there is much that Dōgen and Nietzsche can 
offer us to ruminate upon when it comes to discussions regarding the ecological values, sustainability and 
the capitalistic-technocratic belief that we can innovate our way out of this crisis without curbing our 
economic and consumptive life styles.  In regards to (2), medical ethics, the next culture war that looms 
on the horizon within American society appears to be medical assistance in dying.  From Dōgen’s fascicle 
Shoji, Birth-Death, to Zarathustra’s “On Free Death,” both thinkers in dialogue together can help 
overcome the ideological fixation that killing is always inherently worse than letting die; and in doing so, 
come to realize death is itself a process of living, and that to in order to live well, one must understand 
what it means to die well.  In regards to (3), work and business ethics, as our world faces a host of social 
inequalities that stem from an economic system that is fueled by greed and hatred, and politically 
defended through ideological delusion, we need to create a new clearing for citizens to realize a healthy 
future.  Both Nietzsche and Dōgen recognized the importance of work, though their values are non-
teleological; they are not, contrary to the defenders of capitalism, motivated by “fame or gain.”  
Moreover, the value of work, including manual labor has begun to surface as an area of philosophical 
reflection, such as within Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience 
(1990), Matthew Crawford’s, Shop Class as Soulcraft: An Inquiry Into the Value of Work (2009), and 
Philip Ackerman-Leist’s, Up Tunket Road: The Education of a Modern Homesteader (2010).  Dōgen in 
dialogue with Nietzsche thus provides an opportunity for translating Zen monastic standards, such as 
instructions for the cook (Jpn. tenzo), into contemporary homesteading values and/or craftsperson 
aesthetics. No doubt, as I write this dissertation amidst the Covid-19 pandemic, it becomes clear that as 
society looks to the future to mitigate and overcome the many challenges that have surfaced since the 
outbreak began that conceptions of work that are both meaningful and sustainable are needed.  Finally, in 
regards to (4), the meaning of life, we have recently seen non-Western voices included into 
predominantly Western conversations about the meaning of life.  In the fourth edition of the Cahn and 
Klemke anthology, The Meaning of Life: A Reader (2017), both Confucian and early Buddhist 




philosophical topic.  I contend that Dōgen and Nietzsche can help broaden this conversation further, 
particularly when we consider the ideas of perspectivism, passion and play we reviewed in Chapter seven.  
Moreover, the question, “to what extent does the earth bear incorporation into our conception of 
meaning?”, has been widely neglected by scholars working on this metaethical topic.  
In closing, what is philosophy after comparative philosophy, vis-à-vis this dissertation of ‘not 
committing’ value judgments and ‘not doing’ metaethics?  In short, it is the ruminating process of 
chewing again.  Indeed, how one chews upon the perspectives explored in this dissertation will give rise 
to a host of new questions and new reflections. For example, how would Zarathustra reply to kōan case 14 
from the Mumonkon, “Nanzen Kills a Cat?”191; does a “beyond good and evil” maxim such as, “One has 
watched life badly if one has not also seen the hand that considerately – kills” (Nietzsche 1966, 80), shine 
new light upon this normative kōan case?  Or, is it possible that Nietzsche’s three metamorphoses of the 
spirit is able to lend hermeneutical assistance in making sense of the practice of Zen awakening that is 
captured by the “A is ~ A, ⸫ A is A” logic embedded within the verse “mountains are mountains, rivers 
are rivers…mountains are not mountains, rivers are not rivers…mountains are mountains, rivers are 
rivers”?  Or, does Nietzsche’s distinction between sleep and victory, which he makes in his The Will to 
Power (Nietzsche 1968 374), philosophically correspond to the division between other-power (Jpn. tariki) 
and self-power (Jpn. jiriki) in Japanese Buddhism, particularly Pure Land Buddhism and Zen?  I welcome 
such ruminations as they may provide additional nutrients for realizing good health while simultaneously 
pushing us to rethink what is deserving of philosophical reflection.  If we take our time and chew like a 
ruminant, perhaps we just might become what we are, via what we eat; hence the capping phrase, “With 
                                                 
191 The subject matter of this kōan involves a group of monks who are disputing about a cat, whereupon master 
Nansen takes hold of the cat threatens to kill it if the monks are unable to articulate and express a word of Zen.  
Since the monks failed in their attempt to express the inexpressible, the cat was killed.  Prima facie, this kōan seems 
to reflect an immoralist perspective that is cruel and indifferent to the sentient desires of non-human animals.  
However, according to Shibayama, such an interpretation would be “an extreme misunderstanding” (Shibayama 
1974, 108).  To realize the ‘Zen thrust’ of this kōan, Shibayama contends that “If we are not aware that kōan belong 
to quite another dimension than ethical or prudential and practical activities of men, we shall forever be unable even 





coarse chewing you are quickly satisfied, with fine chewing you are seldom hungry” (Jpn. Sosan wa 
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The focus of this dissertation falls within the general arena of comparative philosophy; in it, I 
explore Zen Master Dōgen’s (1200-1253 CE) writings on ethics through Western metaethical categories 
in general, as well as the normative writings of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900 CE) in particular.  The 
overarching query of my research is to understand how Dōgen’s writings, specifically when placed in 
dialogue with Nietzsche, can contribute to contemporary Western metaethical discussions concerning: (1) 
the metaphysical status of values; (2) the epistemic nature of moral expressions and judgments; and (3) 
non-anthropocentric value creation.  Accordingly, I argue that Dōgen’s writings on ethics can be 
interpreted as anti-realist, vis-à-vis the metaphysical status of values, and anti-cognitivist, vis-à-vis the 
meaning of normative speech acts and value judgments.  In addition, I maintain, in light of Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism, that Dōgen’s practice of ethics can be understood as “active” moral nihilism in regards to 
non-anthropocentric value creation, and moral skepticism in regards to moral truth and knowledge.  
Overall, this inquiry shows that Dōgen’s practice of philosophy in general, ethics in particular, is 
motivated, similar to that of Nietzsche, by “way seeking” values.  In other words, in contradistinction to 
providing the necessary and sufficient conditions that can ungird theoretical beliefs (i.e. “truth-seeking”), 
it is the realization of a practice for individual and communal flourishing that is the primary concern for 
Dōgen.  For Dōgen, such a practice is nothing other than non-thinking (Jpn. hishiryō) via seated 
meditation (Jpn. zazen).  Thus, this “way-seeking” approach to ethics is what allows for Dōgen to defend 
a non-anthropocentric perspective whereby the earth and the entirety of existing beings are understood to 
be the embodiment of Buddha-nature (Jpn. busshō).   
 Notwithstanding their “way-seeking” approaches to philosophy, what makes a dialogue between 
Dōgen and Nietzsche fruitful are the nuances in their metaethical perspectives.  While both thinkers can 
be properly characterized as anti-realist in regards to the metaphysics of morals, meaning there are no 
mind-independent values or normative truths, their writings show that they cannot be pigeonholed into 




theory, fictionalism or non-cognitivism.  This is due in part to the fact that these metaethical theories 
entail dualisms between facts and values, as well as feelings/affects and reason, which are not in keeping 
with the non-dualistic philosophies of Dōgen, vis-à-vis emptiness (Skt śūnyatā), nor Nietzsche, vis-à-vis 
will to power.  Thus, one of the main scholarly contributions this dissertation offers is the stipulation of a 
new metaethical counterpart to anti-realism, which is anti-cognitivism.  Unlike error-theory and 
fictionalism, which dualistically maintains that all normative expressions and value judgments are false 
(i.e. duality between truth and falsity), and, unlike non-cognitivism which dualistically maintains that all 
moral expressions and value judgments are reducible to feelings, emotions or attitudinal leanings (i.e. 
duality between reason and affect), anti-cognitivism, as I define such, is more nuanced; it maintains that 
normative expressions do not refer to objective mind-independent truths/facts, nor are they reducible to 
subjective feelings/affects, but instead they reveal and conceal perspectives. By examining a range of 
normative issues in Dōgen’s writings, including karma, this dissertation shows that anti-cognitivism is 
helpful for clarifying not only what ethical expressions say, but also what they mean. 
   Based upon an anti-cognitivist interpretation of Dōgen’s ethical writings, I am also able to show 
how Dōgen critically rethinks traditional normative concepts and practices from a non-dualistic vantage 
point.  For example, the normative concept of “skillful means” (Skt. upāya) which is associated with the 
action-guiding normative outlook of bodhisattvas, has been widely interpreted through the Western 
ethical theory of consequentialism, which maintains that the ends of an action determine whether the 
action itself is good or bad, right or wrong.  In keeping with the non-dualistic philosophy of emptiness 
(Skt. śūnyatā) that supports Dōgen’s “uncreated” (Jpn. mushō) metaethical perspective, this dissertation 
shows that he rejected any and all dualistic distinctions between the means and the ends of actions, thus 
rendering any consequentialist interpretation of skillful means untenable.  Instead of consequentialism, 
this dissertation shows how Dōgen appeals to the East Asian philosophy of non-action (Ch. wu-wei) to 
make sense of the normative behavior of bodhisattvas, vis-à-vis skillful means, specifically in light of the 




the means of a normative act (i.e. deontology) or the ends (i.e. consequentialism), Dōgen emphasizes the 
idea of effortless action whereby the duality between means and ends, as well as subject and object, 
dissolves.  Ultimately, because skillful means as effortless action is conditioned by non-thinking and 
zazen, this dissertation shows that zazen, according to Dōgen, is best understood as a normative practice. 
 Finally, this dissertation shows how the non-dualistic philosophies that support the metaethical 
perspectives of Dōgen, vis-à-vis emptiness, and Nietzsche, vis-à-vis the will to power, open up a 
comparative dialogue concerning non-anthropocentric value creation.  Specifically in regards to Dōgen, 
while non-anthropocentrism has been a salient normative commitment since early Buddhist traditions in 
that non-sentient beings, such as plants and seeds, were regarded as borderline cases, vis-à-vis normative 
consideration, Dōgen’s non-dual philosophy reinterprets such in a way that moves us beyond biocentric 
normative commitments to that of holism whereby elemental beings, including mountains and valley 
streams, are regarded as moral patients (i.e. beings deserving moral consideration).  Moreover, not only 
does Dōgen’s non-anthropocentrism expand the range of the kinds of beings that are regarded as moral 
patients, but he also elevates the status of all beings that constitute the earth and the greater cosmos to that 
of moral agents who expressively participate within the anti-cognitive horizon of revealing and 
concealing perspectives.  In other words, from Dōgen’s perspective, not only should we regard all beings 
with compassion and care, but also recognize that they are inviting us to consider new perspectives from 
their vantage point.  Ultimately, it is through their revealing and concealing perspectives that Dōgen 
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